ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ANOR V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORALCOMMISSION (INEC) & ORS

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:

• TANKO MOHAMMED CJN (Read the lead judgment)

• OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.

• OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.

• JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

• AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.

• EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.

• UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.

  FRIDAY, 15TH NOVEMBER 2019

COUNSEL FOR PARTIES:

• Dr. Livy Uzoukwu, SAN,

• Chief Chris Uche, SAN,

• Pius Akubo,SAN,

• Adebayo O. Adelodun, SAN and

• Saka Abimbola Isau, SAN - for the Appellants

• Yunus Ustaz Usman, SAN,,

• O.A. Omonuwa, SAN,

• Prof FabianAyogwu, SAN,

• Sam Tomi Ologunorisa, SAN,

• T.M.Inuwa,SAN - for the 1st Respondent

• Wole Olanipekun, SAN,

• Yusuf Ali, SAN,

• Dr Alex Iziyon,SAN,

• A.B. Mahmoud, SAN and

• Prof. Osipitan, SAN - for the 2nd Respondent

• L.O. Fagabemi, SAN and

• Akin Olujinmi, SAN (with them,

• Chief Charles Edosomwan, Esq.;

• Chief Adeniji Akintola, Esq.and Nicholas Akintade Ladapo, Esq.) - for the 3rd Respondent

APPEAL:

This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, sitting as the Presidential Election Petition Court delivered on the 11th September, 2019 in petition No. CA/PEPC/002/2019. In the said judgment, the lower court dismissed the petition of the appellants holding that the petitioners could not prove any of the grounds contained in paragraph 15 of the petition as required by the law.

ISSUES OF LAW INVOLVED: AFFIDAVIT -- Depositions in some paragraphs therein -- where false -- whether renders the affidavit as a whole incompetent

APPEAL -- Decision of lower court -- party aggrieved with -- what he must do -- failure to -- effect

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -- Office of the President -- election thereto - contention as to qualification -- where result -- what must be interrogated -- the constitution as an important factor to resolution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Office of the President -- who can validly contest -- conditions to satisfy

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Office of the President -- election thereto - the phrase "school certificate or its equivalent" -- what it means

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Office of the President -- qualification needed to contest -- whether possession of certificate is mandatory -- academic qualification for

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - The phrase "school certificate or its equivalent" -- the use of "or" therein -- what connotes

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Office of the President -- candidates contesting -- whether must attach certificate to Form CF001 before adjudge educationally qualified

CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE -- Vicarious liability -- whether exist in criminal law -- how operational

ELECTION - Falsehood in affidavit submitted to INEC -- where alleged -- nature of -- duty to prove -- standard of proof

ELECTION -- Website & notice board -- need for INEC to post result simultaneously on

ELECTION -- Election results -- once declared by INEC -- presumption of regularity of -- party who challenges -- duty to prove otherwise

ELECTION -- Particulars of candidates -- where published by INEC -- rights of public thereto

ELECTION -- Qualification and disqualification of candidates -- where provided for by the Constitution -- need to comply strictly with -- where done ultra vires - effect

ELECTION PETITION -- Votes cast in an election -- where contested -- what he must do -- whether required to call special witnesses

ELECTION PETITION -- Election Results -- where challenged on noncompliance with Electoral Act -- specific duty of petitioner thereto -- need for noncompliance to substantially affect result

ELECTION PETITION -- Petition -- where beautifully couched -- failure to adduce evidence to -- effect -- documents tendered from the bar -- nature of

ELECTION PETITION -- Election result - discrepancies in polling unit -- where alleged -- specific witness to call in proof of

ELECTION PETITION -- Over voting -- where alleged - important nature of voters register thereto -- need to tender

ELECTION PETITION -- False declaration -- where alleged against winner of election -- duty to prove -- standard of proof

ELECTION PETITION -- Office of the President and vice president -- election thereto -- where challenged -- court with original jurisdiction

ELECTION PETITION -- The phrase "validly elected" as used in section 239 CFRN -- whether can be open to accommodate section 138(1) (a) of the Electoral Act

ELECTION PETITION -- The "lis" of election -- when actually occurs -- whether pre-dates the announcement of election results

ELECTION PETITION -- Mistake in name of a candidate -- how to correct -- discrepancies in name or age of a candidate -- whether affects election result or leads to his disqualification -- reason for

ELECTION PETITION -- Doctrine of substantial compliance -- when will arise

EVIDENCE -- Facts alleged -- burden to prove -- on whom rest -- whether can be transferred

EVIDENCE -- Documents -- where tendered from the bar -- purpose of -- whether accorded probative value by reason of -- what party must do -- reason for

EVIDENCE -- Documents -- where tendered from the bar -- need to lead evidence thereto and be cross examined on -- failure to -- effect

EVIDENCE -- Documents -- need to tender through its actual marker -- when can be dispensed with -- reason for

EVIDENCE -- Documents dumped before the court -- impropriety sieve and pick

EVIDENCE -- Civil cases -- facts alleged therein -- how proved -- burden on

EVIDENCE -- Documents -- whether must be specifically pleaded before admissible -- where not frontloaded -- whether affects admissibility

EVIDENCE -- Computer generated evidence -- method of proof -- discretion of court thereto -- Certificate -- where relied on -- what it must show -- reason for

EVIDENCE -- Best evidence rule -- nature of

FAIR HEARING -- Rights of parties to -- how entitled -- what parties must do

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES -- Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) -- nature of -- need to give its real meaning -- duty of judiciary thereto

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES -- Rules of interpretation -- need to apply ordinary meaning and avoid conservative construction

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES -- Impropriety of court to deny rights of parties by interpretation

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE -- Pleadings -- need to comply with rules therein -- need to plead facts only -- documents in support of -- admissible nature of

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE -- Special procedure -- where laid down for a purpose -- need to strictly comply with

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE -- Pleadings -- binding nature of -- need to give oral evidence in support -- impropriety of parties to deviate from pleadings

PRE-ELECTION -- Educational qualification -- where contentious -- pre election nature of -- when to challenge -- where to challenge

PRE-ELECTION -- Issues of pre-election -- Court to challenge -- need to challenge within 14 days of cause of action -- failure to -- effect

PRE-ELECTION -- Concurrent jurisdiction of court on same issue -- court to approach first -- issues of pre-election matters -- need to approach State High Court first -- reason for

WORDS & PHRASES -- Sever -- meaning of

WORDS & PHRASES -- Computer -- meaning of

SUMMARY OF THE FACT OF THE CASE:

On 23rd February, 2019, the 1st respondent (INEC) herein conducted Election in respect of the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 1st appellant, Atiku Abubakar contested the said election on the platform of the 2nd appellant. On the other hand, the 2nd respondent was sponsored by the 3rd respondent in the Election. At the close of polls, the 1^st^ respondent declared the 1st respondent as the winner of the election with a total of 15,191,847 votes whilst the appellants scored a total of 11,262,978 votes.

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the election, the appellants filed a petition before the Court of Appeal sitting as the Presidential Election Petition Court on 18th March, 2019.

At the close of hearing, the lower court delivered its judgment on the 11th day of September, 2019 dismissing the petition and affirming the election and return of the 2nd respondent as the duly elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellants filed this appeal.

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION:

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest the election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the 2nd respondent was at the time of the election qualified to contest the said election.

3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the said election held on 23rd February, 2019.

4. Whether by virtue of the evidence adduced before the Court of Appeal, the appellants did not establish non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) to vitiate the election and return of the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent.

5. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in law when it relied on "overall interest of justice" to hold that the 2nd respondent's exhibits R1 - R26, P85 and P86 were properly admitted in evidence.

HELD: (Appeal unanimously dismissed)

1. The issue of qualification to contest election to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a constitutional issue, thus it is the Constitution that must be interrogated where issues of presidential election results. This is because where the Constitution or any other law has made provision or prescribed procedure for the doing of an act, it is the Constitution or that Act or law that must be followed. Anything done outside those provisions either by way of addition, subtraction or amendment would render such act an exercise in futility.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 1]

May I state categorically that issue of qualification to contest election to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is constitutional? And as was rightly observed by the learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent, Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN, it is not open to conjecture, inferences or peradventures. Where the Constitution or any other law has made provision or prescribed procedure for the doing of an act, it is the Constitution or Act that must be followed. Anything done outside those provisions either by way of addition, subtraction or amendment would render such act an exercise in futility. See Elelu-Habeeb & anor v. Attorney General of the Federation & ors (2012) 13 (Pt. 1318) 423). Thus, issue of qualification to contest election to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria being a constitutional issue, it is the Constitution we must interrogate.*

2. Any Nigerian citizen by birth who is at least forty years of age with the right qualification and sponsored by a political party can validly contest for the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 2]

A calm reading of the Constitution will reveal that qualification for election into the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is provided for in section 131 of the said Constitution which states:-

"131 A person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if -

(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth

(b) he has attained the age of forty years;

he is a member of a political party and is(c)sponsored by that political party; and

he has been educated up to at least the school(d)certificate level or its equivalent."

As it is obvious in this appeal and from the facts of this case and judgment of the lower court the appellants appear satisfied with conditions - of section 131 of the Constitution as they have not raised any issue on them. Their grouse is hinged on sub paragraph which challenges the qualification of the 2nd respondent on the basis of his educational attainment. I propose therefore to consider (d) this issue based on section 131 of the Constitution.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 2A]

Now coming back to the issue of qualification, it is my considered view that the issue of qualification of a candidate to contest an election as President is covered solely by the provisions of section 131 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which I will reproduce presently. The said section reads thus:-*

"Section 131 -

A person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if:-

(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth

(b) he has attained the age of forty years,

he is a member of a political party and is (c) sponsored by that political party; and

he has been educated up to at least the School (d) Certificate level or its equivalent".

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 2B]

The contention under section 131 of the Constitution is that the 2nd respondent, at the time of the election, did not possess thebasic qualification set out therein in the said section 131 to contestthe election. It is therefore necessary that the salient provisions ofsections 131 and 318 of the Constitution be set out, section 131 ofthe Constitution provides -"131. A person shall be qualified for election to the office ofPresident if -(a)he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;*

(b)  he has attained the age of forty years he is a member of a political party and is (c) sponsored by that political party; and he has been educated up to at least School(d) Certificate level or its equivalent."

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 2C]

The issue of qualification to contest a Presidential Election is clearly spelt out by the Constitution of the Nigeria. Section 131 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides:

"A person shall be qualified for election to the office of the President if ... he has been educated up to at least School Certificate level or its equivalent."

3. The phrase "school certificate or its equivalent" for the purpose of academic qualification in other to validly contest for the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria means; a Secondary School Certificate or its equivalent; a Grade 11 Teachers Certificate; the City and Guilds Certificate; a Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent; Service in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to INEC for a minimum of ten years; Attendance at courses and training in such institution accepted by INEC for periods totalling up to a minimum of one year, and the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the INEC or any such other qualification that INEC deems to be satisfactory.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 3]

By that sub-section of section 131 of the Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if "he has been educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent." The Constitution has not left anybody in doubt as to what the phrase "school certificate or its equivalent" means. This is clearly defined in section 318 of the said Constitution as follows:-

"School Certificate or its equivalent" means:-

a Secondary School Certificate or its equivalent or Grade 11 Teachers Certificate, the City and(a)Guilds Certificate; or

education up to Secondary school certificate(b)level; or

Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its(c)equivalent and -

service in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum(i)of ten years, and

attendance at courses and training in such institution as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to(ii)a minimum of one year, and

the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the Independent(iii)National Electoral Commission and

any other qualification acceptable by the Independent National

Electoral (d) Commission.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 3A]

The relevant and catch-phrase of the appellants' grouse on section 131(d) is that if person intends to contest election as President he can only be qualified to do so "if he has been educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent". Now the question is "what does the phrase "School certificate or its equivalent" mean". The meaning of such phrase in my view, is not far-fetched. This is because the same constitution has graciously and explicitly provided such meaning vide its section 318 which Ishall reproduce extensively below, where it provides thus:-

Section 318 -

"School Certificate or its equivalent means -

a secondary school certificate or its equivalent or Grade II Teachers Certificate, the City and (a) Guilds Certificate; or

education up to Secondary school certificate (b) level; or

Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its (c) equivalent and -

service in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum(i)of ten years, and attendance at courses and training in such institution as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totalling up to (ii)a minimum of one year, and the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the Independent (iii) National Electoral Commission and

any other qualification acceptable by the Independent National Electoral (d) Commission.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 3B]

Section 318 of the Constitution defining what "School Certificate or its equivalent" means, sets out the following -*

"(a) a Secondary School Certificate or its equivalent, or Grade II Teacher's Certificate, the City and Guilds Certificate; or   education up to Secondary School Certificate level; or*

Primary School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent and -

service in the public or private sector in theFederation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission

(I) for a minimum of ten years; and attendance at courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commissionfor periods totalling to a minimum of one year,

(ii) and the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in the English language tothe satisfaction of the Independent National

(iii) Electoral Commission; and

any other qualification acceptable by the Independent (d)National Electoral Commission;"

One would notice, upon careful perusal of paragraph the omnibus "any other qualification acceptable by the IndependentNational Electoral Commission", INEC in this regard seems to havebeen vested an enormous discretion to accept any other qualification, I notice from the appellants brief that no serious effort, if any, was made to attack the exercise by INEC of its discretion to accept any other qualification presented by the 2nd respondent INEC had in factaccepted that he was qualified to contest the Presidential Electionand had placed him on the ballot for the said election.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 3C]

What amounts to "School Certificate level or its equivalent" was not left unturned by the said Constitution, when in section 318,the meaning was dilated as follows:

"A Secondary School certificate or its equivalent or Grade II teacher certificate or its equivalent, the City and Guild Certificate; or Education up to Secondary School certificate level; or Primary Six School leaving certificate or its equivalent, and service in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years, and attendance at courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totalling up to a minimum of one year, and the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in the English language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission, and any other qualification accepted by the Independent National Electoral Commission."

4. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is the grundnorm upon which our society functions. Thus utmost care must be taken to give it its real meaning when interpreting the words therein. The judiciary must bear in mind that one of its function is to guard the constitution when interpreting it.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 4]

In interpreting the provision of the Constitution, which is the organic law of the land or the grundnorm, care must be taken to give it the real meaning which the people had in mind in adopting its provisions. Speaking along this line, Musdapher, JSC (as he then was), in Brigadier Marwa & ors v. Admiral Nyako & ors (2012) LPELR - 7837 (SC) page 45 - 46, paragraphs B - A; (2012)6 [NWLR (Pt.1296) 199] adopted with approval the dictum of Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunter v Southam Inc (1984) 2 SCR 145 at 146 wherein his Lordship made the following comments:-

"The task of expounding a Constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations.... a Constitution by contrast is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing frame work for the legitimate exercise of governmental power, ... It must therefore, be capable of growth and development overtime to meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and must in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in mind."

See also the case of Attorney General of Bendel State v. The Attorney General of the Federation (1981) 10 SC 1, (1982) 3 NCLR1 and Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (Pt.1) 1, (1994) 6 [NWLR(Pt.352) 506] (Pt.352) 506).

5. Attendance of secondary school up to school certificate level is enough for a party seeking to contest for the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For this purpose, he does not need to graduate or actually possess the certificate. Similarly, a person who possesses a school certificate or Grade 11 Teacher's certificate or its equivalent, the City and Guild certificate is qualified to contest election into office as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Also qualified is a person who has a primary six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent, and has served in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years. A person is also qualified if he or she has a qualification not captured by the constitution but nevertheless accepted by INEC as satisfactory

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 5]

I am well guided. By the definition given to "School Certificate or its equivalent" in section 318 of the Constitution, it unequivocally shows that attendance of secondary school up to school certificate level suffices for qualification without an actual possession of the certificate. My job is not to query the rationale behind the provision but to interpret and pronounce upon it as I find it. As I understand the provision, it means that a person who possesses a school certificate or Grade 11 Teacher's certificate or its equivalent, the City and Guild certificate is qualified to contest election into office as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as in subparagraph (a). Also qualified is a person who has been educated upto Secondary School Certificate level, as in sub paragraph (b). In this one, a person need not obtain a certificate. Mere attendance in a school up to Secondary School Certificate level will suffice.

The Constitution further makes qualification simpler. In subparagraph (c), a person who has a primary six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent, and has served in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years and attendance of courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to a minimum of one year and ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission, is also qualified to contest election into office of President of Nigeria.

After the Constitution made provision for specific educational qualifications, it went further to liberalize the electoral space by stating in sub section as follows:-

"Any other qualification accepted by the Independent National Electoral Commission."

What this means is that a person who possesses any qualification outside those specifically mentioned in section 131and 318 of the Constitution, which is acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission, is also qualified to contest election as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. What a liberal Constitution. Both the Court of Appeal and this court have taken a firm position in relation to this matter and I may cite a few here. See Abubakar v. Yar'adua (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1] at 83 -84, A.D. v. Fayose (2005) 10 [NWLR (Pt. 932) 151 (CA), A.C.N. v. Adelowo (2012) LPELR-19718(CA); Bayo v. Njidda (2004) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 876) 544]) at 630, Imam v. Sheriff (2005) 4 [NWLR (Pt.914) 80] (Pt. 914) 80) at 196.

6. The word "or" used in the phrase "School Certificate or its equivalent" rather than "and" suggest that the phrase is disjunctive and not conjunctive with each standing on its own.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 6]

I need to emphasize that the Constitution does not require a person to have all the qualifications listed in section 318 of the said Constitution before he is qualified. Possession of one of these qualifications will suffice. I say so because as between sub paragraphs(a), and of section 318 relating to the interpretation given to "School Certificate or its equivalent" the word "or" is used rather than "and" which means that (a), and are disjunctive, rather than conjunctive, each standing on its own. As was rightly submitted by all the senior counsel representing the three respondents, this implies that any of the highlighted requirements, being exclusive of the other, would suffice for "school certificate or its equivalent.*

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 6A]

The Constitution in the above provisions gave a litany of academic and other relevant qualifications that are not conjunctive but disjunctive. The use of the word "or" three times and "and" severally that follows after means that the certificate required must not only be that Secondary School Certificate but even Grade II teacher certificate., the City and Guild certificate; or Education up to Secondary School Certificate level; or Primary Six School leaving certificate" in addition to other relevant experience and/or training and courses that will be considered in the acceptance and/or satisfaction of INEC to make the candidate qualified to contestand become the President of Nigeria.

Thus, by virtue of the deposition of the 2nd respondent inexhibits R19-R26, he can be qualified even in the absence of thecontested Secondary School Certificate since exhibit R19 (GradeII Certificate of 1961) is one of the minimum requirement for his qualification, and no fuss was made on that by the appellants.

7. A candidate contesting for the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is not mandated neither is he required by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to attach his certificate to Form CF001 before he can be adjudged educationally qualified to contest election

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 7]

On the contention by the appellants that the 2nd respondent failed to attach his certificate to form CF001, I am in agreement with the court below that neither the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) requires a candidate to attach his certificate to Form CF001 before the candidate can be adjudged educationally qualified to contest election. This court said this much in Terver Kakih v. P.D.P. & ors(2014) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374] at 424, Marwa v. Nyako (supra).The Supreme Court, having taken a firm position on the issue, all the arguments relating to section 76 and 31 of the Electoral Act2010 are of no moment.*

8. An allegation made against a candidate to an election that he gave false information in his affidavit to INEC is one which is rooted in criminality. Thus, such allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not enough for a party to make such allegation alone, he must go further to lead credible evidence to prove such allegation.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 8]

Let me clearly state here that the allegation made against the 2nd respondent by the appellants that he gave false information in his affidavit to the 1st respondent is firmly rooted in criminality which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not enough for the appellants to make such allegation; they must go further to lead credible evidence to prove such allegation. See Agi v. P.D.P. (2016)LPELR - 42578 (SC); (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386], Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2003) 16 [NWLR (Pt. 847) 554], Waziri v. Geidam (2016)11 [NWLR (Pt. 1523) 230], Emmanuel Udom v. Umana (No.1)(2016) 12 [NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179], Okechukwu v. INEC (2014) 17[NWLR (Pt. 1436) 255].*

9. The burden to prove fact and give evidence in support of such stated fact rest on the party who alleges such fact. This burden cannot be transferred on the other party.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 9]

The position of the law is that he who alleges must prove. The failure of the appellants to have subpoenaed the secretary of the Military Board to produce the certificates was fatal to their case. They failed to discharge the burden placed on them by law. See sections 131 and135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The 2nd respondent had no business calling the Army to come and prove an allegation made by the appellants against him. That will amount to standing the law on its head.

10. Whenever documents are tendered from the Bar in election matters, the purpose is simply to speed up the trial in view of time limitation in election matters. However such tendering is not the end itself but a means to an end. Thus, it is mandatory that the makers of such tendered document be called to speak on those documents and be cross-examined on the authenticity of the documents. This is because a party who did not make a document is not competent to give evidence on it. Where the maker of the document is not called to testify, the document would not be accorded probative value by the court.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 10]

Before I conclude on this issue, let me state that whenever documents are tendered from the Bar in election matters, the purport is to speed up the trial in view of time limitation in election matters. Such tendering is not the end itself but a means to an end. The makers of such tendered document must be called to speak to those documents and be cross-examined on the authenticity of the documents. The law is trite that a party who did not make a document is not competent to give evidence on it. It is also the tested position of the law that where the maker of the document is not called to testify, the document would not be accorded probative value by the court. That in deed is the fate of exhibits P80 andP24. See Emmanuel Udom v. Umana Umana (supra), Nyesom v. Peterside (2016) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1512) 452].

11. The term "server" means a computer program that controls or supplies information to several computer in a network.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 11]

"A computer program that controls or supplies information to several computers connected in a network, the main computer on which this program is run."

12. By virtue of section 71 of the Electoral Act, INEC is expected to at the end of every election exercise post on its notice board and its website a notice showing the candidates at the election and their scores as well as the person declared elected or returned as winner. INEC is expected to have and operate a website for the purpose of election.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 12]

I am not unmindful of section 71 of the Electoral Act which states that:-

"The Commission shall cause to be posted on its notice board and website, a notice showing the candidates at the election and their scores; and the person declared as elected or returned at the election."

13. A website means a computer that is connected to the internet that maintains a series of web pages on the World Wide Web.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 13]

I am saying this in case a server and a website are the same thing in view of the definition of Website as "a computer connected to the internet that maintains a series of WebPages on the World Wide Web."*

14. Civil cases are decided on a balance of probabilities based on preponderance of evidence. The burden of proof in civil cases, rests on the party who would fail if no evidence at all is adduced in proof of the facts in the pleadings.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 14]

It is an elementary principle in civil proceedings that civil cases are decided on a balance of probabilities based on preponderance of evidence. The burden of proof, which means the burden of adducing credible evidence in proof of the case rests on the party who would fail if no evidence at all is adduced in proof of the facts in the pleadings. See Ibrahim Sakati v. Jabule Bako & anor (2015)LPELR - 24739 (SC); (2015) 14 NWLR ((Pt.1480) 531, Mogaji vOdofin (1978) 4 SC 91 at 94, Lewis & Peat (NRI) Ltd. v. Akhimien(1976) 7 SC 157 at 169, Daodu v. NNPC & ors (1998) 2 [NWLR(Pt. 538) 355] (Pt. 538) 355).

15. A party who is angry with the decision of the court must specifically challenge same by way of an appeal. Where he does not challenge such finding, that finding stands against him as he is deemed to have accepted it.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 15]

The law is trite that where a party does not challenge a finding by way of an appeal, that finding stands against him. See Leventis Technical Ltd. v. Petrojessica Ent. Ltd. (1999) 6[NWLR (Pt. 605) 45], Iseru v. Catholic Bishop (1997) 3 [NWLR (Pt.495) 517] (Pt. 495) 517), Dabo v. Adbullahi (2005) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 923) 181].

16. A petitioner who contests the legality or lawfulness of votes cast in an election and its result must tender in evidence all the necessary documents by way of forms and other documents used at the elections. He must then call witnesses to testify that the illegality or unlawfulness substantially affected the result of the election. The witnesses he must call must be those who saw it all on the day of the election and not those who picked the evidence from eye-witnesses. It is not enough for the petitioner to tender only the documents. He must call eye witness to testify in support.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 16]

Without much ado, I agree entirely with the court below that the appellants failed to prove that the server they downloaded the result belonged to INEC. Accordingly, all the results, calculations and analysis based on the said unreliable server, are of no moment.

With regards to the evidence of PW60, it is clear that he was not on the field to gather the data he used to compute the results he intended the lower court to use to enter judgment for the 1st appellant. In the case of Atiku Abubakar & ors v. Umaru Musa Yar'adua & ors (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1] at 173 E - G, this court per Niki Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) held as follows:-

"A petitioner who contests the legality or lawfulness of votes cast in an election and subsequent result must tender in evidence all the necessary documents by way of forms and other documents used at the elections. He should not stop there. He must call witnesses totestify that the illegality or unlawfulness substantially affected the result of the election. The documents are among those in which the results of the votes are recorded. The witnesses are those who saw it all on theday of the election not those who picked the evidence from eye-witnesses. No, they must be eye-witnesses too ... It is not enough for the petitioner to tender only the documents. It is incumbent on him to lead evidencein respect of the wrong doings or irregularities bothin the conduct of the election and recording of thevotes, wrong doings and irregularities which affected substantially the result of the election. (Italics mine foremphasis}.

17. Once INEC declares or announces an election result, the law presume that such results as declared are correct and regular except the contrary is proved. The onus is on the petitioner who alleges otherwise to prove same.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 17]

The law is trite that there is a presumption of correctness and regularity in favour of the results of election declared by theIndependent National Electoral Commission in the conduct of anelection. This means that except it is proved or rebutted that suchresults are not correct, they are accepted for all purpose by the Election Tribunal or court. The onus, of course is on the petitionerto prove the contrary. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (supra), Nyesom v.Peterside (2016) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1512) 452] at 532 - 533.

18. A petitioner who desires and urges the court to set aside the result of an election on ground of non-compliance with the Electoral Act has the onerous duty of proving the alleged non-compliance by calling witnesses from each of the polling units complained of. However, he cannot just call any witness. He must present eye-witnesses. He must by his evidence show that such non compliance substantially affected the credibility of the polls. Where he alleges a criminal wrong, he must as a matter of law prove same beyond reasonable doubt.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 18]

There is no doubt the task of establishing a petition on theground of non-compliance is a herculean and daunting one placedon the petitioner by law. A petitioner who desires and urges thecourt to set aside the result of an election on ground of non-compliance with the Electoral Act has the onerous duty of provingthe alleged non-compliance by calling witnesses from each of thepolling units complained of. It has to be noted that he does notjust call any witness. He must present eye-witnesses, i.e. those whowere present at the various polling units across the election area.In the instant case, the entire country. It is indeed a daunting task.See Andrew v. INEC (2018) 9 [NWLR (Pt. 1625) 507], Edonkumohv. Mutu (1999) 9 [NWLR (Pt. 620) 633] at 653. This court observed this much in Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 [NWLR (Pt. 941) 1] at 299 paragraphs F - H, per Pats-Acholonu, JSC that -

"The very big obstacle that anyone who seeks to havethe election of the President or Governor upturned isthe very large number of witnesses he must call due tothe size of the respective constituency. In a country likeour own, he may have to call about 250,000 - 300,000witnesses. By the time the court would have heard allof them with the way our present law is couched, theincumbent would have long finished and left his officeand even if the petitioner finally wins, it will be anempty victory bereft of substance."

