The Supreme Court held in this case that where a crime is alleged to have been committed, punishment without a trial and conviction under the Criminal or Penal code is a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Nigerian Constitution and any sanction imposed is null and void.

The court held in this case that if a public authority departs from the conditions laid down in the law empowering it, an order of mandamus will lie against it to compel it to do its duty.

In this case, the plaintiff brought an action for a writ of habeas corpus to issue on the Commissioner of Police, Western State for his release from detention. The complaint of the applicant was that he was unlawfully detained in the police station at Ibadan and had not been told the reason for his detention. The defendant admitted detaining the appellant and based his authority to do so on Orders Extensions 1 and 2 purported to have been made by the Inspector General of Police by virtue of the powers granted him by the Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree and that the arrest and detention of the applicant was in the interest of public order. The Court of Appeal held in favor of the plaintiff applicant and affirmed the issue of habeas corpus by the trial court and ordered that the applicant be released forth-with.

The court held in this case that the Legislature cannot bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject matter there can be no implied appeal.

The court held in this case that no government can bind its successor.

The Supreme Court held in this case that an Act is null and void where the National Assembly fails to follow the prescribed legislative procedure for passing it into law.

The Supreme Court held that written constitutions are contemplated as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every government must be that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.

The court held in this case that where identical legislations on the same subject matter are validly passed by virtue of their constitutional powers to make laws by the National Assembly and a State House of Assembly and a State House of Assembly, it would be inappropriate to invalidate the identical law passed by the State House of Assembly on the ground that the law passed by the National Assembly has covered the whole field of that particular subject matter.

The Supreme Court in stating what a constitution is, stated that a constitution is the organic law, a system or body of fundamental principles according to which a nation, a state, or body or organization is constituted and governed.

The Supreme Court held in this case that it is the duty of all courts to give effect to the Constitution and parties in a suit cannot by consent or acquiescence or failure to object nullify the effect of a Constitution.

The court held in this case that it is both a fundamental and elementary principle of Nigerian law that the constitution is the basic law of the land. It is the supreme law and its provisions have binding force on all authorities, institutions and persons throughout the country. All other laws derive their force and authority from the constitution.

In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of an Edict in the High court and sought an order of certiorari to quash the order of a tribunal. The court held that that the order was not ultra vires and the Edict was validly made however, the Federal Government validated the subject matter of the action and ousted the jurisdiction of the court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that the structure of the constitution is based on separation of powers and that based on the concept, the Military Government ought not to exercise judicial powers that is the function and jurisdiction of the courts.

However, the decision of the Supreme Court was overruled and set aside by the Federal Government by the promulgation of the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970 which ousted the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into the validity of any Decree or Edict.

In this case where the Parliament of Sri Lanka passed a law which was to take effect retrospectively to cover a coup d'état which the appellants allegedly took part in, the Privy Council held that the Act, directed as it were, to the trial of particular prisoners charged with particular offences on a particular occasion, was retroactive and ostensibly a legislative judgment and involved a usurpation of the judicial powers of the courts and was inconsistent with the written constitution of Sri Lanka which manifested an intention to secure in the judiciary a freedom from political, legislative an executive control.

The court held in this case that a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.

The Supreme Court held in this case that an Edict made by a Military Governor which is inconsistent with any law made by the Federal Military Government before or after it comes to power is void to the extent of its inconsistency.

The court held in this case that under the doctrine of covering the field, where the Federal Government has validly legislated on any matter, any State Legislation on the same matter which is inconsistent with the Federal Legislation will be void to the extent of the inconsistency.

In this case, the Supreme Court examined the position of the Constitution both under a democratic government and under a military regime. The court stated that normally, in a democratic system of Government, the Constitution is supreme and all laws flow from the Constitution and any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is void under Section 1 of the Nigerian Constitution while in a Military regime, a different situation arises whereby the Constitution itself is subordinate to a decree of the Federal Military Government and in some cases, even to the Edict of the Military Government of a State.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by the doctrine of separation of powers, the executive, legislature and judiciary have their respective roles constitutionally delineated. Law making is exclusively within the purview of the Legislature as guaranteed under Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered) provides for separation of power between the three distant organs, the legislature, Executive and judiciary. The Constitution does not allow one out of the three to usurp the powers conferred on any of the other two. See also Ugwuanyi v. Nicon Insurance Plc. (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1366) 546.

The court held in this case that while the constitution diffuses power, the better to secure liberty. It also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable Government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness, but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Sections 4,5 and 6 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Constitution provides for three distinct branches of government; the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. To each of these arms of Government, the Constitution has assigned distinct and well defined roles, duties and responsibilities. To the legislature, both National and States, the onerous responsibility to enact laws for the peace, order, security, prosperity, and good government of the people. To the executive, the responsibilities of implementing and executing all laws enacted by the Legislature and orders by the court. While to the judiciary, the Constitution has cherishingly assigned the noble responsibilities of, and powers to adjudicate and settle disputes or conflicts, consequent upon the inter play of powers and forces between the Federal and State and another, between the citizens and governments, between individuals and/or institutions and other feuding parties.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Executive power is to administratively implement the policies of governance made into laws by the National Assembly. The National Assembly is to make the laws, but the implementation of the laws is vested in the Executive. The Judiciary is to interpret the law. The Legislative powers are vested in the National Assembly by Section 4 of the Constitution; Executive powers are vested in the President by Section 5; the judicial powers are vested in the courts by Section 6 of the Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that under the 1979 constitution, a state executive has its constitutional duties just as the judiciary has its own duties.

The Supreme Court held that under a constitutional structure, as a general rule, except otherwise expressly provided or accidental to the power, conferred, the legislature cannot exercise other executive or judicial power the judiciary cannot exercise it her executive or legislative power.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that under the Constitution, Government is divide into three separate and independent sections, the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Each section must not encroach into the sphere of the other and it is the duty of court to so maintain.

The court held in this case that the principle behind the concept of separation of powers is that none of the three arms of government under the Constitution should encroach into the powers of the other. Each arm -- Executive, Legislative and Judicial is a separate, equal and coordinate department and no arm can constitutionally take over the functions clearly assigned to the other. Thus, the powers and functions constitutionally entrusted to each arm cannot be encroached upon by the other. The doctrine is to promote efficiency in governance by precluding the exercise of arbitrary power by all the arms and thus prevent friction.

The court held that it must be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system that unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power, the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that in democratic society governed by a democratically elected government under the law and the constitution, an illegality, no matter its statutory intention, is not to be permitted.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the principle behind the concept of separation of powers is that none of the three arms of government under the Constitution should encroach into the powers of the other arm. The executive, legislature and judiciary are separate, equal and of coordinate department and no arm can constitutionally be encroached upon by the other. The doctrine is to promote efficiency in governance by precluding the exercise of arbitrary power by all the arms and thus prevent friction. See also A.G, Abia State v. A.G, Federation (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 809) 124.

The Supreme Court of the United States of America in considering the rationale for the separation of powers as embedded in the American Constitution stated that the separation of powers under the American Constitution was not instituted with the idea that it would promote government efficiency but on the contrary, is a bulwark against tyranny.

The Supreme Court of America in explaining why the doctrine of separation of powers was included in the United States Constitution stated that the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary powers. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among the three departments, to save the people from autocracy.

The United States Supreme Court considered the main object of legislative powers in this case. It described the essential function thus, the essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.

The court held in this case that a judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand in present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter.

The High Court of Australia in this case stated that the main objective of the sometimes inconvenient separation of judicial from executive and legislative powers had long been recognized. It is to ensure that the life, liberty, and property of the subject is not in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions are then regulated only their own opinions and not by any fundamental principles of law.

The court went further to hold that parliament cannot usurp the judicial powers of the commonwealth by itself purporting to exercise judicial powers in the form of legislation.

When an Edict is inconsistent with a Decree.

The court held in this case that where an Edict is inconsistent with a Decree, it becomes null and void to the extent of such inconsistency.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the cardinal principle of the Federal Constitutions of 1960, 1963 and 1979 is the separation of powers of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, but the Judiciary has the added responsibility as the guardian and protector of the Constitution. Therefore whenever the Executive or Legislative arms of government exceed their constitutional powers, the judiciary on a proper application to it, will curb the exercise of such excessive powers and declare it a nullity.

In this case, the Supreme Court held in this case that under a constitutional structure, as a general rule, except otherwise expressly provided or accidental to the power conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. The legislative powers of the Federation are vested in the National Assembly; and of the States in the Houses of Assembly of the States. Each is limited to such matters as prescribed in the legislative lists. The executive powers are vested for the federation in the president and for the states in the Governors. The exercise of the judicial powers of the Constitution are vested in named courts both in respect of the Federation and of the States.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that Section 4(8) of the 1979 Constitution which is the same as Section 4(8) of the 1999 Constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting any law, which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts in respect of the powers of the court in the interpretation and application of the constitution including the supervisory powers of the court to declare ultra vires and invalid any legislation which is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution to the extent of such inconsistency.

The court held in this case that a State House of Assembly can only exercise such powers as have been given to it by the Constitution.

The State House of Assembly has the power to confirm or ratify the appointment of a Commissioner, but it would amount to a complete usurpation of the functions and powers of the governor of a State for a House of Assembly to pass motions or resolutions urging the Governor to revoke the appointment of a Commissioner whose appointment has already been confirmed by the House of Assembly.

The Court of Appeal held that in the exercise of its judicial powers a court should adhere to constitutionality. It should not condone the commission by a state of a constitutional wrong nor should it be an accessory after the fact to the commission of unconstitutionality.

The importance of the doctrine of collective responsibility of ministers was considered in this case. The court stated that the maintenance of the doctrine of joint responsibility within the cabinet is in the public interest.

The court held that it is not the view of the law that whatever is officially done is law. On the contrary, the principle of the law is that what is done officially must be done in accordance with the law.

The court held in this case that the Federal Military Government is not above the law it has established. Until such a law is abolished or repealed, it must abide by it. This is part of the rule of law. It must therefore conduct its affairs according to the laid down law.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that in the realm of jurisprudence, statutes are binding on all citizens and the Government unless there is a special provision that it does not bind the latter.

The court stated the meaning of the concept of the rule of law in this case. the court held that rule of law in practical terms means that no person however highly placed is beyond the law and it implies due consideration for others and a true fear of God. The courts are the watchdogs of these rights and the sanctuary of the oppressed and will spare no pains in tracking down the arbitrary use of power where such cases are brought before the court. The fruits reaped by respect for the rule of law is stability, efficient administration and economic progress and satisfaction amongst the citizens. Persons in authority and government functionaries should by their good examples command and not demand respect.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the Nigerian democracy is fundamentally predicated upon the rule of law. Thus, where the rule of law reigns supreme, political expediency ought to be sacrificed on the altar of the rule of law in order to protect and guarantee the continued existence of the democratic institutions, vis-à-vis fundamental values of liberty, peace, security and development throughout the country. See also Anakwe v. Mashasha (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 726) 70.

The United States court in describing democratic country stated that it one with a free government, that leaves the way wide open to further discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however, obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be.

The United States Supreme Court defined a democratic country as a free society in which government is based upon the consent of an informed citizenry and is dedicated to the protection of the rights of all, even the most despised minorities.

The Supreme Court stating extensively the need to obey the judgments and orders of court stated thus, to allow court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If orders of court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought to scorn, if the remedies that the courts grant to correct wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left for each person but to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the courts will quickly result in the destruction of the society.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that an order of court must be obeyed, even if such an order is perverse, until such a time that the order is set aside by a competent court. The Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary are partners in the due governance of the country, each performing its functions clearly defines by the constitution of the land. A flagrant flouting of an order of the court by an executive is an invitation to anarchy.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that an order of the court must be obeyed even if such an order is perverse until such time that order is set aside by a competent court. See also Lijadu v. Lijadu (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 169) 627.

The court of Appeal held in this case that the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights having been incorporated into the Nigerian organic law by legislation is enforceable in Nigeria.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that in issues or questions concerning the fundamental rights protected under the African Charter, the provisions of the African Charter are superior to the decrees of the Federal Military Government.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that where the freedom of an individual is curtailed or abridged, it must be shown that such act is brought within the confines of the law.

The Supreme Court held in this case that any act of governance which is not covered under an enabling law is a nullity. In this case, the purported acquisition of the leasehold property of the respondent by the government of Bendel state which the act was not according to the law was declared a complete nullity.

The Supreme Court held in this case that once there is a dispute and the courts of law are seised with the dispute, no person or authority, whether parties to the matter or not, is allowed by the constitution to usurp the functions of the court of law. It is the duty of every person or authority not to interfere with the legal and judicial process taking its course.

The Court held in this case that the Nigerian Constitution is founded on the rule of law, the primary meaning of which is that everything must be done according to law. It means also that government should be conducted within the framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power as opposed to the uncertain and crooked cord of discretion.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the Rule of law presupposes --

a. That the State is subject to the law.

b. That the judiciary is a necessary agency of the Rule of law.

c. That Government should respect the right of individual citizens under the rule of law.

d. That to the judiciary is assigned both by the Rule of law and by our Constitution the determination of all actions and proceedings relating to matters in dispute between persons or between government or an authority and any person in Nigeria.

The court held in this case that the judges and courts bear a particular responsibility for ensuring that all branches of government the legislative, the executive and the judiciary conform with the principles of the rules of law. And where the provisions of the constitution are clear, compliance with them is not negotiable nor can it be circumscribed.

The Supreme Court in explaining the nature of a fundamental right stated that fundamental right is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence.

The court held in this case that a fundamental right is certainly a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land. However, no fundamental right should stand above the country, state or the people.

The Indian Supreme Court stated in this case that the Chapter on Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and are not liable to be abridged by any legislative or executive act or order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate Article.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution of the country is its fundamental law, the fons et origo of all laws, the exercise of all powers and the source from which all laws, institutions and persons derive their authority. The Constitution of any country is what is usually called the organic law or grundnorm of the people. It contains all the laws from which the institutions of State derive their creation, legitimacy and very being. The Constitution is also the unifying force in the nation, opportuning rights and imposing obligations on the people who are subject to its operations. It is a very important composite document, the interpretation or construction of which is subject to recognized cannons of interpretation designed or crafted to enhance and sustain the esteem in which Constitutions are held the world over. See also A.P.C v. Enugu State Independent Electoral Commission (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1801) 1.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the function of the Constitution is to establish a framework and principles of government, broad and general in terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of the communities must involve. Nigeria being a plural dynamic society, therefore, mere technical rules of interpretation of statutes are to some extent inadmissible in a way as to defeat the principles of government enshrined in the Constitution. See also A.G. Fedraation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the basic law of the country is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 and Section 1(1) of thereof, which is in pari materia with Section 1(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) makes it supreme and its provisions have binding force on all persons and authorities throughout the country.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of the provision of Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), the said Constitution is the grundnorm, and is thus supreme to all other legislations and has binding force on all authorities and persons in Nigeria. The Federal Republic of Nigeria or any part thereof shall not be governed except in accordance with its provisions.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the Constitution is the grundnorm and the fundamental law of the land. All other legislations in Nigeria take their hierarchy from the provisions of the Constitution. It is not a mere common legal document. It is an organic instrument that confers powers and also creates rights and limitations. It regulates the affairs of the nation state and defines the powers of the different components of Government as well as regulating the relationship between the citizens and the State. See also Marwa v. Nyako (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1296) 199.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the 1999 Constitution is superior to other legislations in the country, and any legislation which is inconsistent with the Constitution would be rendered inoperative to the extent of such inconsistency.

The Court of Appeal held that the Constitution is the grundnorm and the fundamental law of the land. All other legislations in the land take their hierarchy from the provisions of the Constitution. by the provisions of the constitution, the laws made by the national Assembly comes next to the Constitution; followed by those made by the House of Assembly of a state. By virtue of Section 11 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the provisions of the Constitution take precedence over any law enacted.

The court held in this case that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land; it is the grundnorm and its supremacy has never been called to question in ordinary circumstance.

The court held in this case that the Constitution is the ground norm, that is, the overriding and superior law of the land. And by virtue of Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution, if any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.

In this case, the court held that the provisions of an ordinary statute will not render nugatory the relevant provisions of the constitution. Therefore, if any law of the State including a subsidiary legislation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the provision of the Constitution prevails and that State Law to the extent of the inconsistency is void. See also A.C.B v. Losada (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 405) 26

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 is supreme and has binding force. It is the basic law of Nigeria and its provisions make it supreme, so that failure to follow its provisions render whatever is done to it unconstitutional. The provisions of the constitution are superior to every provision made in any act or law, and are binding on and must be respected by all persons and authorities in Nigeria. This is because in a democratic system of government with a supreme constitution, all laws flow from the constitution and any law inconsistent with the constitution is void to the extent of such inconsistency. See also Obaba v. Military Governor, Kwara State (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 336) 223

In this case, the court held that where a party acted contrary to, infringes or violates any of the provisions of the Constitution, such action is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Constitution are supreme over any other provisions, law or Act of the National Assembly.

The Supreme Court held that where the constitution has set certain conditionalities for doing a thing, no legislation of the National Assembly in the absence of clear amendment of the particular provision of the Constitution so stipulating the aforementioned conditionalities of a State House of Assembly can alter those conditionalities in any way, directly or indirectly unless the Constitution itself, as an attribute of its supremacy, so expressly authorized. Such is the eminent position of the power and authority, which the constitution enjoys. The Constitution is very much supreme to all other laws of the land and its provisions have binding force on all persons and authorities throughout the Republic of Nigeria.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the provisions of the Constitution have binding force on all authorities, and persons, including the Governor and the State Houses of Assembly throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and accordingly, any law that is inconsistent with its provisions shall to the extent of the inconsistency is void. See also Tanko v. State (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1131) 430, Fawehinmi v. Babangida (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 808) 604.

The Supreme Court held in this case that where the question is whether the Constitution has used an expression in the wider or narrower sense, the Court should whenever possible, and in response to the demands of justice, lean to the broader interpretation, unless there is something in the text or in the rest or the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out the object and purpose of the Constitution. See also Rabiu v. State (1981) 2 NCLR 293.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that in the interpretation, the courts should, whenever possible and in the best interest of justice, lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the text or in the rest of the Constitution indicating that the narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purposes of the constitution. See also Rabiu v. State (1980) 8 SC 130.

The Supreme Court held in this case that it is a cardinal doctrine of interpretation that the words of a Constitution ought not to be construed with debilitating or stultifying narrowness.

In this case, the court held that the Constitution is an organic document which must be interpreted as speaking from time to time. Thus, it can only describe the fundamental rights and freedoms it guarantees in broad terms and it guarantees in broad terms and it is for the court to fill the fundamental rights provisions with contents such as would fulfil their purpose and infuse them with life.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that where the provisions of a statute are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to the words without resorting to any extrinsic aid to interpret it.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a provision in the Constitution cannot be read in isolation where such provision is qualified by some other considerations.

The Court of Appeal held that the words of the Constitution which is the primary law of the land and the organic law should be subjected to very liberal construction in respect of the court's involvement in reviewing certain acts of the other arms of government. To try to restrict or to give a constrictive construction to the provisions of the Constitution would virtually choke the intention of the framers of the Constitution.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that enactments must always be interpreted as they are, rather as they ought to be. Where the intention of the law giver is manifest from the clear and unambiguous words of the statute being interpreted, the court must without further ado give effect to that intention as conveyed through the words employed. The statute should be holistically considered any time a part or a section of it being interpreted in order to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy. Where, however, the holistic approach has been resorted to and the legislation being interpreted by virtue of the clear words which it is made up continues to say exactly what it does, the intention of the law maker must be given effect to as conveyed. See also Awuse v. Odili (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 876) 481

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that in construing constitutional provisions or statutory enactments, where the words are capable of many meanings, the court has a duty to construe the provision in a manner that does not defeat the ends of the Constitution or statute. See also NBN Ltd. Weide & Co. Nig. Ltd. (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 150.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that in construing constitutional provisions or statutory enactments, where the words are capable of many meanings, the court has a duty to construe the provision in a manner that does not defeat the ends of the Constitution or statute. See also NBN Ltd. Weide & Co. Nig. Ltd. (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 150.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the courts should adopt a liberal approach to the construction of the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution should be given liberal construction so as to best carry out obvious intention and ends. And, the construction of provisions of the Constitution should not be guided by construction of other constitutions in other common law jurisdiction unless similar provisions in pari materia were in question; in which case, the meaning and interpretation of the provisions of such other Constitution will be of only persuasive influence having regard to the differences in circumstances. See also A.G, Kaduna State v. Hassan (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 483.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the Constitution does not intend what is unjust. Consequently, its provisions have to be interpreted with such care that they do not diminish from the justice of any matter for which they have been legislated.

