issues & processes of appeal in election petition matters

Q1769. Can an appellate court receive additional evidence on appeal against the decision of an election petition tribunal?

The answer is yes upon the existence of some conditions. The duty of an appellate court is always to determine from the cold facts on records whether the trial court came to the right decision on the evidence placed before it from both sides and whether the trial court or tribunal has correctly applied the law to the facts before it. This was the decision of the court in** AKINWALE V. AMODU (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 206) 710 at 716-717** The import of this is that the appellate courts are not constituted for the purpose of receiving any new or additional evidence. However the Rules of Court of Appeal provide clearly for adducing additional evidence on appeal before that court in its appellate jurisdiction if the Appellant is able to satisfy certain requirements.

Q1770. What are the guiding principles or conditions upon which an appellate court in its appellate jurisdiction can receive additional evidence?

The appellate courts have elucidated certain principles being conditions of admitting such evidence which are so stringent that there exist only few instances before our courts where such adducing of evidence was granted by the court. The principles were outlined in the case of** OKPANAM V. SGE NIG LTD 7 NWLR (Pt. 559) 537 as follows**;

  • The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been with reasonable diligence obtained for use at the trial, or a matter which has occurred after the judgment in the trial court.
  • The evidence should be such that, if admitted, it would have an important, not necessarily crucial effect, on the whole case, and
  • The evidence must be such as is apparently credible in the sense that it is capable of being believed, and it need not to be incontrovertible.
  • It mu

st be stated that the discretion to grant leave to adduce new evidence is invariably exercised for the furtherance of justice. The court held in the case of BABALOLA V. SUNDAY (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1128) 441 at 470 thus; “There is of course the very real and present danger of allowing a person who for one reason or another, had called insufficient evidence at the trial, with relative ease to bring forward for the first time before this court the evidence which could have, but was not adduced before the tribunal” The courts will guard against the above scenario but will also make room for the adducing of vital additional evidence where it is satisfied that the conditions and guiding principles stated above are met. The procedure for this is to bring a motion before the Court of Appeal supported by an affidavit which will contain a deposition of facts in line with the conditions required for adducing additional evidence, and attach a copy of the proposed piece of evidence to the affidavit in support of the motion.

Q1771. Where a candidate was returned as elected in an election and consequently put in an office, if later his victory was invalidated by the tribunal, will he need to vacate the office until after the appeal process is exhaustively/conclusively dispensed with?

The answer is no. The law is settled that a candidate that was returned after election but whose election was invalidated by the election tribunal shall remain in office pending the determination of the Appeal. In the course of garaging against a vacuum the Constitution provides a 21 day period for the party who lost at the tribunal to file his Notice of Appeal against the decision of the tribunal invalidating his election. Where he fails to file within the statutory period, the decision of the tribunal may be enforced, but where he does appeal, he is to remain in office pending the outcome of the judgment upon the appeal. See Section 138 of the Electoral Act, 2022. See also **MADUAKO V. ONYEJIOCHA (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1134) 259 at 275 **

Q1772. Can a respondent on appeal against the court or election tribunal’s judgment that declared him winner or entered judgment in his favour, take liberty of the appeal hearing to attack the judgment. How may he do so if he feels strongly that there is/are area(s) the judgment did not do justice or failed to reflect some aspects of the facts pleaded and argued at the hearing?

The answer is no. In the case of NJABA L.G.C. V. CHIGOZIE (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1218) 166 at 192, it was held as follows; “If they were dissatisfied with the decisions of the High Court, the only option is to appeal against the judgment and not to make themselves respondents on appeal. It is quite elementary that the role of a respondent is to defend the judgment appealed against. If a party who succeeded at first instance and is a respondent on appeal wishes to depart from that rule by attacking the judgment appealed against in any manner, he is obliged by the rules of court to file a cross-appeal.” See- OBI V. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 565 at 673.

Q1773. Are there cases where the Federal High Court can sit on appeal over the decisions of the National Assembly Election Petition Tribunal (which would normally head the way of the Court of Appeal)?

The answer is no. The Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to stray into the realm exclusively reserved for election tribunals. Where the Constitution gives jurisdiction to the election tribunal to the exclusion of all other courts or tribunal, the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, the Election Petition Tribunal ranks as a court of coordinate jurisdiction with the FHC. **NABARUMA V. OFFORDILE (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 599 paras **

Q1774. Where a party is dissatisfied with an interlocutory decision of the Election petition tribunal, can he appeal against it?

The answer is yes. The decisions in ORUBU V NEC and other cases that there cannot be appeals against interlocutory decisions of Election Tribunals has been overruled by the recent case of ATIKU V. YAR’DUA SUIT NO. SC 288/2007 reported in (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 465. The position of the law currently is that interlocutory decisions of the election petition tribunal are appealable. But the Appellant still runs the risk of fallen victim of the time limitations in election petition cases as the fact that he goes on appeal does not suspend the time from running.** Section 285(6) and (7) of the Constitution of the FRN 1999**, provides the time within which an election tribunal and the Court of Appeal shall deliver their judgment. A court that extends the time provided therein would be wrong, as that would amount to judicial legislation, the preserve of the legislature. See- ABALOLA V. SUNDAY (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1128) 414 at 462

Q1775. Does the Court of Appeal have power to extend time for the filing of Briefs of Argument in Election Petition cases?

The answer is yes. The power to do so has been doubly provided by the Electoral Act and the Court of Appeal Rules. Such time enlargement is limited to the doing of a particular thing but still, everything about any particular election petition case, whether at the trial court/tribunal or appellate courts of Appeal Court and Supreme Court, must not go beyond the time allowed by the law See HARUNA V. MODIBBO (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 487 at 584.

Q1776. What is the attitude of the court to a defective Appellant’s Brief?

Whether it is about election petition matter or a normal civil cause, the law is that no matter how defective the brief is, the court should consider the brief and make out what it can of it. The appeal should be considered on its own merit and the court should turn a blind eye to the defective nature of the brief. See OBIH V. MBAKWE & ORS (1984) 1 SCNLR 192; PDP V. APP (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) 238 at 244