I hasten to say that the above decision was rendered when therewas no time frame for the hearing and determination of electionpetitions. It is more difficult*

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 18A]

I must straightaway state here that in order to establish issue of non-compliance as would lead to disturbing the result of an election it must be shown by evidence led by the petitioners that the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Act, had substantially affected the result of the election being challenged. See section 139 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). In fact, where some allegations of corruption, forgery or falsification are alleged, such allegations having the flavour of criminality, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Ojukwuv Ya'adua (2009) 12 [NWLR (Pt.1154) 50] at 140; Imere v. Salami(1989) 2 NEPLR 131, Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 [NWLR(Pt.1482) 205] (Pt.1482) 205) at 321. It needs to be noted here, that the appellants failed to lead adequate and reliable evidence to establish what had actually transpired in various election areas in the entire nation. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 [NWLR (Pt.941) 1] at 299; Andrew v INEC (2018) 9 [NWLR (Pt.1625) 507].

19. A petition no matter how beautifully or powerfully couched will fail if the petitioner does not take steps to assemble credible witness to prove the petition. Similarly, the tendering of documents from the bar without more has no probative value and will in no way assist the petitioner if credible evidence is not led in support.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 19]

May I state once again that it is not enough for a party to file a petition no matter how beautifully and powerfully couched. Such a party must take steps to assemble credible witnesses to prove the petition. Also tendering of tons of documents from the Bar without more does not assist the case of a petitioner.

20. It is only the evidence of an eye witness who saw what happened in respect of a specific polling unit that will appear believable in court. An eye witness for polling unit "A" cannot testify or become a credible witness for what happened in polling unit "B"

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 20]

The court below had reasoned that since the infractions listed above took place at the polling units across the country, the bulk of the witness ought to have come from the polling units. As I said earlier, which is the correct position of the law, only witness who actually saw what happened at the polling units can give credible evidence of what they saw. See Hashidu v. Goje (2003) 15 [NWLR] (Pt. 843) 352) [(Pt. 843) 352](Pt. 843) 352), Oke v. Mimiko (2014) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 1388) 332] at 376, Andrew v. INEC (2018) 9 [NWLR (Pt. 1625) 507] at 563.

21. Voters' register is the foundation of any competent election in any society. Without the voters' register, it will be difficult and impossible to determine the actual number of voters in an election. Thus to prove over voting, the petitioner must tender the voters register and Forms EC8As so as to work out the difference of excess votes easily.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 21]

I can state unequivocally that voters' register is the foundation of any competent election in any society. Without the voters'register, it will be difficult if not impossible to determine the actual number of voters in an election. And if the number of registered voters is not known, how can a court determine whether the numbers of votes cast at the election are more than the voters registered tovote. That is why this court said this much in Shinkafi v. Yari (2016)7 [NWLR (Pt. 1511) 340] that to prove over voting, the petitioner must tender the voters register and Forms EC8As so as to work out the difference of excess votes easily. There is no ground of appeal faulting the decision of the lower court that Voters' Registers were not tendered. I wonder how the appellants intended the court below to determine the issue of over voting. See also Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 [NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87] at 147, Nyesom v. Peterside (supra).

22. when documents are tendered from the bar, such documents have no probative value until the makers of such documents are called to testify on the document and are subjected to cross-examination on them

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 22]

The version of the law I know on the subject (i.e. if there areother versions) is that when documents are tendered from the bar, such documents have no probative value until the makers of such documents are called to testify on the document and are subjected to cross-examination on them.*

23. If the purpose of calling a witness is just to tender a document, a trial court may dispense with the personal appearance of the person who recorded the contents of the documents. But if the intention is for the court to act on those documents, the makers must be called to speak on those documents and be cross examined appropriately. It is only then that the court can attach probative value to those documents.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 23]

I have read the case of Magaji v. Nigeria Army (supra) relied upon by the appellants. This court did not state as the appellants want us to believe. On page 395 - 396 of the report paragraphs H - C, this court per Ogbuagu, JSC (of blessed memory) held as follows:-

"However, I have already stated that if the purpose of calling as a witness is just to tender a document, a trial court may dispense with the personal appearance of the person who recorded the contents of the documents such as the investigator in the instant case. Exhibit 1 although a photocopy, is was certified. It is now settledthat photocopies of documents, must be certified. Seesection 111/112 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Daily Times Ltd. v. Williams (1986) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 36)] (Pt. 36) 526) [526] (Pt. 36) 526) (referred to by the court below as Iheoma v. F.R.A.Williams), it was held that a photocopy of a certified document is admissible. So this authority, also puts the (sic) rest, the complaints in the appellants' brief about the admissibility of the appellants' statementor exhibit 1 as a matter of facts, in the case of International Merchant Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Dabiri &2 ors (1998) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 533) 284] at 297 C.A, itwas held that photocopies of a certified true copy of apublic document needs no further certification undersection 111(1) of the Evidence Act."

The above quotation from the case of Magaji v. Nigerian Army (supra) is very clear and unambiguous. There is nothing in that judgment which suggests that whenever a certified true copy of Public Document is tendered in court the maker need not be called to testify. That would be strange. However, if the intention is just to tender the documents, of course, it can be done without the maker as was done in this case where tons of documents were tendered from the Bar. But if the intention is for the court to acton those documents, the makers must be called to speak to thosedocuments and be cross examined appropriately. It is then and onlythen that a court can attach probative value to it. See Andrew v. INEC & ors (supra), Ikpeazu v. Otti (2016) 8 [NWLR (Pt.1513) 38], Buhari v. INEC (No.2) (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246](, GabrielUdom Emmanuel v. Umana Okon Umana & ors (2016) 12 [NWLR(Pt. 1526) 270] (Pt. 1526) 270) at 286.

24. It is not the duty of the court to accept documents dumped before it and then take same home for the purpose of interrogating them privately in his chambers. To do this would amount to shopping for evidence thus descending into the arena of the conflict.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 24]

The court is not permitted to go home and interrogate those documents privately in the inner recess of its chambers. This will amount to shopping for evidence, thus descending into the arena of the conflict. See Labaran Maku v. Umaru Tanko Al - Makura (2016)5 [NWLR (Pt. 1505) 201] at 230.*

25. By the rules of pleadings, every pleading must contain only statement of material facts on which the party's pleading relies, and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. However where there is a pleading which a document tends to prove, such document becomes relevant and is accordingly admissible.

PER MUHAMMED CJN [RATIO 25]

By the rules of pleadings, every pleading shall contain statement of all material facts on which the party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. Provided there is a pleading which a document tends to prove, such document is relevant and is accordingly admissible. See Magaji v. Nigerian Army (supra), MCC Ltd. v. Azubike (1990) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 136) 74]; Oviawe v. Integrated Rubber Products Nig. Ltd. & anor (1997) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 492) 126].

26. Where the petitioner alleges that the person returned as the winner of an election by INEC made a false declaration as against the Electoral Act, he must prove such allegation beyond reasonable doubt. This is because such allegation is criminal in nature.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 26]

There is no gain saying that the allegation being one of making false declaration, certainly has air of criminality in view of the provisions of section 365 of the 1999 Constitution. Being criminal in nature therefore, the accusers in this case, the appellants, have onerous or heavy task of proving such allegation beyond reasonable doubt. See Imam v. Sheriff (2005) 4 [NWLR (Pt.914) 80])at 116; Kakih v. P.D.P. (2014) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374].

27. An allegation which relates to educational qualification is in itself a pre-election matter. Thus such allegation must be litigated at the High court before the general election.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 27]

Now coming to the nature of the allegation of false declaration in Form CF001 by a candidate, I must say that such allegation which relates to educational qualification is in itself a pre-election matter. Such allegation must therefore be litigated at the High courtbefore the general election.*

28. **By the provisions of section 285(9) of the Constitution, "pre-election" matters issues should must be litigated and disposed of within 14 days and must not be brought after the specific date else it would have become too late and the cause of action statute-barred. It is the High Court which has the power to hear and determine such matter.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 28]

By the provisions of section 285(9) of the Constitution, "pre-election" matters issues should have been litigated and disposed of within 14 days and not after such stipulated period as in this instant case. The cause of action therefore becomes statute-barred and is thereby extinguished for all intent and purposes either as pre-election or post-election matter.*

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 28A]

The 2nd respondent was alleged to have presented forged certificate to INEC and therefore disqualified by virtue of section 137(1) (j) of the Constitution. For this, the appellants posited that the facts the 2nd respondent deposed to in his Form CF001presented to INEC are false. They rely on Modibo v. Mustapha Usman & ors. SC.790/2019 of 30th July, 2019 (reported in (2020) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 1712) 470] and other pieces of evidence they extracted from respondent's witnesses to urge that it be declared that the 2^nd^ respondent was disqualified for the election to the office of the President having "presented a forged certificate to the Independent National Electoral Commission". The MODIBO case (supra) was a pre-election matter. The plaintiff in that case proceeded under section 31(1), (2), & of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, and section 66(1)(j) of the Constitution. Section 66(1)(j) and 137(1)of the Constitution are in substance in pari materia. The issue appears to be pre-election matter for the statutory procedure for its determination is prescribed in section 31(1) - of the Electoral (j) Act, 2010, as amended, thus-*

"31(1) Every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election under the provisions of this Act, submit to the Commission, in the prescribed forms, the list of the candidates the party proposes to sponsor at the elections, provided that the Commission shall not reject or disqualify candidate(s)for any reason whatsoever.

The list or information submitted by each candidate shall be accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the candidate at the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or Federal Capital Territory, indicating that he has fulfilled all the constitutional requirements for (2)election into that office.

The Commission shall, within 7 days of the receipt of the personal particulars of the candidate, publish samein the constituency where the candidate intends to (3) contest the election.

Any person may apply to the Commission for a copy of nomination from, affidavit and any other document submitted by a candidate at an election and the Commission shall, upon payment of a prescribed fee, issue such person with a certified copy of document (4)within 14 days."

Any person who has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by a candidate in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate is false may file a suit at the Federal High Court, High Court if a State or FCT against such person seeking a declaration (5) that the information contained in the affidavit is false.

If the court determines that any of the information contained in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate is false, the court shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the (6) election."

The National Assembly, in its wisdom, has in subsection of section 31 of the Electoral Act vested jurisdiction in the High Court to "issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election" if it is satisfied that the information or the personal particulars of the candidate in his Form CF001 are false. Significantly, INEC does not share that power or jurisdiction with the High Court even though in section 318 of the Constitution there appears enormous powers or discretion vested in INEC to be satisfied with some basic facts of educational qualification which are acceptable to it. In order to curb these enormous powers vested (6)in INEC the National Assembly had enacted in section 31 of the Electoral Act the special procedure for the review of the powers of INEC, in this regard.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 28Ai]

I think, and do hold that, disqualification of a candidate on grounds of false information in his Form CF001 is pre-election matter by dint of section 285(14)(c) of the Constitution. The procedure for ventilating any grievance on this is statutorily provided in section 31 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). That is to say that any party aggrieved that a candidate, in consequence of any false information in his Form CF001 published by INEC has been wrongly placed on the ballot by INEC should first and foremost avail himself the procedure under section 31 of the Electoral Act by inviting the High Court to issue 'an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election' pursuant to subsectionof section 31 of the Electoral Act. Whereas the procedure undersection 31 followed in Modibbo's case (supra); in the instant caseit was not.

29. For the purpose of interpretation of status, words or phrases must be accorded their true and ordinary meaning. Thus narrow or conservative construction must be avoided.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 29]

It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words or phrases should always be accorded their true, natural or ordinary meaning.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 29i]

It is also a cardinal principle of interpretation that counts should, while construing a provision ofstatute should give it broad, ordinary and liberal interpretation tomanifest its purpose and also should avoid narrow or conservativeconstruction. See Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC 130; Onyemav. Oputa (1987) 6 SC 362 at 371, (1987) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 60) 259].

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 29A]

This court in Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8 - 11 SC 130; (1982) 2 NCLR 117 and Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 6 SC 362 at 371; (1987) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 60) 259]) had re-stated the principle that the Constitution should be given a broad and liberal construction to promote its purpose; and that a narrow and conservative construction should be avoided, Generally, a statute must not be construed to deny partiesrelying on it a right unless the statute so states: Agwuna v. A.-G.,Federation (1995) 5 SCNJ 66 at 72; (1995) 5 [NWLR (Pt. 396) 418].*

30. It is improper for the court to construe a statute for the purpose of denying a party any right he or she is entitled to.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 30]

The law is trite, that courts should not construe statute to deny a party any right he is entitled to. See Agwuna v. A.-G., Federation (1995) SCNJ 66at 72, (1995) 5 [NWLR (Pt. 396) 418].

31. Documents need not be specifically pleaded before they can be admitted in evidence. Where they are alluded to in pleadings, it will be enough. Similarly, the fact that a document is not frontloaded does not make it inadmissible.

PER SANUSI JSC [RATIO 31]

The grouse of the appellants on this issue is that some of the documents i.e. R1 - R26, P85 and P86 were wrongly admitted by the lower court even though they were not pleaded. Having rummaged through the record it is noted by me, that the said documents complained of were really pleaded. See pages 2383-2384 on Vol. 3 of the record where it can be seen that they were explicitly pleaded. Even at that, it is not the law that documents which are not front-loaded are inadmissible. See Ogboru v. Uduaghan (2011) 17  (Pt.1277) 538) [(Pt.1277) 538] (Pt. 1277) 538); Adamu Mohammed v. INEC (2015) LPELR-266233 (SC). It can even be observed that the documents were alluded to in the pleadings, hence there is nothing wrong when the lower court admitted their evidence.

32. Where INEC publishes the particulars of candidates in Form CF001, it becomes open to the general public to screen the candidate whose personal particulars are so published by way of objection.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 32]

By virtue of section 31 of the Electoral Act the general public is empowered to screen the candidate whose personal particulars are in Form CF001 published by INEC pursuant to section 31 (1) of the said Act by way of objection. There is no evidence that appellants ever challenged, under section 31(5) of the Electoral Actall or any of the 2nd respondent's averments in his Form CF001 published by INEC pursuant to sub-section of the said section 31.*

33. Where a special procedure for seeking a redress is provided by statute, the party seeking such redress must follow that special procedure

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 33]

I should think the law is settled now on the point that -- where a special procedure for seeking a redress is by statute provided the party seeking such redress must follow such special procedure.

34. It is the Court of Appeal which has the basic original jurisdiction to hear and determine matters regarding whether a person has been validly elected to the office of the President or vice president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; whether the office is vacant or it has ceased.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 34]

[34] The basic original jurisdiction of the lower court is provided for in section 239(1) of the Constitution. That is:

"239(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall, to the exclusion of any other court in Nigeria, have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to whether -

any person has been validly elected to the office of President or Vice-President under this

(a) Constitution; or

the office of the President or Vice-President

(b) has ceased or the office of President or Vice-President has

(c) become vacant."

In the instant case, section 239(1)(a) above is more apposite.

35. It is only in section 138(1) (a) of the Electoral Act that one finds An election may be questioned on the ground that a person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election, not qualified to contest the election. Nevertheless, the phrase "validly elected" as used section 239(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria may be so elastic to include whether the person allegedly "validly elected" was disqualified or is not qualified in the first place to even contest the election let alone "validly elected".

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 35]

The phrase "validly elected" may be so elastic (though it may not be stretched) to include whether the person allegedly "validly elected" was disqualified or not qualified in the first place to even contest the election let alone "validly elected". It is only in section 138(1)(a) ofthe Electoral Act that one finds -

An election may be questioned on the - ground that a person whose election is questioned was, at the time of the election, not qualified to contest the election".

36. By common judicial convention, where two Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, unless special circumstances exist, redress over such matter must first be sought in the inferior court. Thus, where a pre-election issue results, it is the High Court that must be resort to first as a result of it general jurisdiction conferred on it by section 31 of the Electoral Act

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 36]

Even if it appears the lower court and the High Court, respectively by dint of sections 138 and 31 of the Electoral Act, share concurrent jurisdiction on whether a candidate by his alleged false declaration in his Form CF001 'shall be disqualified for the election'; the jurisdiction vested in the High Court by section 31 of the Electoral Act is a special jurisdiction. The jurisdiction vested in the lower court by section 138(1) of the same Act is largely a general one. By common judicial convention (which in some Rules of Procedure e.g. Order 6 rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016) where two Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, unless special circumstances exist, redress over such matter shall first sought in the inferior court - in this case, the High Court.

37. The lis in the election is not the election per se, but the declaration of the election results that precipitates the election petition. Thus, the lis cannot pre-date the announcement of the election results. In otherwords, a lis can only come into existence after the release of the election results. It is only then or thereafter that appropriate procedural steps are taken to question or contest the election results.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 37]

In Kuriga v. Yohama (1989) 2 NEPLR 78 at 83 it was held that the lis in the election is not the election per se, but the declarationof the election results that precipitates the election petition; and that naturally the lis cannot pre-date the announcement of the election results. In otherwords, that a lis can only come into existence after the release of the election results. It is only then or thereafter that appropriate procedural steps are taken to question or contest theelection results. The definition of (pre-election matter in section285(14) of the Constitution accords with Kuriga v. Yohama (supra)as to the lis in pre-election matter and the lis in post election matterthe subject of election petition.

38. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations a party is entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal established by law, but only upon legal or lawful evidence that is credible.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 38]

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations a party is entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court ortribunal established by law, but only upon legal or lawful evidence that is credible. The INEC's unpatriotic denial of the existence of its official website entitled the appellants to call secondary evidence; but not hearsay or illegal evidence. Election disputes and proceedings being special or sui generis require the proof of facts on which they are premised to be proved on the credible evidence other than mere rumour mongery peddled by witnesses who cannot even vouch, for the authenticity of the source of the very facts they testified on like www.facgsdontlie.com.

39. There is no vicarious liability in the realm of criminal law. Criminal liabilities are borne personally by culprits and/or other participes criminis. Since criminal liabilities operate on the individual on the basis of his mens rea, criminal responsibility is personal and not vicarious. Accordingly, a person (other than INEC staff or officials) against whom allegations of criminal nature are made in an election petition must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

PER EKO JSC [RATIO 39]

The settled principle of law, particularly in the area of fair hearing jurisprudence and criminal responsibility, is that: there is no vicarious liability in the realm of criminal law. Criminal liabilities are borne personally by culprits and/or other participes criminis. Since criminal liabilities operate on the individual on the basis of his mens rea, criminal responsibility is personal and not vicarious: Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) FWLR(Pt. 186) 709 at 726, (2005) 13 (Pt. 941) 1; Akpa v. The State (2008)14 [NWLR (Pt. 1106) 72]; Dina v. Daniel (2010) 11 [NWLR (Pt.1204) 137](Pt. 1204) 137) at 158. Accordingly, a person (other than INEC staffor officials) against whom allegations of criminal nature are made in an election petition must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself: section 36(1) & of the Constitution: Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2005) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 956) 96]; Waziri v. Geidam (2015) LPELR - 2604 (CA), (2016) 11 [NWLR (Pt. 1523) 230].

40. Where a lie or falsehood is deposed to in an affidavit, a defect results. However, the defect therein is against that which is affected. The falsehood deposed to has no effect on all the depositions in the affidavit. For the falsehood deposed in an affidavit to affect the substantiality of an election, it must relate to the constitutional requirements for that election into the office in dispute.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 40]

As touching the falsehood deposed in his affidavit, where a lie or falsehood is exposed to a particular thing, the defect is against that which is affected. The falsehood deposed to has not affected all the depositions in exhibits R19-R26 since the case of the appellants have abundantly been on the secondary school certificate. Per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, in Maihaja v. Gaida (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC); (2018) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 1610) 454], sternly held that:

"My understanding of subsection of section 31 is that the false information complained of must relate to the constitutional requirements for election into the office in dispute, in this case the requirements of section 177 & of the Constitution."

41. A mistake in name can be easily committed either by the owner of the name or the inscribers of the name and same may be corrected by swearing to an affidavit. Thus, a discrepancy in the spelling of a name or even the age of the person returned as winner of an election may have no effect on that election neither will it lead to his disqualification except it is shown that such mistake was deliberate with the main purpose of misleading or circumventing the provision of the constitution as it relates to that office.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 41]

Another arm here is that the 2nd respondent is known as Muhammadu Buhari and not Mohamed Buhari as borne in his certificate, which makes the certificate or the 2nd respondent dubious or that the certificate is forged or contrived and concocted. I still insist that the law is sacrosanct that he who asserts must prove. To any ordinary Nigerian and to the mind of the law, this mistake can easily be committed either by the owner of the name or the inscribers of the name. As to the etymology of either "Mohamed" or "Muhammadu", only the appellants can prove this since they want to assert that it is not the same name or meaning. But the point here is whether the name refers to the same person as the2nd respondent in this case or not. I have not seen anywhere that the appellants proved otherwise that the name belongs to another person that is now borne by the 2nd respondent. This is not even in the category of errors or ground that can qualify to disqualify a candidate to the office of a President. It is simply remediable by affidavit at the instance of the 2nd respondent where it is contested with regard to his real identification and true person. If, however, the case of the appellants is that the name is also forged, I stand to declare that it is also not a ground for disqualification. Any difference as pointed out by the appellants in the name of the 2ndrespondent must impact directly on his requisite qualification to contest the Presidential Election. This similarly played out when per Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun, JSC in Maihaja v. Gaida (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC); (2018) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 1610)] (Pt. 1610) 454) [454] (Pt. 1610) 454) held thus:*

"If there is any discrepancy in the age of a candidate, it must have a bearing on the constitutional requirement before it can have the effect of disqualifying him...It was also held in this case that there must be evidence of an intention by the candidate to circumvent the provisions of the Constitution. There was none established in this case."

For all I have laboured to present in the foregoing submissions and sundry, this court has settled this matter before now. The appellants should rather base their case on substance and not on technical strings. Per Clara Bata Ogunbiyi, JSC in Agi v. PDP &ors (2016) LPELR-42578(SC); (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386], loudly and elaborately held concerning this:

"The support for the foregoing conclusion, is as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 2^nd^ respondent, because a person who is qualified to contest an election by virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) cannot be disqualified by the operation of any other law in force in Nigeria. The Constitution takes precedence over all other laws. Therefore, where there is a matter of alleged falsification of a document or rendering of a false statement as alleged in this case, it must relate to a qualifying or disqualifying factor by virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

42. The provisions in order to qualify to hold the office of a Governor in Nigeria is clearly set out under section 177 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the use of the word "shall" therein prescribe specifically the factors for qualification. Thus any attempt by another law to alter the provision except by the Constitution itself is of no-effect. Similarly, section 31 of the Electoral Act 2010 did not by any stretch of imagination create new grounds of disqualification or non-qualification different from that as laid down by the constitution.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 42]

The office of Governor of a State was created by virtue of section 176(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the qualification to hold that office was established by section 177 thus:*

"177. Person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if --

(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;

he has attained the age of thirty-five (b)years;

he is a member of a political party and(c)is sponsored by that political party; and

he has been educated up to at least School(d)Certificate level or its equivalent."

It is pertinent to state in a strong term that the appellant did not allege an infraction of any of the subsections enumerated under section 177 of the Constitution (supra); I seek to restate also that the use of word "shall" prescribes the factor which "shall" qualify a candidate to occupy the office of a Governor of a State. Any attempt by another law to alter the provision except by the Constitution itself shall be rendered of no-effect. See the cases of INEC v. Musa (2003) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 806) 72] at 205 and ANPP v.Usman (2008) 12 [NWLR (Pt. 1100) 1] at 54-55.Section 31 of the Electoral Act did not by any stretch of imagination create new grounds of disqualification or non-qualification."

43. Section 84 of the Evidence Act, consecrates two methods of proof; proof by oral evidence or by a certificate. In either case, the conditions stipulated in section 84 must be satisfied. However, this is subject to the power of the Judge to require oral evidence in addition to the certificate. If a certificate is to be relied upon, it should on its face show that it is signed by a person who from his job description can confidently be expected to be a person to give reliable evidence about the operation of the computer. This enables the defendant to decide whether to accept at its face value or to ask the Judge to require oral evidence which can be challenged in cross-examination

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 43]

I am fully in support of the fact that electronic voting orelectronic transmission of election results is and ought to be part and parcel of our voting system and the means of proving same. Documents produced by computers are an increasingly common feature of all businesses and spheres of life, and more and more people are becoming familiar with their uses and operation. Computers vary immensely in their complexity and in the operations they perform. The nature of the evidence to discharge the burden of showing that there has been no improper use of the computer and that it was operating properly will inevitably varyfrom case to case. The evidence must be tailored to suit the needs of the case. I suspect that I will very rarely be necessary to call an expert and that in the vast majority of cases it will be possible to discharge the burden by calling a witnesses who is familiar with the operation of the computer in the sense of knowing what the computer is required to do and who can say that it is doing itproperly. In actual fact, section 84 of the Evidence Act, consecrates two methods of proof, either by oral evidence under section 84(1)and or by a certificate under section 84(4). In either case, theconditions stipulated in section 84(2) must be satisfied. However, this is subject to the power of the Judge to require oral evidencein addition to the certificate. Proof that the computer is reliablecan be provided in two ways: either by calling oral evidence or by tendering a written certificate subject to the power of the Judge torequire oral evidence. It is understandable that if a certificate is tobe relied upon, it should on its face show that it is signed by a person whofrom his job description can confidently be expected to be a personto give reliable evidence about the operation of the computer. This enables the defendant to decide whether to accept at its face value or to ask the Judge to require oral evidence which can be challengedin cross-examination. See per Nweze, JSC in Dickson v. Sylva &ors (2016) LPELR-41257(SC); (2017) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167].*

The use of computer and computer-generated evidence isinescapably indispensable in this age we are in. For as much as it isvery advantageous, it can be very disadvantageous, since garbage in, garbage out, is always the result. When falsehood is garbagedinto it, it gives out falsehood, and when truth is garbaged into it, it gives out truth. Hence, the caution as warned by Nweze, JSC, above in proving computer-generated evidence.