The Supreme Court held that to succeed in the task of interpreting sections of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), the court must discover the intention of the framers of the sections in order to ensure their persistence. Where the court finds the words that constitute the applicable sections clear and unambiguous, the discharge of the court's duty lies in the application of the literal meaning of the words to the facts in dispute, except if doing so will lead to manifest absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the Constitution. See also N.P.A Plc. v. Lotus Plastic Ltd. (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158.

In this case, the court held that in the interpretation of a constitution, the following principles of interpretation should be borne in mind;

a. Effect should be given to every word.

b. A construction nullifying a specific clause will not be given to the Constitution unless absolutely required by the context.

c. A constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain unconstitutional result of a suit.

d. The language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its evident meaning.

e. While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed yield new and fuller import to its meaning.

f. A constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defeat its evident purpose.

g. Under a constitution conferring specific powers, a particular power must be granted or it cannot be exercised.

h. Delegation by the National Assembly of its essential legislative function is precluded.

i. Words are the common signs that mankind makes use to declare intention, one to another and when the words of a man expresses his meaning plainly, distinctly and perfectly, there is no occasion to have recourse to any other means of interpretation.

j. The principles upon which the Constitution was established rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used measure the purpose and scope of its provisions.

k. Words of the Constitution are not to be read with stultifying narrowness.

The court held in this case that one of the canons of the interpretation of a Constitution is that the true meaning of the words used and the intention of the legislature in any Statute and particularly in a written Constitution, can best be properly understood if the Statute is considered as whole. It is a single document and every part of it must be considered as far as relevant in order to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion of the enactment. A constitution must always be construed in such a way that it protects what it sets out to protect or guides what it sets out to guide. By its very nature and by necessity, a constitution must be interpreted broadly in order not to defeat the clear intention or its fronters. See also Okogie v. A. G, Lagos State (1981) 2 NCLR 337.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that where the question is whether the Constitution has used an expression in the wider or in the narrower sense, the court should always lean where the justice of the case so demands to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose. See also Aqua Ltd. v. Ondo State Sports Council (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 91) 622.

In this case, the court held that the principles that guide in the interpretation of Constitutional provisions are;

a. Sections of the Constitution are not to be construed in isolation, but as a whole;

b. Although words used will ordinarily be given their plain and grammatical meanings, where there is inherent ambiguity in any section, a holistic interpretation must be resorted to in order to arrive at the intention of the framers;

c. The sections must not be construed in such a manner as to render other sections redundant or superfluous.

If the words of a statute are ambiguous, the law makers intention must be sought; first in the statute itself and then in other legislation and contemporary circumstances and by resort to the mischief rule. See also Skye Bank Plc. v. Iwu (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that in determining the general object of the Legislature or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principle should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be the true one.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the main object of statutory interpretation is to discover the intention of the law maker, which is to be deduced from the language used. When, interpreting statutory provisions, the words used must be given their natural and ordinary meaning except where, to do so would lead to absurdity. Furthermore, the provisions must be considered as a whole and not in isolation. See also Dickson v. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167, Nonye v. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 623.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a power must be delegable before it may be delegated and lawfully exercised by a delegate.

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered) which vests the executive authority of the Federal Government in the President similarly vest the executive authority of a State Government in the Governor of the State. The extent of the authority vested in both the President and the Governor in relation to their respective areas of influence extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the power bestowed on the Legislature to make, enact and pass laws is undiluted so long as any laws passed by it is within its own legislative competence and authority. It is not only that the Legislature can enact laws, it can also amend any existing law passed by the arm of Government as circumstances permit. Whereas it is the duty of the Legislature to enact law, that of the judiciary is to interpret the law so made. Therefore, where there is dissatisfaction with the state of the laws as it exists and a desire for a change thereof is expressed by the people, it is the duty of the legislature which made the law in first place to effect the needed reforms by amendment thereto. The duty both to make and amend laws so made belongs exclusively by constitutional arrangement to the Legislature as provided under Section 4 of the Constitution. Therefore, the power to make laws, and, in appropriate cases, to amend the laws is vested in the National or State Assembly. See also Amoshima v. State (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1268) 530.

The court held in this case that the power of a state to legislate cannot be construed in such a way as to contravene the express provisions of the Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that Section 4(7) of the 1999 Constitution makes it clear that the powers of the House of Assembly of a State to make law has limitations. The power to make law conferred on the Houses of Assembly must conform to the provisions of the Constitution. The House of Assembly of a State has no powers to make laws on any matter in the exclusive legislative list, but has power to make law on matters in the concurrent legislative list. See also Lagos State v. Eko Hotel Ltd. (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1011) 378.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the House of Assembly of a State cannot enact the antipode or antipole of the Constitution, in direct contrast or contradiction of the democratic system guaranteed by Section 7(1) of the Constitution and be valid.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that by the combined effect of Section 4(6) (7)(a) -- (c) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), a State House of Assembly is empowered to make laws for the peace, order and good government of a State. By virtue of the Constitution, the legislative powers of a State of the Federation is vested in the House of Assembly of the State. The House of Assembly of a State shall have powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part thereof with respect to the following matters;

a. Any matter not in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution.

b. Any matter included in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the First Column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution to the extent prescribed in the Second Column opposite thereto;

c. Any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the State Legislature in a Federal system such as Nigeria is incompetent to legislate on matters reserved for the Federal and vice versa. In the same vein, the State Legislature in a Federal System cannot confer or cloak a court created by a Federal legislation with jurisdiction as such legislation will be null and an exercise in futility. Such jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court created by a Federal legislation by the principle of interpretation of ejusdem generis. See also Adamolekun v. Council of University of Ibadan (1968) NMLR 253.

The court held in this case that by virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a state legislature has power only to legislate for the territory of the state or any part thereof. Therefore laws made by a state legislature cannot have the force of law in another state.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has expressly donated to the courts the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of any law made by a legislature vis-à-vis the provisions of the Constitution. Where the Constitution expressly vests in the courts the power to pronounce on the constitutionality of a law or vis-à-vis its provisions, then the courts cannot be said to be acting without jurisdiction in discharging the duty imposed on them. See also A.G Abia State v. A.G Federation (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by virtue of Section 270 to Section 280 the 1979 Constitution, judicial office is the office of the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the Justice of the Supreme Court or the President or Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal, the office of the Chief Judge or a Judge of a High Court, a Grand Khadi or Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, or President or Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of a State and a reference to a "judicial officer" is a reference to the holder of any such office.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that judicial power is the power of the court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 6(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), the judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which the section relates, being courts established for the Federation. These Courts include the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, a High Court of a State and two other optional courts for any State that desires to establish them.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the judicial powers of the Federation are vested in the courts established for the Federation under Section 6(5) of the 1979 Constitution which is the same as Section 6(5) of the 1999 Constitution. These Courts include the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, a High Court of a State and two other optional courts for any State that desires to establish them, that is-

a. The Sharia Court of Appeal, and

b. The Customary Court of Appeal.

All these have their jurisdiction clearly spelt out under Chapter VII of the 1979 Constitution.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that by the Nigeria Constitution, judicial powers are vested in the courts.

The court held in this case that the primary judicial function vested by the Constitution in the courts is to decide disputed questions of facts and law in accordance with the law laid down and expounded by the courts. Judicial power is the authority exercised by the judicial department of the Constitution charged with the declaration of what the law is and its construction. The exercise of judicial power involves the investigation of facts.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the judicial powers of each unit of the Federation or State, is vested in the High Court of the State and the other courts created for it in the Constitution and those that it may create for itself in the future. The language by which this vesting has been done especially in the use of the expression "the judicial powers of a state" clearly implies that the courts of each State have authority only to exercise the judicial powers of the state for which they have been established. They cannot exercise the judicial powers of another state. Another clear implication is that the exercise of those powers is restricted within the territory of the State. They cannot exercise those powers over persons or property beyond the limits of the territory of the State.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the community purport of the provisions of Section 7(1) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution is that a democratically elected system of Local Government Councils is guaranteed by the Constitution and a constitutional duty is imposed on State Governments to ensure their existence under a law enacted by the House of assembly of a State, which provides for their establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions, including those set out in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution. See also Eze v. Gov. Abia State (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 192.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the system of local government by democratically elected Local Government Councils is guaranteed under the Constitution, and accordingly, the Government of every State shall subject to Section 8 of the Constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such Councils.

The Supreme Court held in this case that there are three tiers of Government in Nigeria, Federal, State and local Governments. The Local Government Areas, 774 of them, are administered by Local Government councils, consisting of a Chairman, as Chief Executive, and other elected members, known as Councilors.

The Supreme Court held in this case that under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered), the standard for determining the territory of each State of the Federation of Nigeria as set by the Constitution is by Local Government Areas.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as altered), the Supreme Court is jurisdictionally competent to entertain a suit between two States on interstate boundary or oil wells dispute without supervention or imposition of the decision of the National Boundary Commission (NBC).

The court held in this case that the National Boundary Commission is statutorily empowered to delineate boundaries of each State pursuant to Section 7 of the National Boundary Commission (Establishment) Act. But where there is a boundary dispute between States, the Supreme Court is also empowered pursuant to Section 6(6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution to exercise jurisdiction in similar disputes where the legal rights of any of the parties in contention.

The United States Supreme Court settled the question of the right of the United States Congress to conduct investigations by stating that the power of congressional inquiry with the process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative functions.

The United States Supreme Court held that the power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 128(1) of 1999 Constitution (as amended), the State House of Assembly has power to inquire and investigate into the affairs of the Ministries in the State.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a power must be delegable before it may be delegated and lawfully exercised by a delegate.

In this case, the plaintiff respondent challenged the entry of a nolle prosequi which terminated a criminal proceedings in which he had interest, as not being validly entered. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the nolle prosequi was not validly entered in the said criminal proceedings, because, the Attorney General did not delegate power to do so.

The Supreme Court held in this case that inquiry need not be a public one. It is sufficient that the party has opportunity of being heard in defense of the allegations made against him.

The court held that a person who is prima facie disqualified for interest or bias may be held, on grounds of necessity, competent and obligated to adjudicate if no other duly qualified tribunal can be constituted.

The court held in this case that the rule of necessity permits an adjudicator to be a judge in his own cause, for his participation is absolutely necessary to arrive at a decision.

The Supreme Court held that delegation does not imply a denudation of power and authority. The word delegation implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are as a rule, always subject to resumption by the power delegating it. Unless therefore, it is controlled by statute, the delegating power can at any time resume its authority.

In this case, the issue of delegation of powers was examined and the Supreme Court held that the power to delegate functions also includes a power to revoke such delegation.

The court held in this case that a statutory power to delegate will normally include a power to revoke the delegation when desired.

In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and made an order for the defendant respondents State Security Service operatives to release the applicant's passport to him as they had no power to impound it in the circumstances. The act was held to be beyond the powers delegated to them in the enabling statute which established the State Security Service.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1, 1984 enacted by the Federal Military Government was the organic law, supreme law or grundnorm. That subject to the limitations placed by the Decree itself, it gave unlimited legislative powers to a Military Governor of the State to make laws within his area of authority and competence. However, the Governor in making the Edict in the instant case acted ultra vires his legislative powers.

The court stated in this case that all the court do is to see that the power which is claimed to be exercised is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the legislature and to see that those powers are exercised in good faith. Apart from that, the courts have power at all to inquire into the reasonableness, the policy, the sense or any other aspect of the transaction.

In this pre-emptory action, the court held setting aside the Lagos State Government Circular titled "Abolition of Private Primary Education in Lagos State" dated 26^th^ March, 1980 and which was to take effect and operate in the State from 1^st^ September, 1980 that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to await the happening of the event before applying to the court for redress.

The right to commence an action in the court could be exercised by the plaintiff as soon as there exists a threat or likelihood of their fundamental right being infringed or contravened.

This case was brought up to pre-empt government action, a group of parents challenged the Lagos State Government Circular titled "Abolition of Private primary Education in Lagos State." The defendant's counsel contended that the applicants have no right in law which they can claim to claim to have been infringed or threatened as the circular had not yet come into force and that the parents ought to wait till when the Circular had effect. The court held set aside the circular holding that the action was not premature.

Courts have power in their equitable jurisdiction, and by the constitution, statute and rules of procedure and also under its inherent powers to make a declaration against intending infringers, where there is a threatened breach of a right, and where the apprehended act would be unlawful.

The Supreme Court held that the National Assembly cannot delegate its law making function to a joint committee of the National Assembly.

The Court held in this case that the duties of the Attorney General to enforce law and prosecute offenders are by the provisions of constitution delegable. Thus these functions are mainly carried out by the legal officers serving under him in the ministry.

In this case, the Minister of Agriculture under the Defense (General) Regulations 1939, delegated to county agricultural committees his powers to give directives with regard to the cultivation, management or use of the land for agricultural purposes. The committee then decided that eight acres for sugar beet should be grown by the occupiers of certain lands, but the committees left it to its executive officer to do the selection of the field. The executive officer consulted a local sub-committee appointed to make recommendations to the committee and served a notice on the occupiers of certain field specifying the field to be so cultivated. The occupiers challenged the decision in court. The issue was whether the executive officer could so exercise the powers the Minister had delegated to the county agricultural committee. The court held that the notices served by the executive were invalid. On the principle of delegatus potest non delegare, the committee cannot sub-delegate to the executive officer, the powers to determine the cultivated. Therefore, the notice the executive officer served, was ineffective and non-compliance with it on the part of the occupiers was not an offence.

In this case, under the Defense (General) Regulations 1939, Regulations 51, the Minister had powers for the purposes of the war to requisition and take possession of dwelling houses. As a competent authority, the Minister was empowered by a provision in the law to delegate his power take possession of dwelling houses. A requisition notice was subsequently served on the plaintiff that the town clerk of the defendant town corporation had taken possession of his premises and went into the use and occupation of the dwelling house. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant appellant for an injunction restraining the defendants from continuing in the use and occupation of the dwelling house and for nominal damages for the excesses of the town clerk which were not in compliance with the law, but which requisition notice the Minister purported to ratify. The Court of Appeal held that the original attempt at requisition was inoperative because in breach of the conditions or limitations applicable to the delegated powers, the notice purported to requisition the house and its contents and contained no direction as to the exclusion or disposal of the chattels in the house. The Minister in sub-delegating his legislative powers did not reserve power to delegate power to his delegate to requisition a house along with its contents. Consequently, the Minister did not in fact requisition nor take possession of the premises, and the requisition notice and purported requisition would be set aside. The town clerks were therefore not acting as the Minister's agents having breached the provisions of the law.

In the case, each of the parties was laying claim to a certain parcel of land. The respondent summoned the appellant before the elders of the town union to hear the parties and arbitrate the matter according to customary law. The elders of the town union instead of hearing the case themselves, delegated their functions to arbitrate the dispute to some person nominated by them. The appellant objected to the jurisdiction of the nominated persons. The nominees immediately went into action and quickly found for the respondents as being the owner of the land. The Court of Appeal held that in the same manner as a court of law cannot assign its functions to hear and settle a case before it to another court, a judge, body or group of persons without telling the parties, so also a customary arbitration cannot properly delegate the powers conferred upon it as a choice of the parties to the case, to other people to mediate the controversy. This is so, because as a general rule, a delegate cannot further delegate his duties.

In this case, then Court held that although by Section 6(6)(c) of the 1979 Constitution is not justiciable, where the provisions of the Constitution defines a certain cause of action or enshrines certain rights, those provisions must be applied without any inhibition emanating from Chapter II. In other words, where any legislation for implementing the Fundamental Objectives or the directive principles is in issue, the Court shall not declare such legislation void unless the fundamental rights of any citizen is infringed or any other express provision is clearly infringed.

In this case, the plaintiff applicant, a member of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party and the majority leader in the Borno State House of Assembly was deported from Nigeria by the Federal Government and its agents. The court held that once a person proves that he is a Nigerian citizen, under the citizenship provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, he cannot be deported from Nigeria.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of Chapter III of the 1963 Constitution now Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is to preserve the civil rights of the citizen within the limits and scope allowed by the law. Though described as fundamental, they do not override all laws, they are fundamental only because they ensure man as a species of the homo sapiens, and by virtue of his membership of the society.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 46 (1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), any person who alleges that any of the provisions of Chapter IV has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution, any person whose fundamental right is breached or is being breached or about to be breached may apply to a High Court of a State or Federal High Court. Both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction in an action for the enforcement of a fundamental right. An application may therefore be made either to the Federal High Court or the High Court of the State in which the breach occurred, is occurring or about to occur.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by virtue of Section 33 (1) of the 1999 Constitution which is the same as Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), every person has a right to life and no one shall be deprived intentionally of life, save in the execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria.

The Court of Appeal held that by virtue of Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and Constitution in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), in the determination of the civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. The import and meaning of the provision include access to court and fair hearing. See also Alioke v. Oye (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1651) 247.

The Supreme Court held in this case that fair hearing is entrenched in Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution where it encompasses the twin pillars of natural justice, namely audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. Fair hearing is also a common law doctrine that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, a person is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal established by law.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the essence of audi alteram partem in fair hearing and adjudication generally is that no party in litigation shall employ an element of surprise on the adversary.

The court held in this case that one of the propositions fundamental to Nigerian law and system of justice is that a person whose rights and interest are likely to be affected by a decision must be heard before a decision is taken. Another is that statutes should not be lightly presumed to have taken away a legal right.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that fair trial or fair hearing requires that the trial must be conducted according to all applicable legal rules with a view to ensuring that justice is done to all parties before the court. Any proceedings conducted in breach of the right to fair hearing is a nullity and liable to be set aside. See also Kotoye v. C.B.N (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that fair hearing, in the context of Section 33 now Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution encompasses the plenitude of natural justice in the narrow technical sense of the twin pillars of justice, viz: audi alteram and nemo judex incausa sua as well as the broad sense of what is not only right and fair to all concerned but also seems to be so. See also Federal Civil Service Commission v. Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652.

The Supreme Court held in this case that it is a cardinal principle of the administration of justice that a party to a cause or matter is ordinarily entitled and ought to be given opportunity to be heard before a decision can be given against him and any breach of this principle results in the nullity of the proceedings.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution in the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and construed in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.

In this case, the court held that Section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution, now Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that in the determination of the civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal established by the law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. The primary purport of these provisions are that every person shall have his civil rights determined with fairness and within the shortest possible time.

The court held in this case that fair hearing is a constitutional right which is entrenched in the Constitution, it is therefore constitutional and subsequently a fundamental principle that cannot be waived or of which any citizen can be unjustly stripped. See also Bamboye v. UNILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290, Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd. (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 115.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to fair hearing is one which a party may elect to waive if he so desires. The fact that the question of fair hearing is a universally recognized issue does not mean that a person who elected not to be heard after being given an opportunity can be forced to do so.

In this case, the court held that by Article 7 (d) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, every individual shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal.

