The Court held that the appellant having breached a fundamental term cannot rely on the limitation of liability and exception clauses under the policy to absolve itself from the consequences of the breach

The Court held that, the principle is well known that if you undertake to do a thing in a certain way, or to keep a thing in a certain place, with certain conditions protecting it, and have broken the contract by not doing the thing contracted for in the way contracted for, or not keeping the article in the place in which you have contracted to keep it, you cannot rely on the conditions which were only intended to protect you if you carried out the contract in the way in which you had contracted to do it.

The Court held in this case that self-limiting of liability in a contractual obligation implied by exclusion clause is an arrangement of uberrima fides that can only thrive on good faith where the appellant is shown to have discharged her duty by exercising utmost care to execute the contract, but failure of which equity may interpose to correct inequalities and adjust matters according to the plain intention of the parties......To invoke the clause by the appellant to meet the respondent's claims for the loss sustained from the appellant's failure to discharge his duty under the contract is sheer legalism in utter indifference to the economic plight of the respondent. it is unconscionable, a stand which the court cannot support . upholding same would be intolerable and be giving the appellant the best of both worlds.

The Court held that the governing principle of good faith is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary. But either party may be innocently silent as to grounds open to both to exercise their judgment upon.

Bingham LJ stated thus, the civil law principle of good faith does not simply mean that the parties to a contract should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must recognize; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as playing fair'', coming clean'' or putting one's cards facing upwards on the table'' it is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing.

The court stated in relation to the jurisdiction of the court to vary an order granting an extension of time by granting a further extension, no distinction is to be drawn between cases where relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent and other cases where relief against forfeiture is sought. The common feature in all these cases is that a penal provision is involved and the court grants relies against the forfeiture which would otherwise follow from it in such circumstances as justice requires, and it grants relief on such terms as are equitable in those circumstances. If it should later appear that the relief by way of an extension of time first granted ought to be extended, and that in fairness to the other party that can be done, I see no difficulty in holding that the court has the jurisdiction to do that which the justice of the case is seen to required.

The Court held that the contract between the parties is binding at law but when it comes to be examined it is found to contain a penalty which is oppressive and unjust and such a case comes within the very first principles on which equity intervenes to grant a relief.

The Court denied the dismissed employee the right to claim reimbursement, using article 1024 CC to read the clause as in applicable where the dismissal was with cause and was due to the incompetence, intransigence and general lack of good faith execution of the employee's obligations.

In this case a clause in a contract of employment provided that if an employee posted abroad was dismissed, he would be reimbursed his return airfare to Canada.

The Supreme Court held in favour of the plaintiff, enabling him to obtain title to the immovable, on the ground that the actions of the defendant amounted to bad faith, contrary to the dictates of article 1024 CC.

It was held that even though the contract was frustrated and the loss should ordinarily lie where it falls, that would be too abrasive. Oputa JSC said that the defendant should retain the premium for the first year since it had incurred expenses in operating the policy, while the plaintiff was paid the sum that represents the premium he paid for two years. That way, his lordship made a reasonable compromise between the desire to achieve justice and the necessity of upholding the sanctity of contracts.

The Court held that if the conditions necessary for the formation of a contract are fulfilled by the parties thereto, they will be bound by it. It is not the function of a court to make a contract for the parties or rewrite the one which they have made.

In this case the respondent sued the bank for inducing the breach of Obasuyi Brothers 'contract. However, the Court upheld the bank's exercise of the set-off. The court further stated that the question with which they are concerned is whether there has been shown to be such unlawful act on the part of the appellants as entitles the respondents to relief in the present action. no such unlawful act was found.

The Supreme Court held in this case that, for the purpose of filling the form, the writer was the insured's agent and the insurer was not liable due to the misrepresentation in the form.

An insurance agent assisted an illiterate proposer to fill in information in a proposal form. Whereas the proposer told the agent the truth about some questions, the agent considered the information irrelevant and failed to state them in the form. when the event insured against occurred and the insurance company refused to pay, the insured sued.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the appellant had treated the respondent unfairly and that restitutionary relief would assuage its loss. Even so, rather than reward any relief, it held that it was not the province of the court to do so but the legislature's.

The facts are that the appellant encouraged the respondent to alter his building with the hope that a lease would be taken. Before an enforceable contract was executed the appellant called off the transaction after the respondent had expended a large sum in making extensive alterations to the building.

In this case the court stated that the moment the trial judge came to the conclusion that the contract was frustrated, he was no more competent to order the refund of expenses the respondent incurred. The order he made became a moral issue in the light of his findings that the contract was frustrated by the suppliers... courts of law do not pursue moral issue outside the precincts of the law.

It was held that a manager was not a worker for the purposes of the Act. The plaintiff was awarded six months salary as damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Supreme Court held in this case that section 33(1) of the 1979 Constitution which provides for right to fair hearing has no application to employment. Its provisions, the Court said, are limited to the determination of civil rights by courts and tribunals.

The Court held that the appellant's claims were partly for wrongful dismissal and partly for breach of fundamental right. Since the principal case was for wrongful termination of appointment which sought to have been commenced by a writ of summons, then the principal and subsidiary claims are incompetent and ought to be struck out.

The Court held in this case that the respondent's principal relief was reinstatement and the proper procedure should have been by a writ of summons and not by application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. His effort to take advantage of section 40 of the 1999 Constitution on right to associate and join a trade union thus fail.

''The Court said the circulars could not be made the basis of an action by the plaintiff or any other employee, unless it is incorporated into the contract of service of such employee".