The case of the appellants appear very cogent and believing since almost everything done and generated by the computer is based on "seeing is believing", and reasoning and logic or even jurisprudence may be thrown overboard. He who pays the piper dictates the tune of the music. We have seen how the computer has been used these days to spread believable and credible stories which by inquisitions turned out to be lies and false! In the absence of the checks and balances provided by the Evidence Act above, any party can hire any computer expert to play out its case to the belief of the public. Nevertheless, the law courts or the legal sphere is not a place for such display since every fact must be proved by provable and best evidence.

44. The general rule of evidence is that the best evidence must be given in any case, and as such, no evidence will be given in substitution of the best evidence unless strictly under some laid exceptions. This is the best evidence rule. Parties are enjoined to give their best evidence especially in civil case which is decided on the preponderance of evidence.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 44]

The case here as in all civil matters must be based on the preponderance of evidence adduced by either of the parties for substantial compliance or otherwise to be proved. It must therefore be noted that the law of evidence requires a party to prove its case by calling the best evidence available. This is what is referred to as the Best Evidence Rule. See Onu, JSC in Ezemba v. Ibeneme & anor (2004) LPELR-1205(SC); (2004) 14 [NWLR (Pt. 894) 617]. To be repetitive, the general rules of evidence contain the best evidence rule by which it is said that the best evidence must be given and that no evidence will be given in substitution of the best evidence unless strictly under some laid exceptions. Ordinarily, the opposing party is at a disadvantage in having evidence of a witness received against him whom he cannot see and cannot question in the current proceedings even though he had the opportunity of cross-examining the witness in the earlier proceedings. It is not, therefore, asking too much for the law to require the party who is taking the advantage of the evidence of his witness being received as true without thewitness appearing physically to testify, to strictly comply withthe provisions of the section of the law bestowing upon him that advantage. See per Uwaifo, JSC in Shanu v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2002) LPELR-3036 (SC); (2002) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 795) 185].*

45. Oral evidence must be consistent with the pleadings, whether it is the statement of claim or the statement of defence or the witness statement on oath. This is because the case of the parties is erected by the pleadings and parties do not have the freedom to move out of the pleadings in search of a better case.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 45]

Oral evidence must be consistent with the pleadings, whether it is the statement of claim or the statement of defence or the witness statement on oath. This is because the case of the parties is erected by the pleadings and parties do not have the freedom to move out of the pleadings in search of a better case. Evidence which is at variance with thepleadings will go to no issue. See Per Tobi, JSC in Okoko v. Dakolo (2006) LPELR-2461 (SC); (2006) 14 [NWLR (Pt. 1000) 401].

46. In election petition, the doctrine of substantial compliance will only arise where it has been shown by the petitioner through evidence that there was substantial non-compliance with the principle of the Electoral Act. Where a party complains of the irregularity that befalls an election, what is important is whether or not the Electoral Act was substantially complied with.

PER AJI JSC [RATIO 46]

The doctrine of substantial compliance is that its consideration will only arise where the petitioners have succeeded in establishing substantial non-compliance with the principles of the Electoral Act, etc. or, in the alternative, substantial effect on the election result of any infraction of the said Act, etc. no matter how minuscule the transgression may be. See per Nweze, JSC in Omisore & anor v. Aregbesola & ors (2015) LPELR-24803 (SC); (2015) 15 [NWLR] (Pt. 1482) 205) [(Pt. 1482) 205] (Pt. 1482) 205). Of a truth, the appellants have not proved their petition to warrant voiding the election or ordering a fresh election. Thus, issue is resolved against the appellants.

NIGERIAN STATUTES REFERRED TO IN THE JUDGMENT

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), Ss. 36(1)(5)(6), 66(1)(i), 131(d), 137(1), 138(1)(a)(b)(c)(i)(ii)(iii)(d), 160, 239(1), 285(9)-(14)(c) and 318(1)(c)(i)-(iii), (d), 365

Electoral Act, 2011 (as amended), Ss. 31, 52(1)(2), 76, 118(1)(k); Para. 41(8) of the 1st Schedule

Evidence Act, 2011, Ss. 84(1)(2), 131, 132 and 135

Penal Code, S. 156

NIGERIAN RULES OF COURT REFERRED TO IN THE JUDGMENT Court of Appeal Rules, 2016, O. 64

JUDGMENT

I. T. MUHAMMAD, C.J.N. (Delivering the Leading Judgment)

On 30th October, 2019, when this appeal was argued, I pronounced judgment the same date after a conference of the Justices to the effect that the appeal lacks merit and was accordingly dismissed. I also informed parties that reasons for dismissing the appeal would be given in due course. The reasons are now ready and I will proceed to state them.

This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, sitting as the Presidential Election Petition Court delivered on the 11th September, 2019 in petition No. CA/PEPC/002/2019. In the said judgment, the lower court dismissed the petition of the appellants holding that the petitioners could not prove any of the grounds contained in paragraph 15 of the petition as required by the law. The facts giving birth to this appeal are as summarized hereunder.

On 23rd February, 2019, the 1st respondent herein conducted Election in respect of the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 1st appellant, Atiku Abubakar contested the said election on the platform of the 2nd appellant. On the other hand, the 2nd respondent was sponsored by the 3rd respondent in the Election. At the close of polls, the 1^st^ respondent declared the 1st respondent as the winner of the election with a total of 15,191,847 votes whilst the appellants scored a total of 11,262,978 votes.

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the election, the appellants filed a petition before the Court of Appeal sitting as the Presidential Election Petition Court on 18th March, 2019. In paragraph 409 of the said petition, the appellants prayed for the following reliefs:-

"409. Wherefore the petitioners pray jointly and severally against the respondents as follows:-

That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes cast in the said election and therefore the declaration and return of the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent as the President of Nigeria is a unlawful, undue, null, void and of no effect.

That it may be determined that the 1st petitioner was duly and validly elected and ought to be returned as President of Nigeria, having polled the highest number of lawful votes cast at the election to the office of the president of Nigeria held on 23rd February, 2019 and having satisfied the constitutional requirements for the said election.

An order directing the 1st respondent to issue Certificate of Return to the 1st petitioner as the duly elected President of Nigeria.

That it may be determined that the 2^nd^ respondent was at the time of the election not qualified to contest the said election.

That it may be determined that the 2^nd^ respondent submitted to the commission affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for the said election.

In The Alternative

That the election to the office of the president of Nigeria held on 23rd February, 2019 be nullified and a fresh election ordered."

The grounds of the said petition set out in paragraph 15 are as follows:-

The 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of

(i) lawful votes cast at the election.

The election of 2nd respondent is invalid by reason of

(ii) corrupt practices.

The election of the 2nd respondent is invalid by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral

(iii) Act, 2010 (as amended).

The 2nd respondent was at the time of the election not

(iv) qualified to contest the said election.

The 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental

(v) nature in aid of his qualification for the said election.

After the respondents were duly served with the petition, they filed their respective replies. The respondents raised preliminary objections bordering on the competence of the petition and the jurisdiction of the lower court in their respective replies to the petition.

At the hearing of the petition, the petitioners called a total of 62 witnesses and closed their case. 1st respondent rested on the case of the petitioners. The 2nd respondent called seven witnesses indefence of the petition. The 3rd respondent, like the 1st respondent relied on the evidence led by the petitioners.

At the close of hearing, the lower court delivered its judgment on the 11th day of September, 2019 dismissing the petition and affirming the election and return of the 2nd respondent as the duly elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the appellants filed notice of appeal on 23rd September, 2019. The said notice of appeal contains sixty-six grounds of appeal out of which the appellants have distilled five issues for the determination of this appeal.

At the hearing of the appeal on 30th October, 2019, Dr. Livy Uzoukwu, SAN, leading other senior and other counsel for the appellants identified and adopted the appellants' brief filed on 8^th^ October, 2019. He also adopted reply briefs to the 1st, 2nd and 3^rd^ respondents' briefs. The reply briefs were filed on 16/10/2019, 18/10/2019 and 17/10/2019 respectively.

The five issues as formulated by the learned senior counsel for the appellants are as follows:-

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest the election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the 2nd respondent was at the time of the election qualified to contest the said election.

3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the said election held on 23rd February, 2019.

4. Whether by virtue of the evidence adduced before the Court of Appeal, the appellants did not establish non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) to vitiate the election and return of the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent.

5. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in law when it relied on "overall interest of justice" to hold that the 2nd respondent's exhibits R1 - R26, P85 and P86 were properly admitted in evidence.

In the brief of the 1st respondent settled by Yunus Ustaz Usman, SAN, leading a team of counsel, including four senior counsel, four issues are distilled for determination. The said brief was filed on 12th October, 2019 and adopted at the hearing of this appeal. The four issues are:-

1. Whether the lower court was right in holding that the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest the 2019 Presidential Election and that the appellants did not prove the allegation that the 2nd respondent submitted an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification.

2. Whether the lower court was right in holding that the appellants did not prove by credible evidence that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election.

3. Whether the lower court was right in holding that the appellants failed to discharge the onus of proving that the 2019 Presidential Election conducted by the 1st respondent was invalid by reason of corrupt practices and non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the Electoral Guidelines 2019 and Manuals issued for the conduct of the elections.

4. Whether the lower court was right when it relied on the overall interest of justice to hold that the 2^nd^ respondent's exhibits R1 - R26, PB5 and PB6 were properly admitted in evidence.

The learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent, Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN, in company with 14 other Senior Advocates and many other counsel submitted six issues for the determination of this appeal. The issues are contained in 2nd respondent's brief filed on 15/10/2019 and are stated thus:-

1. In the light of the clear provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Electoral Act and the consistent position of judicial authorities vis-à-vis the evidence led at trial, whether the lower court was not right, when it resolved the twin issues of qualification and submission of false information in aid of qualification in favour of the respondent.

2. In view of the unambiguous provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Electoral Act, and consistent judicial authorities on the subject, vis-à-vis the evidence led at trial whether the lower court was not right when it found that the appellants were unable to prove that the respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election.

3. Given the express provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Electoral Act, Guidelines and Manuals for the conduct of the Election and the long line of judicial authorities on the subject, was the lower court not right when it held that the appellants failed to prove allegations of corrupt practices and non-compliance with the Electoral Act as required by law.

4. By the totality of the proceedings before the lower court, whether the court was not right, when it held that the appellants dumped their documents before it.

5. Considering the proceedings at the trial, as evidenced by the records before this honourable court, whether the lower court was not right when it found that the1st and 3rd respondents did elicit relevant evidence in support of their pleadings under cross-examination and as such, have not abandoned their pleadings before the court.

6. Having regard to the judgment of the lower court as represented by the record before this honourable court, whether the lower court was not right by relying on the exhibits before it.

The 3rd respondent also formulated five issues. In its brief filed by leaned senior counsel, L. O. Fagbemi, SAN, who also led many senior advocates and other counsel, the issues are listed as follows:-

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was not right in holding that the appellants failed to prove the allegation that the 2nd respondent had submitted to the 1st respondent affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for the election of 23^rd^ February, 2019 as prescribed by section 138 (1)(e) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).

2. Whether, having regard to the state of pleadings and evidence proffered and tendered by the parties, the Court of Appeal was not right in holding that the appellants have not proved or established that the 2^nd^ respondent did not possess the educational qualification to contest the election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as prescribed and stipulated under sections 131, 137 and 138 (1)(a), (b),(c), (i)(ii)(iii) and of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

3. Whether the Court of Appeal was not right when it held that appellants did not prove that 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election of 23rd February, 2019.

4. Whether having regard to the settled position of the law on the proof of allegations of corrupt practices and non-compliance with the Electoral Act, the Court of Appeal was not right on the materials placed before it, in holding that the appellants failed to prove the allegations of corrupt practice and non-compliance as required by law.

5. Whether the 2nd respondent's exhibits R1 - R26 and P86 were not rightly and properly admitted in evidence by the Court of Appeal.

From the issues formulated by all the parties, it is clear that they are similar in all ramifications. I propose to be guided by the issues as donated by the appellants, after all, it is their appeal. Learned senior counsel for the appellants argued issues one and two together. There is wisdom in it as both challenge the judgment of the court below in respect of the qualification of the 2nd respondent to contest the vexed election. Honestly, both issues ought to have been fused into one as done by the learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent. Accordingly, I shall resolve issues one and two together.

Issues One and Two:-

In the main, the learned senior counsel for the appellants' grouse against the judgment of the lower court is that it failed to hold that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that he was not qualified to contest the said election. That although the 2nd respondent deposed in his affidavit (exhibit P1) that all his academic qualifications documents as filled in his Presidential form i.e. President APC/001/2015 were with the secretary of Military Board, RW1 - Major General Paul Tarfa (Rtd) who gave evidence on behalf of the 2nd respondent told the lower court under cross-examination that the Army did not collect the certificates of Military Officers. The learned Silk contended that this was an admission against interest which admission is against the 2nd respondent. According to him, such admitted facts need no further proof, relying on Mba v. Mba (2018) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1641)] (Pt. 1641) 177) (Pt. 1641) 177) at 189, Alhassan v. Ishaku (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 584) 52 at67; (2016) 10 [NWLR (Pt. 1520) 230]. The learned senior counsel wondered why in spite of such admission against interest, the court below held against the appellants on the issue of the 2nd respondent submitting to the 1st respondent a false affidavit of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification.

The appellants further opined that apart from the admission against interest made by the 2nd respondents witnesses, the 2nd respondent failed to adduce evidence that he had submitted his certificates to the Secretary of the Military Board as claimed in Form CF001 (exhibit P1), failed to disprove the case of the appellants by himself producing his certificates and tendering them in evidence before the lower court, failed to accompany exhibit P1 with even a single certificate notwithstanding the unequivocal denial by the Nigerian Army of being in custody of his certificates. The learned SAN submitted further that the court below erred in law when it relied on presumptions, assumptions and "so-called common sense" to rule in favour of the 2nd respondent. It is his contention that the lower court gave erroneous interpretation to sections 131,137 and 138(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

It was again submitted that the lower court failed to appreciate that form CF001 not only demands the 2nd respondent to state the schools he attended, but also mandatorily required him to attach the certificates obtained by him from the said schools. That having failed to attach those certificates, the court below was wrong to hold that he possessed them. Also that it was gratuitous and unsolicited, the holding of the court below that the 2nd respondent was "eminently qualified to contest" the Presidential Election.

On the burden of proof as regards the issue of non qualification of the 2nd respondent, learned senior counsel submitted that the appellants' burden in this case is minimal. According to him, the burden upon the appellants is to show that the requirements of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) on qualification were not complied with by the 2nd respondent who did not attach any School Leaving Certificate. That this was eminently done by the presentation of Form CF001 i.e. exhibit P1. He cited the case of Oshiomole v. Airhiavbere Major General (Rtd) & ors (2013) LPELR -19762(SC) P. 13, B - E, ; (2013) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1353) 376].

Learned counsel drew attention to exhibits P1, P2, P2A, P30, P31, P24 and P25 which the appellants tendered to establish the factthat the 2nd respondent was not qualified to contest the election intothe position of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thatthe lower court failed to state the rationale for the preference of thetestimony of RW1, RW2 and RW4 over the testimony of PW62who had exhibits P24, P30 and P80 in support of his testimony, together with the testimonies elicited under cross-examination from RW1 to RW5 as to the qualification of the 2nd respondent. He urged that those exhibits were the hangers upon which to assessoral evidence, referring to Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (2011) 1SCNJ 70 at 84; (2011) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 1238) 512], Kimdey & ors v.Governor of Gongola State (1988) 2 [NWLR (Pt. 77) 445].

The learned Silk contended further that the name "Mohammed" on exhibit R19 is not the same as "Muhammadu". He stressed that there is no change of name by the 2nd respondent from "Mohammed Buhari" to "Muhammadu Buhari". Again, that the 2nd respondent, in search of an academic qualification to counter the appellants' case, had copiously and extensively pleaded and given evidence of his public service, military courses and training attended as well as the2nd respondent's ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language. Learned senior counsel submitted that in so doing, the 2nd respondent completely misconceived the relevant grounds of the petition and the case made by the appellants. According to him, before the qualifying criteria stipulated undersub - paragraphs 318(1)(c)(i), and of the Constitution caninure to the benefit of a candidate such as the 2nd respondent, such a candidate must first possess the Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent referring to Abubakar v Yar'adua (2008)19 [NWLR (Pt.1120) 465], Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye (2007) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1057) 218]) at 245.

With some more elaboration on the issue, the learned senior counsel urged this court to resolve the two issues in favour of the appellants.

In response, the learned senior counsel for the 1st respondent Yunus Uztaz Usman, SAN, submitted on the two issues which he had made a double barrel single issue, that the 2nd respondent met the conditions laid down in section 131 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 to contest election into the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He submitted that the words used in the section are unambiguous and therefore were rightly given their plain and ordinary meaning by the court below, relying on Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 31 WRN 1 at 60 -- 61; (2007)12 [NWLR (Pt. 1048) 365], Ojokolobo v Alamu (1987) 3 [NWLR (Pt.61) 377] (Pt. 61) 377) and Garba v. F.C.S.C. (1988) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 71) 449].

Learned senior counsel also referred to section 318 of the said Constitution which gives the definition "school certificate or its equivalent" and submitted that the benchmarks for qualification are disjunctive in nature and not cumulative. According to him, a candidate is expected to fulfill only one of these pre-conditions to be qualified to contest the said election. He places reliance on Abia State University v. Anyaiba (1996) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 439) 646] at 661, Alh. Atiku Abubakar, GCON & Ors v. Alh. Umaru Musa Yar'adua& Ors (2008) 12 SC (Pt.II) 1; (2008) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 1078) 465], Arubo v. Aiyeleru (1993) 3 [NWLR (Pt.280) 126].

Mr. Usman, SAN, further submitted that exhibits R19 -R26 which were identified by RW2 and RW3, and adequately demonstrated and related to the 2nd respondent's qualification, clearly put the matter to rest. He also contended that exhibitsP80 and P84 tendered by the appellants as the press statements by the erstwhile Director of Public Relations of the Nigerian Army, Brigadier General, Olajide Olaleye confirmed that the 2ndrespondent was educated up to the Secondary School Certificate level and that he passed the listed subjects in exhibit P1.

It is the submission of learned Silk that no provision of the Electoral Act or any other law can subvert the clear provisions of sections 131, 137 and 318(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). He relies on Marwa & 7 ors v. Nyako & ors (2012) LPELR - 7837 (SC); (2012) 6 [NWLR(Pt.1296) 199] (Pt.1296) 199); INEC v. Musa (2003) LPELR - 24927 (SC), (2003)3 [NWLR (Pt. 806) 72] and *Shinkafi & anor v. Yari & ors *(2016)LPELR - 26050 (SC); (2016) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1511) 340].

On the issue of failure by the 2nd respondent to attach his certificates to Form CF001, he submitted that there is nothing in section 76 of the Electoral Act which expressly or impliedly suggest that a candidate must submit his certificates as evidence of his school Education to Independent National Electoral Commission in aid of his qualification.

On the allegation of giving false information to Independent National Electoral Commission, learned counsel submitted that thisis a criminal allegation which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt but which the appellants failed woefully to do, relying on the case of Maihaya v. Gaidam (2017) LPELR - 42474 (SC),(2018) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 1610) 454]. He submitted that the court below was right when it held that the appellants failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 2nd respondent lied about the academic and professional qualifications that he listed in exhibit P1. That they also failed to prove that the secondary schoo1 certificates the2nd respondent tendered as exhibits R19, R20 and R21 were forged and were not issued by the schools/Institutions listed as having issued them.

Learned Silk concluded on this issue by submitting that "the lower court rightly discountenanced the chicanery of the appellants, when having failed to impeach the authenticity of exhibit R19, they sought to harp in the name "Mohammed" as supposedly distinct from "Muhammadu." He contended that this was not part of the appellants' case in their pleadings in the petition or the evidence led by their witnesses at the trial of the petition that 2nd respondent was laying claims to certificates that do not belong to him or that exhibit R19 belongs to someone else known as "Mohamed". That parties are bound by their pleadings. He urged the court to resolve this issue against the appellants.

The learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent, Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN opened his argument in his double barrel issue by stating that qualification to contest for the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a constitutional issue which is sufficiently provided for by the Constitution itself. That it does not accommodate conjectures, inferences or peradventures. Therefore, any claim of qualification or non-qualification must necessarily derive its root from the said Constitution as opposed to the suggestion or imagination of parties.

Learned senior counsel referred to section 131 of the Constitution regarding qualification for election into the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and points out that the appellants do not complain about sub paragraphs - but subparagraph which they challenge the educational attainment and/or qualification of the 2nd respondent. The learned Silk also referred to section 318 of the Constitution which defines "school certificate or its equivalent" as the least educational attainment a person must have to be qualified to contest election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In respect of section 318 of the Constitution, he contended that as between each of sub paragraphsa, b and c, the word "or" is applied, rather than "and" meaning that (a), and are disjunctive, rather than conjunctive, each standing on its own. That any of the requirements, being exclusive of each other would suffice for "school certificate or its equivalent" referring to Abubakar v. Yar'adua (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1 at83 - 84.

The learned SAN submitted that the attendance of secondary school up to school certificate level suffices for qualification as opposed to an actual possession of the certificate. Learned Silk cited the following cases: A.D. v. Fayose (2005) 10 [NWLR (Pt.932) 151] (Pt. 932) 151) at 223, Action Congress of Nigeria v. Jimoh Afiz Adelowo (2012) LPELR - 19718, Bayo v. Njidda (2004) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 876)544] (Pt. 876) 544) at 630 etc. etc.

On the argument that the 2nd respondent failed to attach his certificates to Form CF001, the learned senior counsel submitted that notwithstanding the fact that the 2nd respondent possessed the various educational qualifications and certificates, he was not mandated by any law to attach the said certificates to Form CF001.He contended that when the Constitution has made a provision fora particular subject, or on a particular point, no other statute, talkless of an administrative form designed by an institution created by the same Constitution can add to, review, modify or amend the constitutional provision, referring to *Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of the Federation *(2002) 9 [NWLR (Pt.772) 222] (Pt. 772) 222), Abacha v. Fawehinmi(2000) 6 [NWLR (Pt. 660) 228] etc, Kakih v. PDP & ors (2014) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374].

The learned SAN further submitted that having alleged that the 2nd respondent did not possess the requisite educational qualification to vie for the office of President of Federal Republic of Nigeria, the appellants ought to have stated facts relating to his non-qualification. That the law relating to pleadings requires that the appellants ought to either have stated that in fact, he did not attend any of the schools/qualifications he claimed to have attended/attained, or that the said schools/qualifying particulars, were below the required minimum qualifications for an election into the office of the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria. Learned Silk refers to the case of Oshiomole v. Airhiavbere (2013) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1353)]( (Pt. 1353) 376) [376] (Pt. 1353) 376) at 396. He urged this court to hold that the appellants' petition had no substratum upon which the lower court could have accorded their allegation of non-qualification any seriousness.

Chief Olanipekun, SAN further drew the attention of this court to the statement of the outgone Director of Army Public Relations Brigadier General Olajide Olaleye which the appellants tendered as exhibit 24.According to him, this exhibit goes a long way in buttressing the 2nd respondent's defence before the lower court which confirms the truism and authenticity of exhibits R19, R20, R22 and R23 tendered by the 2nd respondent through RW3, RW4 and RW5. He urged this court to agree with the decision of the lower court that the 2nd respondent was eminently qualified to contest the election of 23rd February, 2019 into the office of President of Federal Republic of Nigeria.

On allegation of submission of false information to Independent National Electoral Commission to aid his qualification, learned Silk submitted that the appellants, apart from pleading same inparagraphs 396, 397, 398, 402, 403 and 404 of the petition, they maintained deafening silence on this area of their allegation in spite of calling 62 witnesses. That they did not pretend to ventilate it at all thereby translating to an abandonment of same. He urged this court to note that the allegation of submission of false information, when same was deposed to before a court of law, is a grievous criminal allegation, referring to sections 118 k of the Electoral Act and section 156 of the Penal Code.

According to learned senior counsel, by the imperatives of sections 131 and 135 of the Evidence Act, such allegation, as raised against the 2nd respondent by the appellants must necessarily be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He cited Waziri v. Geidam (2016)11 [NWLR (Pt. 1523) 230] at 283, Udom v. Umana (No. 1) (2016)12 [NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179] at 232. He submitted that the appellantsfailed in their duty, relying on *Imam v. Sherriff *(2005) 4 [NWLR (Pt.914) 80] (Pt. 914) 80) at 196, *Nsefik & ors v. Muna & ors *(2007) 10 [NWLR (Pt.1043) 502] (Pt. 1043) 502), *Nduul v. Wayo & 2 ors *(2018) 16 [NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548], *Ogah v. Ikpeazu *(2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1594) 299] at 348.

In conclusion, the learned SAN urged this court to observe that the evidence of RW1, RW2, RW3, RW4 and RW5, read along with exhibits P1, P24, R19, R20, R21, R22, R24 and R25 sufficiently dispel any doubt of the 2nd respondents qualification. That they equally settle the point that all facts contained in 2nd respondents

Form CF001 are a true and accurate reflection of his qualification. Therefore, he added, having satisfactorily demonstrated that the 2nd respondent possesses far more than the requisite qualification, the insinuation of submission of false information could only have emerged from the position of mala fide and shear spite, relying on Agi v. P.D.P. (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386] at 454. He urged the court to resolve this issue against the appellants.

In his response, the learned senior counsel for the 3rd respondent L. O. Fagbemi, SAN also argued issues one and two together. The learned SAN submitted that contrary to the appellants' submission in paragraphs 4.0

• 4.96 in support of the allegation against the2nd respondent that he made false declaration in an affidavit; it is his view that the allegation in the mould of "perjury" is criminal in nature and requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. That by virtue of section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. According to him, to state otherwise is to ask him to prove his innocence which the law prohibits. He also submitted that since he who asserts must prove, the onus was squarely on the appellants to discharge this onerous burden. He contended that the burden of proof is not minimal as erroneously submitted by the appellants.

On the issue of admission against interest, learned Silk submitted that for an admission against interest to be relied on and accepted by the court as proof of the matter or a fact in issue, it must be weighed along with the entire evidence on record in order to determine its correct and proper probative value. That in this case, the lower court reviewed and evaluated all the evidence, inclusive of documentary exhibits tendered from the Bar and found sufficient evidence that the Army had knowledge of the contents of the 2nd respondent's school certificate results. He referred to the case of *Emmanuel Chima Orakwe v. Nnamdi Orakwe & ors *(2018) LPELR - 44763 (CA).

On sections 76 and 31 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) learned senior counsel submitted that the construction given to them by the lower court is very correct and cannot be faulted. That section 76 relates to the relevant Forms to be used at the event of actual elections/voting and not a pre-election Form as in FormCF001 contemplated in section 31 of the Electoral Act.

On the argument that 2nd respondent did not attach his certificates, the learned Silk submitted that attachment of evidence of educational qualifications is not a requirement of the Electoral Act and the Constitution.