In this case, the court of appeal considering the constitutionality or otherwise of holding charge held that a holding charge is unknown to Nigerian law and an accused person detained thereunder is entitled to be released on bail within a reasonable time before trial, more so in non-capital offence.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that fair hearing only means that a party should be given an opportunity to be heard and present his case before the court. This is fully entrenched in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). It therefore follows that the provisions of this section are only breached when a party is denied the right or opportunity to be heard and present his case before the court or call witnesses as the case may be.

The court held in this case that fair hearing is synonymous with fair trial and as implying that very reasonable and fair minded observer who watches the proceedings should be able to come to the conclusion that the court or other tribunal has been fair to all the parties concerned. See also Baba v. N.C.A.T.C (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388.

The Court of Appeal held that fair hearing implies hearing parties to a suit or giving them an opportunity to be heard. Thus, in determining a question whether fair hearing had been given to a party, the issue is not whether injustice had been done because of lack of fair hearing. It is whether a party entitled to be heard before deciding his case had in fact been given the opportunity of a hearing.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that hearing can only be said to be fair when, inter alia, all the parties in the dispute are given a hearing or an opportunity of a hearing. If any of the parties is refused or denied a hearing or is not given an opportunity of being heard, such hearing cannot qualify as a fair under the audi alteram partem rule. See also Olumesan v. Ogundipo (1996) 2 NWLR (pt. 433) 628, Gukas v. Jos International Breweries Ltd. (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 199) 614 and Mohammed v. Olawunmi (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 133) 458.

The Supreme Court held in this case that fair hearing within the meaning of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) means a trial or hearing conducted according to all legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties. It requires the observation or observance of the twin pillars of the rules of natural justice which are; audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. these rules, the obligation to hear the other side of a dispute or the right of a party in dispute to be heard, are so basic and fundamental a principle in the determination of disputes that they cannot be compromised.

The court held in this case that fair hearing as encompassed in Section 33 of the 1979, now Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) is not an imaginary proposition. It is a state of affairs that consists of many ingredients. It encompasses not only compliance with the twin rules of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua, but entails compliance with all the provision of Section 33 of the 1979 constitution. It also entails doing, during the course of trial of a civil or criminal action things which will make an impartial observer leaving the courtroom believe that the trial has been balanced and fair to both sides to the trial.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 33(1) of the 1975 Constitution which now Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, a party is entitled to a fair hearing in the prosecution of his case and fair hearing includes giving to the party or a legal practitioner of his choice the opportunity to present the case before an impartial court in an atmosphere free from fear and intimidation. Thus, it is the requirement of the rule of a natural justice that a party must be heard -- the audi alteram partem rule.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), every person charged with criminal offence must be afforded an opportunity to be heard before a pronouncement is made against him. This section guarantees the right to fair hearing.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a litigant is entitled as of right to the consideration of the case he has presented before the court and to be heard thereupon.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution which is pari materia with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which guarantees and has entrenched fair hearing in one strict interpretation limited to the determination of civil rights and obligations. It follows therefore that where the determination of civil rights and obligations are not in issue, particularly in an investigation committee, the observance of fair hearing is not strictu sensu obligatory.

The Supreme Court held in this case that from the provision of Section 33 (1) of the 1979 Constitution which is the same as Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the independence and impartiality of a court are part of the attributes of fair hearing. The requirement of impartiality is intended to prohibit a person from deciding a matter in which he has either pecuniary or any type of interest. Such other interest may arise from his personal relationship with one of the parties to the case or may be inferred from his conduct or utterances during the hearing of the matter. Thus, it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the right of fair hearing in its full plenitude must carry with it the right to know the case and evidence proffered by one party against the other party.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that a complaint against an infringement of fundamental right to fair hearing is a constitutionally guaranteed right which cannot be taken away by any domestic arrangement between parties.

The Court of Appeal held that one basic requirement of natural justice is that a party should be given an opportunity to state his case without fear or hindrance.

The court held in this case that the rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) are termed fundamental for the simple reason that they are inalienable natural rights which stand above the ordinary laws of the land and are primarily conditions to civilized existence. It is for their natural inalienability that the law prioritizes their preservation against violation. It is also for the same reason that Section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) grants any person who alleges that his fundamental right provided for in Chapter IV of the Constitution has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State to apply to any High Court in that State for redress. See also Fawehinmi v. I.G.P. (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 606.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the principle of fair hearing entrenched in the Constitution is so fundamental in the judicial process or the administration of justice that breach of it will vitiate or nullify the whole proceedings and a party cannot be heard to say that the proceedings were properly conducted and should be saved because of such proper conduct. See also Orugbo v. Una (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) 175.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the principle of fair hearing is fundamental to all court procedures and proceedings and, like jurisdiction, the right to fair hearing is both fundamental and constitutional right of every party to a dispute who is to be afforded an opportunity to present his case to the adjudicating authority without hindrance from the beginning to the end. See also O.O.M.F. Ltd. v. N.A.C.B. Ltd. (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 412

The Supreme Court held in this case that the important thing in dealing with the trial of any case be it civil or criminal is to ensure that the procedure for fair hearing is strictly complied with.

The Supreme Court held that fundamental rights are so basic and inalienable to every man that they are enshrined directly in the Constitution. Under the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the rights are preserved by Chapter IV thereof. See also Dongtoe v. C.S.C, Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (PT. 717) 132.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that under Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the right to fair hearing extends beyond affording the parties a hearing but also envisages proper consideration of the issues raised by the parties before the court.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the constitutional principle of fair hearing is for both parties in the litigation. It is not only for one of the parties. Fair hearing according to the law envisages that both parties to a case be given opportunity of presenting their respective cases without let or hindrance from the beginning to the end. Fair hearing in accordance with the law also envisages that the court or tribunal should be fair and impartial without showing any degree of bias against any of the parties. See also Newswatch Communications Ltd. v. Atta (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the right to be heard is such an important, radical and protective right that the courts strain every nerve to protect it and even imply it where a statutory form of protection will be less effective if it did not carry with it the right to be heard.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that one of the cardinal principles of the justice system is the adoption of the principle of fair hearing and the basic criteria and attributes of fair hearing include:

a. That the court or tribunal hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case.

b. That the court or tribunal shall give equal treatment, equal opportunity and equal consideration to all concerned; and

c. That having regard to all the circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seen to have been done.

See also Udo-Akugba v. Paico Ltd. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 434.

The court held in this case that the certain basic criteria and attributes of fair hearing include;

a. That the court shall hear both sides not only in the case but also in all material issues in the case reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case.

b. That the court or tribunal shall give equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned;

c. That the proceedings shall be held in public and all concerned shall have access to and be informed of such a place of public hearing; and

d. That having regard to all circumstances, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done.

In this case, the court held that in a judicial or quasi-judicial or quasi-judicial body, hearing, in order to be fair and just include the right of the person to be affected to;

a. Cross examine or otherwise confront or contradict all the witnesses that testify against him;

b. Have read before him all the documents tendered in evidence at the hearing.

c. Have disclosed to him the nature of all relevant material evidence at the hearing;

d. Have disclosed to him the nature of all relevant material evidence, including documentary and real evidence prejudicial to the party save in recognized exceptions;

e. Know the case he has to meet at the hearing and have adequate opportunity to prepare for his defense; and

f. Give evidence by himself; call witnesses if he likes and make oral submissions either personally or through counsel of his choice. See also Baba v. N.C.A.T.C (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388.

The court held in this case that the constitution in light of fair hearing is synonymous with the common law principles of natural justice. Any proceeding conducted in breach of a party's right to fair hearing, no matter how well conducted would be rendered a nullity. See also Tsokwa Motors (Nig.) Ltd v. U.B.A Plc. (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 347.

The court held in this case that the right to fair hearing being a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by the constitution, the breach of it in a trial or investigation or inquiry nullifies the trial, investigation or inquiry and any action taken on them is also a nullity. See also Chief Land Officer v. Alor (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 187) 617.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by virtue of Section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution, every person who is charged with a criminal offence is to be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty, in other words, Nigeria operates the accusatorial system of jurisprudence opposes to the inquisitorial system whereby a person accused of having committed an offence is presumed guilty until he establishes his innocence.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 36(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, every person who is charged with a criminal offence is entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence, and this must be strictly followed. See also Ebem v. State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 113.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that it is a fundamental pre-condition, which is not negotiable, that a person accused of a wrong doing must be confronted with the accusation before any action detrimental to him can be legally taken. See also Aiyetan v. N.I.F.O.R (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that it is a fundamental pre-condition, which is not negotiable, that a person accused of a wrong doing must be confronted with the accusation before any action detrimental to him can be legally taken. See also Aiyetan v. N.I.F.O.R (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 48.

The Supreme Court held in this case that Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides for the right to personal liberty. The right can be curtailed under the circumstances enumerated in Section 35 (1) (a) -- (f) of the Constitution.

The court held in this case that the right to property is entrenched under Section 40 of the 1979 Constitution, now Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution. The right is inviolate and such property or any right attendant thereto can only be taken possession of or compulsorily acquired by or under the provisions of the law. Furthermore, such law must provide for the payment of adequate compensation to the owner and must give him the right of access to a High Court for the determination of his interest in the property and the amount of compensation due to him.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a citizen's right to free movement and ownership of property be it movable or immovable is not absolute.

In this case, the court held that acquisition of a person's property compulsorily s prima facie a breach of his entrenched fundamental right to his property by virtue of the Constitution. As his right to his property is his fundamental right, he is entitled to make representations against such a compulsory acquisition, or claim compensation therefore, or appeal or petition against it. So, he is entitled to a protection of that right to his property by exercising his right of fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that although there is seldom any right which cannot be acquired by agreement, there is a distinction between a wholly private right to property and pubic right to property. It is well settled that an owner of a wholly private right can willingly decide to divest or extinguish such a right gratuitously or by agreement. A person can voluntarily divest himself of his private property by way of a gift or outright sale or by a conditional or unconditional seizure of his property in breach of an obligation willingly entered and consented to him. An enforcement of such obligation in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions do not per se amount to a breach of his fundamental right to property. If it were so, there will be no movement of goods and services, no sale of property, real or chattels will not pass from hand to hand. There will be no business of buying and selling. Society will come to almost abrupt contemplation of the law makers with regards to the fundamental rights to property as enshrined in the Constitution. As opposed to private rights, no person has a right to waive a right to public property. For, no one can give that which he does not have. No one can waive the right to public property which is not wholly vested in him.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and peoples' Rights, every individual shall have the right to liberty and security of his person. No one may be derived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by the law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.

The court held in this case that by Article 7 (1) (d) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, every individual reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that access to court means approach or means of approach to the court without constraint. It is however, settled that the constitutional right of access to the court does not preclude statutory regulations of the exercise of the right.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the constitutional provision of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 entitles an aggrieved citizen to have recourse to a court of law where his rights and obligations are threatened.

The Court of Appeal held that where the interests of a person has been adversely affected, such a person has the constitutional right to seek redress in a court of law.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the constitutionally provided right of access to court does not exclude statutory provisions which regulate the exercise of the conferred right.

The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 36 (6) (c) of the Constitution (as amended), every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to defend himself in person or by a legal practitioner of his choice.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 36 (6) (d) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), every person who is charged with criminal offence shall be entitled to examine, in person or by his legal practitioners, the witnesses called by the prosecution before any court or tribunal, and obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf before the court or tribunal on the same conditions as those applying to the witnesses called by the prosecution.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the constitutional right of appeal is premised on the existence of a disputable issue which the appellate court must give a proper look and make a determination one way or the other and decide on the rights of the parties. It is not a license to waste the time of the court or delay the enjoyment of the fruits of the plaintiff's judgment or involve the court and the parties in a merry-go-round-dance of litigation.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the right of appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court is donated and vested by the extant 1999 Constitution (as amended) in a party or person having interest, as the case may be, in a matter, who is dissatisfied with the decision.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that religion as a subject falls within the objective policy and directive principles of State policy not justiciable per se under Chapter II of the 1979 Constitution. However, the teaching of religious knowledge which carries with it its practice and worship can give rise to certain fundamental rights enforceable by virtue of Section 42 of Chapter IV of the 1979 Constitution which is the same as Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that freedom of movement consists of movement within Nigeria of citizens of Nigeria from Nigeria.

In this case, the court held that by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, Article 12 (2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act which has the force of law in Nigeria and Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

a. Every citizen of Nigeria has a right not to be refused entry to or exit from Nigeria;

b. Every citizen of Nigeria has the right to leave any country to or exit from Nigeria;

c. Every citizen of Nigeria has the right to travel abroad.

In this case, the court defined freedom of religion as the right to adhere to any form of religion or none, to practice and abstain from practicing religious beliefs and to be free from governmental interference with or promotion of religion.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion implies a right to be prevented, without lawful justification, from choosing the course of one's life, fashioned on what one believes in, and a right not to be coerced into acting contrary to one's religious belief. The limits of these freedoms in all cases are where they impinge on the rights of others or where they put the welfare of the society or public health in jeopardy. The sum total of the right of privacy and freedom of thought, conscience or religion which an individual should be left alone to choose a course for his life, unless a clear and compelling overriding state interest justifies the contrary.

Right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion. In this case, the court held that according to Section 38 of the Constitution that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, includes freedom to change religion or behavior and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or in private to manifest and propagate his religion or belief teaching, practice and observance.

The Supreme Court held in this case that nobody can be compelled to associate with other persons against his will. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees to all Nigerian citizens freedom of conscience, thought and religion. Accordingly any purported drafting of any person into an association against his will even if by operation of customary law is in conflict with the provision of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion enshrined in Section 38(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) implies a right not to be prevented, without lawful justification, from choosing the course of one's life, fashioned on what one believes in, and a right not to be coerced into acting contrary to one's religious belief. The limits of these freedoms as in all cases are where they impinge on the rights of others or where they put the welfare of society or public health in jeopardy. See also M.D.P.D.T. v. Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206.

In this case, the court held that although a person has a right to choose a course for his or her life, that right is not available to determine whether a child should live or die on account of a parent's religious belief.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), everybody shall be entitled to freedom of expression including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and import ideas and information without interference.

In the case, the court held that every person is entitled to freedom of expression including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference. See also Awoniyi v. Registered Trustees of AMORC (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 154) 42.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the right provided by Section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which entitles a person to freedom of expression and imparting ideas and information, is not a blanket right. It must not be utilized or invoked in such a way that t offends public safety, order, morality and health, and it must not be injurious to the rights and freedom of other persons.

The court held in this case that every person is entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the Press has the inalienable right to disseminate information to members of the public, a right that must not be whittled down by legal or linguistic refinements. See also Gomes v. Punch (Nig.) Ltd. (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 602) 303.

In the case, the court held that the word media is not limited to the press, but includes any medium for imparting and receiving information and it includes schools and that the rights to freedom of expression and the press includes the right to own a private school to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.

The United States Supreme Court held that a prior restraint on expression comes to court with a heavy presumption against its unconstitutionality.

In this case, the purported abolition by the Lagos State Government of fee paying private schools was held to be an infringement of the right to peaceful assembly and association of the children, as they would thereby be forced to go to other schools, such as public schools, which were not their choice.

The court held in this case that a company regulation which denied employment to women with pre-school age children was unconstitutional and invalid for being discriminatory against women with infant children.

In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that an Idaho State Law which gave arbitrary preference to fathers over mothers in the administration of their children's estate was discriminatory and cannot stand in the face of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United states which states that citizenship rights are not to be abridged and each person is to enjoy equal rights and protection under the laws of the United States of America.

In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that the provision of separate educational institutions for different races was discriminatory and unconstitutional.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that by virtue of Section 42 (1) of the Constitution, a citizen of Nigeria of a particular community ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not be discriminated against b reason that he is such a person. See also Folami v. Cole (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 133) 445.

The court held in this case that where any arm of government exceeds such powers or acts in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution, it would be the duty of the judiciary to put it in check at the instance of any aggrieved party.

The court held in this case that the terms, court or tribunal is usually used to indicate a person or body of persons exercising judicial functions by common law, statute, patent, charter, custom etc. Whether it be invested with permanent jurisdiction to determine all causes or a class or as and when submitted or to be clothed by the State or the disputants, with merely temporary authority to adjudicate on a particular group of disputes.

The court held in this case that a tribunal may consist of one person, sitting alone as the tribunal, such as, a sole commissioner as was the case in this case.

In this case, it was held that a High Court has power of judicial review over the findings of a tribunal.

In this case, the complainant police officer was retired based on a medical report. He challenged the medical report. The court held that when a medical practitioner is making a medical decision or report which may lead to a person being retired compulsorily on medical grounds, he must act fairly and that decisions leading to the compulsory retirements of persons are of a judicial character and must conform to the rules of natural justice.

The Supreme Court held in this case that in the observance of the principles of natural justice and the essential requirement of fair hearing, there is a distinction between the recommendation of an investigation panel which has no statutory powers, and the action on the recommendation by a statutory body with requisite statutory powers. Whereas recommendation of the Investigation Panel will not affect the civil rights and obligation of the appellant, the acting upon such recommendation does. Hence, the implementation of the recommendation must comply with the rules of natural justice.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that non-judicial or administrative bodies have the duty to act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is the duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.

In this case, the court held that while it is true that there is no invariable way by which a quasi-judicial tribunal should proceed in carrying out its duty in ascertaining the culpability or otherwise of an accused before it, it is still expected that the procedure to be followed would ensure that the accused is given fair hearing. When a person states that he is not guilty of an offence, the next stage that must follow is the establishment of his guilt. The procedure of doing this need not be the same as normally employed in a court of law, but it must be such that any fair minded person would conclude that it was fair.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that two cardinal principles-namely that no person shall be condemned unheard and that none shall be a judge in his own cause are implicit in the concept of fair adjudication by any authority which has any duty to get judicially. However, the courts exercising supervisory authority have taken the view that it is no longer necessary, in order to establish that a duty to act judicially applies to performance of a particular exercise by an administrative body, person or tribunal, to show that the exercise is essentially or analytically of a judicial character, or that t involves a determination of a dispute between parties. But such a duty on the part of an administrative body to act judicially in the name of applying the principle of audi alteram partem may be excluded expressly or by necessary implication, by statute. Where however, a statutory provision excludes the need for prior hearing of the party whose rights are to be affected by the decision of an administrative body, the courts have in such cases held that if in addition, the statute contains provisions for an administrative appeal from, or judicial review on, the merits of the decision of that body, these are sufficient to negative the existence of any implied duty on the part of such a body to apply the audi alteram partem rule before the original decision is made. See also Falomo v. Lagos State Public Service Commision (1977) NSCC 230.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a body, whether judicial, quasi-judicial administrative or executive from inception is judicially when determining the civil right obligations of a person in finding him liable of a law and therefore it must give the person a hearing before any issue can be properly decided. This is the intendment of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution and is also the essence of fair hearing as a constitutional right. For in such cases, the hearing body must be seen to have observed all the implications of fair hearing.

In this case, the appellant appealed from a decision of the Medical Disciplinary Committee which had ordered that the appellant's name be removed from the Register of medical practitioners for the period of two years. The appellant averred that the inquiry was conducted in a manner contrary to the principles of natural justice, because the registrar of the profession ho was in fact the prosecutor who took part in the disciplinary committee's deliberations. After the trial had ended and the committee rose for its decision, the Registrar remained with the members of the Committee, while they were considering their decision, whereas the appellant and his counsel were asked to retire from the tribunal room. It was plain from the Gazette constituting the membership of the Medical Disciplinary Committee that the Registrar was neither by name nor by virtue of the position he held in the Federal Civil Service a member of the committee and, therefore, he should not have remained with the committee during the consideration of their decision. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Disciplinary Committee could not stand and was quashed as the principles of natural justice and fair hearing had not been fully observed.

