Election Petition is distinct and in a class of its own, different from the general civil proceedings. Separate from the Federal and State High Courts, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) in Section 285 established in each State of Nigeria and Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, at least one Election Tribunals with the exclusive jurisdiction to take charge, preside and determine petitions as to whether:
285(1) a. any person has been validly elected as a member of the National Assembly, or b. any person has been validly elected as a member of the House of Assembly of a State
In sub-section(2) of Section 285 of the CFRN, the Governorship Election Tribunal is also established to handle petitions arising from the Governorship elections.
Notwithstanding that the Election Tribunals are like trial courts, courts of first instance, their membership are constituted of at least three (3) judges of high Courts. Judges are not appointed freshly into Election Tribunals. See CHIEF COLLINS OBI V. CHIEF SAM MBAKWE (1984) 15 NSCC 127.
Other peculiar characteristic of election tribunals is that they seasonal (election cycles) tribunals with narrow jurisdiction of only matters arising out of conduct elections, and do also operate under very clear time limitations.
In the case of ORUBU V. N.E.C. (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 94) 323 where the Appellant relied on what he believes to be the proper rule in a normal civil proceedings that his opponent in an action whom he did not join in his initial electoral petition against 1st – 13th Respondents (N.E.C. and it’s officials) but later brought an ex-parte application to join as the 14th Respondent and to restrained from being sworn into office. He was obliged. The 14th Respondent’s application on Notice that his name be struck out was refused. The 14th Respondent/Appellant appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal. The Petitioner/Applicant raised a preliminary objection that the Appellant had no right of appeal being that there was not yet a decision on the petition to confer right of appeal on anybody. The Court of Appeal disagreed with him, insisting that the matter was election petition which is in a class of its own with its peculiar rules and procedure, and that since the appeal was against the order of injunction there was a competent right of appeal, and so went ahead to hear the appeal and discharged the order of injunction against the swearing in of the Appellant.
Mr Orubu appealed against this decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. Dismissing his appeal, the Supreme Court held that:
Election petitions are proceedings ‘sui generis’ which are not considered to be identical with other proceedings [Obih v. Mbakwe (1984) 1 SC 325 referred to]. Thus, although the High court is empowered to exercise the same control over the proceedings in election petitions as in civil proceedings and to assimilate as nearly as possible the practice and procedure of the High Court in exercise of its civil jurisdiction, and to apply the civil procedure rules with such modifications as may be necessary to render them conveniently applicable as enacted in paragraph 51 (1) of Schedule 3 of Decree 37 of 1987, there are still differences traceable to the governing statute.
Emphasising the peculiar nature of election petition proceedings in the case of OBASANYA V. BABAFEMI (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 1 the Court of Appeal made it clear that an election petition trial is not the same thing as what obtains in the general civil trial proceedings as everything relating to issues of democratic elections is regarded as a special matter that touches on the very existential fabric of the Nation State. The Court therefore attributed the peculiarity of election petitions cases, the great aura of importance in which they held to how dependent the wellbeing of the democratic society rests on election outcomes.
Another factor that emphasizes the sui generis nature of election petition proceedings has to do with how, because of the urgency of matters of election petitions and election result declarations, and time being of the essence, there is strict compliance with the statutory time frame in such a way and manner that could raise the question of whether the sacred principle of fair hearing is not being sacrificed on the altar of speed.
In this Obasanya case it was held that there can be no reason for extending the period within which the proceedings could be allowed to go beyond the time prescribed by the Electoral Act.