Learned senior counsel made elaborate submissions on the two issues which are in tandem with those of the 1st and 2nd respondents' senior counsel. I need not repeat the exercise. The learned Silk also joined to urge this court to resolve the two issues in favour of the respondents.

The appellants filed three reply briefs in response to the arguments of the three respondents. Though the reply briefs are somewhat an expansion of the argument of the appellants, I need not say more. I shall however refer to them in the course of the judgment as the need arises.

Resolution of issues one and two

The complaints of the appellants in issues one and two areas set out above in this judgment. Issue one attacks the decision of the lower court when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest the election to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The second issue relates to the aspect of the judgment which held that the 2nd respondent was at the time of the election qualified to contest the said election. In resolving these two issues, I intend to start from the second issue, which has to do with qualification. In other words, was the court below right to hold that the 2nd respondent was, at the time of the election alluded to above, qualified to contest the election?

Concluding on this issue, the court below, at page 6090 of the record of appeal, said as follows:-

"In conclusion, after careful and calm perusal and examination of the relevant pleadings, oral and documentary evidence proffered and tendered, as well as the various submissions of learned senior counsel for the parties, I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioners have not proved or established that the 2nd respondent does not possess the educational qualifications to contest the election to the office of 'the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as prescribed and stipulated under section 131, 137 and318(1) (a), (c)(i)(ii)(iii) and of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)."

1 May I state categorically that issue of qualification to contest election to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeriais constitutional? And as was rightly observed by the learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent, Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN, itis not open to conjecture, inferences or peradventures. Where the Constitution or any other law has made provision or prescribed procedure for the doing of an act, it is the Constitution or Act that must be followed. Anything done outside those provisions either by way of addition, subtraction or amendment would render such act an exercise in futility. See Elelu-Habeeb & anor v. Attorney General of the Federation & ors (2012) 13 [NWLR (Pt. 1318)] (Pt. 1318) 423) [423] (Pt. 1318) 423). Thus, issue of qualification to contest election to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria being a constitutional issue, it is the Constitution we must interrogate.

2 A calm reading of the Constitution will reveal that qualification for election into the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is provided for in section 131 of the said Constitution which states:-

"131 A person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if -

(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth

(b) he has attained the age of forty years;

he is a member of a political party and is(c)sponsored by that political party; and

he has been educated up to at least the school(d)certificate level or its equivalent."

As it is obvious in this appeal and from the facts of this case and judgment of the lower court the appellants appear satisfied with conditions - of section 131 of the Constitution as they have not raised any issue on them. Their grouse is hinged on sub paragraph which challenges the qualification of the 2nd respondent on the basis of his educational attainment. I propose therefore to consider (d) this issue based on section 131 of the Constitution.

3 By that sub-section of section 131 of the Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if "he has been educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent." The Constitution has not left anybody in doubt as to what the phrase "school certificate or its equivalent" means. This is clearly defined in section 318 of the said Constitution as follows:-

"School Certificate or its equivalent" means:-

a Secondary School Certificate or its equivalent or Grade 11 Teachers Certificate, the City and(a)Guilds Certificate; or

education up to Secondary school certificate(b)level; or

Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its(c)equivalent and -

service in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum(i)of ten years, and

attendance at courses and training in such institution as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to(ii)a minimum of one year, and

the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the Independent(iii)National Electoral Commission and

any other qualification acceptable by the Independent National

Electoral (d)Commission.

4 In interpreting the provision of the Constitution, which is the organic law of the land or the grundnorm, care must be taken to give it the real meaning which the people had in mind in adopting its provisions. Speaking along this line, Musdapher, JSC (as he then was), in Brigadier Marwa & ors v. Admiral Nyako & ors (2012) LPELR - 7837 (SC) page 45 - 46, paragraphs B - A; (2012)6 [NWLR (Pt.1296) 199] adopted with approval the dictum of Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunter v Southam Inc (1984) 2 SCR 145 at 146 wherein his Lordship made the following comments:-

"The task of expounding a Constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations.... a Constitution by contrast is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing frame work for the legitimate exercise of governmental power, ... It must therefore, be capable of growth and development overtime to meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and must in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in mind."

See also the case of Attorney General of Bendel State v. The Attorney General of the Federation (1981) 10 SC 1, (1982) 3 NCLR1 and Ishola v. Ajiboye (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (Pt.1) 1, (1994) 6 [NWLR(Pt.352) 506] (Pt.352) 506).

5 I am well guided. By the definition given to "School Certificate or its equivalent" in section 318 of the Constitution, it unequivocally shows that attendance of secondary school up to school certificate level suffices for qualification without an actual possession of the certificate. My job is not to query the rationale behind the provision but to interpret and pronounce upon it as I find it. As I understand the provision, it means that a person who possesses a school certificate or Grade 11 Teacher's certificate or its equivalent, the City and Guild certificate is qualified to contest election into office as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as in subparagraph (a). Also qualified is a person who has been educated upto Secondary School Certificate level, as in sub paragraph (b). In this one, a person need not obtain a certificate. Mere attendance in a school up to Secondary School Certificate level will suffice.

The Constitution further makes qualification simpler. In subparagraph (c), a person who has a primary six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent, and has served in the public or private sector in the Federation in any capacity acceptable to Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years and attendance of courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to a minimum of one year and ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission, is also qualified to contest election into office of President of Nigeria.

After the Constitution made provision for specific educational qualifications, it went further to liberalize the electoral space by stating in sub section as follows:-

"Any other qualification accepted by the Independent National Electoral Commission."

What this means is that a person who possesses any qualification outside those specifically mentioned in section 131and 318 of the Constitution, which is acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission, is also qualified to contest election as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. What a liberal Constitution. Both the Court of Appeal and this court have taken a firm position in relation to this matter and I may cite a few here. See Abubakar v. Yar'adua (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1] at 83 -84, A.D. v. Fayose (2005) 10 [NWLR (Pt. 932) 151] (CA), A.C.N. v. Adelowo (2012) LPELR-19718(CA); *Bayo v. Njidda *(2004) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 876) 544] at 630, Imam v. Sheriff (2005) 4 [NWLR (Pt.914) 80] (Pt. 914) 80) at 196.

6 I need to emphasize that the Constitution does not require a person to have all the qualifications listed in section 318 of the said Constitution before he is qualified. Possession of one of these qualifications will suffice. I say so because as between sub paragraphs(a), and of section 318 relating to the interpretation given to "School Certificate or its equivalent" the word "or" is used rather than "and" which means that (a), and are disjunctive, rather than conjunctive, each standing on its own. As was rightly submitted by all the senior counsel representing the three respondents, this implies that any of the highlighted requirements, being exclusive of the other, would suffice for "school certificate or its equivalent. "It is only in paragraph which a person who has Primary School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent is required to have served in the public or private sector for 10 years and other requirements listed above. I tend to agree with the learned Senior counsel for the2nd respondent that Independent National Electoral Commission, in demonstration of its acceptance of the 2nd respondent's qualification has repeatedly and consistently cleared him to contest successive elections in 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019.

For the avoidance of doubt, let me in this judgment set out the documents submitted by the 2nd respondent which the lower court relied upon to hold that he was eminently qualified to contest the election. On this, I refer to the exhibits as listed on pages 5452 -5453 of the record of appeal, Vol. 7 thereof:-

1. Cambridge Assessment International Education Grade 2 of 1961 - Exhibit R19

2. Certified True Copy of Confidential Result of the University of Cambridge, West African School Certificate - Exhibit R20

3. Certified True Copy of Confidential Result of University of Cambridge West African School Certificate for Provincial Secondary School - ExhibitR21

4. Group photograph of Katsina Secondary School -Exhibit R22

5. Print out of Elites of Nigerian Online Publication of January 22nd, 2015 in respect of Katsina Secondary School- Exhibit R23

6. Certificate of Compliance with the Evidence Act for the groups photograph of Katsina Secondary school -Exhibit R24

7. Commandant of the US Army War College Letter of Commendation for Major Buhari dated 13th June, 1980- Exhibit R25

8. Copy of Curriculum Vitae of the 2nd respondent -Exhibit R26 (a)

I am satisfied that the court below was right to rely on the above documents/certificates to hold that the 2nd respondent was eminently qualified to contest the said Presidential Election. Evidence clearly show that these exhibits were not only identified by RW2 and RW3, they were demonstrated and related to the issue of the 2nd respondent's qualification to contest the election into the office of President of Federal Republic of Nigeria. And although the appellants averred in their Petition that the 2nd respondent did not possess the certificates he listed in exhibit P1 the tendering of the exhibits listed above crushed the appellants' argument. After becoming aware of the documents tendered by the 2nd respondent, they ought to have led oral and/or documentary evidence to debunk the existence of authenticity of these certificates/documents. They did not also prove that these documents/certificates were forged. Without much ado, I pitch my tent with the lower court on its findings and decision that 2nd respondent was "eminently" qualified to contest the Presidentia1 Election of 23rd February, 2019.

The learned senior counsel for the appellants sought to rely on the press statement by the erstwhile Director of Public Relations of the Nigerian Army, Brigadier General Olajide Olaleye to the effect that the Army was not in possession of the certificates of the 2nd respondent. However, exhibits P80 and P84 tendered by the appellants confirmed that the 2nd respondent was educated up to the Secondary School Certificate level and that he passed the subjects listed in exhibit P1. Also the admission by the appellants' witnesses that the 2nd respondent rose to the position of Major-General in the Nigerian Army and served as Military Governor and as Military Head of State of this nation between 1983 - 1985 together with documents tendered were compelling enough in assisting the court below to reach its decision on the qualification of the 2nd respondent. In fact, exhibits P80 and P84 were admission against the interest of the appellants. Hence, the lower court rightly attached probative value to these exhibits in proof of the fact that the 2nd respondent not only had a "secondary school certificate" but that he was educated up to secondary school certificate level and/or that he satisfied the requirements under section 318(c) - of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. See Adeyeye & Anor. v. Ajiboye & ors (1987) LPELR - 175 (SC); (1987) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 61) 432],Oseni Aboyeji v. Amusa Momoh (1994) 4 SCNJ (Pt.2) 302;.(1994)4 [NWLR (Pt.341) 646], Olatunji v. Adisa (1995) 2 SCNJ 90 at 102;(1995) 2 [NWLR (Pt. 376) 167]).

7 On the contention by the appellants that the 2nd respondent failed to attach his certificate to form CF001, I am in agreement with the court below that neither the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) requires a candidate to attach his certificate to Form CF001 before the candidate can be adjudged educationally qualified to contest election. This court said this much in Terver Kakih v. P.D.P. & ors(2014) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374] at 424, Marwa v. Nyako (supra).The Supreme Court, having taken a firm position on the issue, all the arguments relating to section 76 and 31 of the Electoral Act2010 are of no moment.

The court below made the following impressive conclusion on the issue of qualification of the 2nd respondent on pages 6076 - 6077of the record of appeal thus:-

"The question may be asked, if 2nd respondent did not present his certificate how did the Army indicate the subjects in their Form 199A. The plausible inference was/is that he presented the certificate to the Army for documentation. See section 167 of the Evidence Act2011 which says:-

"167. The court may presume the existence of any fact which it deems likely to have happened, regard shall be had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in theirrelationship to the facts of the particular case."

It will be incredible and repugnant to common sense and justice to hold in the face of all the pieces of evidence highlighted above that 2nd respondent does not possess qualifications to contest the exalted office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as prescribed by section 131 and 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or that he submitted an affidavit to the1st respondent containing false information of fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest the election.

The petitioners also tendered the C.V. of the 2nd respondent showing his educational background, Military Service and Public Service becoming Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria from December 1983 to 1985. All of these were confirmed by Brigadier-General Olajide Olaleye who said 2ndrespondent rose steadily to become Head of State. To my mind the C.V. contains impressive credentials to enable him contest and hold the office of the President of Nigeria even if it could be said that he has only Primary School Certificate and that is not the case here. The 2nd respondent has more than Secondary School Certificate having attended courses in famous Military College in USA, UK and India.

There is no doubt that he is eminently qualified to contest the February 23, 2019 Presidential Election."

I agree entirely.

I intend to say a few words with regards to allegation that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest the election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This issue leverages on the provision of section 138(1) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as-amended) which states:

"(e) that the person whose election is questioned had submitted to the Commission, affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for the election."

Ordinarily, I would have made a sentence and conclude this issue without much ado in view of the fact that I have already agreed with the court below that the 2nd respondent was eminently qualified to contest the said election. However, for the sake of clarity, I shall make some comments in support of the position taken by the court below. On pages 6069 - 6070, the court below made the following findings:-

"The petitioners in paragraph 3.43 of their address in response to INEC final written address submitted that the 2nd respondent gave false information when he claimed in his affidavit deposed to on 24th November, 2014 and submitted to the 1st respondent vide FormCF001 18/10/2018 when he said all his academic qualifications documents as filled in his Presidential Form APC/E01/2015 were with the Secretary Military Board as at the time he made the affidavit.

The petitioners claim that they have proved the false affidavit and in addition they pleaded and tendered public statements made by the Secretary to the Army Board both in the electronic and print media and relied on exhibit P80 and P24 to show that the Army emphatically denied the claim and as such onus shifts on the 2nd respondent to disprove it.

The fact remains that the petitioners failed to call the then Director of Army Public Relations, Brigadier General Olajide Olaleye who they pleaded in paragraph396 of the petition as having debunked the assertion of 2nd respondent contained in affidavit sworn to on24/11/2014.

The said paragraph 396 constitutes the fountain and pivot of the petitioner's allegation" of and they have bounden duty to show that the affidavit contained false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for election.

What the petitioners did through their learned counsel was tendering the documents from the Bar with no one to confirm the authenticity of the report contained in exhibit P80 and P24 and with no witness to cross examine on it thereby rendering exhibits P80and P24 of no probative value as the court cannot rely on them to found on petitioners favour."

8 Let me clearly state here that the allegation made against the2nd respondent by the appellants that he gave false information in his affidavit to the 1st respondent is firmly rooted in criminality which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not enough for the appellants to make such allegation; they must go further to lead credible evidence to prove such allegation. See Agi v. P.D.P. (2016)LPELR - 42578 (SC); (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386], Yusuf v. Obasanjo 2003) 16 [NWLR (Pt. 847) 554], Waziri v. Geidam (2016)11 [NWLR (Pt. 1523) 230], Emmanuel Udom v. Umana (No.1)(2016) 12 [NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179], Okechukwu v. INEC (2014) 17[NWLR (Pt. 1436) 255].

Having read through the record of proceedings and the brief of argument filed, I agree entirely with the court below that the appellants failed to prove the allegations of submitting false information by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent. Appellants contend that the 2nd respondent failed to call the Military to appear in court to produce his certificate. If I may ask: whose duty was it to call the erstwhile Army Spokesman to authenticate exhibits P80and P24? Is it not the party who made the allegation? 9 The position of the law is that he who alleges must prove. The failure of the appellants to have subpoenaed the secretary of the Military Board to produce the certificates was fatal to their case. They failed to discharge the burden placed on them by law. See sections 131 and135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The 2nd respondent had no business calling the Army to come and prove an allegation made by the appellants against him. That will amount to standing the law on its head.

10 Before I conclude on this issue, let me state that whenever documents are tendered from the Bar in election matters, the purport is to speed up the trial in view of time limitation in election matters. Such tendering is not the end itself but a means to an end. The makers of such tendered document must be called to speak to those documents and be cross-examined on the authenticity of the documents. The law is trite that a party who did not make a document is not competent to give evidence on it. It is also the tested position of the law that where the maker of the document is not called to testify, the document would not be accorded probative value by the court. That in deed is the fate of exhibits P80 andP24. See Emmanuel Udom v. Umana Umana (supra), Nyesom v. Peterside (2016) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1512) 452].

Finally, on this issue, it was contended by the appellants that the variation in the names of 2nd respondent on exhibit R19 and R21 makes his relationship with the two documents doubtful. Is "Mohammed" and "Muhammadu" the same name and belong to the 2nd respondent? The court below made an elaborate discussion on the issue and concluded that RW5 gave explanation on the names and stated that they are the same. Attention was also drawn by the learned senior lead counsel for the 2nd respondent and others to the name of lead counsel for the appellants whose name on the roll of Legal Practitioners is Livinus Ifeanyi Chukwu Uzoukwu but he signed the petition and other processes as Dr. Livy Uzochukwu, SAN. The court below concluded as follows:-

"I am of the solemn view that upon all the pieces of evidence given, both oral and documentary on the issue of non-qualification or allegation of affidavit containing false information tendered or proffered in the case, there is no doubt that exhibits R19 and R21relate to the 2nd respondent."

For me, as the appellants failed to prove that any of the documents belong to another person and as nobody has come out to claim any of the two exhibits, I do agree with the explanation given by the RW5 and the conclusions of the court below that both names "Mohammed" and "Muhammadu" as contained in exhibitsR19 and R21 belong to the 2nd respondent. On this note, I resolve issues one and two against the appellants.

Issue Three

In this issue, the appellants are contending that the court below was wrong when it held that they did not prove that 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the Presidential Election held on 23rd February, 2019. In the main, the learned senior counsel for the appellants stated that at the court below, the appellants pleaded and led evidence through PW2, PW3,PW4, PW16, PWI7, PW36 and PW59 inter alia to show that the1st respondent has a server into which results were electronically collated and transmitted and that the results contained in the server showed clearly that 1st appellant won the election and not the 2^nd^ respondent. He submitted that the figures contained in the server result from the 35 States and the FCT showed that the 1st appellant scored 18,356,732 valid votes while the 2nd respondent scored16,741,430 votes. According to him, by the showing in the server, the 1st appellant won the election with a margin of 1,615,302 lawful votes.

The learned Silk further contended that upon a proper collation and summation of scores of candidates electronically transmitted to and contained in the 1st respondent's server, pursuant to the provisions directions contained in exhibit P3 (INEC Manual on Elections Technologies (Use, Trouble shooting and Maintenance 2019), it's the 1st appellant who indeed scored the majority of lawful votes cast. He further contended that the 1st appellant satisfied the mandatory constitutional threshold and spread across the Federation and ought to have been declared winner and returned as duly elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Learned Silk submitted that the respondents failed to lead evidence in support of their pleadings in rebuttal of the appellants' evidence, their pleadings are deemed abandoned, relying on Ilodibia v. Nigerian Cement Company Ltd. (1997) LPELR - 1494(SC); (1997) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 512) 174], U.B.N. Plc v. Emole (2001)LPELR - 3392 (SC); (2001) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 745) 501].

Dr. Livy Uzoukwo, SAN submitted further that the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 2015 amended section 52(2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 by substituting same with a new subsection and that consequent upon the amendment, the prohibitive clause against electronic voting machine was removed from Nigeria's electoral jurisprudence. That section 52(2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) now unequivocally clothes the 1st respondent with full discretion to determine the procedure for voting during election under the Electoral Act. The learned senior counsel submitted that the new section 52(2) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) introduced vide section 9 of the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 2015 provided impetus to the 1st respondent to introduce exhibit P33being Manual on Election Technologies. He submitted that exhibitsP27, P28 and P33 are subsidiary legislations which have the force of law and ought to be applied and enforced. According to him, exhibits P27, P28 and P33 unequivocally state that card readers were not just for accreditation and authentication, but also for e -collation and transmission of result. He urged this court to hold that the lower court erred when it held that the reliance placed by the appellants on exhibits P27, P28 and P33 were misplaced and have no evidential value. He also urged the court to find umbrage in the contributory judgment of S. C. Oseji, JCA on the issue.

Learned SAN further submitted that the evidence of PW59and PW60 who are experts and exhibit P87, 89 and exhibits P90A- K relating to the existence of the 1st respondent's server and the election results contained therein are detailed, self -- explanatory and illustrative. That the expertise and evidence of PW59 and PW60 as stated in their reports and oral testim0nies during their evidence-in-chief were not contradicted under cross-examination by the respondents. He wondered why their reports should not be believed and acted upon by the lower court relying on MIA & Sons v. F.H.A. (1991) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 209) 295] at 331, S.P.D.C. v. Isaiah(1997) 6 [NWLR (Pt. 508) 236] at 249 - 251. He then urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellants.

In response, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent stated that the 1st respondent did not electronically transmit the result of the Presidential Election held on 23rd February, 2019 into any server vide Smart Card Reader as there is no such provision in the Electoral Act, 2010. That election results were manually collated and declared at the various collation centres.

Learned senior counsel Yunus Ustaz Usman, SAN submitted that contrary to the submission of the appellants, the power conferred by section 52(2) of the Electoral Act on the 1st respondent to issue exhibits P27 and P28 for the conduct of 2019 General Election does not by any stretch of the imagination authorize the transmission of election results electronically. The learned Silk opined that there is therefore no statutory provision which authenticates the appellants' contention that the 1st respondent could transmit results of the election electronically vide Smart Card Readers. He submitted further that it is pursuant to section 52(2) of the Act that the 1strespondent made and issued Guidelines for the conduct of elections. That whilst the said Guidelines made provisions for accreditation of voters through the use of Smart Card Readers, the statutes are clear that voting cannot be done electronically. That there is no mention of collation and/or transmission of election results electronically in the Electoral Act and the Guidelines. He stressed the need for statutory provisions to be given their ordinary meaning, citing the case of *Prof Jerry Gana v. S.D.P. & ors *(2019) 11 [NWLR (Pt. 1684)510] (Pt. 1684) 510) at 533.

The learned Silk contended that the petitioners were under a duty to prove that results of the 2019 Presidential Election were electronically transmitted as he who asserts must prove, relying on section 131(1) and section 132 of the Evidence Act 2011, Akinbade & anor v Babatunde & ors (2017) LPELR - 43463 (SC); (2018)7 [NWLR (Pt. 1618) 366], Ogah v Ikpeazu & ors (2017) LPELR- 42372 (SC); (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1594) 299]. He stated that under cross-examination the prosecution witness who testified in respect of the server informed the lower court that they did not know the identity or particulars of the alleged Independent National Electoral Commission server into which they allegedly transmitted results of elections. According to learned counsel this continues to defy logic and invariably translates into the fact that no such electronic transmission took place. He contended that the court below reasonably and rightly found the testimonies of prosecution witnesses ineffectual and this includes PW59 and PW60. He concluded that appellants' reliance on exhibit P33 (Manual on Election Technologies) as proof that a server exists is baseless on the face of exhibit P45 which is a video tendered by the 2nd respondent through the PW40 during cross-examination wherein Independent National Electoral Commission Chairman state unequivocally that "transmission of election result via electronic transmission is not feasible or attainable." It is his view that the appellants failed to demonstrate that exhibit P33 was deployed for the conduct of the 2019 General Elections by the 1st respondent.

The learned senior counsel for 2nd respondent, Chief Wole Olanipekun, SAN, made submission which is substantially akin to that of the 1st respondent on the issue. He submitted in the main that the appellants failed woefully before the lower court to prove their allegation that the 2nd respondent did not win the highest number of lawful votes cast at the Presidential Election of 23rd February, 2019.That the entirety of the witness statement of PW59 and the exhibits attached constitute a charade. That on page 4914 Vol. 7 of the record, the said witness admitted the fictitious and anonymous nature of his sources, the domain which he relied onwww.factsdontlie.ng.com.is not ascertainable one, that it is suspect. Learned Silk contended that the entire result put forward by the appellants is based on manipulation, conjecture, anonymity, peradventure and guess work. In view of the learned SAN's arguments being substantially similar to that of the 1st respondent, I propose not to repeat the exercise since they share the same interest of defending the judgment of the court below.

Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent has also keyed into the same line of argument as the 1st and 2nd respondents. He stated emphatically that the appellants' reliance on the existence of server in paragraph 5.4 - 6.35 of their brief of argument is most preposterous and inconceivable. That it was the case of the appellants that they won the election by the content of an imaginary 1st respondent's server, the existence of which was denied by the 1st respondent. He submitted that by section 52(1) and of the Electoral Act when read together shows that electronic voting is not allowed by the Electoral Act. Therefore, reliance on any server to transmit election results would be unlawful. That this goes to buttress the fact that the 1st respondent had no server. All the three senior counsel for 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents urge the court to resolve this issue against the appellants.

Resolution of Issue Three:

The contention of the appellants in this issue is that the 2ndrespondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes. From all I have read in the briefs of all parties regarding this issue and the judgment of the lower court thereto, the appellants relied heavily on a certain server they contended belonged to the 1st respondent through which they computed their result and found that the 1stappellant won the election by majority of lawful votes. They were able to show the lower court through the evidence of witnesses particularly PW59 and PW60. The court below made the following findings and conclusion regarding the said server and evidence ofPW59 and PW60. On page 6159 - 6163 of the record, the lower court had this to say:-

"PW59 testified on 19-07-2019 when he adopted his witness statement on oath. His evidence revealed that his report is based on a website whose owner he did not know. The said website is www.factsdontlieng.com, according to PW59 and that the author of the website relied upon by him claimed to be a staff of the Independent National Electoral Commission. The website was created on 12/3/2019 about two weeks after the result of Presidential Election was announced.

On page 6 of exhibit 8 attached to his witness statement on oath PW59 said he copied into page 6

INEC's diagram for Training Manual and concluded on page 6 of exhibit 8 attached to his witness statement as follows:-

"Whistle blower's Data Analysis Facts Don't Lie

Website www.factsdontlieng.com

The website was created on 12th of March, 2019. A look at the website will show that apart from the information on the INEC records, nothing else appeared there. It has no other basic information or navigation features as to what a regular website ought to contain such as Contact; About, etc. the author of the content of the website revealing the information on INEC server, claimed to be an INEC staff He remained anonymous and hence, christened Whistle Blower."

In paragraph 18 and 19 of his witness statement on oath he concluded as follows:-

"18. Conclusion

Bearing a simplified and common understanding of the 'server' as a computer, a device or a program that is dedicated to managing network resources such as storage, communication, security, centralized applications and database management systems"; and acknowledging the INEC's Guidelines which outlined a transparent and integrated electronic process of voters accreditation, votes collation and transmission; indeed, there existed a robust system of servers whose extensive use in the(a)Presidential Elections is undeniable.

The analysis of the data held at the whistle blowers website using standard professional data analysis tool and techniques authoritatively demonstrates Accuracy and Precision, Legitimacy and Validity, reliability and consistency, Timeliness and Relevance, Completeness and comprehensiveness; Granularity and Uniqueness of the data whose(b)source can be nothing but INEC servers,

An expertise corroboration and correlation of (c) the technical processes, data and description of whistle blowers data herein and INEC's setups is an explicit and implicit demonstration that the server from whose data the whistle blower was drawn is INECs tallying servers.

That a report of my findings are attached and marked as exhibit 8."