In this case, the appellant appealed against the decision of the Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal which pronounced him guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect and ordered the removal of his name from the Medical Register. Amongst other departure from accepted procedure, the appellant was not told the case against him. It was when he was before the tribunal that the appellant and counsel became aware of the nature of the evidence against him. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances surrounding the taking of the evidence and the subsequent conduct of the panel in withholding the evidence until such time as it was released constituted a denial of justice to the appellant. The order or direction striking out the name of the appellant off the medical Register would therefore be quashed and set aside.

In the case, the appellants sued the respondents who were members of a military court martial from which the appeal lies to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that a court martial is a Federal cause since defense is in the Exclusive legislative list in respect of which only the National Assembly could make laws. The court held further that any impropriety or irregularity in the composition or proceedings of a court martial can warrant the invocation of the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution.

In the case, the plaintiff appellant police officer was accused of certain misconduct. The matter was dealt with in the manner of orderly room proceedings. He was found innocent of the charges, but it was recommended that the appellant be reprimanded. The appropriate authority after considering the report and the recommendations instead dismissed the appellant. The appellant then brought an action for a declaration that his dismissal was wrongful and for an order for reinstatement, payment of his salaries and entitlements. The Court of Appeal held, granting all the appellant's prayers that where a police officer disobeys a police regulation or directive, he can be dealt with disciplinarily in a police orderly room proceedings. However, if such obedience amounts to an allegation of crime, such officer like any other person, must first be tried in a court of law or criminal tribunal before any disciplinary action can be taken against him, in any orderly room proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that if a person is accused of committing a crime, it is only a criminal tribunal that could convict him and that conducts amounting to crime must first be a matter for the criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues could be raised. This is because a person when a person is accused of committing a criminal offence, his civil right to freedom from arrest, prosecution and punishment is called into question. See also Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550

The court held in this case that where the misconduct of a person amounts to a criminal offence, he should be tried before a court established by the law and vested with jurisdiction to try him. Thus, conducts amounting to crime must first be a matter for the criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues could be raised. See also Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1981) 1 NCLR 135.

The court held in this case that if a person is accused of committing a crime, it is only a criminal tribunal that could convict him and that conducts amounting to crime must first be a matter for the criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues could be raised. This is because when a person is accused of committing or having committed or having committed a criminal offence, his civil right to freedom from rest, prosecution and punishment is called into question.

In this case, the plaintiff respondent was alleged to have misbehaved during a General Certificate of Education examination. The 1^st^ defendant appellant WAEC decided to cancel the entire result of the respondent and also barred her from taking any examinations conducted by the Council for three years. The Council stated that the decision was final and that the matter should be regarded as closed. The respondent then brought an action for a declaration that the decision of the Council against her was unreasonable and contrary to natural justice and sought an order for the release of her result and an injunction restraining the appellant from further interfering with the plaintiff's educational progress. The Court of Appeal dismissed the action and held that the type of unreasonableness that will warrant a court to intervene on a decision reached or act done by an appropriate body or authority is not the opposite of reasonableness in the sense of which the expression is used in common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, or injustice, that a court may say that the parliament never intended to give such powers; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.

In this case, the appellant and three other medical practitioners were charges before the medical and dental practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal with negligence in their non-attendance to a patient contrary to the ethics of the medical profession. The appellants denied liability. The tribunal found against the appellants and directed that their names be struck off the medical Register. The appellants appealed that the counsel to the appellants was not afforded ample opportunity to defend the appellants at the trial. The court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice, and set aside the direction of the tribunal to strike off the names of the appellants from the Medical Register.

The appellant in this case was the Chairman of the Calabar local government Council. He was accused in a notice signed by eighteen councilors of misconduct in the performance of his duties in office. A resolution was passed the same day by the council that the allegations be investigated. The appellant thereupon instituted an action by motion exparte for leave for an order of certiorari to bring up the resolution of the Council to be quashed and for an order of injunction restraining the defendants from taking any action to implement the said resolution before the determination of the substantive suit. The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had not established any conditions that could warrant the court in interfering with the steps taken as the appellant cannot contend that he cannot be investigated because no law regulating the procedure is in existence.

The court held in this case that a tribunal of any kind a master of its own procedure provided that the rules of natural justice are applied.

The court held in this case that an employee cannot be removed or dismissed for a specific misconduct in the absence of adequate opportunity afforded to justify or explain same. Before an employer can dispense with the service of his employee, all he needs to do is to afford the employee an opportunity of being heard before exercising his power of summary dismissal, even where the allegation for which the employee is being dismissed involves accusation of crime.

The appellant and certain members of staff of the respondent bank appeared before a disciplinary committees of the respondent bank to give evidence before the committee investigating the award of certain contracts. At the disciplinary committee, eight out of the nine witnesses who testified against the appellant before the disciplinary committee did so in his absence. Also, the letter sent to the appellant merely invited him to appear before the committee to give evidence. It did not accuse him of anything. It was not a notification of any case against the appellant. The committee at the end of its sitting made certain findings and recommendations in its report regarding the allegation against the appellant. Based on these findings and recommendations, the respondent wrote a letter dismissing the appellant from employment. The appellant sued for a declaration that his dismissal was wrongful and for damages. the supreme Court held that if allegations are to be made against a party, he must be formally given notice and particulars of the charges before the hearing so that he can prepare his answers and defense and that in order to give him fair hearing, he must be given opportunity to confront the witnesses called against him, and to controvert, correct or comment on the evidence or information that is available at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the fact that a person appeared before a court or a panel does not ipso facto mean that he was given a fair hearing in a matter in which his conduct was called to question. He may have been heard, but there can be no fair hearing if the person does not know what his adversary has against. If the purpose of the hearing was to determine his guilt or the propriety of his conduct, it is not enough that he was heard. The hearing must relate to his defense of the complaint against him. Being the person to be affected by the outcome of the hearing, there is need to afford him the opportunity not just to be heard, but to be heard in his defense of whatever allegation made against him.

The Supreme Court held that one of the essential elements of fair hearing, is that the body investigating the charge against a person must not receive evidence, or representation behind the back of the person being investigated. Where it does, the court will not inquire whether such evidence or representation did not work to the prejudice of the person being investigated. It is sufficient it might. The risk of it is enough.

The court further held that it was a clear violation of natural justice in this case for the Disciplinary Committee to permit witnesses to testify against the appellant, without giving him the opportunity to cross examine them.

The Supreme Court in frowning at the use of tribunals instead of courts for the trial of persons stated that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to try any allegation of crime is a radical and fundamental tenet of the Rule of law and the cornerstone of democracy. If the Executive branch is allowed to operate through tribunals and executive investigation panels, that surely will be a very dangerous development. This court cannot be a party to such dangerous innovation. It is only when one is on the receiving end that he can fully appreciate.

The Supreme Court held in this case that hearing by one body followed by a judgment delivered by another body, does not constitute fair hearing. Fair hearing will certainly imply that the body that hears will be the same body that will consider all representations made, and the come to a decision.

The Supreme Court held that when anyone is accused of a criminal offence he should, in his own interest and in the interest of truth and justice be tried by the ordinary courts in the land. No hush hush inquiry will take the place of open trial. The right to fair hearing comprehends and includes the right to be heard in open court in defense of one's character and good name when accused of misconduct amounting to a criminal offence.

The Court of Appeal held that it is unconstitutional to make an order for or against persons who have not been heard. Section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution which is now Section 36 0f the 1999 Constitution, makes it mandatory to grant a person whose civil rights and obligations are being determined a fair hearing. Fair hearing judicially defined does not admit the invocation of equitable powers of the court to deny persons rights so jealously guarded and guaranteed. It is thus an implied requirement of Section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution that in civil matters, judgment should only be given where issues have been joined or admitted.

In this case, an order by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee directing the name of the appellant barrister to be struck out from the register of the legal profession for the offence of champerty was set aside as null and void for being extreme and in the nature of a death sentence as it would deny the appellant opportunity to practice and consequently his means of livelihood.

The facts of this case are that two villages had a communal clash. After a panel of inquiry into the causes, the Bendel state Government enacted Edict No. 7 of 1978 by which it declared one of the community as aggressors in the clash, and Section 3 thereof purported to impose punishment on the community. Action was brought by the community challenging the constitutionality of the Edict on the ground of being contrary to the fair hearing provisions of the constitution and for being a legislative trial and judgment. The Court of Appeal held that Section 3 of the Edict amounted to legislative trial and judgment and that a court has power to enquire into and pronounce on the validity of an Edict, on the ground of inconsistency with a decree or clash with unsuspended sections of the Nigerian Constitution such as the fair hearing provision.

In this case the Court of Appeal held that the public may be excluded from court when and only to such extent as it is strictly necessary in the circumstances of the case and that the fact that the public hearing of a matter will cause embarrassment to some or all the persons concerned is not a sufficient reason for a judge to sit in private or camera.

The Supreme Court held that a tribunal of inquiry is inferior to both the High Court and the Supreme Court which are vested by the Constitution with unlimited power to adjudicate on the rights of parties who appear before them and see to the execution and enforcement of their decision. Consequently, once a party gets a final judgment in his favor before a court of competent jurisdiction, such a judgment is effective, conclusive and binding on the parties and their privies and can only be upset on appeal, and a tribunal of enquiry not being an appellate court, is incompetent to review, overrule, or set aside such a judgment.

In this case, the appellant brought an action, claiming for a declaration that he was recognized as the Bale of Oro by the first and third respondents and that he acted in that capacity, was paid salaries and emoluments and the respondents functionaries addressed correspondences to him as such until 1982, when the respondents purported to withdraw his recognition as Bale without a hearing and instead recognized the fifth defendant. He sought a declaration that the purported withdrawal of his recognition and the subsequent recognition of the fifth defendant was null and void, and sought for an order of injunction. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to a hearing before the withdrawal of his right, if at all, to the Chieftaincy Stool.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the principle of audi alteram partem has been incorporated in our jurisprudence that a man cannot be condemned without being heard and this is often expressed by the Latin maxim, audi alteram partem; hear the other side, and it is applicable in all cases in which decision is to be taken in any matter, whether in a judicial, quasi-judicial or even in a purely administrative proceedings involving a person's interest in a property, right or personal liberty.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the principle of audi alteram partem demands that whenever prejudicial allegations are made against a party, he must be given particulars of the allegation so that he can prepare his answers. Furthermore, in order to protect his interest, he must also be enabled to controvert, correct or comment on other evidence or information that may be available before the hearing, and the right course is usually to give him advance notification.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the principle of audi alteram partem demands that whenever prejudicial allegations are made against a party, he must be given particulars of the allegation so that he can prepare his answers. Furthermore, in order to protect his interest, he must also be enabled to controvert, correct or comment on other evidence or information that may be available before the hearing, and the right course is usually to give him advance notification.

The court held that fair hearing connotes that all parties may be availed the opportunity to be heard. Thus the maxim audi alteram partem is to the effect that both sides to litigation be heard before a decision is made.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the courts have a duty to protect vested rights, as otherwise lawlessness will reign. So they have always taken the view that any attempt by a competent authority to take away a citizen's vested rights must be done in strict compliance with the law and any laid down procedure.

The Supreme Court held in this case that natural justice demands that a party must be heard before the case against him is determined. Even God gave Adam an oral hearing despite the evidence supplied by his act of covering his nakedness, before the case against his continued stay in the Garden of Eden was determined against him.

The Court of Appeal held that the rule of audi alteram partem postulates that the court must hear both sides at every material stage of the proceedings before handing down a decision. It is a rule of fairness and a court cannot be fair unless it considers both sides of the case as may be presented by the parties. See also Eagle Shipping Agencies Ltd. (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 65) 475.

The Supreme Court held in this case that constitutionally entrenched provisions, particularly those safeguarding individual rights, should not, save in fascist system, be lightly trampled upon. An appointee should not have the specter of misconduct hanging over his head without being given an opportunity of clearing his name.

In this case, the court held that even personal knowledge of an offence is no substitute for hearing an officer; his explanation might prove or disprove criminal motive or intent, and bring forward other tort in mitigation.

The court held in this case that an administrative officer conducting an enquiry is a judicial tribunal who is subject to the rules of natural justice and fair hearing.

In this case, a land owner was informed by the local authority of its intention to apply to the Minister of Health for confirmation of an order for compulsory purchase of his farmland for housing purposes. He submitted notice and grounds of objection to the Minister. The Minister sent the notice and grounds, without informing the land owner, to the local authority, who sent the Minister a detailed reply. The Minister, did not inform the landowner of the detailed reply made by the local authority, and having, in the exercise of his discretion under the Housing (Temporary provisions) Act, decided not to hold a public local inquiry, the Minister thereupon confirmed the compulsory purchase order. the court held that the confirmation order was invalid and must be quashed, since a mere notice and grounds of objection did not constitute a presentation of the land owner's case, and, as the local authority had had an opportunity of presenting their case in detail, the Minister had acted without hearing both sides equally.

The court held in this case that when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete justice.

The Supreme Court held that the right to fair hearing being a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by the constitution, the breach of it in any trial or investigation or inquiry nullifies the trial, investigating or inquiry, and any action taken on them is a nullity.

The court held in this case that where two parties are each subjected to different types of hearing, it cannot be said that there was a fair hearing.

The court held in this case that the words "hearing" or "opportunity to be heard" includes both where oral submissions are made, as well as where written representations are made.

The court held in this case that a decision reached after a full enquiry without an oral hearing does not violate the principles of fair hearing.

The United States Supreme Court held that the opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not permit the recipient to mold his arguments to the issues the decision maker appear to regard as important, particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue. Written submissions are wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the denial of fair hearing is denial of justice and it is a prejudice to any man to be denied justice.

The Supreme Court held that the principle that a judge must be impartial is accepted in the jurisprudence of any civilized country.

The court held in this case that natural justice requires that an accused person must be given the opportunity to put forward his defense fully and freely and to ask the court to hear any witnesses whose evidence might help him.

The Supreme Court held in this case that natural justice requires that a party to a case must be given the opportunity to put forward his case fully and freely and to apply to the court to hear any material witness and consider relevant documentary evidence with the view to reaching a fair and just decision in the matter.

The court held that fair hearing must involve a fair trial, and a fair trial of a case consists of the whole hearing. The true test of a fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at a trial, whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the true test of fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case.

The court held in this case that in the matters involving the exercise of statutory administrative power, the function of the court begins, only if and when it is alleged that the power has not been exercised in accordance with the statute creating them.

The court held in this case that the Latin maxim, audi alteram partem expresses the fair hearing aspect of the rule. It simply means that no one is to be condemned, punished, or else deprived of his property or rights without an opportunity of being heard. therefore, when a person's legal right or right and obligations are called in question, he should be accorded full opportunity of being heard before any decision is taken in relation to those rights and obligations. It is an indispensable requirement of justice, that the arty who has to decide shall hear both sides, giving both sides the same opportunity, and according each side the same method of presenting his case. It will therefore be wrong to receive oral evidence from one side and deny the other side the privilege of adducing oral evidence. It will also be wrong to call for written statements from one side while denying same to the other side.

The court held in this case that he who shall decide anything, without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have done what is right.

The court held in this case that where one party is denied an opportunity of fully presenting his case, and that same opportunity was allowed the opposite party, then there is a denial of the first party's right of presenting his case in detail.

The court held in this case that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.

The court stated the rule in this case that the law does not measure the amount of interest which a judge possesses. If he has any legal interest in the decision of the question one way, he is disqualified, no matter how small the interest may be. The law in laying sown this strict rule, has regard not so much perhaps to the motives which might be supposed to bias the judge as to the susceptibilities of the litigant parties. One important object, at all events, is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of the tribunal, and so to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of justice, which is so essential to social order and security.

The court held in this case that it is against all laws, that the same person should be party and judge in the same cause, for the party is he that is to complain to the judge, and the judge is to hear the party; the party endeavors to have his will, the judge determines against the will of the party, and has authority to force him to obey his sentence: and can any man act against his own will, or enforce himself to obey. To say that he may be judge and party, it is manifest contradiction, it is impossible that one should be judge and party, for the judge is to determine between party and party, or between the government and the party.

In the case, the Lord Chancellor of England who owned 90 shares in the canal company gave judgment in favor of the canal company in a suit between the appellant and the company. On appeal, the court set aside the judgment holding that it amounted to a breach of the rule of natural justice.

The court held in this case that there any direct pecuniary interest however small in the subject of inquiry does disqualify a person from acting as a judge in the matter.

The Court of Appeal in explaining the meaning of bias stated that in a charge of bias, the integrity, honesty or fidelity of purpose and the judge's traditional role of holding the balance in the matter are questioned. He is branded or seen as one who leaves his exalted, respected and traditional arena of impartiality to descend unfairly on one of the parties outside all known canons of judicial discretion. The judge is said to have a particular interest, a propriety interest which cannot be justified on the scale of justice, as he parades that interest recklessly and parochially in the adjudication process to the detriment of the party he hates and to obvious advantage of the party he likes. The judge, at that level, is incapable of rational thinking and therefore rational judgment. His thoughts are blurred against the party he hates. He is poised for a fight, an uninstigated fight in which he is the main participant. the conduct of the judge invariably and unequivocally points to one trend and it is that he will give judgment to the party he favors at all cost, come day or night, come rain or sunshine. Such is the terrible state of mind of the biased judge or one who is likely to be biased. The law recognizes a number of causes of bias. It is foreknowledge or previous knowledge of the case. This arises when the judge at one time or the other, had done something in the matter to the extent that he cannot be said to be completely neutral person or stranger to it.

ANYEBE

V.

ADESIYUN & ORS. (1997) 5 NWLR (PT. 505) 403

Meaning and test of bias.

In this case, it was held that the term bias or real likelihood of bias may not be capable of exact definition since circumstances giving rise to it may vary from case to case. But it must mean a substantial possibility of bias. The test is whether there is a reasonable suspicion of bias looked at from the objective point of a reasonable person and not from the objective standpoint of tan aggrieved party.

The court stated in this case that even an act of parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own cause is void in itself.

The Supreme Court held in this case that to "hear" a cause or matter, means to hear and determine the cause or matter.

The court stated in this case that there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it is likely or probable that the justice or the Chairman, as the case may be, would or did favor one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not enquire whether he did, in fact favor one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'the judge was biased'.

The court held in this case that relationship with a party or parties counts as one of the interests that may disqualify a judge from adjudicating over a matter.

The court held in this case that the previous involvement, participation or decision in a matter can disqualify a judge from adjudicating over that matter.

The court held in this case that inhibiting or denying a party from effectively stating his case can disqualify a judge from adjudicating a case.

The court held in this case that the principles of natural justice, are part of the pillars that support the concept of the Rule of law. They are an indispensable party of the process of adjudication in any civilized society. The twin pillars on which they are built, are the principles that one must be heard in his own defense before being condemned, and that no one should be a judge in his own case.

The court held in this case that the rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. The two rules are the essential characteristic of what is often called natural justice. They are the twin pillars supporting it. They are put in two words: impartiality and fairness. But they are separate concepts and are governed by separate considerations. If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them.

The court held in this case that as regards bias or likelihood of bias, the common law has disqualified an adjudicator from adjudicating whenever circumstances point to real likelihood that he will have a bias by which means an operative prejudice whether conscious or unconscious.

The court held in this case that a person who has a judicial duty to perform is disqualified from performing it, if he has a bias which renders him otherwise an impartial judge or if he has so conducted himself in relation to the matter to be investigated so as to lead a reasonable man to suspect that he may have such a bias.

The court held in this case that in the circumstances of the country, fair hearing is an entrenched provision of the constitution which cannot be displaced by legislation however unambiguously worded.

The court held in this case that no proposition can be more clearly established than that a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence by a judicial proceeding, until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the case against him, unless indeed the legislature has expressed or given an authority to act without that necessary preliminary.

The court held in this case that fair hearing therefore must mean a trial conducted according to all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties in the cause.