His evidence is that it is the Whistle blower's Data Analysis www.factsdon'tlieng.com that report of his expertise evidence wasbased. He variously referred to the owner of the website as whistleblowers, anonymous and "the author of the content of the website,claimed to be an INEC staff" PW59 could be seen in his evidencedid not rely on any data gotten by him from an INEC Server. Hestated that the server he relied upon for his report as an Expert wasan anonymous website which to me is of doubtful and unreliablesource by all accounts, PW59 gave in his evidence and the reporthe authored. Whatever results he claimed to have got, according tohim came from server belonging to whistle blower not INEC.

When asked under cross-examination the source of the resultshe claimed were found in the anonymonus website he said, theauthor of the content of the website maybe an INEC Staff but that the said anonymous author of the contents of the website got theinformation or the results from INEC Servers which he PW59 saidhe could not access without the consent of INEC.

Under cross-examination he admitted that the information inthe website Whistleblower's Data Analysis Facts don't Lie Website

www.factsdon'tlieng.com could have been doctored. Under furthercross-examination by L. O. Fagbemi, SAN for 3rd respondent,PW59 said as an expert, that it is possible to use scientific methodto decrypt data source and tamper or alter the content or informationcontained therein. PW59's report and evidence is thus hanging onthird party information from an undisclosed source.

PW59's evidence is no doubt caught by section 37 of theEvidence Act which provides;-

"37. Hearsay means a statement -

oral or written made otherwise than by a(a)witness in a proceeding; or

contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tend ered in evidence for the purpose(b)of proving the truth of the matter stated in it."

As can be seen the evidence of the PW59 cannot under any stretch of imagination be classified asexpert opinion as it is not supported by any direct knowledge of what his report contains and it isnot supported by anything he did directly withregard to the existence or otherwise of an INECSERVER. He relied on third party informationnot derived from his knowledge. Worse still,his informant the author of the contents ofthe website relied upon by PW59 cannot be identified. Even if he could be identified, it isthe alleged whistleb lower or anonymous who claimed to be INEC staff that could give the evidence of anything relating to the existence of the alleged server which Petitioners heavily relied upon as containing results of elections transmitted electronically vide the Smart Card Readers. PW59's evidence is hearsay and it is unreliable."

Also on pages 6168 - 6169 of the record, the lower court continued as follows:-

"PW60 said he is an Independent Database Analystand Designer and a graduate of Industrial Chemistryfrom the University of Ilorin.

The Table constructed in the learned seniorcounsel's address was lifted from the exhibit attachedto the witness statement on Oath of the PW60. Acalm perusal of the exhibit attached (exhibits PK90A- K shows a conglomerate of examination of FormsEC8As from Polling Units with observations by him ofwhich Polling Units results were signed or not signed, which one shows bad votes or mutilated results andsundry other criminal allegation, malpractices and or irregularities. It is a strange attempt by the petitioners to use PW60 as a Witness testifying in respect of all the anomalies or evidence of crimes allegedly committedat Polling Units and doctoring of results by unnamed persons. No witnesses were called to establish all the allegations made against the results of elections inPolling Units Wards and Local Government Levels.

The witness PW60 testified that he used duplicate copies (red copies) of Form EC8As to carry out his joband that he utilized Forms EC8As, EC8Bs and EC8C series.

Under cross-examination he recoiled and stated that he in fact used Certified True Copies of FormsEC8A's. He did not know Form EC8C.

All the things he did in exhibits P90A - K, endedup in what he called an Executive Summary on hisfindings on votes recorded in Certified True Copies of Forms EC8As for the 11 focal States. He failedto demonstrate to this court how he came about the conclusion reached by him and upon which petitionerlearned senior counsel raised the tables reproduced.

It is my decision that PW60 cannot be regarded as anexpert under any guise. As a matter of fact, he admittedunder cross-examination that he was not certifiedby any institution. His evidence like the evidence of PW59 lacks probative value and the pieces of evidencehe gave are not worthy of any weight.

Consequently, I hold that the petitioner did not proveany of the complaints laid out in respect of the 11 focal States just as they failed to prove the facts in paragraph106 of the petition result of which they claimed wasderived from votes in the server inputted through smartcard readers."

Before I make any comment on the judgment of the lowercourt reproduced above vis-à-vis the argument of counsel in thisissue, I wish to find out what a server is. This is so because theexistence of a server belonging to 1st respondent or not determinesthe fate of the appellants' complaint in this issue. Now, what is aserver? The Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary defines a server as:

11 "A computer program that controls or supplies information to several computers connected in a network, the main computer on which this program is run."

12 I am not unmindful of section 71 of the Electoral Act which states that:-

"The Commission shall cause to be posted on its noticeboard and website, a notice showing the candidates atthe election and their scores; and the person declaredas elected or returned at the election."

The issue in this appeal is pot whether INEC has a websiteor not. It is not also whether INEC posted election results in itswebsite or not. Rather, the issue is whether the websitewww.factsdon'tlieng.comwhich the appellants downloaded the result ofthe Presidential Election belong to INEC; the 1st respondent herein. 13 I am saying this in case a server and a website are the same thing inview of the definition of Website as "a computer connected to the internet that maintains aseries of WebPages on the World Wide Web."

Whereas the appellants contend that the results of the electiondownloaded from the website alluded to above belongs to INEC, the1st respondent denies owning or being associated with the website.Were the appellants able to prove that the server belongs to the 1strespondent?

14 It is an elementary principle in civil proceedings that civil casesare decided on a balance of probabilities based on preponderanceof evidence. The burden of proof, which means the burden ofadducing credible evidence in proof of the case rests on the partywho would fail if no evidence at all is adduced in proof of the factsin the pleadings. See Ibrahim Sakati v. Jabule Bako & anor (2015)LPELR - 24739 (SC); (2015) 14 NWLR ((Pt.1480) 531, Mogaji vOdofin (1978) 4 SC 91 at 94, Lewis & Peat (NRI) Ltd. v. Akhimien(1976) 7 SC 157 at 169, Daodu v. NNPC & ors (1998) 2 [NWLR(Pt. 538) 355] (Pt. 538) 355).

Now, considering the evidence of PW59, the court belowobserved that PW59 obtained his data analysis of the result of theelection from a website called www.factsdon'tlieng.com variouslyowned by a Whistleblower Anonymous an INEC Staff.At the risk of repetition, the court below said:-

"His evidence is that it is the Whistleblower's DataAnalysis Facts Don't Lie Website www.factsdon'tlieng.com that Report of his expertise evidence was based.He variously referred the owner of the website aswhistle blowers, anonymous and "the author of thecontent of the website claimed to be an INEC Staff".PW59 could be seen in his evidence did not rely on any data gotten by him from an INEC Server. He stated that the Server relied upon for his report as an Expert was an anonymous website which to one is of doubtful and unreliable source by all accounts. PW59 gave his evidence and the report he authored. Whatever result she claimed to have got, according to him came fromserver belonging to whistleblower, not INEC."

I am surprised that the appellants whose case depended onthis issue of server did not specifically appeal against the abovefindings of the lower court as the PW59 stated at the court belowthat the server belongs variously to a whistleblower. Anonymousand/or an INEC Staff. It ought to have dawned on the appellantsthat their game was up because the server which the result wasallegedly obtained was said by them to be that of INEC. Havingnot linked the said server to INEC in their evidence, it is my viewthat the court below was right to reject every result gotten fromthe anonymous server or the one from a whistle blower or the oneowned by an INEC staff. 15 The law is trite that where a party does notchallenge a finding by way of an appeal, that finding stands againsthim. See Leventis Technical Ltd. v. Petrojessica Ent. Ltd. (1999) 6[NWLR (Pt. 605) 45], Iseru v. Catholic Bishop (1997) 3 [NWLR (Pt.495) 517] (Pt. 495) 517), Dabo v. Adbullahi (2005) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 923) 181].

16 Without much ado, I agree entirely with the court below thatthe appellants failed to prove that the server they downloaded the result belonged to INEC. Accordingly, all the results, calculationsand analysis based on the said unreliable server, are of no moment.

With regards to the evidence of PW60, it is clear that he wasnot on the field to gather the data he used to compute the resultshe intended the lower court to use to enter judgment for the 1stappellant. In the case of Atiku Abubakar & ors v. Umaru MusaYar'adua & ors (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1] at 173 E - G, thiscourt per Niki Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) held as follows:-

"A petitioner who contests the legality or lawfulnessof votes cast in an election and subsequent result musttender in evidence all the necessary documents by wayof forms and other documents used at the elections.He should not stop there. He must call witnesses totestify that the illegality or unlawfulness substantiallyaffected the result of the election. The documentsare among those in which the results of the votes are recorded. The witnesses are those who saw it all on theday of the election not those who picked the evidencefrom eye-witnesses. No, they must be eye-witnesses too ... It is not enough for the petitioner to tender onlythe documents. It is incumbent on him to lead evidencein respect of the wrong doings or irregularities bothin the conduct of the election and recording of thevotes, wrong doings and irregularities which affectedsubstantially the result of the election. (Italics mine foremphasis}.

Clearly, the PW60 was not available in the 11 focal stateswhich he sought to establish the anomalies or irregularities whichthe appellants pleaded. The documents he used to analyze theresults were not made or signed by him. In the process, he evencontradicted himself. The court below said this much on page 6169of the record as follows:-

"The witness PW60 testified that he used duplicatecopies (red copies) of Form EC8As to carry out his joband that he utilized Form EC8As, EC8Bs and EC8Cseries. Under cross-examination he recoiled and statedthat he in fact used "certified true copies of FormEC8As. He did not know Form EC8C."

The said PW60, apart from not being an eye-witness in respectof the areas he testified, he contradicted himself on a material issuei.e. the type of Forms he used to make calculations. I am surprisedhow the said single witness was able to detect irregularities andmalpractices in polling units he was not present. The court belowobserved that it was a strange attempt by the petitioner to use PW60as a witness testifying in respect of all the anomalies or evidenceof crimes allegedly committed at all the polling units and doctoringof results by unnamed persons. The court below also held that nowitness was called to establish all the allegations made against theresult of elections in polling units, wards and local governmentlevels. The court below lamented that PW 60 failed to demonstrateto the court how he came about the conclusion reached by him, anddoubted his expertise. I have no reason to disagree with the courtbelow on this issue.

In conclusion, I am satisfied that the lower court properly heldthat the evidence of PW59 and PW60 lacked probative value. I alsoagree that the appellants failed to prove that the 2nd respondent did not score majority of lawful votes at the Presidential Election of 23rdFebruary, 2019. This issue is thus resolved against the appellants.

Issue Four

This issue is challenging the decision of the trial courtwhich held that the appellants failed to adduce credible evidenceto establish non-compliance with the Electoral Act 2010 (asamended) substantial to vitiate the election and return of the 2^nd^ respondent by the 1st respondent. In the main, the learned seniorcounsel for the appellants faulted the decision of the lower courtwhen it merged the burden of proof in relation to non-compliancewith that of corrupt practices. That while corrupt practices entailallegations of criminality requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt,allegation of non-compliance with the provisions of the ElectoralAct is only expected to be established on the balance of probability.He referred to the cases of Ojukwu v. Yar'adua (2009) 12 [NWLR] (Pt. 1154) 50) [(Pt. 1154) 50] (Pt. 1154) 50) at 140,nAkeredolu v. Mimiko (2014) All FWLR (Pt.728) 829; (2014) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 1388) 402], Omisore v Aregbesola (2015) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205] at 321.

Learned senior counsel wondered why supplementaryelection was not ordered in areas which elections did not hold orwere cancelled in the Presidential Election as was done in respectof senatorial elections. He submitted that the election ought to havebeen declared inconclusive based on the margin of lead accordingto the appellants' calculations; citing paragraph 34 of the INECRegulations and Guidelines for Conduct of 2019 Elections. Thelearned Silk submitted further that the appellants adduced evidenceto graphically demonstrate how the 1st respondent and its agentsdeliberately and inappropriately entered wrong results in 11 Statesnamely Borno, Yobe, Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Bauchi, Jigawa,Kaduna, Kano, Gombe and Kebbi which substantially affected theoutcome of the elections.

With respect to corrupt practices the learned Silk listed thePWs who testified to issues of over voting, non-deployment andmalfunction of Card Readers, indiscriminate allotment of votes,vote buying, voters' harassment and intimidation by securityagencies. That since the 1stand 3rd respondents did not lead evidencehaving regard to the circumstances of this case, this tantamount toan admission relying on Akanni v. Makanju (1978) 11 - 12 SC 13 at18.

On the decision of the court below that appellants merelydumped documents on the court, the learned senior counsel submitted that the lower court did not only ignore its duty, but itsjudgment also jettisoned trite position of law that when a publicdocument is certified, there is no need whatsoever to call the makersof such document or those knowledgeable to testify, referring toMagaji v. Nigerian Army (2008) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 1089) 338]. He urgedthe court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellants.

In response, the learned senior counsel for the 1st respondentsubmitted that where allegation of crime is made as in this petition,the standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt. Thatseveral paragraphs of the petition filed at the lower court are repletewith weighty allegations which are criminal in nature against therespondents, some private individuals, the Nigerian Police andthe Nigeria Army. That in spite of this, the said individuals werenot found in the petition, relying on Ogundoyin & ors v. Adeyemi(2001) LPELR - 2335 (SC); (2001) 13 [NWLR (Pt. 730) 403].

Learned SAN submitted that even the allegations of non-compliance raised by the appellants such as alleged inflation of the2nd and 3rd respondents' votes in specific States and depletion of theappellants votes in some States are fraudulent which are criminalin nature also which ought to have been proved beyond reasonabledoubt. According to him, allegation of allocation vote is criminal,relying on Sabiya v. Tukur (1983) 11 SC 109, Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 [NWLR (Pt. 941) 1].

In respect of non-compliance, learned SAN contended that anallegation of non-compliance with the provisions of the ElectoralAct shall not be enough to invalidate the election if it appears tothe Election Tribunal or court that the election was conductedsubstantially in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Actand that the non-compliance did not substantially affect the resultof the election, placing reliance on Wike v. Peterside (supra). Heurged the court to resolve this issue against the appellants.

Both the learned Senior counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondentshave also proffered arguments which are in tandem with that madeby the learned SAN for the 1st respondent. May I respectfullyacknowledge those arguments and go ahead to resolve this issue.

Resolution of Issue Four

17 The law is trite that there is a presumption of correctnessand regularity in favour of the results of election declared by theIndependent National Electoral Commission in the conduct of anelection. This means that except it is proved or rebutted that suchresults are not correct, they are accepted for all purpose by the Election Tribunal or court. The onus, of course is on the petitionerto prove the contrary. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (supra), Nyesom v.Peterside (2016) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1512) 452] at 532 - 533.

18 There is no doubt the task of establishing a petition on theground of non-compliance is a herculean and daunting one placedon the petitioner by law. A petitioner who desires and urges thecourt to set aside the result of an election on ground of non-compliance with the Electoral Act has the onerous duty of provingthe alleged non-compliance by calling witnesses from each of thepolling units complained of. It has to be noted that he does notjust call any witness. He must present eye-witnesses, i.e. those whowere present at the various polling units across the election area.In the instant case, the entire country. It is indeed a daunting task.See Andrew v. INEC (2018) 9 [NWLR (Pt. 1625) 507], Edonkumohv. Mutu (1999) 9 [NWLR (Pt. 620) 633] at 653. This court observedthis much in Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 [NWLR (Pt. 941) 1]at299 paragraphs F - H, per Pats-Acholonu, JSC that -

"The very big obstacle that anyone who seeks to havethe election of the President or Governor upturned isthe very large number of witnesses he must call due tothe size of the respective constituency. In a country likeour own, he may have to call about 250,000 - 300,000 witnesses. By the time the court would have heard allof them with the way our present law is couched, the incumbent would have long finished and left his office and even if the petitioner finally wins, it will be anempty victory bereft of substance."

I hasten to say that the above decision was rendered when therewas no time frame for the hearing and determination of election petitions. It is more difficult now under the present legal regime ofthe Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) where the Election Tribunalor court has 180 days to hear and determine petitions. Where is the time to call such number of witnesses? I say this to demonstrate thefrustration of a petitioner seeking to set aside an election on ground of non-compliance.

The court below listed the various acts of non-compliance andcorrupt practices which the appellants opined affected the outcomeof the election to include:

1. Intimidating and chasing away supporters of Petitionersand members of PDP.

2. Stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers.

3. Assisting the members of APC and supporters of the2nd respondent to carry out multiple voting.

4. The Army and Police Forces connived with respondentsto carry out massive rigging in the strongholds of thepetitioners.

5. That the election was marred in Bauchi State byirregularities, violence, harassment and intimidationof petitioner agents by policemen and military menaided by respondents and that there was unlawfulcancellation of votes.

6. That no real voting or election took place in DekinaLGA of Kogi State as heavily armed thugs and fakepolicemen sponsored by 3rd respondent invaded severalpolling units.

7. That Nigerian Army were used by respondents inZamfara State to chase away PDP supporters and thatother criminal acts were committed by them.

8. That in Nassarawa State that out of 1496 polling unitsthe 1st respondent returned nil accreditation in 68 polling units.

9. That 2nd respondent manipulated and used securityagencies to influence the outcome of the election tofavour him by retaining General Tukur Buratai, ChiefArmy Staff, Admiral Ibok Ekwe Ibas, Chief of NavalStaff and Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar, Chief of AirStaff with a view to using them to intimidate supportersof the opposition to prevent them from voting.

10. That in Rivers State, Oyo State, Kaduna State notablemembers of PDP were detained or arrested.

11. That in Rivers, Borno, Benue, Kogi, Yobe, Kebbi,Kaduna, Zaffifara, Nassarawa, Plateau and practicallyin all States of the Federation, Military and police Officers actively informed members and supporters of respondents to attack, terrorize and scare away 2^nd^ petitioners and supporters of 1st petitioner to preventthem from voting.

12. That soldiers invaded several LGAs in Rivers State todisrupt elections.

13. That there was massive multiple thumb printing of ballot papers by agents of 2nd and 3rd respondents inconnivance of the 1st respondent.

14.That prominent members of PDP were detained in those States by security forces at the instance and promptings of the 2nd and 3rd respondents.

On the above inventories, the court below held that the petitioners failed to lead evidence to establish witnesses in court as none of the party agents or polling agents of the petitioners were called to prove the various criminal allegations made against the respondents and members of the Nigerian Army and the Police Force. 19 May I state once again that it is not enough for a party to file a petition no matter how beautifully and powerfully couched. Such a party must take steps to assemble credible witnesses to prove the petition. Also tendering of tons of documents from the Bar without more does not assist the case of a petitioner.

I am surprised that in a Presidential Election where a petitioner seeks to nullify election, only five polling agents were called as witnesses which according to the court below were PW5, PW6,PW12, PW46, PW49. On page 6221 of the record, the court belowstated concerning the five Polling Agents as follows:-

"However, apart from the five witnesses from Polling Units, the other witnesses are hearsay evidence of what allegedly took place at the polling units. That pieces of evidence either alone or taken together did not establish all or any of the facts pleaded under grounds 2 and 3 ofthe petition and all the criminal allegations contained in paragraphs 227, 231, 232, 234, 236, 250, 293, 299,302, 306, 308, 309, 310, 317, 322, 328, 329, 333, 335,373, 380 and 381 of the petition are not proved by the evidence of the aforementioned witnesses."

20 The court below had reasoned that since the infractions listedabove took place at the polling units across the country, the bulkof the witness ought to have come from the polling units. As I saidearlier, which is the correct position of the law, only witness whoactually saw what happened at the polling units can give credible evidence of what they saw. See Hashidu v. Goje (2003) 15  (Pt. 843) 352) [(Pt. 843) 352] (Pt. 843) 352), Oke v. Mimiko (2014) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 1388) 332] at376, Andrew v. INEC (2018) 9 [NWLR (Pt. 1625) 507] at 563.

One aspect of this issue which I need to emphasize has to do with over voting in an election. The court below made some findings on page 6240 of the record to the effect that the petitioners failed to tender voters registers and that even the Forms EC8As,EC8Bs, EC8C EC8E and other Forms tendered were not utilized or demonstrated before the court by any of the 62 witnesses called by the petitioners.

21 I can state unequivocally that voters' register is the foundation of any competent election in any society. Without the voters'register, it will be difficult if not impossible to determine the actual number of voters in an election. And if the number of registered voters is not known, how can a court determine whether the numbers of votes cast at the election are more than the voters registered tovote. That is why this court said this much in Shinkafi v. Yari (2016)7 [NWLR (Pt. 1511) 340] that to prove over voting, the petitioner must tender the voters register and Forms EC8As so as to work out the difference of excess votes easily. There is no ground of appeal faulting the decision of the lower court that Voters' Registers were not tendered. I wonder how the appellants intended the court below to determine the issue of over voting. See also Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 [NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87] at 147, Nyesom v. Peterside (supra).

On issue of dumping of documents on the court below, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was noneed to call the makers of those documents tendered from the Barbecause they were public documents duly certified. On page 37,paragraphs 7.17 of their brief, it is submitted thus:-

"The Court of Appeal, based only on presumptions,held that the appellants required to call witnesses whohave knowledge on the exhibits tendered even if the said exhibits are certified true copies. We submit thatthe lower court did not only ignore its duty, but its judgment also jettisoned trite position of law that whena public document is duly certified, there is no need whatsoever to call the makers of such documents or those knowledgeable on it to testify. We commend the case of Magaji v Nigerian Army (2008) 8 [NWLR (Pt.1089) page 338] (Pt. 1089) page 338). "

22 The version of the law I know on the subject (i.e. if there areother versions) is that when documents are tendered from the bar,such documents have no probative value until the makers of such documents are called to testify on the document and are subjected to cross-examination on them. It cannot be as argued by the learned Silk for the appellants above. Whether it is a certified public document or any other document, the need for the maker to testify and be crossed examined on it has not yet been jettisoned by this court.

23 I have read the case of *Magaji v. Nigeria Army *(supra) relied upon by the appellants. This court did not state as the appellants want us to believe. On page 395 - 396 of the report paragraphs H - C, this court per Ogbuagu, JSC (of blessed memory) held as follows:-

"However, I have already stated that if the purpose ofcalling as a witness is just to tender a document, a trial court may dispense with the personal appearance of the person who recorded the contents of the documents such as the investigator in the instant case. Exhibit 1 although a photocopy, is was certified. It is now settledthat photocopies of documents, must be certified. Seesection 111/112 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Daily Times Ltd. v. Williams (1986) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 36)] (Pt. 36) 526) [526] (Pt. 36) 526) (referred to by the court below as Iheoma v. F.R.A.Williams), it was held that a photocopy of a certified document is admissible. So this authority, also putsthe (sic) rest, the complaints in the appellants' brief about the admissibility of the appellants' statementor exhibit 1 as a matter of facts, in the case of International Merchant Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Dabiri &2 ors (1998) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 533) 284] at 297 C.A, itwas held that photocopies of a certified true copy of apublic document needs no further certification undersection 111(1) of the Evidence Act."

The above quotation from the case of *Magaji v. Nigerian Army *(supra) is very clear and unambiguous. There is nothing inthat judgment which suggests that whenever a certified true copyof Public Document is tendered in court the maker need not be called to testify. That would be strange. However, if the intentionis just to tender the documents, of course, it can be done without the maker as was done in this case where tons of documents were tendered from the Bar. But if the intention is for the court to acton those documents, the makers must be called to speak to thosedocuments and be cross examined appropriately. It is then and onlythen that a court can attach probative value to it. See Andrew v. INEC & ors (supra), Ikpeazu v. Otti (2016) 8 [NWLR (Pt.1513) 38], Buhari v. INEC (No.2) (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246], GabrielUdom Emmanuel v. Umana Okon Umana & ors (2016) 12 [NWLR(Pt. 1526) 270](Pt. 1526) 270) at 286.

It is therefore not difficult to appreciate the court below when it held that the appellants merely dumped those documents on thecourt. 24 The court is not permitted to go home and interrogate thosedocuments privately in the inner recess of its chambers. This will amount to shopping for evidence, thus descending into the arena ofthe conflict. See Labaran Maku v. Umaru Tanko Al - Makura (2016)5 [NWLR (Pt. 1505) 201] at 230. One wonders how the appellants expected judgment to be entered in their favour when they failed todo the needful in respect of those documents which were the pivot of their petition.

Apart from issue of the documents, the monumental allegations of corrupt practices could not be proved by PW62 who said hewas in the situation room. As was rendered by the court below, hehad no personal knowledge of the happenings in the field (polling units). He could not - have been in the Situation Room at his party'soffice and be at any of the polling units, wards, Local Government Areas and State level on the date of the election. I am surprised he was described as a star witness. Be that as it may, this issue doesnot avail the appellants at all. It is resolved against the appellants.

Issue Five:-

In this issue, the learned SAN for the appellants submittedthat having not been pleaded, listed and frontloaded by the 2ndrespondent exhibits R1 - R26, P85 and P86 ought not to have beenadmitted in evidence by the lower court. That exhibits P85 and P86were wrongly and inappropriately tendered through PW 40 undercross-examination as he was not the maker of the exhibits, relyingon Buhari v. INEC (2008) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246]. Learned seniorcounsel contended that the admission of exhibits R1 - R26 and P85and P86 under the omnibus phrase "overall interest of justice" waswrong. He urged the court to expunge, these exhibits from therecord, relying on H. A. Willoughby v. International Merchant Bank(Nig) Ltd. (1987) 1 [NWLR (Pt. 48) 105].

In response, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the 2nd respondent averred in paragraphs 384 of hisamended reply to the petition facts, of which exhibits R1 - R26 weretendered. He responded that documentary evidence need not be specificially pleaded before it can be admitted in evidence, relyingon Allied Bank of Nigeria v. Akubueze (1997) LPELR - 429 (SC);(1997) 6 [NWLR (Pt. 509) 374]. That in view of the constitutional requirement for qualification in section 131(d) and 318(b) thereof,the court below was right to admit the documents as credible to that the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest the election. Tobuttress the fact that the exhibits were rightly admitted, learned Silk relied on the following cases. Matthew v. Otabor (2015) 14[NWLR (Pt.1479) 360] at 383-384, Abubakar v. Yar'adua (2008) 4[NWLR (Pt. 1078) 465]); NDIC v. Gateway Paper Products Ltd. &anor. (2018) LPELR - 43795 (CA).

The learned senior counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that the lower court rightly admitted exhibits R1-R26, P85 and P86. He referred to pages 2383 - 2384, Vol. 3 of the record of appeal to show that those documents were pleaded. In respect of exhibits P85 and P86, he submitted that they were pleaded in paragraph 386of the 2nd respondent's reply at page 2367 Vol. 3 of the record. He opined that exhibits P85 and P86 were relevant to the case and assuch admissible.