The court in stating the law said in this case that the question is not, whether in fact he was or was not biased. The court cannot inquire into that. There is something between these two prepositions in the administration of justice, whether by a recognized legal court or by persons who, although not a legal public court are acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires that in order that there should be no doubt about the purity of the administration, any person who is to take part in it, should not be in such a position that he might be suspected of being biased.

The court held in this case that it is highly desirable that justice should be administered by persons who cannot be suspected of improper motives.

The court held in this case that if it is incompatible for the same man to be at once a judge and occupy some other position which is really in the case, then prima facie; he must not act as a judge at all, that is a fundamental and essential principle of justice.

In the case, the appellant, a judicial officer brought an action against the respondent members of the judicial service commission for unlawful removal from office and sought several declaratory and injunctive reliefs. The Court of Appeal held that the right to fair hearing is a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by the constitution and the breach of it at a trial, investigation or inquiry, nullifies the trial, investigation or inquiry and any action taken thereon is also a nullity.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the test of real likelihood of bias which the courts have applied is based on the reasonable man who is fully appraised of the facts involved. At times, in considering whether there was real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the Chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may be who sits in judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did in fact favor one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough. Thus, there must circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favor one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not enquire whether he did, in fact, favor one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking the judge is biased.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the test to be applied in determining what constitutes bias which can be implied to a court or any tribunal is not actual bias but a real likelihood of bias.

In the case, the appellant, an Assistant Superintendent of Police following an allegation was dismissed. Although he was served with a letter alleging misconduct of which he replied, it was contended that the full statement of the facts and evidence, on which the public service commission relied for his dismissal, was never communicated to him, in breach of the rules of natural justice. It was submitted that the failure, to hear oral evidence, in a case, of this nature was a denial of justice. However, it was not suggested that there was any rule, either in the general orders or in the rules made by the commission, which prescribed an oral hearing before the Commission. The plaintiff sought an order of certiorari to quash the commission's decision to dismiss him, alleging that the procedure adopted by the Commission, an administrative tribunal with disciplinary powers were irregular and contrary to natural justice. The Supreme Court held in this case that a tribunal , is in the absence of any declaration to the contrary, entitled to decide its own procedure and lay down its own rules for the conduct of enquiries regarding discipline and the like; however, such rules, procedure and enquiries, be in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that fair hearing is an opportunity to be heard in a court proceedings or in any situation where justice is required to be established.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that a judge should not hear a case if he is suspected of partiality because of consanguinity, affinity, friendship or enmity with a party, or because of his subordinate status towards a party or because he was or had been a party's advocate. Also, natural justice demands, not only that those whose interest may be directly affected by an act or decision should be given prior notice and adequate opportunity to be heard, but also that the tribunal should be disinterested and impartial.

The court held in this case that the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rule under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the purity of the administration of justice is so jealously guarded, that if there are any circumstances so affecting a person or body of persons, called upon to determine the rights of fellow human beings, as to be calculated to create in the mind of a reasonable man a suspicion of those person's impartiality, those circumstances in themselves and by themselves alone, are sufficient to disqualify the person or persons from adjudicating.

The court held in this case that a court of inquiry, though not a court of record, nor a court of law nor coming within the ordinary definition of a court of justice is nevertheless a court duly and legally constituted and recognized in the Articles of War and many Acts of Parliament.

The court held in this case that the test necessary for determination whether a statutory body has judicial powers are;

a. Whether it has before it a lis inter partes, or an issue for determination between parties;

b. Whether the decision of the statutory body is binding; and

c. Whether the decision of the body is conclusive and final.

The court held that a purely administrative tribunal may turn judicial, once it embarks on judicial or quasi adventure. The test should be the function the tribunal performs at a particular time. During the period of in-course into judicial or quasi functions, an administrative body must be bound in process thereof to observe the principles that govern exercise of judicial functions.

The court held in this case that there is a clear distinction between the exercise of judicial power and administrative powers. The characteristics of bindingness, finality and lis inter partes, or the exercise of a judicial power are clearly absent in the exercise of administrative powers.

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the exceptions to the nemo judex in causa sua rule. The exceptions to the rule which are on the grounds of necessity are;

a. Where another court, tribunal or adjudicator cannot be constituted;

b. Where a statute names a particular person or body as the judge, or appellate body;

c. When a court punishes contempt committed in the face of court.

The court held in this case that the requirements of natural justice is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons, invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequence to individual.

The court held in this case that the right to be heard is such an important, radical and protective right, that the courts strain every nerve to uphold it, and even to imply it where a statutory form of protection would be less protective, if it did not carry with it the right to be heard.

The Supreme Court held that the right of a man to be heard in his own defense is the most elementary protection of all, and where a statutory form of protection would be less effective if it did not carry with it a right to be heard, I would not find it difficult to imply this right.

It was held in this case that the courts have been appointed sentinels to watch over the fundamental rights secured to the people and to guard against any infringement of those rights by the state.

The court held in this case that where a tribunal is dealing with matters affecting a man's reputation and livelihood or other matters of importance, natural justice requires that he should be allowed to be defended by counsel and solicitor.

The court held in this case that the choice of counsel is entirely the business of the accused person and not that of the court.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a man can never have a verdict entered against him, on a matter relating to his civil rights or obligations before a court or tribunal, without being given an opportunity of being heard. The rule is in fact one of the essential cornerstones of our judicial process.

The court held in this case that the right to be heard is so fundamental a principle in Nigerian adjudicatory process that it cannot be compromised on any ground. The principle of fair hearing not only demands but dictates that the parties to a case must be heard. A hearing can only be fair when all the parties to the dispute are given a hearing or an opportunity of a hearing. If one of the parties is refused hearing not given opportunity to be heard, the hearing cannot qualify as fair hearing. And without fair hearing, the principles of natural justice are abandoned. See also Nwokoro v. Onuma (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 22.

The court held in this case that fair hearing lies in the procedure followed in the determination of the case, not in the correctness of the decision. It does not matter whether a decision made subsequently therefore is correct. A denial of the right to be heard is a breach of constitutional right, natural justice and rules of court. It is an elementary and fundamental principle of the administration of justice of justice in Nigeria, that no decision can be regarded as valid, unless, the trial judge or court has heard both sides of the conflict.

The Supreme Court held that it is a fundamental principle of the administration of natural justice, that a defendant and his witnesses should be heard before the case against him is determined, and it is a denial of justice to refuse to hear a defendant's witnesses.

In this case the court held that the principle of fair hearing entrenched in the Constitution is so fundamental in the judicial process or the administration of justice that breach of it will vitiate or nullify the whole proceedings and a party cannot be heard to say that the proceedings were properly conducted and should be saved because of such proper conduct. Once the court comes to the conclusion that there is or was a breach of the principle of fair hearing, the proceedings or decision cannot be salvaged as they are null and void ab initio.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the word "represent" in the context of legal representation means to act or stand for or be an agent for another.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the onus is on the accused person to show that he does not understand the language of the court. The right of an accused person to an interpreter is that of the person on trial. It is therefore not a right which could be waived by counsel, and is not one that could be cure by the presence of counsel. The absence of an interpreter is a violation of his constitutional right.

The court held in this case that a fundamental right is a right that cannot be waived.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a right conferred by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria cannot be taken away by any other legislation or statutory provision except by the Constitution. But a right, even that provided, for and guaranteed in the Constitution can, in appropriate cases, be waived by the person or body for whose benefit it was provided. See also Co-operative & Commercial Bank Limited v. Mbakwe (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 765) 158.

The Supreme Court stating concerning the right not to be tried under retroactive laws stated that it is a cardinal principle of the concept of criminality which is protected by the Constitution that a person can only be charged with and convicted for an offence recognized by law and in existence at the time the act alleged was committed; this is the hallowed and sacred principle of legality. It is because of its importance and high public policy that the legislative jurisdiction of the legislature is also excluded from having retrospective effect in relation to any criminal offence whatsoever.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that laws made by the national Assembly are construed as operating only in cases or in facts which come into existence after the laws were passed, unless a retrospective effect is clearly stated.

The Supreme Court held that fair hearing must of course be a hearing that does not contravene the principles of natural justice.

The court held that the principles enshrined in Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution which is in pari materia with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) represent an indispensable cornerstone of the well settled rules of the principles of natural justice which must be observed in every determination affecting the rights of citizens.

The Supreme Court held that Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution which is in pari materia with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is an omnibus provision to ensure justice, and compliance with it automatically means compliance with the rules of natural justice.

The court held in this case that the principles of natural justice are easy to proclaim, but their precise extent is far less easy to define.

The court held in this case that a fair trial of a case consists of the whole hearing. There is no difference between the two. The true test of a fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial, whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case.

The Supreme Court held in this case that fair hearing means a trial conducted according to all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties.

The court held that a complaint of the absence of fair hearing is always serious. Not only is the right to fair hearing a constitutional right; but fair hearing is fundamental in the system of administration of justice.

The court held in this case that the use of the term culprits implies a finding of guilt, and any finding of guilt without a trial is a breach of all the rules of natural justice.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a person liable to be directly affected by the proposed administrative acts, decision or procedure or against whom disciplinary action is proposed must be clearly informed of the allegations against him, and be given the opportunity to answer those allegations or charges before action is taken against him.

In the case, based on certain allegations, the appellant, registrar of the institute, was invited to appear before a panel set up by the respondent institute to give evidence as a witness. The panel sent its report to the Governing Council. The Council adopted the report of the investigating panel and decided without calling on the appellant to explain himself to retire him compulsorily from the service of the college. The appellant sued claiming inter alia for an order quashing the decision of the Governing Council. The Supreme court in allowing the appeal held that there was a lack of fair hearing an accordingly, the purported retirement of the appellant was null and void.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the requirement is that when a disciplinary action is to be taken against the officer, he must first of all be informed of the allegations, in a manner that will show that the conduct of the matter concerned will be the subject of an inquiry and that to point and accusing finger without real accusation of the charges and the denial of opportunity to defend, falls far short of the principle of fair hearing and cannot and must not be substitute for the accusation of the particular misconduct and explanation expected from the man accused of the misconduct.

The court held in this case that suspicion however strong cannot support a conclusive inference of guilt. It is still the wavering accusing finger of suspicion. Guilt can only be accepted when the accusing finger stops wavering and stands straight and erect pointing unwaveringly at the accused.

In this case, the Supreme Court in stating what judicial review entails stated that in Nigeria, which has a written presidential constitution, judicial review entails three processes which are;

a. The courts particularly the Supreme Court, ensuring that every arm of government plays its role in the true spirit of the principle of separation of powers as provided for in the constitution.

b. That every public functionary performs his functions according to law, including the constitution; and

c. For the Supreme Court, that it reviews court decisions including its own, when the need arises in order to ensure that the country does not suffer under the same regime of obsolete or wrong decisions.

The court held in this case that a declaration of rights also known as declaratory judgment is a judgment declaring the legal rights of a party. A declaration of rights is a declaration that one party has a right and the other party owes an obligation and the making of an appropriate order by court to do justice in the circumstances.

In the case, the appellant was deported by the Federal Authority and its agents from Nigeria. An application was filed on behalf of the appellant to enforce his fundamental rights and for redress for the violation. He sought a declaration that he is a citizen of Nigeria and as such has a fundamental right of immunity from expulsion from Nigeria. The court held in this case that the deportation of the appellant was unconstitutional, set aside the deportation order and granted the declarations.

In the case, the plaintiff was detained on March 12, 1984 at the Abeokuta prisons pursuant to an order made under the State Security (Detention of Person) Decree No. 2, 1984. Summons was filed and served on the respondents to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued for the release of the defendant. The court held that there was no proof that a detention order was issued under the hand of the relevant authority, the chief of staff, supreme headquarters. the order of detention filed was irregular on its face and the affidavit filed was defective as the contents failed to show sufficient facts to establish that the power was exercised in strict compliance with the enabling decree and as such, the defendants failed to discharge the onus placed on them to establish the legal justification for the detention of the applicant. The court declared the applicant entitled to have the writ of habeas corpus issued to set him at liberty.

In the case, the appellant State Government purportedly acquired the building of the respondent. The respondent sued challenging the action. The Supreme Court held that any purported acquisition of property under a law contrary to the provisions of Section 40 of the 1979 Constitution which is now Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution, is no acquisition at all in the eyes of the law.

The court held in this case that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man and the legislature therefore has no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another without just compensation.

The court in explaining the position of the law and the potency of a declaratory judgment, stated that a pronouncement on a right, with or without sanction is enough, and is expected to be instantly obeyed; the underlying principle in all civilized societies being that, a coercive sanction against a government is unnecessary because it must obey any judgment of its own court.

The court held in this case that a mandamus is an order of court commanding a person to perform a public duty which lies on him. Therefore, where an applicant has fulfilled the legal requirements for performance, a court will issue an order of mandamus to compel its performance.

The court held in this case that in the absence of a prescribed procedure for attacking the exercise of powers by a Minister; the normal civil processes and the principles of general law, including the prerogative orders, are, of course available to be invoked to advantage by an aggrieved person whose rights have been infringed.

The court speaking on the order of mandamus in this case stated that it was introduced to prevent the disorder from failure of justice, and defect of the police. Therefore it ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be a remedy.

In this case, the appellants impounded the passport of the respondent. He brought an action for the enforcement of his fundamental rights and claimed inter alia an order of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal and held that the seizure of the passport was null and void and an order of mandamus would issue against the appellants for its release.

The applicant requested the Director of Public Prosecutions to exercise his discretion to prosecute the respondents and if he declines to prosecute, to endorse a certificate to that effect on the information and permit private prosecution. The DPP did not come to a decision whether or not to prosecute. The applicant then applied for leave for an order of mandamus to issue on him to come to a decision. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the court held that leave to apply for an order of mandamus would be granted to compel the DPP to make a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute. After the order, the DPP exercised his discretion and decided not to prosecute the complainant filed by the applicant.

In the case, the applicants were members of a farmers union which had paid to the ministry for a truck load of fertilizer. Following the long delay in delivery, the applicants filed a motion on notice seeking an order of mandamus to issue to compel the first respondent to perform his official or public duty of releasing the said fertilizer to the union. The Court of Appeal held that an order of mandamus will lie and held that an order of mandamus is a discretionary remedy and courts of justice must always bear in mind that the principal purpose of its use is to remedy defects in justice. Although the courts will as a general rule, and in the exercise of their discretion refuse an order of mandamus, when there is an alternative specific legal remedy at law, mandamus may yet issue in cases where although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual.

The court held in this case that for an order of mandamus to issue, the law requires that there must be a legal right on the part of the applicant for mandamus, to the performance by a person or body of some duty of public nature, and not merely of private character.

In this case, the court granted an application for an order of mandamus to issue compelling the management committee of the defendant Council to issue permits to the applicant taxi owners to operate their taxi cabs in the area of jurisdiction of the Council.

In this case, an order of mandamus was issued by the Supreme Court to compel the Registrar of Companies to register a company being formed by promoters, all requirements for registration having been met.

It was held in this case that where a discretion has been exercised according to law, bona fide and upon relevant considerations, the court has not any occasion or indeed any right to examine into the manner in which, or the principles upon which, that discretion has been exercised.

Where a discretion has been exercised according to law, a court will not intervene by an order of mandamus.

The court held in this case that the vestry authorities had not properly exercised their discretion and a mandamus would go to them to consider and determine the application according to law.

Where a discretion is not exercised fairly, reasonably and according to law, an order of mandamus will issue against such public authority to exercise the discretion based on facts, relevant considerations, in good faith and according to law.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether or not to grant an order of mandamus, the court must take onto consideration that the grant or refusal is discretionary and must be satisfied that ;

a. It is not to direct the doing or refusal of act which a statute makes discretionary.

b. The party against whom the order is sought has received some prior intimation of what the applicant requires him to do and that he has refused to do it.

c. There is an infringement of some public right or duty and no effectual relief can be obtained in the ordinary course of an action. See also R v. Western Urhobo Rating Authority (1961) 1 ANLR 796.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a certiorari is a writ of common law originally issued by a superior court to inferior court requiring the latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein. The writ is issued in order that the court issuing the writ may inspect the proceedings and determine whether there have been irregularities.

The court held that an order of certiorari is an order by which a superior court or tribunal calls upon an inferior court, tribunal, public, or administrative authority to produce the record of the proceedings upon which h such body based its decision, touching the right of the applicant so that the superior court will examine the record and adjudge the legality of the decision reached on it.

The court held in this case that that the prerogative writ or order of certiorari is designed to check the excesses and arbitrary decisions of inferior tribunals whereby they are compelled to bring up their records or proceedings to the superior court for correction and or to be quashed in an appropriate case. An application for certiorari under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is meant to enforce the fundamental right to fair hearing enshrined in the Constitution. It is to ensure that no one is denied the right to fair hearing and that one is made to know the case against him and be given unfettered opportunity of being heard in one's defense. this is so fundamental that no superior court of record should glibly by a mere stroke of the pen strike out an application for certiorari to quash the proceedings of an inferior tribunal where the accepted and undenied complaints are manifest injustice on the records and amount to a denial of principles of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that certiorari is a prerogative writ of common law origin available to the High Court in its exercise of its supervisory control over inferior tribunals or courts to ensure that these tribunals or courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or do not commit any irregularities which will render their decisions bad. When such writ is issued and the proceedings of the inferior tribunal is produced for inspection, the High Court has power to quash such proceedings where due cause is disclosed for doing so.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the most important function of the writ of certiorari is that by it, in the exercise of the supervisory role of the High Court over inferior courts, judgments, orders or other proceedings of the inferior courts, whether civil or criminal, made without or in excess of jurisdiction may be removed to the High Court to be quashed.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a writ of certiorari lies at common law to remove the proceedings of inferior courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial functions for the purpose of being quashed. It may be an alternative to appeal and serves as a way of controlling inferior courts or tribunals. It could be employed to quash proceedings conducted without jurisdiction or in excess of it. The writ does not lie to correct purely administrative or ministerial acts.

The court held that certiorari will lie against a judge if he has acted without jurisdiction.

The court held in this case that an order of certiorari will lie, if the tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction, and equally if the tribunal gives a decision which the court conceives to be bad on the face of decision.

The court held in this case that where there is a failure to consider all the relevant evidence, an order of certiorari will lie

The court held in this case that where a prima facie case has not been made an order of certiorari will not issue.

An order of certiorari is a prerogative order issued at the discretion of the superior court in deserving cases. It is therefore not issued as a matter of right to a claimant.

In this case, the appellant was charged at the instance of the administrative officer in his capacity as the local authority responsible for tax collection in Aba, for failure to pay income tax, and was tried by the Administrative Officer acting again in his capacity as Magistrate and was found liable. His appeal to the high court was dismissed. On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the proceedings were vitiated by the fact that the same person was both prosecutor and judge. This offended against the rules of natural justice. Therefore, the decision was quashed and set aside.

In this case, the appellants who were students of the respondent university were expelled following some allegations. The appellants applied to court inter alia on ground of breach of the rules of fair hearing. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted an order of certiorari quashing the expulsion.

In this case, the applicant sought an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Governors removing him from office as a district head, and for an order of prohibition against the Governor from exercising his powers under Section 2 (1) Ex- native Office Holders Removal Ordinance. The court held that the acts of the Governor were not judicial but were a ministerial act or a legislative act. An order of certiorari nor prohibition will not lie.

In this case, the revocation of the applicant's goldsmith license was held not to be judicial act but the exercise of discretion and an administrative act and the fact that the appellant was not given opportunity of being heard is not a ground for interfering with revocation.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that in certiorari proceedings, the court is mainly concerned with whether the record on the face of it showed errors or jurisdictional irregularities, which must be corrected by quashing the record of the inferior tribunal.