According to the learned SAN for the 3rd respondent, admissibility of document is guided by the Evidence Act andnot the rule of court or 1st Schedule of any law and there is no provision of the Evidence Act which states that a document which is not front loaded is in admissible relying on Dunalin Investment Ltd. v. BGL Plc (2016) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 1544) 262] at 340, Ogboru v.Uduaghan (2011) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1277) 727], Adamu Mohammed v.INEC (2015) LPELR - 260233. He nonetheless submitted that the 2nd respondent clearly pleaded relevant facts in support of exhibitsR1 - R26, P85 and P86 as contained on pages 2367 - 2369 while they were conspicuously listed on pages 2383 - 2385 of Vol. 3 of the record.

In this matter exhibits R1 - R26 relate to documents tending toshow the educational qualification of the 2nd respondent which was a major thrust in this petition. Exhibits P85 and P86 show the INEC Chairman's preparation for the election. After a careful perusal of pages 2383 - 2384 and pages 2367 and 2383 of the record of appeal Vol. 3, I am satisfied that the 2nd respondent, not only pleaded facts relevant to those exhibits but also listed them in his reply to the petition. The 43 items listed as exhibits include the resume of the 2^nd^ respondent, documents from Associates, Classmates, Coursemates and School mates of the 2nd respondent. Also listed are "video clips, DVD clips, Chats and other such materials that attest to the free andfair conduct of the said election."

25 By the rules of pleadings, every pleading shall containstatement of all material facts on which the party pleading relies,but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. Provided thereis a pleading which a document tends to prove, such document isrelevant and is accordingly admissible. See Magaji v. NigerianArmy (supra), MCC Ltd. v. Azubike (1990) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 136) 74]; Oviawe v. Integrated Rubber Products Nig. Ltd. & anor (1997) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 492) 126]. Even, paragraph 41 of the 1st schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) requires documents to be either listed or filed before it can be received in evidence. The 2^nd^ respondent properly listed the exhibits alluded to above and as such I do not see any reason why the court below could not have admitted them in evidence especially as they were and are still relevant. Iagree with the court below that those documents were admitted inthe interest of justice and nothing more. I resolve this issue against the appellants.

Having resolved the five issues against the appellants, I hold that this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed as I did on 30^th^ October, 2019 when this appeal was argued. I affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 11th September, 2019 which upheld the election and return of the 2nd respondent as the dulyelected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Parties shall bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.

RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.:

At the hearing of this appeal on 30th October 2019, this court dismissed the appeal and stated that reasons for doing so would be given on a date to be announced.

My learned brother, I.T. Muhammad, the Chief Justice of Nigeria has given those reasons in the leading judgment which Iwas privileged to read in draft.

I am in agreement with his Lordships reasoning and conclusions.

HON. JUSTICE OLUKAYODE ARIWOOLA, J.S.C.:

The contribution of Hon. Justice Olukayode Ariwoola, J.S.C. who was a member of the Panel of Justices of the Supreme Court that decided this case could not be obtained despite several efforts made by this publication to obtain same.

OKORO, J.S.C.:

When this appeal was argued on 30th October,2019, I agreed that this appeal be dismissed for lacking in merit I also stated that I shall give reasons for dismissing the appeal on adate to be communicated to the parties.

I have had the privilege of reading in draft the reasons forjudgment just rendered by my learned brother, Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad, CJN. I am in agreement with him that these are the reasons which informed us to dismiss the appeal. I hereby adopt those reasons in the lead judgment as also make no order as tocosts.

SANUSI, J.S.C.:

This appeal emanates from the judgment of the Presidential Election Petition Court, Court of Appeal (herein afterreferred to as "the lower or court below") delivered on 11th day of September, 2019 in petition No.CA/PEPC/002/2019. At the end ofthe hearing of the petition, the lower court delivered its judgment in favour of the respondents. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the two appellants jointly filed this appeal and four other interlocutory appeals before this court namely, appeals Nos. SC.1212/2019,SC.1213/2019, SC.1214/2019, SC.1215/2019 and SC.1216/2019. Similarly the third respondent herein i.e. APC, also filed cross appeal No.SC.1217/2019. It is apt to say that this appeal (hereinafter also referred to as the "main appeal", the five interlocutory appeals and the cross appeal originate from the same judgment delivered on 11th September, which is now being appealed against in this main and other appeals, and also have the same parties.

The facts giving rise to these appeals as could be gleaned from the record of appeal are summarised below. The first respondent is by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), saddled with the responsibility oforganising and conducting elections into various political positions in Nigeria including the election for the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In keeping with such mandate, the 1^st^ respondent conducted Presidential election in Nigeria on the 23rd of February, 2019. At the conclusion of the election after due collation of results in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws, rules and guidelines, it declared results of the election in favour of the 2^nd^ respondent who contested the said election on the platform of the3rd respondent, the APC, having polled 15,191,847 as against the 11,262,978 votes scored by the 1st appellant Alhaji Atiku Abubakar who contested the said election on the ticket of the 2nd appellant the PDP. The 1st respondent further declared that the 2nd respondent surpassed the votes scored by the 1st appellant with a margin of 3,818,869, hence it declared the 2nd respondent winner of the said election. It also declared that the 2nd respondent herein, scored the highest number of lawful votes cast at the election and that heacquired the constitutional spread.

In an effort to prove their petition against the respondents, the appellants called sixty two witnesses. The 1st respondent did not call any witness but rested its case on the petitioners' petition.On his part, the 2nd respondent called seven witnesses to defend the petition and closed his case. The 3rd respondent relied on the evidence adduced by the petitioners.

Piqued by the declaration of results and return of 2nd respondent as winner of the election by the 1st respondent, the appellants jointly filed an election petition before the lower court on the following premise/grounds:-

That the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by a(a)majority of lawful votes cast at the election.

The election of the 2nd respondent was marred by (b)corrupt practices.

That the election of 2nd respondent was invalid due tonon-compliance with the provisions of Electoral Act,(c)2010 (as amended)

That as at the time of the election the 2nd respondent(d)was not qualified to contest the said election; and

That the 2nd respondent presented to the 1st respondentan affidavit containing false information concerninghis educational qualification for his suitability to(e)contest the said election.

The lower court after protracted trial/proceedings gave judgment in favour of the three respondents. Naturally, the appellants became disenchanted with the judgment of the court below, hence they jointly filed this main appeal and the other interlocutory appeals. Also aggrieved by the said judgment, the 3^rd^ respondent filed a cross appeal as highlighted above.

Suffice it to say, that at the hearing of the appeals by thiscourt on 30th October, 2019, the learned senior counsel for the respondents agreed that this main appeal i.e. No. SC.1211/2019 only, should be taken and its result should abide the remaining fiveinterlocutory appeals and the cross appeal.

On his part, the learned senior counsel for the appellants though he also in principle, agreed that the decision in the main appeal should abide his other five interlocutory appeals, but he insisted that he should be allowed toargue the five interlocutory appeals independently or separately.This court however drew his attention to the fact that all the appeals arose from the same judgment and the parties are the same. After considering the futility of taking or hearing the interlocutory appeals and the cross appeal separately, the court decided to take the main appeal only and it also and ordered that any decision arrived at in the main appeal should abide all the remaining appeals.

On the same day i.e. 30th October, 2019, this court took arguments of learned counsel to the parties in the main appeal. Briefs of argument were filed and exchanged, were also adopted.

After taking arguments in the main appeal the court decided to render its judgment later in the day, of course, after it had closely and pain stakingly considered the arguments canvassed in the respective briefs of argument earlier adopted by the parties'learned senior counsel and dismissed the appeal for being lacking in substance. We thereupon adjourned to a later day when reasons for the judgment will be given. Below are my detailed reasons formy judgment dismissing the entire appeals.

The issues for determination formulated by learned counsel tothe parties are reproduced hereunder:-

Appellants ' formulated 5 issues for determination:

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of hisqualification to contest the election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (Grounds1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 49 and 65)

2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it heldthat the 2nd respondent was at the time of the election qualified to contest the said election. (Grounds 13, 14,24, 27 and 32)

3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it heldthat the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the said election held on 23rd February, 2019. (Grounds 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,57, 58, 59, 60, 63 and 64)

4. Whether by virtue of the evidence adduced before the Court of Appeal, the appellants did not establish non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) substantial to vitiate the election and return of the 2^nd^ respondent by the 1st respondent. (Grounds 39, 44, 45,46, 47, 61, 62 and 66)

5. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in law whenit relied on 'overall interest of justice' to hold that the 2nd respondent's exhibits R1-R26, P85 and P86 were properly admitted in evidence. (Ground 25).

1st respondent formulated 4 issues for determination as follows:

Whether the lower court was right in holding that the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest the 2019 Presidential Election and that the appellants did not prove the allegation that the 2nd respondent submitted an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification.

Whether the lower court was right in holding that the appellants did not prove by credible evidence that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election.

3. Whether the lower court was right in holding that the appellants failed to discharge the onus of proving that the 2019 Presidential Election conducted bythe 1st respondent was invalid by reason of corrupt practices and non-compliance with the provisions ofthe Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the Electoral Guidelines and Manuals issued for the conduct of the elections.

4. Whether the lower court was right when it reliedon the overall interest of justice to hold that the 2^nd^ respondent's exhibits R1-R26, P85 and P86 were properly admitted in Evidence.

2nd Respondent Formulated 6 Issues for Determination

1. In light of clear provisions of the CFRN, the ElectoralAct and the consistent position of judicial authoritiesvis-à-vis the evidence led at trial, whether the lower court was not right, when it resolved the twin issuesof qualification and submission of false informationin aid of qualification in favour of the respondent. (Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,32, 33, 37, 38 and 65 of the notice of appeal)

2. In view of the unambiguous provisions of the CFRN,the Electoral Act and consistent judicial authorities on the subject vis-à-vis the evidence led at trial, whether the lower court was not right when it found that the appellants were unable to prove that the respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes castat the election. (Grounds 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43,50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60 and 63 of the notice of appeal)

3. Given the express provisions of the CFRN, the Electoral Act, Guidelines and Manuals for the conduct of the election and the long line of judicial authorities on the subject, was the lower court not right when itheld that the appellants failed to prove their allegations of corrupt practices and non-compliance with the Electoral Act, as required by law grounds 39, 44, 45,46, 47, 49, 61, 62 and 66 of the notice of appeal.

4. By the totality of the proceedings before the lower court, whether the court was not right when it heldthat the appellants dumped their documents before it. Grounds 48, 55, 56 and 64 of the notice of appeal.

5. Considering the proceedings at the trial, as evidenced by the records before this honourable court, whether the lower court was not right when it found that the 1st and 3rd respondents did elicit relevant evidence insupport of their pleadings under cross examination andas such, have not abandoned their pleadings before thecourt. (Ground 57 of the notice of appeal)

6. Having regard to the judgment of the lower court as represented by the record before this honourable court,whether the lower was not right by relying on the exhibits before it. (Ground 25 of the notice of appeal)

3rd Respondent formulated 4 issues for determination whichare set out below:-

1. Having regard to the state of pleadings and evidenceproffered and tendered by the parties, the Court ofAppeal was right in holding that the appellants havenot proved or established that the 2nd respondent doesnot possess the educational qualifications to contestthe election to the office of the President of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria as prescribed and stipulated undersections 131, 137 and 318(1)(a), (b), (c)(i)(ii)(iii) &of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1999 (as amended) Distilled from Grounds 1, 2, 3, 8,9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,28, 30, 32, 33, 38 and 49 of the notice of appeal.

2. Having regard to the circumstances of this case,whether the lower court was not right in holding thatthe appellants failed to prove the allegation that the 2nd respondent had submitted to the 1st respondent affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for the election of 23^rd^ day of February, 2019, as prescribed by the provisionof section 138(1)(e) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (asamended)? Distilled from grounds 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 17,18, 21 and 31 of the notice of appeal.

3. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, whether the lower court was not correct in holding that the appellants failed to satisfactorily discharge the burden of proof placed on them by the law and consequently dismiss the petition in its entirety Distilled from grounds 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42,50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 63, 64, 65 and 66 of the noticeof appeal.

4. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, whether the lower court was not right in holding that pursuant to the provision of section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the settled position of the law appellantsare under a duty to prove all allegations under twoissues of corrupt practices and noncompliance beyondreasonable doubt and by witnesses on polling unit bypolling unit basis Distilled from grounds 45, 46, 47,48, 57, 58 and 61 of the notice of appeal.

Argument on Issues for Determination Submissions of Counsel on Issues for Determination -

On issue No. 1 which deals with whether the appellant did notprove that the 2nd respondent submitted affidavit containing false information to the 1st respondent, the learned counsel argued that inspite of the exhibit P1 which is an attachment to Form CF001, P2, P2A, P30, P31, the CTC at pages 1 and 5 of Vanguard Newspaper dated 21st of January, 2015 as exhibits P. 24, P25 and P. 80 as well as the testimony of PW 62, PW 1 and through cross examination of witnesses called by the 2nd respondent. The lower court should resolve this issue in favour of the appellants. He argued further, that the evidence of RW1, Major General Tarfa, the 2nd respondent'switness was admission against the interest of the 2nd respondent andit is conclusive. He referred to the case of Taiwo v. Adegboro (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 554) 52 at 67 (SC), (2011) 11 [NWLR (Pt. 1259)562](Pt. 1259) 562).

He submitted that the appellants through cross examination extracted vital admission from RW1, RW2, RW3 and RW4 to provethat the 2nd respondent was not qualified to contest the election and that the conclusion of the lower court that failure of the appellantto call Brigadier Oladije Laleye is fatal to his case, was wrong. He referred to exhibit R23 and submitted that the admission contended therein, is against the interest of the 2nd respondent. He submitted that there is more sufficient evidence before the lower court which would have enabled it to make findings in favour of the appellants.He argued that the appellants were able to establish throughconvincing evidence that the claim that the certificate were withmilitary was false because the military denied being in possessionof the certificate. He submitted that by the combined provisions ofsections 131, 137 (1)(1) and 138 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and sections 31 and 76 of the Evidence Act, 2010 makes it mandatory for the 2nd respondent and indeed any candidate voting for any elective position in Nigeria,to attach his certificate showing his qualification for the position being vied for and that the conclusion of the lower court that the constitution does not make provisions for attachment of certificate was wrong. He remarked that the assertion that the 1st respondenthas power to make rules and regulation to guide the conduct ofelection has force of law and it is the duty of the court to interpreteand give recognition to same. He argued that the exhibit relied upon by the lower court is hear say as none of the persons in the processes or exercise was called to testify and that the Statement ofResult therein, purported to have come from Government College Katsina and Katsina State Ministry of Education were not tendered in evidence.

He argued also that the certified true copy of the Certificate/Result Sheet issued by the West African Examination Council (WEAC) (exhibit R19) was made during the pendency of the suitand therefore inadmissible. He argued that exhibits R19 and R21 which are contested result sheets were written on the same date, time and place by one 'Mohamed Buhari' are sufficient proof that the 2nd respondent does not possess the qualification he claimed inForm CF001 submitted to the 1st respondent. He contended thatthe 2nd respondent did not testify or explain the circumstanceswarranting the necessity for him alone to have two different documents purportedly certifying one examination written in 1961. He pointed out that the name on exhibit R19 is 'Mohamed' and not"Muhammadu".

On the evidence led by the 2nd respondent regarding the attendance of public service, military courses and training aswell as his ability to read, write, underst and and communicate in English Language, he submitted that before the 2nd respondent canbenefit from the condition stipulated under sub-paragraphs 318 and of the 1999 constitution (CFRN), he must possessthe Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent as the constitution employed word "and" under ("c") in relation to the sub-provision in (i), which is conjunctive unlike the use of "or"which is disjunctive. He contended that the appellants from the totality of the evidence before the court has been able to prove that(c) the 2nd respondent does not possess the Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent. He urged the court to resolve issuesNos. 1 and 2 in favour of the appellants.

Issue No. 3 deals with whether the 2nd respondent wasduly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election, thelearned senior counsel to the appellants referred to the evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4. PW16, PW17, PW36 and PW59 to prove that the 1st respondent has a 'server' through which the results were electronically collated and transmitted and that the result contained therein, showed that the 1st appellant won the election and not the2nd respondent. He argued that the result contained in the 'server' showed that the 1st appellant scored 18,356,732 valid votes, while the 2nd respondent scored 16,741,430 votes pursuant to the results shown in exhibit P33 (INEC Manual on Electoral Technologies Case Troubleshooting and maintenance 2019). He contended that all the respondents failed to lead evidence in rebuttal of the existence of "the server" as established by the appellants. He argued further, that by the Electoral (amended) Act, 2015, the amended sub election '2' the prohibitive clause against electronics voting machine which by the way is only a part of electoral procedure has remained in the Nigeria's electoral jurisprudence. He also referred to section 160 1999 CFRN to buttress this point and section 153 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) under which the 1^st^ respondent presented electoral procedures for Electronics Collation and Transmission of Result for 2019 Elections. He argued that the conclusion of the lower court that exhibit P33 was not deployed bythe 1st respondent can be taken as an example against descending into the arena as neither the 1st respondent nor any of the respondents claimed so since there is no evidence to the contrary in the record. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellants.

Issue No. 4 deals with whether non-compliance with Electoral Act was established -

Here the learned appellants counsel referred to the pleading of the appellant where it was pleaded that the 2nd respondent submitted an affidavit giving false information and the oral and documentary evidence to prove the existence of the pleading onnon-qualification of the 2nd respondent to contest 2019 Presidential Election (see pages 131-135 of vol. 1 of the record). He argued that the burden of proof in allegation of non compliance with the Electoral Act, is not the same with that of corrupt practices and that while the corrupt practices entails allegation of criminality requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, the allegation of noncompliance with Electoral Act only requires proof on balance of probability. He therefore submitted that contrary to the position ofthe lower court, the allegations of non compliance with Electoral Act are not criminal in nature and as such do not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. He argued that the burden of proof envisaged in section 135 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to the allegation of non-compliance.

On the issue of corrupt practices, he referred to the evidence of PW7-PW29, PW48, PW49, PW50, PW51, PW52, PW53, PW54,PW56, PW57, PW58 and PW61 and submitted that they are relevanton corrupt practices and that none of the respondents presented any evidence in rebuttal. On non presentation of the maker of the exhibit tendered, he submitted that the position of law is that wherea public document is duly certified there is no need to call the makerto testify as such maker can be dispensed with. He cited the caseof Magaji v. Nigerian Army (2008) 8 [NWLR (Pt.1089) page 338] inurging this court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellants.

As regards issue No.5 which relates to whether the lower court was right in admitting exhibits R1-R26, P.85 and P.86 the learned appellants' senior counsel contended that the above exhibits as wellas exhibits P.85 and P.86 tendered by the 2nd respondent were not pleaded in their reply to the petition of the appellants and that they were not on the list of documents to be relied upon at the trial. He therefore submitted that having not been pleaded, they ought notto have been admitted in evidence. He cited the case of P.D.P. v.I.N.E.C. (2014) 17 [NWLR (Pt.1437) 525]. He urged this court toalso resolve this issue in favour of the appellants and to allow the appeal.

In his response to the argument of the appellants, the learned counsel to the 1st respondent distilled four issues for determination.

The first issue proposed as I posited above deals with whether the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest and that the appellants did not prove the allegation that the 2nd respondent submitted affidavit containing false information. The learned counsel to the 1st respondent submitted that the lower court was right in holdingthat the 2nd respondent having complied with the requirement ofsection 131 CFRN 1999, he was qualified to contest the electioni nto the office of the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria.

He argued that the bench-mark in the provisions of section 131 is disjunctive in nature and a candidate is therefore expected to fulfil only one of these pre-conditions in order to be qualified to contest. He referred to the case of *Alh. Atiku Abubakar & orsv. Alh. Umar Musa Yar'adua *(2008) 4 [NWLR (Pt.1078) 465]. Hereferred to exhibits P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26 and submitted that these exhibits confirmed that the 2nd respondent has satisfied the requirements to contest election into the office of the President. He also referred to exhibits P80 and P84, the press statement by the former Director, Public Relations of the Nigerian Army Brigadier General Olajide Olaleye which confirmed that the2nd respondent was educated up to the Secondary School Certificate level and had passed the listed subjects in exhibit Pl. He pointedout that the documentary evidence and testimony of the appellants'witnesses are very convincing in assisting the court to reach the conclusion that the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest the 2019 Presidential Election. He argued further, that the lower court found that the 2nd respondent could read and write in English Language and served at the highest office in the country as the Head of State between 1983-1985 and also between 2015-2019.

He then submitted that in the face of the credentials, the 1^st^ respondent had no difficulty in presuming that the 2nd respondent was qualified to contest that election. He argued that the lower court was right in holding that the provisions of the Electoral Act2010 cannot override the clear provision of section 131, 137 and 318 1999 CFRN. He cited the case of *Shinkafi & anor v. Yari & ors *(2016) LPELR-26050 (SC), (2016) 7 [NWLR (Pt. 1511)340] (Pt. 1511) 340). He argued that the recourse to sections 76 and 31 of the Electoral Act by the appellants that it is compulsory for the 2^nd^ respondent to attach evidence of his qualification to Form CF001 was erroneous. He argued further, that Form CF001 is designed asan affidavit and the information deposed to can only be determined to be true or false by a competent court as provided in section 84 of the Electoral Act. He submitted that once the form is published and there is no objection to its contents by any person or institution within the time set out under the law at the appropriate court then the right to challenge the deposition or contents of the said form is extinguished and cannot be revisited under the guise of challenging the qualification of a candidate by virtue of Section 138 of the Electoral Act, 2010. He argued that they did not even plead the fact that the 2nd respondent was not qualified to contest the presidential election for failure to attach proof of his qualification. He submittedthat parties are bound by their pleadings and any evidence orsubmission on issues on non-attachment of certification as a basis for qualification of the 2nd respondent to contest the election is ofno moment as rightly held by the court below. He submitted also, that the court has power to raise issue suo motu and it is not in all situations that the court will call on parties to address it on that. He argued that section 138 of the Electoral Act is not designed tocreate or impose additional qualifying/disqualifying requirement oncandidate as the proposed interpretation is to construe it as making presentation of forged certificate or credential as a disqualifying factor. He submitted that since the import of this provision is about forged certificate, it therefore means that any person bringing hiselection petition on this ground must prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

He argued that the appellant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 2nd respondent lied about his academic and professional qualifications listed in exhibit P1 and also hadfailed to prove that exhibits R19, R20 and R21 were forged. Heargued that by virtue of section 89(c) of the Evidence Act, the 2^nd^ respondent having stated that his certificate was with Nigeria Army and the latter having denied that, the 2nd respondent was entitledto rely on secondary copies which is what he did by applying for a certified true copy thereof and tendered in evidence as exhibitsR19 - R21. He pointed out that in response to paragraph 4.33 of the appellants' brief the appellants cannot rely on a typographical errorin the judgment of the lower court to argue that the court relied innon existent exhibits P124 and 130 to hold that the 2nd respondent presented his certificate, to the military as the preceding, paragraphs of the judgment clearly referred to exhibits P1 and P24 in reaching its conclusion and not exhibits P.124 and P.130. He urged the courtto resolve this issue in favour of the 1st respondent.

Issue No.2 deals with whether the 2nd respondent was notduly elected by majority of lawful votes. Here, the learned counselsubmitted that the decision of the lower court that the appellantshad not proved their petition through credible evidence that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority lawful votes was correct. He argued that the appellants cannot rely on the witness statement on oath of PW60 (supposed expert who claims the existence of an imaginative 'server' belonging to INEC) to claimthat their testimonies linked the INEC result form tendered.

He cited the case of *Atiku Abubakar & ors v. Musa Yar'adu & ors *(supra). He argued that the 1st respondent did not electronically transmit the result of the presidential election into any server videsmart card readers as there is no such provision in the Electoral Act. He argued that contrary to the submission for the appellants, the power conferred by section 52 of counsel the Act on the 1^st^ respondent is to issue exhibits P.29 and P.28 for the conduct of 2019 General Election and this does not by any stretch of imagination, authorise the transmission of election results electronically. He argued that there is nothing in the manual or guidelines for theconduct of election that suggests that the 1st respondent shouldcollate and transmit election results electronically. He argued that there is nothing in the testimony of the appellants' witnesses that established the existence of server into which the result was transmitted. He referred to testimony of PW62 (Mr. Osita Chidoka), the National Collation Agents for the 2nd respondent. Under crossexamination by the 1st respondent's counsel he admitted that he was not there when the election results were transmitted into the purported server and that he had never seen the said sever.

On reliance placed by the appellants on the testimony of PW60 (a supposed expert) to establish anomalies in 11 states from where the appellants called witnesses, he submitted that by Section 67 of the Evidence Act, the opinion of any person as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue or relevant fact in issue is inadmissible, He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st respondent.

Issue No.3 deals with whether the appellant proved the allegation of corrupt practices, irregularities and non-compliance with the conduct of the election.

Here the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that having regard to the pleadings of this petition, the appellants failedto provide the particulars of how and when the votes of the 2nd and 3rd respondents were inflated and depleted. He submitted further,that appellants cannot hide under the guise of non-compliance tomake wild allegations of criminal acts against the respondents andyet seeking to take the benefit of the lesser burden of proof on the balance of probability.

On the argument of the appellants that allegation of irregularitiesis not criminal in nature to warrant proof beyond reasonable doubt,he referred to the case of Chime v. Onyia (2009) 2 [NWLR (Pt.1124) 1] (Pt. 1124) 1) where it was held thus "Allegation of allotment of votesin an election is criminal in nature and so must be pleaded with sufficient specification and be proved beyond reasonable doubt."

On allegation of non holding of election in some places by tendering VCD as exhibits PW36-83, he argued that the lowercourt was right in holding that the evidence were dumped on the court and thus cannot be relied upon by the court. He referred tothe case of Udom v. Umana (Unreported) SC1/2016 delivered on Monday, the 15th day of February, 2016, reported in (No. 1) (2016)12 [NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179]. He urged the court to also resolve thisissue in favour of the 1st respondent.

Issue No.4 deals with whether exhibits R1-R26, P85 and P86were properly admitted. He submitted that these exhibits wererightly admitted. On the argument of the appellants that these exhibits were neither pleaded nor front loaded, he submitted that documentary evidence need not be specifically pleaded in order to become admissible so long as facts by which such document is areconnected are expressly pleaded. He cited the case of Ipinlaiye v.Olukotun (1996) 6 [NWLR (Pt. 453) 148]. He argued that by virtue of the provisions contained in paragraph 41 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2010, they had option to either attach copies of documents or by listing them when attachment is not possible.He submitted that non-compliance with paragraph 48 of the 1^st^ Schedule to the Electoral Act is a mere irregularity that is curable and does not vitiate the proceedings of the lower court. He referred to the case of Abubakar v. Yar'adua (supra) at 510-511 G-D. Onthe argument that exhibits R19 and R21 were inadmissible because they were made during the pendency of this suit, he submitted that these exhibits cannot be deemed to have offended the provisions ofsection 83 of the Evidence Act on the ground that they were not made by the 2nd respondent. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st respondent and to dismiss the appeal.