The court held in answering the question when an administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity stated that a judicial act seems to be an act done by a competent authority, upon consideration of the facts and circumstances, imposing liability and affecting the rights of others.

The court held that the earlier view of the law is that an administrative body, in ascertaining facts, may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of, and are not conducted in accordance with the practice of a court of law. The modern concept, which however, commends itself to us, is that the duty placed on such a body is to act fairly in all such cases. No labels such as "judicially" or 'quasi-judicially" are necessary as they tend to confuse.

The court in explaining the duty on an administrative body performing a judicial or quasi-judicial duty stated it is not a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly.

The court held that the duty to act fairly rests on any body, even though they are not judicial nor quasi-judicial, but only administrative.

The court held in this case that it is not necessary to label the proceedings "judicial," "quasi-judicial," "administrative," "investigatory." it is the characteristics of the proceedings that matters, not the precise compartment into which it falls.

The court held in this case that lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark to an inquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage, while engaged on a proper on a proper inquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its inquiry into something not directed by parliament and fail to make the inquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity.

In the case, there was a boundary dispute between two communities, and Kwara State government appointed the respondent as a sole boundary settlement commissioner to inquire into the matter and resolve the dispute. The Commissioner completed the assignment and submitted his report to the Governor of Kwara state together with an attached survey plan made by the Surveyor General showing the boundaries as determined. Following the submission of the report, the appellants applied for and were granted leave to apply for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the sole Commissioner. After hearing the application the High Court refused the grant the order of certiorari. The Supreme Court refused the application and held that there was no substance in the complaint that the Commissioner did not prepare a separate plan in support of his decision but used the plan of the area of the area in dispute, made by the Surveyor General of the state and tendered during the proceedings, particularly as there was no suggestion that this plan was clear; that he did not therefore exceed his power by so doing; and that the Commissioner was a fit and proper person to conduct an inquiry into the boundary dispute.

In the case, there was a boundary dispute between two communities, and Kwara State government appointed the respondent as a sole boundary settlement commissioner to inquire into the matter and resolve the dispute. The Commissioner completed the assignment and submitted his report to the Governor of Kwara state together with an attached survey plan made by the Surveyor General showing the boundaries as determined. Following the submission of the report, the appellants applied for and were granted leave to apply for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the sole Commissioner. After hearing the application the High Court refused the grant the order of certiorari. The Supreme Court refused the application and held that there was no substance in the complaint that the Commissioner did not prepare a separate plan in support of his decision but used the plan of the area of the area in dispute, made by the Surveyor General of the state and tendered during the proceedings, particularly as there was no suggestion that this plan was clear; that he did not therefore exceed his power by so doing; and that the Commissioner was a fit and proper person to conduct an inquiry into the boundary dispute.

The court held that whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of a subject, and having the duty to act judicially, acts in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that an order of prohibition has to restrain an inferior tribunal or any body of persons which has a legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of a subject from exceeding its jurisdiction.

The court held in this case that an injunction is an order of court prohibiting a person or body from doing a specified thing.

In this case, the court granted a temporary injunction to restrain a person from removing property from jurisdiction pending the hearing of the matter. This type of injunction came to be known as the Mareva injunction.

In this case, the court held that the undertaking to pay damage applies whether the plaintiff has not been guilty of misrepresentation, suppression or other default in obtaining the injunction. The undertaking is equally enforceable where a court of first instance fails to extract an undertaking as to damages, an appellate court ought normally to discharge the order of injunction on appeal.

The court held in this case that an interlocutory injunction is an injunction made pending the determination of a suit and is usually granted after hearing both parties.

In this case, the Court of appeal held that the measure taken at an early stage in the proceeding before the court has had an opportunity to hear and weigh fully the evidence on both sides and it is intended to preserve matters. It is an injunction which is directed to ensure that particular acts o not take place pending the final determination of the rights of the parties by the courts. In other words, interlocutory injunctions are those measures issued at any time during the pendency of litigation for the short term purpose of preventing injury to the applicant prior to the time that the court will be in a position to either grant or deny permanent relief on the merit. See also Alcatel (Nig.) Plc. v. Ojuegbele (2003) 2 NWLR (pt. 805) 429, Omaliko v. Awachie (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 780) 1.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the principle on which the court will act in an application for interlocutory injunction is that the court should be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing and that on the facts before it, there is probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the principle on which the court will act in an application for interlocutory injunction is that the court should be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing and that on the facts before it, there is probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the grant of an ex parte application for interim injunction infringed the right to fair hearing in this case. The court held that the right to fair hearing under the Constitution is synonymous with the common law rules of natural justice. However, because of the nature of certain preliminary steps that have to be taken before the commencement of substantive matters, the rules of court have made provisions for ex parte applications and there is nothing unconstitutional in such rules.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the grant of an ex parte application for interim injunction infringed the right to fair hearing in this case. The court held that the right to fair hearing under the Constitution is synonymous with the common law rules of natural justice. However, because of the nature of certain preliminary steps that have to be taken before the commencement of substantive matters, the rules of court have made provisions for ex parte applications and there is nothing unconstitutional in such rules.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the grant of an ex parte application for interim injunction infringed the right to fair hearing in this case. The court held that the right to fair hearing under the Constitution is synonymous with the common law rules of natural justice. However, because of the nature of certain preliminary steps that have to be taken before the commencement of substantive matters, the rules of court have made provisions for ex parte applications and there is nothing unconstitutional in such rules.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the grant of an ex parte application for interim injunction infringed the right to fair hearing in this case. The court held that the right to fair hearing under the Constitution is synonymous with the common law rules of natural justice. However, because of the nature of certain preliminary steps that have to be taken before the commencement of substantive matters, the rules of court have made provisions for ex parte applications and there is nothing unconstitutional in such rules.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that once a temporary or interim injunction has been made, parties are to maintain the status quo and not make the laws into their hands, nor resort to self-help. No one including the government is entitled to take law into his hands.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that an order of interlocutory injunction is predicated on the determination of a number of contentious issues which require that the court hears both sides before deciding. On the other hand, an order of interim injunction merely leaves matters in status quo and the court entertaining the application does not have to decide any contentious issues before reaching a decision. in fact, it is the extent to which a court can go in the determination of contentious issues in the case when an application for an order of interim injunction or for an order of interlocutory injunction comes before it that constitutes one of the significant or decisive factors in the determination of whether all or any of them can be granted without hearing the other party or parties to the case in accordance with the fair hearing provision of the Constitution.

In the case, the applicant was deported by the Federal authorities and its agents from Nigeria. An application was filed on behalf of the plaintiff to enforce his fundamental rights and to redress the violation. An interlocutory injunction was granted to restrain the respondents until the determination of the proceedings. At the conclusion of the trial, an order of perpetual injunction was issued to restrain the respondents from interfering with the applicant.

The Supreme Court held in this case that when an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a defendant from doing acts alleged to be a violation of the plaintiff's legal right is made upon contested facts, the decision whether or not to grant the interlocutory injunction, has to be taken at a time when the existence of the right or the violation of it or both are uncertain and will remain uncertain, until final judgment is given in the action.

The court regarding the rules guiding the grant of interim injunction held that the difficulty in the law with respect to interim injunction exists not because the law is recondite but because the ascertained principles must be subjected at all times to a rather amorphous combination of facts which are perpetually different in every case.

The court held in this case that the applicant for an interim injunction must show that the balance of convenience is on his side for a grant of the order, that is, that more justice will be done by granting the application than in refusing it.

The court held in this case that an order of injunction is not a remedy for an act which has already been carried out.

The court held in this case that a habeas corpus is a writ for determining the legality of the detention of a person who is in official custody.

The court held in this case that a habeas corpus is a writ for releasing a person from unlawful detention which could be private hands.

It was held in this case that where a court is satisfied that a detention is prima facie illegal, a writ is usually issued to command the custodian of the prisoner bring the detainee to court and justify the detention, and if he cannot, the detainee is released forthwith.

The court commenting on the purpose of habeas corpus held that the common law adapted the old writ of habeas corpus ad suscipiendeum et recipiedum to the purpose of securing the subject's right of immunity from imprisonment, save by due process of law.

The court stated in this case that the writ of habeas corpus is a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its roots deep into the genius of common law. It is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity. It has through the ages been jealously maintained by courts of law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the executive at the case of the liege.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a citizen who is arraigned before and ordered to be remanded in custody by a court having no jurisdiction to try him could have his right enforced through habeas corpus proceedings or under the Fundamental Rights Enforcements Rules.

The court held in this case that it is one of the pillars of liberty that in English law every imprisonment is prima facie unlawful, and that it is for the person directing the imprisonment to justify the act.

The court held in this case that no one can be detained against his will except under the warrant of a lawful authority, and when that warrant is required by law to be in writing, it must be produced on demand to the person detained and any other person properly concerned to challenge the detention. When the legality of the detention has to be proved in a court of law, the document itself must be produced. It is the best evidence and nothing else will do.

It was held in this case that the court will not grant a writ of habeas corpus to release a person who is serving a lawful sentence passed by a court of competent jurisdiction.

t was held in this case that a writ of habeas corpus will lie to release a prisoner where a court has no jurisdiction to try him.

The court held that in a matter involving the liberty of the subject, the action of the government, or its ministers or officials is subject to the supervision of the judges on habeas corpus

In this case, the Supreme Court of India held that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty, in the discharge of what they consider to be their duty, must scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law.

In this case, the sum of fifty thousand naira was awarded as damages, compensatory and exemplary jointly and severally against the respondents for the assault and unlawful deportation from Nigeria and unlawful interference with the applicant's freedom and liberty to move freely in Nigeria.

In this case, the plaintiff was at the material time a 13 year old secondary school student. Her father was beaten up by a policeman and detained at a police post. The plaintiff who was alarmed came and was crying outside and asking what her father had done to deserve being mercilessly beaten and detained. The defendant policemen asked her to shut up and go away, and when she failed to go, they started beating her and pressed her head in a pool of stagnant water and almost drowned her, dragged her to the police post and detained her. She sustained injuries. She was released on bail the following morning. The plaintiff and her father filed separate suits for breach of their rights. She claimed for violation of her fundamental right to dignity of human person and right to personal liberty guaranteed by the Nigerian constitution. The evidence was not contested and no explanations were offered by the defendants for the abuse of their status. The court held the defendants liable and awarded the sum of two thousand naira against each of the two policemen, to make a total of four thousand naira to the plaintiff applicant.

The plaintiff, Minere Amakiri was the chief correspondent of the Nigerian Observer in Port Harcourt. The plaintiff reported on the ultimatum issued by the Rivers State chapter of the Nigerian Union of Teachers to the State government and the attitude of the State Ministry of Education, which was said to be nonchalant. The story was alleged to have embarrassed the government. The plaintiff averred that the defendant who was a police officer and aide de camp to the military governor of rivers sate invited him to the state house, where the plaintiff was allegedly queried on the said publication. The plaintiff stated that on the said day he was imprisoned at the said government house after the whole hair on his head was shaved off and he was beaten by the soldiers. He averred that he was detained from 4 p.m. on July 30, 1973 until 7 p.m. on July 31, a period of 27 hours during which detention he alleged he was not given any food or refreshment. The plaintiff brought action for assault and false imprisonment. The court held in favor of the plaintiff, and awarded the sum of ten thousand naira to the plaintiff as compensation.

In this case, the appeal of Tajudeen Bello against conviction and death sentence was pending before the Court of Appeal, when he was executed by the Government of Oyo State. His dependents sued for damages for the wrongful killing of their bread winner. The Supreme Court awarded damages against the State Government for the premature execution which denied the deceased of the right to life and the right to prosecute his appeal.

In this case, the sum of ten thousand naira was awarded as damages for the unlawful arrest and detention of the plaintiff as compensation for his loss of liberty and the indignity to which he was subjected.

In this case, the plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to three months imprisonment by a Bade area court. On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and sentence by the lower court and ordered that Bade Local Government Council pay five hundred naira to the plaintiff as damages, and also make a public apology to the plaintiff through Borno state radio with a copy of the said apology to be tendered on the plaintiff.

In this case, an editor was arrested as he was driving along Adeniyi Jones Avenue, Ikeja, Lagos by agents of the defendants. The plaintiff through his lawyers sued the Attorney General of the Federation, the inspector-general of police, the State security Service and the Directorate of Military Intelligence and severally for damages to the plaintiff for the violation of his fundamental rights. The court held the defendants liable and awarded hundred thousand naira as exemplary damages for the illegal arrest and detention of the plaintiff.

In this case, the respondent was routinely picked up as a suspect whenever there was a case of robbery. he applied and obtained the leave of the High Court to enforce his fundamental rights against the police to show cause why his fundamental right to personal liberty should be breached by being unconstitutionally and unlawfully arrested and detained on diverse dates without being informed of the offence he committed or charged to a court of competent jurisdiction. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the fundamentals of the respondent have been infringed without reasonable and probable. The sum of seventeen thousand, five hundred naira was awarded as damages to the plaintiff for unlawful arrest and detention.

In this case, in addition to an award of damages, the court ordered that the applicant was also entitled to a public apology from the police, to be published on the mass media and a copy of it to be served on the plaintiff. The Inspector General of Police personally complied.

In his case, in addition to an award of damages for wrongful conviction and sentence, it was also ordered that a public apology be tendered to the plaintiff by the appellants.

In this case, the court held that an applicant does not have to wait for the threatened breach of right to be carried out, before applying to court for judicial review.

The court held in this case that a third party whose interest is affected, or likely to be affected by the act alleged to be wrong, may bring an application for joinder, or otherwise sue to protect or secure his interest in the matter from being defeated and lost.

The court held in this case that where an action is regular and has been done intra vires, within the powers of the public or administrative authority doing it, then of course, no cause of action will lie for relief.

The court held in this case that where a party who is applying for relief has no locus standi to sue on a matter, then of course the legal action will fail.

It was held in this case that a matter must be justiciable or be a breach of right, for remedy to be granted by court.

The court held in this case that under the constitution, impeachment proceedings initiated by the legislature cannot be challenged in court.

The court held in this case that where there is no right of appeal or it is limited under statute, such a party may have no recourse than to petition for clemency or pardon by the government in an exercise of the prerogative of mercy by the President or Governor as the case may be.

The court held in this case that where there is an ouster clause which effectively ousts the jurisdiction of court, judicial review will not be possible.

The court held that where a court has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim, anything done in respect of the claim will be an exercise in futility, and before a court can claim jurisdiction in respect of any matter, it must be properly constituted as regards members, and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no one is disqualified for one reason or another, the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature; in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and the case comes by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. Once there is a defect in competence, it is fatal as the proceedings are a nullity.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff dies, a personal cause of action dies with him as he can no longer prosecute it and the law does not allow anyone to be substitutes in his place, to continue the action.

The court held in this case that where a matter has been litigated and rested, it cannot be re-opened again.

In this case, the court held that where the act complained against, is an exercise of discretion, based upon relevant considerations and in accordance with law, such exercise of discretion will not be reviewed by the court.

The court held in this case that statutes of limitation limit the time within which legal action can be brought against public officers, for acts done by them in the course of employment, to three months from the date it occurred, or from the date it ceased to occur if it had been a continuing act.

The court held in this case that the fundamental rights of a person may be restricted only where a clear and present danger is posed by the person to the security of the state.

The United States Supreme Court held in this case that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary action by the police is basic in a free society.

The Supreme Court held in this case that under the Public Officers Protection Act and laws of the various states, the liability of a public officer, if any, is limited to three months, and thereafter they are immune to liability for all time, for any wrong they may have committed in the course of their employment or duty as a public officer or civil servant.

In this case the court stated that where powers are conferred and the manner of performing those has not been directed by the legislature, it would seem according to the consensus of opinion that the manner or mode of performance ought not to be arbitrary or oppressive; and that when this is attempted, the courts may interfere, and prevent an unreasonable cause.

The court held in this case that a public body invested with statutory power must take care not to exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act reasonably.

The Court of Appeal held that where a statute prescribes an internal procedure of settlement of disputes, an aggrieved party reserves the right to commence action in the High Court without exhausting the internal procedure pursuant to Section 6(6) (b) which is the same as Section 6(6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and 236 of the 1979 Constitution which is now Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 6(6) (b) of the 1979 Constitution which is the same as Section 6(6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the courts are vested with the powers for the determination of any questions to the civil right and obligations between persons, or between government or authority and any person in Nigeria. Accordingly, where the determination of the civil rights and obligations of a person is in issue, any law that imposes conditions inconsistent with the free and unrestrained exercise of that right is void to the extent of such inconsistency.

The court stated in this case that if a person complains under the fundamental rights chapter of the Nigerian constitution that his right has been breached, it is open to him to seek redress in a competent court, which under the Constitution is the a court in the state where the breach took place.

In this case, the court in stating the import of the exhaustion of available administrative remedies held that if a matter is justiciable in Nigeria, the domestic nature of the dispute does not under the 1979 constitution oust the jurisdiction of the court. It can only mean that until the remedies available in the domestic forum are exhausted, any resort to court action would be premature.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that where power is conferred on an authority, whatever is done outside or beyond the power conferred authority when exercising the power so conferred is ultra vires.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that a corporation which is created under statute cannot do anything at all unless authorized expressly or impliedly by the statute or instruments defining its powers.

The court held in this case that no public authority may lawfully make a decision or take a certain course of action unless it is authorized by law to do so, or the decision or action is construed, that is, interpreted as being reasonably incidental to its express powers.

In this case, the appellant challenged the acquisition of certain land by the Bendel state Government and on which the respondent was allocated land for its economic activities as not being acquired for public purpose as required by law. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the acquisition of the land was properly done and held public purpose to include acquisition made for or in connection with housing estates, economic, industrial or agricultural development and for obtaining control over land require for or in connection with such purpose.

In this case, two parties were disputing the title to a certain parcel of land. Whilst the appellant relied on the Local Government Council for his title, the respondent relied on the State Government. The Supreme Court in dismissing the appellant's claim held that the local government has no right, authority or jurisdiction to grant or vest any right of occupancy on land in an urban area or land designated by the government of the state as constituting an urban area.

The court held in this case that an order of court will lie to compel the performance of a neglected public duty where it results in an injury to a person.

In this case, the court held that when an administrative act which is done is unreasonable, an order of court will lie to set it aside.

The court held in this case that where an administrative act which is done is ill motivated or irregular, an order of court will lie to set it aside.

In this case, the court held a bye-law as being oppressive and set it aside as being null and void.

In this case, the court held that where a power is discretionary and the discretion has been exercised by the relevant authority in a particular way, the court is usually reluctant to intervene, the reason for this being that a discretionary act is not generally ultra vires.

In this case, the court held that discretion is a science of understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and wrong, between shadows and substance, between equity and colorable glasses and pretenses and not to do according to their wills and private affections.

The court held in this case that the exercise of discretion is not confined to the courts and it imports a duty on the person exercising it to be fair, candid and unprejudiced, not arbitrary, capricious, or biased, much less warped by resentment or personal dislike.

The court held in this case that the exercise of a discretion presupposes consideration of all the factors relevant and requisite to the exercise of the discretion. Consequently, where the person or authority vested with the power to exercise a discretion refuses to exercise and gives reasons for such refusal, the reasons or reason given must be one of the factors or factor relevant to the exercise of the discretion. Where however, the reason for refusal so given is not any of such factors, the discretion has been exercised upon irrelevant considerations and it is not an exercise of discretion and invalid.

In this case, the court held that a person entrusted with a discretion must so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider.

The court held in this case that the scope of the review of the exercise of discretion is subject to several factors. The wording of the discretionary power, the subject matter, the authority in which the exercise of the discretion is vested, the purpose of the exercise of the discretion, the materials available to a court, and the particular circumstances in which the discretion has been exercised. It is also very probable that the scope of the review may be determined by the form of the proceedings in which the review is sought.