In further response to the argument of the appellants' counselthe learned counsel to the 2nd respondent distilled six issues for determination.

On issue No. 1 which deals with whether the lower court was right in resolving the issue of qualification and submission of false information in favour of the respondent. The learned senior counsel argued that INEC in demonstration of acceptance of the 2^nd^ respondent's qualification has always cleared the 2nd respondent tocontest successive or previous elections in 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections. He argued that the courts have related that attendance of secondary school up to school certificate levelsuffices for qualification, as opposed to actual possession of the certificate. He cited the case of A.D. v. Fayose (2005) 10 NWLR(Pt. 932) 151 151) at 223.

On the failure of the 2nd respondent to attach his certificate toForm CF001, he submitted that the appellants have not been ableto cite any statutory provisions or judicial decision which requires that a person contesting an elective position apart from meeting the statutory constitutional provision is also required to enclose the certificate in question. He submitted that notwithstanding the factthat the 2nd respondent possesses various degrees or educational qualifications and certificates, he was not required by any lawto attach the said certificates. He argued further the appellant'spetition had no facts upon which the lower court could have accorded their allegation of non-qualification. He referred to thecase of Oshiomhole v. Airhiavbere (2013) 7 [NWLR (Pt.1353) 376]

On the allegation of non-existence of the school certificate) heargued that no single witness whether from Katsina State Ministryof Education or the school in question was called as a witness to testify regarding the date the 2nd respondent claim to have attended them. He submitted that the place of evidence in determination of action is without any iota of doubt. He cited the case of Statev. Ibangbee (1988) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 84) 548] at 577. He argue that the respondents adduced cogent and convincing evidence in establishing his educational qualification by calling RW1, RW2, RW3, RW4 and RW5 and that the appellants could not debunk any of the above testimonies of the respondents' witnesses. He argued further, that the appellants themselves tendered exhibit P.24 whichgoes a long way in buttressing the case of the 2nd respondent before the lower court.

On the allegation of submitting affidavit containing false information, he argued that these allegations were only confinedto pleading without more, as none among the 62 witnesses called by the appellants gave evidence in respect of same. He submitted that by sections 131 and 135 of the Evidence Act, such allegations must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He cited the case of Agiv. P.D.P. (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt.1595) 386] at 454-455.

On the issue of variation in the 2nd respondent's name, he submitted that it is incumbent on the appellants to come up withevidence that there is somebody else bearing the other variant ofthe name of the 2nd respondent (Mohammed Buhari) who also attended Katsina Provincial Secondary School, and graduated in 1961 showing that all the documents belong to him. He urged thecourt to resolve this issue in favour of the 2nd respondent.

On issues Nos. 2, 3 and 4 which he sought to argue together, he argued that the appellants failed to prove allegation that the 2^nd^ respondent did not win the election with the highest number ofvotes cast at the presidential election of 23rd February, 2019 and likewise they failed to prove their allegations of non-compliance and Corrupt Practices in respect of the said election. He referred to the evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4, PW6, PW17, PW36, PW40,PW59, PW61 and PW62 and submitted that the entirety of thesewitnesses' statements on oath and exhibits attached constitute acharade. He therefore submitted that the lower court was right tohave discountenanced same. He argued further, that the appellantsdid not tender any smart card reader let alone demonstrated how thePW2, PW4, PW16, PW17 and PW36 used it to collate and transmit results at their respective polling units.

On the dumping of documents on the lower court, he arguedthat the appellants had deliberately refused to establish the slightestlinkage between the said documents and any aspect of their case. He submitted that even though the lower court at the pre-hearingordered that documents be tendered from the Bar, but authoritiesare replete that when documents are tendered from the Bar, a party still has task of demonstrating before the court the relevance of eachof the said documents to his case. He referred to the case of UdomUmana (supra) among others. He submitted that the lower courtwas right in holding that the documents were dumped as it couldnot have embarked on the ex curiae investigation of the documents.He urged the court to resolve this issue against the appellants.

On the issue of use or non-use of card readers and electronics transmission of results, he argued that the appellants cannot faultthe correctness of the decision of the lower court and that no party based its claim on the use or non-use of card reader.

He cited the case of Agbaje v. INEC (2016) 4 [NWLR (Pt.1501)151] (Pt.1501) 151).

On the issue of existence of server, he submitted thateven if there exists a sever, the content of a website constitutesdocumentary evidence and by virtue of Section 86 of the EvidenceAct, content of a server cannot be given by oral evidence only butby the production of the server itself which is the only means bywhich it could be proved. He argued further, that the appellantscould not prove the identity of the person who operated INECserver with the INEC establishment and through whom informationwas downloaded from the server.

On non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act,he submitted that the appellants had duty of proving the allegationsin every polling units and in every ward. He cited the case of Uchav. Elechi (2012) 13 [NWLR (Pt.1317) 330] at 359.

On the alleged corrupt practices etc he pointed out thatmajority of the paragraphs that can sustain these allegations hadbeen struck out by the lower court in its ruling delivered on the 11thday of September, 2019 i.e. paragraphs 150, 228, 232, 233, 267,277, 299, 306(A)(B), 308, 309, 319, 322, 323, 324, 325(A), 326,328, 329, 333, 334, 348, 349, 350, 358, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369,370, 371, 372, 373(A) and 383 precisely. He then submitted that unless the court sets aside the said ruling in the sister appeals Nos.SC1217/2019, all the allegations contained in these paragraphs are merely academic and deserve no consideration because there wereno pleadings to support such allegations. He urged the court toresolve this issue against the appellant.

On issue No.5 which deals with whether the 1st and 3^rd^ respondents did elicit relevant evidence in supporting their pleadings, he submitted that the 1st and 3rd respondents cannot besaid to have abandoned their pleadings as they actively participated through cross-examination of the petitioner and respondents witnesses alike. He referred to pages 531-5467 of Vo1. 10 of the record. He submitted that a party can lead evidence on the pleading of his adversary. He cited the case of Nwachukwu v. Onuoha (1995)9 [[NWLR (Pt.421) 603]. He urged the court to resolve this issue against the appellant.

On issue No. 6 which deals with whether the court can rely onexhibits before it, he referred to pages 2383-2384 of Vo1.3 of therecord and argued that the respondents pleaded all the documents tendered and admitted as exhibits R1 - R26 as well as exhibits P.85 and P.86. He urged the court to resolve this issue against the appellants.

The learned counsel to the 3rd respondent on its part distilled 5 (five) issues for determination, find the issue distilled in the 3^rd^ respondent's brief of argument similar to the ones submitted by 1stand 2nd respondent. It may therefore be unnecessary to repeat samebecause the argument and submissions contained therein are thesame or similar in context. On the reply brief of the appellants to the1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents briefs of argument, I can safely conclude that the larger part of same had been damaged with repetitions of the argument and submission in the appellants' brief. To that extent I do not find the said reply briefs useful in consideration and determination of this appeal.

In treating this appeal, I think it will be apposite to be guided by the issues for determination formulated by the appellants in their joint brief argument and in doing so, I will consider them in themanner they were argued in the appellants' brief of argument.

Issues No. 1 & 2

This first issue queries whether the lower court was correct when it held that the appellant failed to prove that the 2nd respondent presented to the 1st respondent (INEC) an affidavit which contained false information to justify that he acquired the requisite educational qualification to qualify him to contest election into the office of President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and also whether the lower court was right in holding that as at that time, the 2^nd^ respondent was qualified to contest such election as he did.

In the first place it is not out of place to say that the first issue reproduced supra is seemingly posing an attack as propriety of the screening exercise conducted by the 1st respondent with regard to qualification of the 2nd respondent to contest election and the positive finding by lower court in that regard, it also questions the lower court's finding that the appellants woefully failed toprove that the 2nd respondent did not acquire the constitutionally recognised qualifications to contest the election in keeping with the provisions of section 76 of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended. It is also in line with the stance by the appellants that the 2nd respondent lack of such requisite qualification and that the appellants made the allegation that the 2nd respondent made false declaration in an affidavit. 26 There is no gain saying that the allegation being one of making false declaration, certainly has air of criminality in view of the provisions of section 365 of the 1999 Constitution. Being criminal in nature therefore, the accusers in this case, the appellants, have onerous or heavy task of proving such allegation beyond reasonable doubt. See Imam v. Sheriff (2005) 4 [NWLR (Pt.914) 80]at 116; *Kakih v. P.D.P. *(2014) 15 [NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374].

27 Now coming to the nature of the allegation of false declarationin Form CF001 by a candidate, I must say that such allegationwhich relates to educational qualification is in itself a pre-election matter. Such allegation must therefore be litigated at the High courtbefore the general election.

28 By the provisions of section 285(9) of the Constitution, "pre-election" matters issues should have been litigated and *disposed of within 14 days *and not after such stipulated period as in this instant case. The cause of action therefore becomes statute-barredand is thereby extinguished for all intent and purposes either as pre-election or post-election matter.

2A Now coming back to the issue of qualification, it is my considered view that the issue of qualification of a candidate to contest an election as President is covered solely by the provisions of section 131 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which I will reproduce presently. The said section reads thus:-

"Section 131 -

A person shall be qualified for election to the office of President if:-

(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth

(b) he has attained the age of forty years,

he is a member of a political party and is (c) sponsored by that political party; and

he has been educated up to at least the School (d) Certificate level or its equivalent".

It would seem to me that in their joint petition, the appellants merely hinged their complaint on the educational qualification of the 2nd respondent. In other words, the petitioners pleadings onthe qualification was relating or restricted to sub paragraph ofsection 131 of the Constitution. Since they did not challenge the other aspects of qualification covered by sub-sections of the said section.

3A The relevant and catch-phrase of the appellants' grouseon section 131(d) is that if person intends to contest election as President he can only be qualified to do so "if he has been educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent". Now the question is "what does the phrase "School certificate or its equivalent" mean". The meaning of such phrase in my view, is not far-fetched. This is because the same constitution has graciously and explicitly provided such meaning vide its section 318 which Ishall reproduce extensively below, where it provides thus:-

Section 318 -

"School Certificate or its equivalent means -

a secondary school certificate or its equivalentor Grade II Teachers Certificate, the City and (a) Guilds Certificate; or

education up to Secondary school certificate (b) level; or

Primary Six School Leaving Certificate or its (c) equivalent and -

service in the public or private sectorin the Federation in any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum(i)of ten years, and attendance at courses and training insuch institution as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totalling up to (ii)a minimum of one year, and the ability to read, write, understand and communicate in English language to the satisfaction of the Independent (iii) National Electoral Commission and

any other qualification acceptable by the Independent National Electoral (d) Commission.

29 It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words or phrases should always be accorded their true, natural or ordinary meaning. Bearing that in my mind, it will be apt to say that any Presidential election contestant shall only be qualified if he attains or possesses a "Primary School Certificate or Grade II Teachers Certificated or its equivalent such as City and Guild Certificate. Other equivalent could be accommodated such as Secondary School Level Certificate. With regard to the latter, the contestant or candidate needs not obtain a certificate as the law does not make it a condition that certificate must be obtained at all. Mereattendance of Secondary School will therefore be sufficient, in fact,even attainment of primary school leaving certificate backed with/by evidence of displaying that such candidate has served in eitherpublic or private sector in the Federation in any capacity such asthe Armed Forces or the Nigeria Police Force or other institutions established by statute.

There is no gain saying, that the second respondent attended Government Secondary School Katsina (now Government College, Katsina) before joining the Army where he rose to the rank of a Majoror General, the rank which he wore when he became the Nigeria Head of State during the Military regime of his time. Needless to say however, and it is even backed by adequate evidence adduced at during the proceedings at the lower court that the 2nd respondent besides attending primary and secondary schools, he also attendedvarious post Secondary School and Military Institutions during his career as a military officer and those training or courses in my view,could be equivalent to courses, in public service of the federation ascontemplated by section 318 of the 1999 Constitution.

30 The law istrite, that courts should not construe statute to deny a party any right he is entitled to. See Agwuna v. A.-G., Federation (1995) SCNJ 66at 72, (1995) 5 [NWLR (Pt. 396) 418].

29i It is also a cardinal principle of interpretation that counts should, while construing a provision ofstatute should give it broad, ordinary and liberal interpretation tomanifest its purpose and also should avoid narrow or conservativeconstruction. See Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC 130; Onyemav. Oputa (1987) 6 SC 362 at 371, (1987) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 60) 259].

It is pertinent to also stress that mere attendance of primary-school or secondary school even without obtaining a certificatewould satisfy the condition provided in section 318 of the sameConstitution as it relates to qualification to contest election intothe office of President of the Federation. Therefore, obtaininga certificate is not a condition precedent contemplated by theprovisions of section 318 of the Constitution (as amended).

Issue No. 3

On this issue, the appellants alleged that the 2nd respondentwas not elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election. To buttress their assertion they relied heavily on a server which they alleged belonged to the 1st respondent which according to them, they used in computing the results. Here, the lower court had adequately analysed the propriety of the existence of the server which the appellants said belonged to 1st respondent and on which they relied to compute the version of their own results as opposed to the one declared by the 1st respondent. The question that needs categorical answer in my view is, "does the 1st respondent really own that server or any server at all capable of being relied on by the appellants or anybody for that matter?". It is an elementary principle of law that "He who asserts must prove". In this instant situation, the appellants alleged that the 1st respondent owned the server theyrelied on. But on the other hand, INEC the 1st respondent totally denied existence of any such or any other server at all. It is then left for the appellants to lead cogent evidence to debunk the assertion of INEC (1st respondent) that it really owned the alleged server. This, as rightly found by the lower court, the appellants failed tolead any credible evidence to prove their assertion that INEC had really owned the server they allegedly relied on to compute its own version of the results. I cannot differ from the finding by the lower court in that regard. I also resolve this issue against the appellantsin favour of the respondents.

Issue No. 4

This issue relates to non-compliance with the Electoral Act,2010 (as amended).

18A I must straightaway state here that in orderto establish issue of non-compliance as would lead to disturbingthe result of an election it must be shown by evidence led by thepetitioners that the alleged non-compliance with the provisions ofthe Act, had substantially affected the result of the election beingchallenged. See section 139 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (asamended). In fact, where some allegations of corruption, forgeryor falsification are alleged, such allegations having the flavour ofcriminality, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See *Ojukwuv Ya'adua *(2009) 12 [NWLR (Pt.1154) 50] at 140; Imere v. Salami(1989) 2 NEPLR 131, Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 [NWLR(Pt.1482) 205] (Pt.1482) 205) at 321. It needs to be noted here, that the appellants failed to lead adequate and reliable evidence to establish what had actually transpired in various election areas in the entire nation. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 [NWLR (Pt.941) 1] at 299; *Andrew v INEC *(2018) 9 [NWLR (Pt.1625) 507]. It is my view, that the appellants also failed to prove the alleged non-compliance, asrightly found by the lower court. I resolve this issue also against thetwo appellants.

Issue No. 5

31 The grouse of the appellants on this issue is that some of thedocuments i.e. R1 - R26, P85 and P86 were wrongly admitted by thelower court even though they were not pleaded. Having rummagedthrough the record it is noted by me, that the said documentscomplained of were really pleaded. See pages 2383-2384 on Vol. 3of the record where it can be seen that they were explicitly pleaded. Even at that, it is not the law that documents which are not front-loaded are inadmissible. See *Ogboru v. Uduaghan *(2011) 17  (Pt.1277) 538) (Pt.1277) 538 538); Adamu Mohammed v. INEC (2015) LPELR-266233 (SC). It can even be observed that the documents were alluded to inthe pleadings, hence there is nothing wrong when the lower court admitted their evidence. This issue is also resolved against the appellants.

In the result, I also see no substance in this appeal. The appealis therefore hereby dismissed by me for being devoid of any meritas I did on 30th October, 2019 when we heard same. The judgment of the lower court is hereby accordingly affirmed. I decline to make any order on costs, so each party should bear his/its own costs.

EKO, J.S.C.:

On 30 October, 2019 this court unanimously dismissed this appeal. I was on that panel. I then indicated that I would give reasons for my decision later. These now are myreasons.

On 23rd February 2019, INEC, the 1st respondent conducted the Presidential Election throughout the Federation. The 1st appellant contested the election on the platform of the 2nd appellant. The 2^nd^ respondent also contested the election, but on the platform of the 3^rd^ respondent. On 27th February, 2019, the 1st respondent declared and returned the 2nd respondent the winner of the election with a total of15,191,847 votes as against the total votes of 11,262,978 ascribed to the appellants.

Dissatisfied with the return of the 2nd respondent the appellants brought their election petition to the Court of Appeal (the lowercourt), as the Presidential Election Tribunal. In paragraph 409 ofthe petition the appellants sought the following reliefs:-

That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent wasnot duly elected by a majority of lawful votes castin the said election and therefore the declaration andreturn of the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent as thePresident of Nigeria is unlawful, undue, null, void and(a)of no effect.

That it may be determined that the 1st petitioner was duly and validly elected and ought to be returned as President of Nigeria, having polled the highest number of lawful votes cast at the election to the office of the President of Nigeria held on 23rd February, 2019 and having satisfied the constitutional requirements for the(b) said election.

An order directing the 1st respondent to issue Certificate of Return to the 1st petitioner as the duly elected (c) President of Nigeria

That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent wasat the time of the election not qualified to contest the (d) said election.

That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent submitted to the commission affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his(e)qualification for the said election.

In The Alternative

That the election to the office of the President ofNigeria held on 23rd February; 2019 be nullified and a (f)fresh election ordered.

The lower court, in its considered judgment, after evidence and addresses of counsel for respective parties, dismissed thepetition on 11th September, 2019; hence this appeal. The issues inthis appeal centre round the questions -

1. Whether the 2nd respondent was qualified and/ordisqualified to contest the election; and

2. As between the appellants and the 2nd respondent, whowon the election with the majority of lawful votes castat the election

The issue of qualification or disqualification to contest theelection was fought on two sub-heads. That is -

Section 31 read together with section 318 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"); and

ii. Section 137(1)(j) of the Constitution.

2B The contention under section 131 of the Constitution is that the 2nd respondent, at the time of the election, did not possess thebasic qualification set out therein in the said section 131 to contestthe election. It is therefore necessary that the salient provisions ofsections 131 and 318 of the Constitution be set out, section 131 ofthe Constitution provides -

"131. A person shall be qualified for election to the office ofPresident if -

(a)he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;

(b)  he has attained the age of forty years

  he is a member of a political party and is (c) sponsored by that political party; and he has been educated up to at least School(d) Certificate level or its equivalent."

3B* Section 318 of the Constitution defining what "School Certificate or its equivalent" means, sets out the following -

"(a) a Secondary School Certificate or its equivalent, or Grade II Teacher's Certificate, the City and Guilds Certificate; or

  education up to Secondary School Certificate level; or

Primary School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent and -

service in the public or private sector in theFederation in *any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission *

(I) for a minimum of ten years; and attendance at courses and training in such institutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commissionfor periods totalling to a minimum of one year,

(ii) and the ability to read, write, understand and *communicate in the English language tothe satisfaction of the Independent National *

(iii) Electoral Commission; and

any other qualification acceptable by the Independent (d)National Electoral Commission;"

One would notice, upon careful perusal of paragraph the omnibus "any other qualification acceptable by the IndependentNational Electoral Commission", INEC in this regard seems to havebeen vested an enormous discretion to accept any other qualification, I notice from the appellants brief that no serious effort, if any, was made to attack the exercise by INEC of its discretion to accept any other qualification presented by the 2nd respondent INEC had in factaccepted that he was qualified to contest the Presidential Electionand had placed him on the ballot for the said election.

Still under section 318 of the Constitution the 'Public Serviceof the Federation includes 'the armed forces of the Federation or the Nigeria Police Force or other government security agencies established by law'. There is no dispute that the 2nd respondent joined the Nigerian Army from Katsina College, and was in the Army and rose to the rank of Major-General - the post he held as a Military Head of State. The 2nd respondent, indubitably attended primary school, secondary school and various post - secondaryschool military institutions. The military service that was the undoubted career of the 2nd respondent, is of course, service inthe "Public Service of the Federation" under section 318 ofthe Constitution, Reading together sections 131 and 318 of the Constitution, purposefully and without a gloss or mask-tape, I amof the firm view that any Nigerian with Primary School Leaving Certificate or its equivalent who

had been in the public service (including Militaryservice/or private Sector in the Federation in anycapacity acceptable to the Independent Nationali. Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years, and

ii. had attended courses and training in such institution*as may be acceptable *to the Independent NationalElectoral Commission for periods totalling up tominimum of a year, and

iii. has demonstrable "ability to read, write, understandand communicate in the English language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission is qualified to contest election for theoffice of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

I have no doubt about this in me. The Constitution, in sections131 and 318 thereof, is so clear and without any ambiguity on this.

29A This court in *Rabiu v. The State *(1980) 8 - 11 SC 130; (1982) 2 NCLR 117 and Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 6 SC 362 at 371; (1987) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 60) 259] had re-stated the principle that the Constitution should be given a broad and liberal construction to promote itspurpose; and that a narrow and conservative construction should beavoided, Generally, a statute must not be construed to deny partiesrelying on it a right unless the statute so states: Agwuna v. A.-G.,Federation (1995) 5 SCNJ 66 at 72; (1995) 5 [NWLR (Pt. 396) 418].

All through the whole gamut of the proceedings at the lower court there was no proof, nor was there any attempt to prove, that the educational qualification of the 2nd respondent to contest forthe office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was either not acceptable to INEC, the 1st respondent; or that INEC wasnot satisfied thereby. As I stated earlier INEC was vested enormous"discretion in this regard. I therefore have no hesitation dismissing the contention that the 2nd respondent, by virtue of sections 131 and 318 of the Constitution, was not qualified to contest for the officeof the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

28A The 2nd respondent was alleged to have presented forged certificate to INEC and therefore disqualified by virtue of section 137(1)(j) of the Constitution. For this, the appellants positedthat the facts the 2nd respondent deposed to in his Form CF001presented to INEC are false. They rely on Modibo v. Mustapha Usman & ors. SC.790/2019 of 30th July, 2019 (reported in (2020) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 1712) 470] and other pieces of evidence they extractedfrom respondent's witnesses to urge that it be declared that the 2ndrespondent was disqualified for the election to the office of thePresident having "presented a forged certificate to the Independent National Electoral Commission". The MODIBO case (supra) wasa pre-election matter. The plaintiff in that case proceeded undersection 31(1), (2), & of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended,and section 66(1)(j) of the Constitution. Section 66(1)(j) and 137(1)of the Constitution are in substance in pari materia. The issue appears to be pre-election matter for the statutory procedure for its determination is prescribed in section 31(1) - of the Electoral (j) Act, 2010, as amended, thus-

"31(1) Every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election under the provisions of this Act, submit to the Commission, inthe prescribed forms, the list of the candidates the party proposes to sponsor at the elections, provided that the Commission shall not reject or disqualify candidate(s)for any reason whatsoever.

The list or information submitted by each candidate shall be accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the candidate at the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or Federal Capital Territory, indicating that he has fulfilled all the constitutional requirements for (2)election into that office.

The Commission shall, within 7 days of the receipt of the personal particulars of the candidate, publish samein the constituency where the candidate intends to (3)contest the election.

Any person may apply to the Commission for a copy of nomination from, affidavit and any other document submitted by a candidate at an election and the Commission shall, upon payment of a prescribed fee, issue such person with a certified copy of document (4)within 14 days."

Any person who has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by a candidate in the affidavit orany document submitted by that candidate is false may file a suit at the Federal High Court, High Court if a State or FCT against such person seeking a declaration (5) that the information contained in the affidavit is false.

If the court determines that any of the information contained in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate is false, the court shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the (6) election."

The National Assembly, in its wisdom, has in subsection of section 31 of the Electoral Act vested jurisdiction in the High Court to "issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election" if it is satisfied that the information or the personal particulars of the candidate in his Form CF001 are false. Significantly, INEC does not share that power or jurisdiction with the High Court even though in section 318 of the Constitution there appears enormous powers or discretion vested in INEC to be satisfied with some basic facts of educational qualification which are acceptable to it. In order to curb these enormous powers vested (6)in INEC the National Assembly had enacted in section 31 of the Electoral Act the special procedure for the review of the powers of INEC, in this regard.

32 By virtue of section 31 of the Electoral Act the general public is empowered to screen the candidate whose personal particulars are in Form CF001 published by INEC pursuant to section 31 (1) of the said Act by way of objection. There is no evidence that appellants ever challenged, under section 31(5) of the Electoral Actall or any of the 2nd respondent's averments in his Form CF001 published by INEC pursuant to sub-section of the said section 31.

33 I should think the law is settled now on the point that -- where a special procedure for seeking a redress is by statute provided the party seeking such redress must follow such special procedure.

28Ai I think, and do hold that, disqualification of a candidate on grounds of false information in his Form CF001 is pre-electionmatter by dint of section 285(14)(c) of the Constitution. The procedure for ventilating any grievance on this is statutorily providedin section 31 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). That is to say that any party aggrieved that a candidate, in consequence of anyfalse information in his Form CF001 published by INEC has been wrongly placed on the ballot by INEC should first and foremost avail himself the procedure under section 31 of the Electoral Actby inviting the High Court to issue 'an order disqualifying thecandidate from contesting the election' pursuant to subsectionof section 31 of the Electoral Act. Whereas the procedure undersection 31 followed in Modibbo's case (supra); in the instant caseit was not. I therefore have my doubt if proper procedure wasfollowed at the lower court, as an election tribunal on the issue ofthe alleged' false information in the 2nd respondent's Form CF001and the disqualifying effect of the same.

34 The basic original jurisdiction of the lower court is providedfor in section 239(1) of the Constitution. That is:

"239(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall, to the exclusion of any othercourt in Nigeria, have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to whether -

any person has been validly elected to the office of President or Vice-President under this

(a) Constitution; or

the office of the President or Vice-President

(b) has ceased or the office of President or Vice-President has

(c) become vacant."

In the instant case, section 239(1)(a) above is more apposite.

35 The phrase "validly elected" may be so elastic (though it may not bestretched) to include whether the person allegedly "validly elected"was disqualified or not qualified in the first place to even contest the election let alone "validly elected". It is only in section 138(1)(a) ofthe Electoral Act that one finds -

An election may be questioned on the - ground that aperson whose election is questioned was, at the time ofthe election, not qualified to contest the election".

36 Even if it appears the lower court and the High Court, respectively by dint of sections 138 and 31 of the Electoral Act, share concurrent jurisdiction on whether a candidate by his alleged false declaration in his Form CF001 'shall be disqualified for theelection'; the jurisdiction vested in the High Court by section 31 ofthe Electoral Act is a special jurisdiction. The jurisdiction vestedin the lower court by section 138(1) of the same Act is largely ageneral one. By common judicial convention (which in some Rulesof Procedure e.g. Order 6 rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016) where two Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter,unless special circumstances exist, redress over such matter shallfirst sought in the inferior court - in this case, the High Court.