The court held in this case that where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the legislation of the conditions upon which they are called for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised and the court will require it to be exercised.

The court in stating the duty of the court where discretion is exercised held in this case that all that the court can do is to see that the power which is claimed to be exercised is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the legislature, and to see that those powers are exercised in good faith. Apart from that, the court has no power at all to inquire into the reasons, the policy, the sense or any other aspect of the transaction.

The court held in this case that discretion means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, according to law, and not humor. It is not to arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office.

The Supreme Court held in this case that judicial discretion is the power and freedom to decide what should be done in a particular situation or the exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under given circumstance and guided by the rules and principles of law. It is a court's power to act or not to act when a litigant is not entitled to demand the act as a matter of right. In effect, the exercise of discretion involves a consideration of surrounding facts and circumstance. See also Akinyemi v. Odu'a Inv. Co. ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 209.

The court held in this case that judicial discretion is not the indulgence of judicial whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances.

In this case, it was held that a judge has unrestricted power in exercising his discretion and he needs not give reasons for exercising it in a particular way.

The court held in this case that where the trial court or lower court exercises a discretion wrongly thereby giving rise to injustice, an appellate court will interfere with the exercise of that discretion in order to correct or prevent injustice.

The court held in this case that a party seeking the grant of a discretionary remedy must furnish the court with enough materials upon which a court may exercise its discretion in his favor.

The court defined locus standi in this case as the right of a party to appear and be heard on the question before the court or tribunal.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that locus standi means the legal right to an action to be heard in a litigation before a court of law or tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting, initiating or commencement of an action in a competent court of law or tribunal without inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever including the provision of an existing law.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the term locus standi or standing to sue denotes legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law or tribunal or the right of a party to appear and be heard on the question before a court or tribunal. Thus, for a person to invoke judicial power, he must show that his personal interest will immediately be or have been adversely affected by the action and that he had sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself. See also Adesanya v. President FRN (1981) 5 S.C 112.

The court held in this case that locus standi or standing is the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in a litigation before a court of law or tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting or commencing in a competent court of law of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law, and where a plaintiff lacks locus standi, his case must be struck out as being incompetent. The test to be applied in determining locus standi of a plaintiff is, whether her civil rights and obligations are affected. When a party's standing to sue is in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is in issue is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. See also Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of C.C.C (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 675) 315.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the term locus standi denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law or tribunal to enforce a right recognized by law. It is the right to appear before a court to prosecute or defend an action affecting a legal right. Accordingly, if a party has no legal capacity or standing to institute an action, the court will have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. See also Gombe v. P.W Nig. Ltd (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 567.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that locus standi or capacity to institute proceedings in a court connotes the act of standing which the right of a person to appear and be heard on the question before any court or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever.

The Court of Appeal held that locus standi necessarily implies three conditions, namely, sufficient interest, cause of action and proof by cogent evidence. Locus standi n the true sense requires only sufficient interest to maintain or pursue an action.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that for a person to be entitled to invoke judicial power, he must show that either his personal interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the action of the defendant or that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself. See also Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 5 SC 112.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that for someone to have locus standi to institute an action, he must show that he has sufficient interest in the matter. See also B & C (Nig.) Ltd. v. Okafor-Udeji (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1630) 298.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a party prosecuting an action would have a locus standi where the reliefs claimed would confer some benefit on such party; such benefit must be personal or peculiar to that party.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that at common law, in the realm of public right, for a person to invoke judicial power to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive action, he must show that either his personal interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the action or that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself, and which interest or, injury is over and above that of the general public. In other words, the plaintiff or claimant must show that he has some justiciable interest which may be affected by the action or that he will suffer injury or damage as a result of the action.

The Supreme Court held in this case that it is not the law that if a party has no locus standi then he has no reasonable cause of action. See also Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669.

The court held in this case that when a plaintiff by his pleadings fails to show that he has a locus to institute an action, no issues in the case can be gone into, not even the question whether or not the statement of claim discloses a cause of action. The only and proper order to make is that striking out the suit.

The Supreme Court held in this case that it is always necessary, where the plaintiff claims a declaration that a law is invalid, that the court should be satisfied that the plaintiff's legal rights have been, or are in imminent danger of being invaded in consequence of the law. The court went further to state that since the validity of a law is a matter of concern to the public at large, the court has a duty to form its own judgment as to a plaintiff's locus standi and should not assume it merely because the defendant admits it or does not dispute it.

The court held in this case that all persons interested should be made parties, whether by representation, order, or otherwise, before a declaration by its terms affecting their rights is made.

The court held in this case that the high constitutional policy involved in Section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution is the removal of the obstacles erected by common law requirements against individual bringing actions before the court against the government and its institutions, and the preconditions of the consent of the Attorney General.

The court held in this case that both the individual affected and the Attorney General are at liberty to sue. In other words, they have equal right to do so. The former as a private person, and the later on behalf of the public at large.

In this case, the plaintiff, a member of a political party nominated to stand for election successfully obtained an order of injunction to restrain the respondents from holding Local Government elections in his electoral district because of the omission of the names of the number of voters from the Register of Voters, until correction of it was affected. In making the order, the court had regarded to Section 17(2) (a) of the 1979 Constitution which is the same as Section 17(2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution, which provided that there shall be equal opportunity for every citizen before the law and Section 17(2) (e) which is the same as Section 17(2) (e) of the 1999 Constitution which stipulated that easy accessibility to the courts shall be secured and maintained.

In this case, the court held that the appellant had no sufficient interest or locus standi in the matter of the appointment of the 2nd respondent as the Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission and that to succeed, a plaintiff has to establish personal injury or the likelihood of it.

this case, the appellants, members of the Anglican Communion within the Diocese of Lagos, challenged the appointment of the Reverend Joseph Adetiloye as the new bishop of Lagos and asked the court to declare it void. The appellants did not say they had an interest in the office of the Bishop of the Diocese. They did not also say how their interests, if any had been adversely affected by the appointment of the respondent. They in fact conceded that they were not interested in a particular candidate, but pleaded that the process of the appointment of the respondent contravened some provisions of the Constitution of the Church of Nigeria. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had no locus standi and that failure to disclose locus standi is fatal to a legal action, just as, failure to disclose any reasonable cause of action.

The court held in this case that the words "cause of action" comprise every fact , though not every piece of evidence, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, to support his right to the judgment of the court.

The court held in this case that the phrase "cause of action" comprises every fact which is material to be proved to enable the plaintiff to succeed.

The court defined the words "cause of action" in this case as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.

The court defined a reasonable cause of action as meaning a cause of action with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that so long as the statement of claim or the particulars disclose some cause of action or raise some question fit to be decided by a judge or jury, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out.

The Supreme Court held in this case that where a statement of claim discloses no cause of action and if the court is satisfied that that no amendment, however ingenious will cure the defect, the statement of claim will be struck out and the action dismissed. Where no question as to the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff is raised in the statement of claim for determination, the statement of claim will be struck out and the action dismissed.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that for a person to have locus standi, either to institute an action or prosecute matter, he has to show that he has personal interest. The special interest must not be vague or intangible, supposed, or speculative and it should not be an interest which he shares with other members of the society generally without more.

The court held in this case that if a plaintiff's locus standi to bring his action before the court is successfully challenged, the court would in turn, have no jurisdiction to adjudicate. If a plaintiff is incompetent to bring the action, the court as well will not be competent to hear an incompetent plaintiff, for then his action would not have been brought upon fulfillment of a condition precedent to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction.

The court held in this case that an infant only has locus standi when he sues through an adult.

The court held in this case that it common ground in all the jurisdictions that the claimant must have some justifiable interest which may be affected by the action nor that he will suffer some injury or damage as a result of the action.

In this case, the defendant was the First Lady of Nigeria between 1985 and 1993. As First Lady, her office initiated a project known as the Better Life Program, on which a sizeable portion of public funds were expended. The plaintiff brought action to challenge the unauthorized and extra-budgetary expenditure of public funds on the program. The court held in line with the narrow interpretation of locus standi that a tax paying citizen of Nigeria lacked locus standi to challenge the expenditure of public funds by the office of the first lady on the program.

In this case, the defendant was the First Lady of Nigeria between 1985 and 1993. As First Lady, her office initiated a project known as the Better Life Program, on which a sizeable portion of public funds were expended. The plaintiff brought action to challenge the unauthorized and extra-budgetary expenditure of public funds on the program. The court held in line with the narrow interpretation of locus standi that a tax paying citizen of Nigeria lacked locus standi to challenge the expenditure of public funds by the office of the first lady on the program.

The court held in this case that the phrase "public interest litigation" means nothing more than that it states, namely it is a litigation in the interest of the public. Public interest litigation is not that type of litigation which is meant to satisfy the curiosity of the people, but it is a litigation which is instituted with a desire that the court would be able to give effective relief to the whole or section of the society. In a changing society, the courts cannot remain static. In the interest of administration of justice, some of the old and well-established procedural rules and practices have been altered. Public interest litigation can now be initiated not only by filing formal petitions in court, but even by writing letters and telegrams. Entertaining letters, telegrams and articles in newspapers as petitions by the High court may have been unthinkable a decade ago, but this procedure has come to stay in case involving public interest litigation.

The Supreme Court liberally interpreting and widening the scope of locus standi held that every Nigerian is his brother's keeper and any person including a legal practitioner can bring an application for an order of mandamus to compel the director of prosecutions to exercise his discretion to prosecute an alleged crime or in default permit a private prosecution of it.

The court adopted a liberal application of locus standi. In the case, the plaintiffs brought an action for a declaration that the Local Government (Establishment) (Amendment) Law, 1981 was illegal, null and void and of no effect. The court in granted the application held in this case that the constitution has opened the gates to the courts by its provisions and there can be no justifiable reasons for closing the gates against those who do not want to be governed by a law enacted not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

This suit was an effort of several Nigerian NGOs to challenge the closure of the Guardian Newspapers by the Federal Government authorities as illegal, and a gross violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and the press. The court held that the plaintiffs as concerned citizens had the right to sue the government on the matter.

This action was brought on behalf of a client to challenge the extent of the legislative powers of the Federal Military Government and the exercise of its powers of preventive detention of persons under the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984. The State challenged the competence of the suit and the jurisdiction of the court citing the ouster clause contained in the decree. The court held that a legal practitioner has the locus standi to bring an action in his own name to seek legal clarification of the detention for his client and to uphold the fundamental rights of his client.

In this case, the court stated the law that if an act is a lawful act, however ill the motive might be, a person has the right to do it. If an act is unlawful, however good the motive might be, a person has no right to do it.

The Supreme Court held in this case that judicial power is therefore invested in the courts for the purpose of determining cases, and controversies before it; the cases or controversies, however, must be justiciable.

The court held in this case that if a plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have the means to vindicate it, and a remedy, if he is injured in the exercise of it, and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without remedy, for want of right and remedy are reciprocal.

The court held in this case that the right of appeal is the right to go to a higher court for the review of the judgment or ruling of a lower court, with which the appellant is not satisfied.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that no appeal lies unless a right of appeal is expressly conferred by statute, and in order to be entitled to exercise a right of appeal, the appellant must come within the provisions of the statute creating the right of appeal.

The court held that where a statute requires a pre-action notice to be given to a defendant, failure to do so, means that the action is not maintainable against the defendant.

The court held in this case that an ouster clause is a provision or law, which excludes the power of court to entertain a matter and decide it.

The court on the matter of jurisdiction held that a court's judicial power is the ability to deal with a matter within a jurisdiction. There is no power to act, except with respect to a subject matter within the jurisdiction.

The court held in this case that where a court lacks jurisdiction, that is the end matter, and any exercise of its powers by the court in embarking on a trial will be futile and null. This is because jurisdiction is so radical that it forms the foundation of adjudication.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the issue of jurisdiction of a court is fundamental, and its being raised in the course of proceedings can neither be too early, nor premature, not too late. this is because, if there is want of jurisdiction, the proceedings of the court will be affected by a fundamental vice and would be a nullity no matter how well conducted the proceedings might otherwise be.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the issue of jurisdiction is always fundamental and it is only prudent it be resolved first, otherwise the court that ignores that issue might finally find its going to the real trial of all issues a mere adventure. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to adjudicate in the subject matter and it is either given by the constitution or a specific statute on the subject in issue. To avoid unnecessarily wasting the time of the court, it is therefore desirable to ascertain first, if there is jurisdiction by the court to try the issue.

In this case, the court held that for a person to obtain remedy or relief in court, there must be no ouster ousting the jurisdiction of court.

The Supreme Court in stating how the words in a statute purporting to take away the jurisdiction of a court should be couched held that ordinarily, a constitutional amendment is a very serious affair, and when it is intended to divest a court from jurisdiction which has been given to it by the Constitution, it is a more serious affair still. It must however, be by express and unambiguous words, and by a competent amendment of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a court always has jurisdiction to examine a matter in order to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that once there is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court at any of the courts forming the three tiers of Nigerian hierarchical system of courts, the courts whose jurisdiction is being challenged will first of all assume jurisdiction and consider whether it has or lacked jurisdiction. See also Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 1 ANLR (Pt. 1) 409.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that once an ouster clause is raised in any proceedings, the court does not automatically throw in the towel, decline jurisdiction and strike out the action. Where the court is faced with an ouster clause, it has the duty to inquire into the case to enable it determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. See also Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 1 ANLR 409

The Supreme Court held in this case that res judicata means that a final decision pronounced by a competent court or tribunal, which is not subject to appeal, is conclusive of the matter between the parties, and they are estopped from litigating it all over.

The court held in this case that death brings a legal right to an end. When a plaintiff dies, a personal right of action dies with him.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a statute of limitation is a provision, or law, which stipulates that after a stated period of time, from the date a cause of action accrued, legal action cannot be brought to redress a wrong.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that there is no limitation period in criminal prosecution, and so time does nor run against the State.

The Supreme Court held in this case when a person is immune from legal process or immune from legal liability, then legal action for judicial remedy will not succeed.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the protection from judicial proceedings afforded to the relevant persons under Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution respectively, is not absolute. It is subject to certain conditions. It does not apply when the act complained of is official or only apply to protect unofficial acts and while the person is in the office.

The court held in this case that whenever the legislature entrusts to anybody of persons other than to superior courts the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals, the courts ought to exercise as widely as they can the powers of controlling these bodies of persons if those persons admittedly attempt to exercise powers given to them by Act of Parliament.

The court held in this case that municipalities are established not to confer arbitrary powers upon officials but to conserve the rights and interests of the people through governments which operate by means of official acts, limited and regulated by law. A municipality may be enjoined from unreasonably exercising any lawful power conferred upon it by the legislature; for a power granted by the legislature cannot lawfully be so exercised as to violate organic rights of individuals.

In this case, the court held that what is hearing worth to an accused person who does not understand the language of the court, who does not know the rules of procedure, and who cannot properly present his case. The right to counsel is thus at the very root of, and is necessary foundation for a fair hearing. The ordinary layman, even the intelligent and educated layman is not skilled in the science of law and he therefore needs the aid and advice of counsel.

In this case, the appellant who was an employee of the respondent retired as State Secretary. There was no dispute that the appellant is pensionable employee and was entitled to gratuity and pension on retirement. The appellant receive pension for eighteen months but following a dispute, the respondent stopped paying the monthly pension. The appellant sued claiming for payment of the pension and the arrears. the Court of Appeal held that pension is an accrued right of an employee having satisfied the conditions for payment of pension and retirement from service and pension is a right which cannot be unilaterally taken away by an employee on a dispute, and an order compelling the respondent would be made for the employer to pay monthly pension to the appellant until death.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that Under Section 174 and Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution, the Attorneys General of the Federation and State respectively have the power to:

a. Institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before a court of law in Nigeria, other than a court martial in respect of any offence created under any Act of the National Assembly.

b. Take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that may have been instituted by any other authority or person; and

c. Discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any authority or person.

The power conferred upon the Attorneys General of the Federation and State under the respective sections may be exercised by him in person or through officers of the department. And in exercise of these powers, the Attorney General must have regard to the public interest of justice and the need to prevent abuse of legal process.

The Supreme Court held in this case that Section 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) recognizes the Attorney General of a State as authorized to institute and undertake criminal proceedings, take over and continue criminal proceedings or discontinue criminal proceedings at any stage before judgment is delivered. The power so conferred is exercisable by the Attorney General personally or through officers of his department.

In this case, the respondent state government made an order for the forfeiture of the house and property of the appellant public officer. The appellant then sued for a declaration that the order of forfeiture was null and void and also for an injunction restraining the State government from entering or trespassing on the property. The trial judge gave judgment for the appellant. Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the Attorney General filed a notice of appeal against the judgment, but before the record of appeal was compiled, the Attorney General filed a notice of withdrawal of the appeal in the High Court, instead of the Court of Appeal. In the meantime, there was a cabinet reshuffle and the Attorney General was replaced by another person who had the Governor's order to proceed with the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal had been withdrawn and deemed to have been dismissed. on appeal, the Supreme Court held that the power of the Attorney-General of a State under the Nigerian Constitution applies in all court proceedings to which the State is a party, and that there is a presumption that an Attorney General has all the necessary authorization of the relevant government that appointed him to withdraw an appeal when he does withdraw an appeal. The appeal was deemed duly withdrawn by the former Attorney General.

In this case, the court held that a pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender, and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil right, it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation in its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequences of the conviction and judgment.

In this case, the plaintiff brought action against the defendant for calling him a thief. The plaintiff had earlier been granted pardon for the offence. The court giving judgment in favor of the plaintiff held that though he had been convicted of the offence, when the King pardoned him of the offence, he had cleared the defendant of the crime and infamy.

The court considering the effect of a pardon held that when the crime of which a man has been convicted is pardoned, he is absolved not only from the punishment inflicted on him by the judge who pronounced sentence, but form all penal consequences, such as the disqualification from following his occupation and that to treat it otherwise would be contrary to what certainly must have been the intention of the legislature.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that there is no distinction between a pardon and a full pardon. A pardon is an act of grace by the appropriate authority which mitigates or obliterates the punishment the law demands for the offence and restores the rights and the privileges on account of the offence. The effect of a pardon is to make the offender a new man, a novus homo, to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to the offence pardoned.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a pardon is usually granted where a convict;

a. Has exhausted all his legal rights of appeal or,

b. Has no intention of exercising such right or,

c. Where he is wrongfully convicted and is afterwards pardoned upon the ground of his innocence.

The Supreme Court held in this case that it is not within the competence of a state to make laws affecting any of the matters in the exclusive legislative list.

The defined the word "concurrent" in this case. The court held that the word "concurrent" means existing together. What is meant therefore is when a matter is said to be concurrent to Federal and States Governments is that their power in respect of it exists side by side together. In other words, the powers of both governments in respect of the matter are co-existent, nor mutually exclusive; the power of one does not exclude that of the other. Both governments can, in theory at least, act on the matter. But their powers need not necessarily be co-existence in the sense of extending over the entire of the matter; they may co-exist only in respect of some aspects of it.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that where the Federal Government and the State Government have powers or concurrent powers to legislate on the same subject matter, the Federal Act supersedes the laws of the State where there is a conflict.

The Supreme Court held that the National Assembly cannot validly make a law permitting direct allocation to Local Government Councils. It further held that the extensive powers granted the national Assembly to legislate in respect of allocation of Federation Account is limited strictly to the process of allocating the funds and cannot extend to anything to be done after the funds does not extend to establishment of a State Joint Local Government Account Allocation Committee by prescribing its membership and functions.

The supreme Court held in this case that where a matter legislated upon is in the concurrent list and the Federal Government has enacted a legislation in respect thereof, where the legislation enacted by the state is inconsistent with the legislation of the Federal Government, it is indeed void and of no effect for inconsistency.

In this case, the Court held that any State law inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution as amended is null and void and of no effect. Although, a legislature, under the doctrine of separation of powers is a master of its own household but its sovereignty is subject to the restrictions contained in the Constitution under which it operates. The legislative powers of a State cannot be exercised in such a manner as to contravene or controvert a clearly expressed provision of the Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by virtue of the provision of Section 1(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Constitution is supreme over all laws in Nigeria, and if any law is inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution, the Constitution prevails and the other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. See also F.B.N. Plc. v. T.S.A. Ind. Ltd. (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 247.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of its inconsistency and the Constitution shall prevail.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 1(1) and 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the constitution, being the fundamental legal order of a State, is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout Nigeria, and if any law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the Constitution of the Federal Republic Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) is supreme and has overriding effect. See also Kalu v. Odili (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 240) 130.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the Constitution of Nigeria is the grundnorm, otherwise known as the basic norm from which all the other laws of the society derive their validity. Each legal norm of the society derives its validity from basic form. Any other law that is in conflict with the provision of the Constitution must give way or abate.

The court held in this case that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 is the original law of the country which all other laws must conform or comply with to avoid being declared null and void. The Constitution of Nigeria is the law upon which the nation stands and all citizens and organs of Government and indeed all institutions must obey it. It is the foundation of the legal system. It is the yardstick in determining the legality of any action by anyone or any institution. It is the law that commands respect from everyone no matter how highly or lowly placed. Every person in Nigeria must show due respect to the Constitution of Nigeria, as it reflects the will of the people, as evidenced in the preamble of the Constitution. In legal parlance, the Constitution is the fons et origo of any legal system and it is supreme to all other laws and actions.

The court held in this case that the provision of Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) prohibits the existence of any other law that is inconsistent with a constitutional provision and declares that such other law shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency with the Constitution. The supremacy of the Constitution is captured by Section 1(1) and (3), Part I of Chapter 1 under general provisions.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that a constitution is the organic law or grundnorm of the people. While it seeks to provide the machinery of Government, it also gives right and imposes obligations on the people it is meant for. See also Musa v. Hamza (1982) 3 NCLR 239

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution of a nation is the fons et origo, not only of the jurisprudence but also of the legal system of the nation. It is the beginning and the end of the legal system. In Greek language, it is the alpha and omega. It is the barometer with which all statutes are measured. In line with the kingly position of the Constitution; all the three terms of government are slaves of the Constitution; not in the sense of undergoing servitude or bondage, but in the sense of total obeisance and loyalty to it. This is the recognition of the supremacy of the Constitution over and above every statute, be it an Act of the National Assembly or a law of the House Assembly of a State.

In this case, the court held that if a competent legislature expressly or impliedly evinces its intention to cover the whole field that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field. The inconsistency is demonstrated, not by comparison of detailed provisions, but by the mere existence of the two sets of provisions.

The court held that when the parliament of the commonwealth and the parliament of a state each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes. That this is so settled, at least, when the sanctions they impose are diverse. But the reason is that, by prescribing the rule to be observed, the federal statute shows an intention to cover the subject matter and provides what the law upon it shall be. If it appeared that the Federal law was intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon State law; then no inconsistency would be exhibited in imposing the same duties or inflicting different penalties. The inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience. It depends upon the intention of the paramount legislature to express by its enactment, completely, exhaustively, what shall be the law governing the particular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed. When a Federal statute discloses such an intention, it is inconsistent with it for the law of a state to govern the same conduct or matter.

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of inconsistency substantively amounts to this. When a state law a state law, if valid, would alter impair or detract from the operations of a law of the Commonwealth parliament, then to that extent it is invalid. Moreover, if it appears from the terms, the nature of the subject-matter of a Federal enactment that it was intended as a complete statement of the law governing a particular matter set of rights and duties, then for a state law to regulate or apply to the same matter or relation is regarded as a detraction from the full operation of the commonwealth law and so is inconsistent.

The court held that the inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two laws which are susceptible or simultaneous obedience. it depends upon the intention of the paramount legislative to express by its enactment, completely, exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law governing the particular condition or matter to which its attention is directed. When a federal statute discloses such an intention, it is inconsistent with it for the law of a state to govern the same conduct or matter

The court held that where identical legislations on the same subject matter are validly passed by virtue of their constitutional powers to make laws by the National Assembly, it would be more appropriate to invalidate the identical law passed by the State House of Assembly on the ground that the law passed by the National Assembly has covered the whole field of that particular subject matter. To say that law is "inconsistent" in such a situation would not in my view, sufficiently portray clarity or precision of language.

The Supreme Court held that first, all powers, legislative, executive and judicial must be ultimately traced to the Constitution. Secondly, the legislative powers of the legislature cannot be exercised inconsistently with the Constitution. Where it is so exercised, it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. Thirdly, where the Constitution has enacted exhaustively in respect of any situation, conduct or subject, a body that claims to legislate in addition to what the Constitution had enacted must show that it has derived the legislative authority to do so from the Constitution. Fourthly, where the Constitution sets the condition for doing a thing, no legislation of the National Assembly can alter those conditions in any way, directly or indirectly, unless, of course, the Constitution itself as an attribute of its supremacy expressly so authorized.

This case was a claim for compensation for land acquired by the Government of Western region some twenty years earlier. They petitioned for grant of consent to sue. The fiat was not granted until October 9, 1958, by which time it was argued for the respondent Government that an amendment effected by the Public Lands Acquisition (Amendment) law 1958 had affected the petition retrospectively and that since 12 months had expires between the publication of the consent to sue in the Government Gazette and the filing of the petition in court, it was statute barred and the petition could not be entertained. The court allowing the appeal of the plaintiffs held that the effect of the amendment was in future and did not apply to the case. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for hearing on its merit.

In this case, the plaintiff, a senior police officer was purportedly removed from service by the defendants who were members of the police service commission. The plaintiff brought an action against the individual members of the police service commission for wrongful removal from service. It was argued that though the plaintiff was removed from service under the wrong law, the defendant Commission was a statutory arm of the State though not a department of a Ministry, and as such the plaintiff ought to have brought the action by way of a Petition of Right with the consent of the Attorney General. The court held that Section 3 of the Petition of Rights as amended by Legal Notice No. 112 of 1964, by the words "department thereof" can only refer to a department of a Ministry. Counsel to the defendant did not suggest that the Police Service Commission is the Government or a Ministry. Therefore Section 3 of the Petition of Rights Act does not embrace the case and the action was properly brought against the defendants without the consent of the Attorney General of the Federation.

In this case, the appellants brought action against the defendants jointly and severally for damages suffered when soldiers set fire to the plaintiffs; two storey building and other properties, and for assault and battery of the plaintiffs. Apart from invoking the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution, it was a claim for vicarious liability of the Federal Government of Nigeria for the wrongful acts of its servants and agents, the soldiers. It was argued that the Federal Government of Nigeria could not be sued, that a petition did not lie in tort. The claim was dismissed by the trial court. On further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Petition of Rights Act (as amended) preserved the immunity of the State.

Before the 1979 constitution, the Government was not liable to persons for tortious acts. The common law principle that the "state can do no wrong" applied. The 1979 Constitution under which the government may be held liable was not applicable in this case as the events leading to the claim occurred before the 1979 Constitution came into force.

The court in stating the immunity of the State in respect of tort actions held that no claim in tort will lie against the Crown in the respect of a wrongful act done by its servants in the performance, or supposed performance of their duty; the only remedy, if any, must be against the person who actually committed the wrongful act, as personally liable therefor.

This common law principle that the State could not be held liable for tortious actions was later abolished.

The court held in this case that it is clearly established that no proceedings to enforce a remedy for tort will lie against the Crown, or against any servant of the Crown as representing in the proceedings the Crown, unless the Crown consents to such proceeding. The crown itself can do no wrong, and the public revenues cannot be made liable without the Crown's consent, to remedy wrongs committed by servants of the Crown.

This common law principle that the State could not be held liable for tortious actions was later abolished.

The court held in this case that a petition of right will not lie against the Crown for the recovery of property tortuously seized by the Crown.

This common law principle that the State could not be held liable for tortious actions was later abolished.

The court held in this case that in as much as plaintiffs could not sue the Crown for a past or threatened trespass, they could not in respect of any trespass, sue the defendants in the capacity of the agents as representing the Crown.

This common law principle that the State could not be held liable for tortious actions was later abolished.

The court held in this case that all the great officers of the State are emanations from the Crown. They are delegations by the Crown of its own authority to particular individuals.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by the provision of Section 138(1) of the 1979 Constitution which is now Section 150 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the Attorney General of the Federation is an agent of the Federal Government.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that in the common law jurisdiction, an independent sovereign state may not be sued in the courts against its will against its will and without its consent. This doctrine of State or sovereign immunity evolved from rules of international law and same has been internalized and made part of the common law. Under the common law, exercise of court's jurisdiction against the sovereign is deemed incompatible with the superior authority of the sovereign State. The doctrine is founded upon the broad considerations of public policy, international law and comity rather than on any technical rules of law. Under the doctrine, the protection avails not only the State but to the Head of State while in office personally, and to the government of the State or its component part or any of their departments.

The court held in this case that a person has unfettered access to sue the State except where a statute specifically provides immunity for the administrative authority, public corporation or officer in question.

In this case, the respondent sued the appellant Imo State Government for the balance sum due in respect of a contract entered into by both parties for the building of a residential quarters for state parliamentarians in the Second Republic. The contract was duly performed but the appellants refused to pay the balance of the contract sum. The respondent then sued claiming the sum. The appellant filed an application praying the High Court to dismiss the action on three grounds, one of which was that the respondent ought to bring the claim by way of Petition of Rights. The trial court overruled the objection. the court of appeal in dismissing the appeal affirmed the abolition of the Petition of rights Act and Laws and held that the respondent is entitled to the sum claimed and it does not have to sue by way of first obtaining the fiat or consent of the defendant government as the Petition of Rights Act and Laws have been abolished by the Nigerian Constitution as being unconstitutional.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that an ouster clause is a clause that ousts. It is most frequently used in relation to the Constitution.

In this case, the plaintiff was the Governor of Kaduna State. He brought an application for stay of proceedings of the investigation committee appointed by the Kaduna State House of Assembly in pursuance of impeachment proceedings under Section 170(5) of the 1979 Constitution which is now Section 188(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Section 170(10) of the 1979 Constitution, now Section 188(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ousted the jurisdiction of a court of law in such matters.

In this case, the applicant, Governor of Kaduna State prayed the court to issue an order of prohibition against the seven man panel appointed by the Kaduna State of Assembly in relation to his impeachment under Section 170(5) of the 1979 Constitution which is now Section 188(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in order to prohibit them from exercising the functions of their office. The court held that the exercise of removing a Governor from office under Section 170 of the 1979 Constitution is a purely legislative affair, as the jurisdiction of court was ousted by the Section 170 (10) of the 1979 Constitution, now Section 188(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

In this case, the plaintiff by an application sought the leave of the High Court of Kaduna State to apply for judicial review by way of certiorari, declarations and injunction of the impeachment proceedings against him as Governor. It was held that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application as it relates to the process of removal of a State Governor, by virtue of Section 170(10) of the 1979 Constitution, now Section 188(10) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which ousted the jurisdiction of courts.

The court held in this case that the courts are open to every citizen who comes and complains that the law is being broken. So long as he has a proper case for consideration, the court will hear it. No one shall forbid him access.

In this case, the title of a building was being contested by the parties. Pending its determination and against an order of interim injunction stopping the ejectment of the respondent, the appellant Government and the Commissioner of Police, Lagos State without an order of court for possession of the house forcefully ejected the respondent from the property in dispute. The Supreme Court held that no one is entitled to take possession of premises by a strong hand, or with a multitude of people. They must apply to court for possession and act only on the authority of the court in the form of an order for ejection.

In this case, the Government of Benue State with the aid of armed forces personnel forcefully ejected the staff of the applicant hospital, and took over possession of the premises and remained in possession. After instituting action, the appellant then applied to court for orders of injunction to restrain the respondents inter alia from preventing the appellant from obtaining access thereto and occupying the premises. The Supreme Court allowing the appeal allowed the appeal and granted the injunctions against respondents.

In the case, the appellant State Government purportedly acquired the building of the respondent. The respondent sued challenging the action. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was entitled to his building. The purported act of acquisition of the property of the respondent y State Government in a manner not authorized by any law, was a complete nullity. The wresting of possession of the said property from him in a manner not provide for under law is a tortious trespass.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by virtue of Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution, no civil or criminal proceedings can be instituted against a person holding the office of President or Vice President, Governor or Deputy Governor of a State during their period of office; neither can any of such persons be arrested or imprisoned nor can they be requires to be compelled to appear in court in response to a process of any court during their period of office.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the immunity granted to certain functionaries of Government from civil and criminal proceedings under Section 267 of the 1979 Constitution, which is now Section 308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, does not extend to bar election petition proceedings from being brought against them.

The court held in this case that the plaintiff, Governor of Ogun state can sue in his personal capacity. Under section 267 of the 1979 Constitution, it is expressly stated that the plaintiff being a Governor cannot be sued in his personal or private capacity.

The court held in this case that Section 267 of the 1979 Constitution gives a Governor immunity in his personal capacity while in office as Governor, but it does not disable him from bringing legal proceedings against other persons while in office as Governor.

The court held in this case that defense of Act of State may be pleaded on behalf of the servant or agent in applicable instances to save him from liability for wrongs committed in his course of duty.

In this case, the defendant, a policeman in the course of his duty drove a Black Maria in which there were prisoners and collided with a motor cycle damaging it, and injuring the plaintiff who was a passenger on the motor cycle. Action for damages in negligence was brought against the police officer after the statutory three months limit. He sought protection under the Public Officers Protection Act. The court held that the action was statute barred for being brought late outside the statutory three months limit.

In this case, the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent judge, held that at common law, persons exercising judicial functions are immune from all civil liability whatsoever for anything done in their judicial capacity.

In this case, the respondent paid for a motor vehicle belonging to a co-operative union of which he was a member. However, the lorry was seized from the respondent and he brought action for detinue, for its recovery and for damages against the first appellant who was the Chief Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Bendel State. The Supreme Court held that the action was brought outside the three months' time limit specified by the Public Officers Protection Law and accordingly, the action against the 1^st^ respondent who was sued and also defended in his official capacity must fail.

The court held in this case that if the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the actions is statute barred.

The court held that limitation period commences to run after the event that gave rise to the cause of action arose.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the action brought against the Nigerian Ports Authority was incompetent for being brought outside of the 12 calendar months limitation period prescribed by the Nigerian Ports Authority Act, and also for failure to issue a pre-action notice to respondent as required under the Act.

In this case, appellant, a public officer with the Epe District Council was carrying out the Council's instructions that the foreshore, waterway and landing route of Epe Town be cleared of canoes. In the course of this, the respondent's canoes was allegedly destroyed. The respondent sued for damages for the wrongful destruction of the canoe. According to evidence, the Council's instruction did not extend to the destruction of canoes. However, it was contended that the action should be dismissed as statute barred under the Public Officer Ordinance for being brought outside the three months' time limit. The court held that the breaking up of the canoe after its removal, cannot be regarded as either necessary or incidental to the duty imposed on the defendant by his employer to clear the foreshore and landing route. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the result is that the defendant's wrongful act cannot be regarded as apparently having been done in any of the circumstances entitling him to protection under the statute.

In this case, the appellants were arrested by the respondents policemen for allegedly committing assault and obstruction of a public highway. The appellants were detained from Friday morning when they were arrested until the next Monday, however no criminal proceedings was instituted against them. The appellants then sued the police for damages for unlawful imprisonment. The Supreme Court allowing the appeal held any person who acts on an unlawful order, made in breach of the provisions of a statute, cannot be protected in an action against him. The onus is on the person who admits detention of another person to prove that the detention was lawful. The Constitution does not approve of any detention, unless under a valid law and procedure permitted by law.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Public Officer Protection Act and Laws do not protect public officers in respect of a crime.

In the Supreme Court held that the word "person" used in the Public Officers protection law of northern Nigeria as applicable to Kaduna State, and in accordance with the definition of word "person" provided in the Interpretation law of Northern Nigeria, which is in pari materia with the Interpretation Act includes both natural and artificial persons.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that in considering whether an action is statute barred, negotiation between parties will not stop the time from running. However, where there has been an admission of liability by the defendant during negotiation it will be unjust and inequitable to bar the action by calculating the limitation period from the date the cause of action arose. In such an instance, the limitation period will start to run afresh from the date of the admission of liability, because every admission of liability renews the statutory limitation period and makes it to start running afresh.

In this case, the respondent sued the appellant university outside the three months limitation period stipulated by the Imo State University Law as applicable to the university when it became Abia State University on the creation of Abia State. However, order 1 Rule 3 (1) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 1979 which stipulated a twelve month limitation period overrode and enlarged the three months limitation period prescribed in the University law, and saved from being statute barred.

In this case, the respondent entered into a contract for the importation of bagged cement from Barcelona, Spain to be shipped to Lagos using the appellants ship MV Fontini. the ship which got to Lagos 1/7/75 could not discharge its cargo due to port congestion, and was asked to proceed to Takoradi and Tema ports in Ghana, by which time it allegedly incurred demurrage for a total of 292 days. The plaintiff owners of the MV Fontini brought action against the respondents for its direction to proceed to Ghana, which resulted in the damages suffered on demurrage. The Supreme Court held allowing the appeal held that the appellant was entitled to recover damages against the government and that the defense of Act of State raised by the Solicitor General was inapplicable.

The Court of Appeal held that the term public officer referred to in the Interpretation Act can only be described to be referrable to those, enjoying employments with statutory flavor as reflected in Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a public officer is a person engaged in the service of the State in a civil capacity.

The court held in this case that although under the Constitution, public service of the Federation means the service of the federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation, and includes service as staff of any company or enterprise in which the Government of the Federation or its agency owns controlling shares or interest, that cannot be authority for the proposition that any employee engaged in any such service ipso facto becomes a public officer. The definition is reflective of and particularly consistent with the provisions in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution which deals with the Code of Conduct for Public Officers. The Schedule defines a public officer to mean a person holding any of the offices specified in Part II of the Schedule containing a long list including staff of statutory corporations and of companies in which the Federal or State Government has controlling interest.

In this case, the plaintiffs, shop owners at Balogun Market, Lagos instituted action against the Board of Customs and Excise. They averred that between June 30 and July 4, 1980, custom officers who were aided by soldiers, raided their shops, seized and detained their goods which were alleged to be contraband and prohibited. The plaintiffs alleged that the custom officers and their said aides freely used horsewhip and teargas. The court held that the action of the Custom Officers aided by the Police Officers and Soldiers amounted to a violation of the fundamental rights of the traders under Section 31(1) and (9) of the 1979 Constitution which provides for right to dignity of person.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the Attorney General can be sued in his official and nominal representative capacity for the tort committed by the government or any government department.

The court held in this case that as a matter of law, the function of instituting or defending civil actions affecting the government is a basic common law function that the Attorney General exercises. He has the locus standi to commence and defend actions for and on behalf of the Government. See also Adewunmi v. Ogunbowale (1983) 4 NCLR 662, A.G Federation v. A.G Imo State (1983) 4 NCLR 178.

The court held in this case that the provisions of protection under the Public Officers Protection laws will not be available to a public officer who acted maliciously in that the law was enacted only to protect public officers who have acted in good faith and those who acted maliciously in the abuse of office or in gross violation of law and with no semblance at legal justification.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 251(1)(r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the national Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matters in any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.

The Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 251(1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matters relating to the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.

In this case, the court held that by virtue of Paragraph 18(1) of Part 1 of the 5th Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended), where the Code of Conduct Tribunal finds a public officer guilty of a contravention of any of the provisions of the Code, it shall impose upon that officer any of the punishments specified under sub-paragraph (2) of the Paragraph, and such other punishment as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.