37 In Kuriga v. Yohama (1989) 2 NEPLR 78 at 83 it was held that the lis in the election is not the election per se, but the declarationof the election results that precipitates the election petition; and that naturally the lis cannot pre-date the announcement of the election results. In otherwords, that a lis can only come into existence after the release of the election results. It is only then or thereafter that appropriate procedural steps are taken to question or contest theelection results. The definition of (pre-election matter in section285(14) of the Constitution accords with Kuriga v. Yohama (supra)as to the lis in pre-election matter and the lis in post election matterthe subject of election petition.

I have said or shown enough why the appellants' issue on the disqualification of the 2nd respondent by the operation of section 137(1)(j) of the Constitution should have been ventilated at the High Court, as a pre-election matter by virtue section 285(9) of the Constitution and pursuant to section 31 of the Electoral Act.

The salient portions of section 31 of the Electoral Act,germane to what I am saying had earlier been reproduced, I willnow reproduce the limitation provisions of section 285(9) of the Constitution, to wit -

"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of."

The combined reading of section 285(9) of the Constitution and section 31(1), (2), (3), (4), & of the Electoral Act leads me to conclusion that whoever complains, as the appellants do, that a candidate at an election had made false declarations on oath in his Form CF001 published by INEC pursuant to section 31(1) of the Electoral Act, shall timeously; before the general election and within 14 days from the date of the publication by INEC of the allegedly false declarations in Form CF001 submitted by the candidate, file a suit at the High Court against such candidate' seeking a declaration that the information contained' in the said Form CF001 is false, And if the High Court determines, pursuant to subsection of section 31 of the Act, that any information contained in Form CF001 is false, the court 'shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate from contesting the election'. The effect of such person, complaining that the information contained in the candidate's Form CF001 is false, not filing the suit within 14 daysfrom the date of the publication by INEC of the said Form CF001pursuant to section 285(9) of the Constitution, is that the right to the cause of action arising or accruing to such person, on the grounds of any false information contained in Form CF001, is extinguished the cause of action having become statute barred.

Accordingly, once the right to the cause of action accruing or arising from the fact of submitting Form CF001 that contains false particulars or information about the candidate to INEC, has become statute barred by dint of section 285(9) of the Constitution,it remains statute barred and the right there to extinguished. Theissue or cause of action that has become statute barred and the right to enforce the same having become extinguished can no longer, and will no longer, be available to the appellants herein to subsequently litigate on in their election petition. In Modibbo v. Umar (supra) theissue of the candidate making false declarations in his Form CF001, duly certified on solemn oath, was raised timeously and determined at the High Court before the appeal on it subsequently came to thiscourt. It was a pre-election issue. That is what distinguishes thatcase from the instant in which the appellants avoided the forum proper and brought it up as a post election dispute. Modibbo v. Umar (supra) is only an authority for what it decided.

Proceedings in election litigations are sui generis in that they are unique and of their own kind or class. The courts have always insisted that the proceedings must strictly comply with the law.

On this both the judicature and the legislature are in unison. Section 139(1) of the Electoral Act provides inter alia that the results of the election shall not be disturbed unless the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Act did substantially affect the result of the election. Accordingly, where a candidate at the election had been declared and returned as the winner from the election such declaration or return should only be disturbed on firm and substantial grounds and on proved allegations and not on any fanciful or flimsy grounds: Imiere v. Salami (1989) 2 NEPLR 131.

The appellants pleaded that the 1st appellant scored a total of 18,356,732 valid votes while the 2nd respondent polled on 16,41,430 votes. In paragraphs 5.4 & 5.6 of the appellant's briefit is contended that these figures were allegedly extracted from the 1st respondent's "server into which results were electronically collated and transmitted and that the results contained in the server showed clearly that the 1st appellant won the election and not the 2nd respondent". These results are allegedly from 35 States and the Federal Capital Territory. Issues were joined on the existence or non-existence of this server.

INEC, the 1st respondent, denied the existence of this server.The denial appears preposterous in view of sections 34 and 71 ofthe Electoral Act which respectively direct INEC the 1st respondent,to post statutory notices and results of the election "showing the candidates at the election and their scores; and the person declared as elected or retuned at the election" on its website. I agree, on this point, with S.C. Oseji, JCA (who sat on the panel of the lower court) that the posting of results must be on the notice board and website. The word "and" is conjunctive which means that the result must not only be posted on the notice board, but also on the website. A website is defined by the English Dictionary as "a computer connected to the internet that maintains a series of web pages on the world wide web". It also defines a server as "a digital computer that provides work stations on a network with controlled access to shared resources". In the light of the above clarifications, it will be out of place to emphasise that as a fact duly proved as earlier indicated and by law, as per section 71 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), there exists a website managed and controlled by the 1st respondent. (Italics supplied)

The law maker is presumed to know the state of facts existing at the time legislation on such fact was enacted. If, therefore, no website existed that was managed and controlled by INEC, the 1^st^ respondent, the National Assembly should not, reasonably, have enacted sections 34 and 71 of the Electoral Act. The President ofthe Federal Republic of Nigeria could also not have assented tosuch an absurdity.

However, it is not enough that the INEC website existed as afact. The question material and germane to this appeal is: whether the appellants derived the facts on which they pleaded and calledevidence that the 1st appellant polled 18,356,732 lawful votes against the 2nd respondent's 16,741,430 votes from a lawful and legitimate source; that is, INEC official website?

By way of an admission against interest: the PW.59, undercross-examination, admitted that the appellants derived those facts from an undisclosed whistle-blower's site - *www.factdontlie.com.*which is not a legitimate or official INEC website. This website -www.factsdontlie.com, is nothing but a rumour peddling site. On this the lower court made the very adverse finding of fact at page 6161 of the record, in discrediting and disbelieving the PW.59,thus:

His evidence is that the whistle blower's Data Analysis- Facts don't lie website - www.factsdontlie.com that the report of his expertise (sic-expert) evidence was based. He variously referred to the owner of website asthe whistle blowers, anonymous and the author of the content of the website, claimed to be an INEC staff.The PW.59 - (as) could be seen in his evidence did notrely on any data gotten by him from an INEC server.

The 1st respondent submits correctly on this that this adverse, albeit fundamental, finding of fact was not appealed. An adverse finding of fact not appealed subsists between the parties. It remains binding on the parties and it is deemed acceptable to them: Anyanwuv. Ogunenwe (2014) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 1410) 437] at 470. This adverse finding of fact appears to me to have punctured the appellants' balloon and had it wholly deflated. The appellants clung to that deflated artifice to make their contention that they won the election by the majority of lawful votes cast at the election. The floating aircastle wherein the appellants sought this refuge has thus crashed miserably. The failure of this issue is fundamental. It transcendsall claims of the appellants to having won the election with the majority of lawful votes cast at the election.

38 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations a partyis entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court ortribunal established by law, but only upon legal or lawful evidence that is credible. The INEC's unpatriotic denial of the existence of its official website entitled the appellants to call secondary evidence; but not hearsay or illegal evidence. Election disputes and proceedings being special or sui generis require the proof of facts on which they are premised to be proved on the credible evidence other than mere rumour mongery peddled by witnesses who cannot even vouch, for the authenticity of the source of the very facts they testified on like www.facgsdontlie.com.

Three key witnesses called by the appellants to establish that they won the Presidential Election with majority of lawful voteswere discredited for their, either, not being experts so called or that they came to peddle only hearsay evidence. The PW60 was found to have contradicted and discredited himself and his evidence. The PW.62 admitted under cross-examination that his entire evidence was hearsay. This apart the lower court, at page 6235 of the record, found his evidence incredible for his fantastically outrageous claim to omnipresence at some of the spots or places that malpractices were allegedly committed.

For the alleged inflation of votes; the appellants predicated their case largely on the discredited PW.59, PW.60 and PW.62. The allegations, being criminal in nature, require proof beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of section 135 of the Evidence Act. Seealso Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1; Omoboriowo v. Ajasin(1984) 1 SCNLR 108. Hearsay evidence, an inadmissible evidence, cannot discharge the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt cast onthe appellants.

The appellants pleaded against some individuals and organisations (including the Police and Army) who were not made parties to the petition, as respondents, allegations of corrupt practices and illegal interference with the conduct of the election. These are not INEC officials or staff. 39 The settled principle of law, particularly in the area of fair hearing jurisprudence and criminal responsibility, is that: there is no vicarious liability in the realm of criminal law. Criminal liabilities are borne personally by culpritsand/or other participes criminis. Since criminal liabilities operateon the individual on the basis of his mens rea, criminal responsibilityis personal and not vicarious: Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) FWLR(Pt. 186) 709 at 726, (2005) 13 (Pt. 941) 1; Akpa v. The State (2008)14 [NWLR (Pt. 1106) 72]; Dina v. Daniel (2010) 11 [NWLR (Pt.1204) 137] (Pt. 1204) 137) at 158. Accordingly, a person (other than INEC staffor officials) against whom allegations of criminal nature are madein an election petition must be given an opportunity to be heardand to defend himself: section 36(1) & of the Constitution: Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2005) 18 [NWLR (Pt. 956) 96]; Waziri v. Geidam (2015) LPELR - 2604 (CA), (2016) 11 [NWLR (Pt. 1523) 230]. Thefore going under scores why the non-joinder to the petition persons (other than INEC staff or officials) against whom serious allegations of criminal nature and corrupt practices were made in petition fatal to the petition.

On the footing of my foregoing stance I hold the firm view that the lower court properly dismissed the petition. I find no good cause to disturb the decision of the lower court. The appeal lacking in substance is, accordingly, dismissed.

Parties shall bear their respective costs.

ABBA AJI, J.S.C.:**

This appeal was argued on the 30th October, 2019. The court unanimously dismissed the appeal as lacking in merit. These are my reasons for dismissing the appeal:

The appellants as petitioners filed their petition on 18/3/2019 seeking the following reliefs:

That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes cast in the said election and therefore the declaration andreturn of the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent as the President of Nigeria is unlawful, undue, null and of noeffect.

ii. That it may be determined that the 1st petitioner wasduly and validly elected and ought to be returned as President of Nigeria, having polled the highest numberof lawful votes cast at the election to the office of the President of Nigeria held on 23rd February 2019 and having satisfied the constitutional requirements for the said election.

iii. An order directing the 1st respondent to issue Certificate of Return to the 1st petitioner as the duly elected President of Nigeria.

iv. That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent wasat the time of the election not qualified to contest thesaid election.

v. That it may be determined that the 2nd respondent submitted to the commission affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification for the said election.

In the alternative

vi. That the election to the office of the President of Nigeria held on 23rd February 2019 be nullified and afresh election conducted.

The 1st respondent conducted the Presidential Election on 23/2/2019, wherein the 2nd respondent polled 15,191,847 while the 1st appellant trailed behind him with polled votes of 11,262,978. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent was declared winner and returnedas the President of Nigeria. Dissatisfied, the appellants petitioned the respondents at the Presidential Election Petition Tribunal on 18/3/2013. After the hearing, the tribunal gave judgment in favourof the respondents, hence this appeal before this honourable court.

The appellants' appeal before this court vide a notice of appeal, formulated 5 issues for the determination of this appeal thus:

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it heldthat the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent submitted to the 1st respondent an affidavit containing false information of a fundamental nature in aid of his qualification to contest the election to the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it heldthat the 2nd respondent was not at the time of theelection qualified to contest the said election.

3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the appellants did not prove that the 2nd respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the said election held on 23rd February, 2019.

4. Whether by virtue of the evidence adduced before the Court of Appeal, the appellants did not establish non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) substantial to vitiate the election and return of the 2^nd^ respondent by the 1st respondent.

5. Whether the Court of Appeal was right in law when it relied on "overall interest of justice" to hold that the 2nd respondent's exhibits R1-R26, P85 and P86 were properly admitted in evidence.

Issues 1 and 2 basically border on the academic and relevant qualification of the 2nd respondent as at the time of the contested Presidential Election of 23/2/2019. One of the gravamen of the appellants is on exhibit P1 wherein the 2nd respondent deposed *"That all my academic qualification documents as filled in mypresidential Form, President APC/001/2015 are currently with the Secretary Military Board as at the time of this affidavit." *To the appellants, this affidavit runs foul to section 138(1)(e) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), which invariably reveals the falsehood in the deposition of the 2nd respondent.

2C The issue of qualification to contest a Presidential Election is clearly spelt out by the Constitution of the Nigeria. Section 131 ofthe 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides:

"A person shall be qualified for election to the officeof the President if ... he has been educated up to at least School Certificate level or its equivalent."

3C What amounts to "School Certificate level or its equivalent "was not left unturned by the said Constitution, when in section 318,the meaning was dilated as follows:

"A Secondary School certificate or its equivalent or Grade II teacher certificate or its equivalent, the City and Guild Certificate; or Education up to Secondary School certificate level; or Primary SixSchool leaving certificate or its equivalent, andservice in the public or private sector in the Federationin any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years,and attendance at courses and training in suchinstitutions as may be acceptable to the IndependentNational Electoral Commission for periods totalingup to a minimum of one year, and the abilityto read, write, understand and communicate in the English language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission, and any other qualification accepted by the Independent National Electoral Commission."

In to wing this constitutional requirement, the 2nd respondent in proof supplied and tendered exhibits R19-R26 encompassing his least qualification to contest the Presidential Election, as listed under section 318 of the Constitution.

He who asserts must prove has become a bed rock of our law of evidence. Although the case of the appellants herein does not seem to me to be that of disqualification as I have observed but seems to be on the false information on qualification supplied.

However, I have keenly observed the constitutional provision that made the minimum benchmark of educational qualification not to be only on non-presentation or non-submission of certificates (which is not and cannot be the basis for disqualification), but whether the candidate has possessed other qualifications to make him qualified. In clarity, the Constitution has unfortunately to my mind, made it that even where the person does not possess a Secondary School Certificate, he can be qualified by the combined effect of sections 131 and 318 of the Constitution, if, he is "educated up toat least School Certificate level or its equivalent". The Constitution goes further to define what the equivalent of a Secondary certificate can mean in section 318, which includes:

"the City and Guild Certificate; or Education upto Secondary School Certificate level; or PrimarySix School leaving certificate or its equivalent, andservice in the public or private sector in the federationin any capacity acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for a minimum of ten years, and attendance at courses and training in suchinstitutions as may be acceptable to the Independent National Electoral Commission for periods totaling up to a minimum of one year, and the abilityto read, write, understand and communicate in the English language to the satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission, and any other qualification accepted by the Independent National Electoral Commission." Further, the Constitution again sadly makes the academic and relevant qualification of a candidate to election into the office of President to be requisite and added qualification on attendance of courses and training and subject to the "acceptance or satisfaction of the Independent National Electoral Commission.

6A The Constitution in the above provisions gave a litany of academic and other relevant qualifications that are not conjunctive but disjunctive. The use of the word "or" three times and "and" severally that follows after means that the certificate required mustnot only be that Secondary School Certificate but even Grade IIteacher certificate., the City and Guild certificate; or Education up to Secondary School Certificate level; or Primary Six Schoolleaving certificate" in addition to other relevant experience and/ortraining and courses that will be considered in the acceptance and/or satisfaction of INEC to make the candidate qualified to contestand become the President of Nigeria.

Thus, by virtue of the deposition of the 2nd respondent inexhibits R19-R26, he can be qualified even in the absence of thecontested Secondary School Certificate since exhibit R19 (GradeII Certificate of 1961) is one of the minimum requirement for his qualification, and no fuss was made on that by the appellants.

40 As touching the falsehood deposed in his affidavit, where a lieor falsehood is exposed to a particular thing, the defect is againstthat which is affected. The falsehood deposed to has not affected all the depositions in exhibits R19-R26 since the case of the appellants have abundantly been on the secondary school certificate. Per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, in *Maihaja v. Gaida *(2017) LPELR-42474 (SC);(2018) 4 [[NWLR (Pt. 1610) 454]:

"My understanding of subsection of section 31 is that the false information complained of must relateto the constitutional requirements for election intothe office in dispute, in this case the requirements of section 177 & of the Constitution."

The law that you cannot put something on nothing and expectit to stand applies where the stratum or foundation is completely destroyed. As earlier pointed out, the 2nd respondent has another foundation, exhibit R19 (Grade II Certificate of 1961), wherein his qualification can stand, even if the other is destroyed. What Iimply here is that the Secondary School Certificate and Grade II Certificate are of the same coordinate foundation and qualification, as so defined by the Constitution.

41* Another arm here is that the 2nd respondent is known as Muhammadu Buhari and not Mohamed Buhari as borne in his certificate, which makes the certificate or the 2nd respondent dubious or that the certificate is forged or contrived and concocted. I still insist that the law is sacrosanct that he who asserts must prove. To any ordinary Nigerian and to the mind of the law, this mistakecan easily be committed either by the owner of the name or the inscribers of the name. As to the etymology of either "Mohamed"or "Muhammadu", only the appellants can prove this since theywant to assert that it is not the same name or meaning. But thepoint here is whether the name refers to the same person as the2nd respondent in this case or not. I have not seen anywhere that the appellants proved otherwise that the name belongs to another person that is now borne by the 2nd respondent. This is not evenin the category of errors or ground that can qualify to disqualify a candidate to the office of a President. It is simply remediable byaffidavit at the instance of the 2nd respondent where it is contested with regard to his real identification and true person. If, however, the case of the appellants is that the name is also forged, I standto declare that it is also not a ground for disqualification. Anydifference as pointed out by the appellants in the name of the 2ndrespondent must impact directly on his requisite qualification tocontest the Presidential Election. This similarly played out when per Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun, JSC in Maihajav. Gaida (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC); (2018) 4 [NWLR (Pt. 1610)] (Pt. 1610) 454) [454] (Pt. 1610) 454) held thus:

"If there is any discrepancy in the age of a candidate, itmust have a bearing on the constitutional requirement before it can have the effect of disqualifying him...It was also held in this case that there must be evidence of an intention by the candidate to circumvent the provisions of the Constitution. There was none established in this case."

For all I have laboured to present in the foregoing submissions and sundry, this court has settled this matter before now. The appellants should rather base their case on substance and not ontechnical strings. Per Clara Bata Ogunbiyi, JSC in Agi v. PDP &ors (2016) LPELR-42578(SC); (2017) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386], loudly and elaborately held concerning this:

"The support for the foregoing conclusion, is as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 2^nd^ respondent, because a person who is qualified tocontest an election by virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) cannot be disqualified by the operation of any other law inforce in Nigeria. The Constitution takes precedence over all other laws. Therefore, where there is a matter of alleged falsification of a document or rendering ofa false statement as alleged in this case, it must relateto a qualifying or disqualifying factor by virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

42 The office of Governor of a State was created by virtue of section 176(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the qualification to hold that office was established by section 177 thus:

"177. Person shall be qualified for election to th eoffice of Governor of a State if --

(a) he is a citizen of Nigeria by birth;

he has attained the age of thirty-five (b)years;

he is a member of a political party and(c)is sponsored by that political party; and

he has been educated up to at least School(d)Certificate level or its equivalent."

It is pertinent to state in a strong term that theappellant did not allege an infraction of any ofthe subsections enumerated under section 177of the Constitution (supra); I seek to restate also that the use of word "shall" prescribes the factor which "shall" qualify a candidate to occupy theoffice of a Governor of a State. Any attemptby another law to alter the provision except bythe Constitution itself shall be rendered of no-effect. See the cases of INEC v. Musa (2003) 3 [NWLR (Pt. 806) 72] at 205 and ANPP v.Usman (2008) 12 [NWLR (Pt. 1100) 1 at 54-55.Section 31 of the Electoral Act did not byany stretch of imagination create new groundsof disqualification or non-qualification."

The end of what I mean is that the 2nd respondent has not supplied anything false in aid that directly or otherwise affects his qualification to contest the office of the President in the election of 23/2/2019 and therefore was qualified to contest the said election.This issue is resolved against the appellants.

The remaining three issues shall be considered together asto whether there was substantial non-compliance to declare theappellants the winner or order a fresh election.

It is the case of the appellants that by the figures in the 1^st^ respondent's server from the results of elections covering the 35 States and the FCT, the appellant scored 18.356,732 valid voted against the scores by the 2nd respondent of 16,741,430 votes, with a margin of 1,615,302 votes. This was allegedly and purportedly proved through PW2, PW3, PW4, PW16, PW17, PW36 and PW59, demonstrating that the 1st respondent has a server into which results were electronically collated and transmitted. On the other hand, the respondents' case is that the 2nd respondent won the Presidential Election of 23/2/2019 with total votes of 15,191,847 ahead ofthe appellants who scored 11,262,978, gapping him with about 3,818,869 votes.

43 I am fully in support of the fact that electronic voting orelectronic transmission of election results is and ought to be partand parcel of our voting system and the means of proving same. Documents produced by computers are an increasingly commonfeature of all businesses and spheres of life, and more and morepeople are becoming familiar with their uses and operation. Computers vary immensely in their complexity and in theoperations they perform. The nature of the evidence to dischargethe burden of showing that there has been no improper use of the computer and that it was operating properly will inevitably varyfrom case to case. The evidence must be tailored to suit the needs of the case. I suspect that I will very rarely be necessary to call an expert and that in the vast majority of cases it will be possible to discharge the burden by calling a witnesses who is familiar with the operation of the computer in the sense of knowing what the computer is required to do and who can say that it is doing itproperly. In actual fact, section 84 of the Evidence Act, consecrates two methods of proof, either by oral evidence under section 84(1)and or by a certificate under section 84(4). In either case, theconditions stipulated in section 84(2) must be satisfied. However, this is subject to the power of the Judge to require oral evidencein addition to the certificate. Proof that the computer is reliablecan be provided in tow ways: either by calling oral evidence or by tendering a written certificate subject to the power of the Judge torequire oral evidence. It is understandable that if a certificate is tobe relied upon, it should on its face that it is signed by a person whofrom his job description can confidently be expected to be a personto give reliable evidence about the operation of the computer. Thisenables the defendant to decide whether to accept at its face value or to ask the Judge to require oral evidence which can be challengedin cross-examination. See per Nweze, JSC in Dickson v. Sylva &ors (2016) LPELR-41257(SC); (2017) 8 [NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167].

The use of computer and computer-generated evidence isinescapably indispensable in this age we are in. For as much as it isvery advantageous, it can be very disadvantageous, since garbage in, garbage out, is always the result. When falsehood is garbagedinto it, it gives out falsehood, and when truth is garbaged into it, it gives out truth. Hence, the caution as warned by Nweze, JSC, above in proving computer-generated evidence.

The case of the appellants appear very cogent and believingsince almost everything done and generated by the computer isbased on "seeing is believing", and reasoning and logic or even jurisprudence may be thrown overboard. He who pays the piperdictates the tune of the music. We have seen how the computerhas been used these days to spread believable and credible stories which by inquisitions turned out to be lies and false! In the absence of the checks and balances provided by the Evidence Act above, any party can hire any computer expert to play out its case to the belief of the public. Nevertheless, the law courts or the legal sphere is not a place for such display since every fact must be proved by provable and best evidence.

44 The case here as in all civil matters must be based on the preponderance of evidence adduced by either of the parties for substantial compliance or otherwise to be proved. It must thereforebe noted that the law of evidence requires a party to prove its caseby calling the best evidence available. This is what is referred to as the Best Evidence Rule. See Onu, JSC in *Ezemba v. Ibeneme & anor *(2004) LPELR-1205(SC); (2004) 14 [NWLR (Pt. 894) 617]. Tobe repetitive, the general rules of evidence contain the best evidencerule by which it is said that the best evidence must be given and that no evidence will be given in substitution of the best evidence unless strictly under some laid exceptions. Ordinarily, the opposing party is at a disadvantage in having evidence of a witness received against him whom he cannot see and cannot question in the current proceedings even though he had the opportunity of cross-examining the witness in the earlier proceedings. It is not, therefore, asking too much for the law to require the party who is taking the advantage of the evidence of his witness being received as true without thewitness appearing physically to testify, to strictly comply withthe provisions of the section of the law bestowing upon him that advantage. See per Uwaifo, JSC in Shanu v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2002) LPELR-3036 (SC); (2002) 17 [NWLR (Pt. 795) 185].

In the case played out here, the appellants paraded PW2, PW3,PW4, PW16, PW17, PW36 and PW59, to give the 'best' evidence to prove the pleading and assertion that the appellants scored the majority of votes in the said Presidential Election. The evidence each gave is to basically establish the evidence of PW59 to prove the existence of the 1st respondent's server wherein all the collated results were electronically fed into the server. Nevertheless, none of the witnesses who ought to be expert or vital witnesses qualified assuch or gave any direct evidence to establish substantial compliance or non-compliance as the case may be. Besides, the oral evidence given went contrary to the depositions made by each of them or amounted to hearsay.

45 It is therefore elementary law that oral evidence must be consistent with the pleadings, whether it is the statement of claim or the statement of defence or the witness statement on oath. This is because the case of the parties is erected by the pleadings and parties do not have the freedom to move out of the pleadings insearch of a better case. Evidence which is at variance with thepleadings will go to no issue. See Per Tobi, JSC in Okoko v. Dakolo(2006) LPELR-2461 (SC); (2006) 14 [NWLR (Pt. 1000) 401].

The evidence of PW59 concerning the server, on which all other evidence confluenced to, crashed and crumbled when he evinced that the websitewww.factsdontlieng.com has no ascertainable domain, anonymous, and does not have the features of a regular and authentic website. The evidence of PW60, and expert statistician, also went awry.

By the analysis done by the appellants in their brief from page 30-32 it shows that the appellants ought to be leading the 2nd and 3rd respondents with about 222, 332 votes. This is the case of the appellants. The respondents' case however is that the margin is 3,818,869 votes. When the two margins or differences are ascertained, can it be said that there was substantial non-compliance to invalidate the election or order a fresh election. 46 The doctrine of substantial compliance is that its consideration will only arise where the petitioners have succeeded in establishing substantial non-compliance with the principles of the Electoral Act, etc. or, in the alternative, substantial effect on the election result of any infraction of the said Act, etc. no matter how minuscule the transgression may be. See per Nweze, JSC in Omisore & anor v. Aregbesola & ors (2015) LPELR-24803 (SC); (2015) 15 [NWLR] (Pt. 1482) 205) [(Pt. 1482) 205] (Pt. 1482) 205). Of a truth, the appellants have not proved their petition to warrant voiding the election or ordering a fresh election.Thus, issue is resolved against the appellants.

Having read in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad, CJN, I support his reasoning and conclusions that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

This appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety and I equally abide as to order of costs made by my learned brother.

Appeal dismissed.