The court held that the whole civil justice will collapse under the weight of officious litigants who believe they are rendering public service by being sentinels of conduct of companies. This is not to diminish the civil duty of a citizen to expose wrongdoing. However, it is not a duty which ripens into a right which the citizen can protect by private litigation

The court held that what is to be considered is whether the plaintiff was given proper notice before notice before his appointment was terminated in so far as it can be said that any employer has always the right to determine the services of his employees.

The court held that, the contract of employment commenced in 1981; a collective agreement made in 1989 was held not incorporated into the contract of employment. Oftentimes employees seek to resort to it to ensure that their employers adopt the collective agreement to give them procedural due process prior to determination of the contract.

The court held that collective agreements, except where they have been adopted as forming part of the terms of employment, are not intended to give, or capable of giving, individual employees a right to litigate over an alleged breach of their terms as may be conceived by them to have affected their interest nor are they meant to supplant or even supplement their contract of service. In a concurring opinion, AKINTAN JCA said: It is definitely necessary to expressly adopt the provisions of the document either in the letter of appointment or in a subsequent communication varying the terms of employment before the (employee can) enforce its contents against the employer.

The court threw out the employer's objection, stating that having relied on the collective agreement to dismiss the employee, it was estopped from urging that it was not enforceable.

In the instance case, although it was not included in the respondent company's rules as gross misconduct, the court held that it ought not be necessary for anybody to have in black and white in the form of a rule that a fight is something that is going to be regarded very gravely by management.The fight in this case took place near machinery on the factory floor.

The court held that rule books are not in no way terms of the contract of employment. That they are only instruction to a man as to how he is to do his work and must be construed according to the usual course of dealing and to the way they have been applied in practice.

In this case the appellant sought to rely on a general meeting resolution that checked the managing director's discretion dismissing employees, vesting this on a five-man management council. The Supreme Court rejected the evidence, and stuck to the handbook on the ground that resorting to the resolution was tantamount to varying the terms of a written contract with extrinsic evidence.

In this US case the bank president enthused by attendance at a seminar on employee relations, introduced a disciplinary policy stating that no one would be dismissed without a review of the case by the Executive Officer. This backfired when Mettille was summarily dismissed for accounting irregularities. Although the procedure had been introduced some months after his employment commenced, the court took the view that the introduction of the policy constituted an offer by the employer which the employee accepted by continuing in employment on the new terms.

In this case the trial Court, stated that the question whether or not conduct justifies a dismissal was a matter for determination of the court. Except where by agreement the employees have themselves submitted the judgment of an employee's conduct to the discretion of his employer. In such a situation, the court should not interfere with the genuine opinion of the employer, even if unreasonable and the court would have come to a different conclusion.

In this case the Court of Appeal upheld the contents of the employer's handbook that states that management is the sole determination of what constitutes gross misconduct or serious neglect.

In this case the issue turned on whether plaintiff's conduct in bringing a sex worker into his residence which was owned by the defendant constituted an act ''likely to bring the company into disrepute, before the public.'' Savage J said, '' it is not necessary that the act should actually bring the company into disrepute. It is enough if it is likely to bring the company into disrepute in the opinion of the company. It is the opinion of the company that matters''

In this case the respondent contended that his appointment was governed by the Federal Civil Service Rules. The Court held that the Rules would become relevant if the respondent's letter of appointment referred to them. In truth, since the appellant is not a ministry or an extension of the office of the President, the Rules cannot apply whether the letter of appointment refers to it or not.

The court held that, the respondent in this case, lost a councillorship seat he had won, on proof that he was dismissed from the service of National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). Section50(1) of the Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 1997 provides that any person dismissed from the Public Service of the federation was disqualified to contest an election. Kalgo JCA held that NEPA formed part of the public service of the federation because it was listed in the second schedule to the pensions Act 1979.

The Supreme Court ably held that the respondent was not a civil servant for whom the Civil Service Rule enured. To enjoy the benefits of the Civil Service Rules, an employee must prove that the Civil Service Commission employed him and he works in the office of the President or his Vice, a governor or his deputy, or a ministry.

The court held that, Section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution defines '' Public Service of the Federation and State' as service in any capacity in all courts, legislature, commission or authority established for the Federation or State by the Constitution or Statute, area councils, statutory corporation established by statute, educational institution established or financed principally by federal or state governments, any company or enterprise in which the government of the Federation or State or their agencies own controlling shares or interest, and members or officers of the armed forces of the federation, the Police Force or other government security agencies. In this case Karibi-Whyte, JSC noted that the respondent was a statutory corporation by virtue of section 277 of the 1979 Constitution and said, ''accordingly appellant was a member of the public service of the Federation.''

The Court held with regards to contract staff, the position of the decisions is that they are not entitled to procedural fairness before termination or dismissal. It is clear from the definition of civil servant and public employees in the Constitution that no reference is made to contract staff, probationers and temporary employees. This categorization does no harm to the Constitutional definition; they may be necessary for the effectual working of ministries and public corporations. What is offensive is that the security of these employee's service is perpetually under threat. In this case, the appellant was an unconfirmed medical Officer employed on a month to month basis. He was dismissed for absence from duty without leave. The issue turned on whether this was regular. From the High Court through the Court of Appeal up to the Supreme Court the procedural fairness as set out in the public Service Commission Regulation was discussed without a hint that, his status as a temporary employee disentitled him to a hearing. The decision accords with the Civil Service Rules. Rule 04406 of the Federal Civil Service Rules 1999 (FCSR) provides that a temporary officer may be dismissed only after ha has been informed of the grounds on which it is proposed to dismiss him and has been given opportunity to submit representations why he should not be dismissed.

The Court held in this case, that the respondent, a medical practitioner employed by the appellant for one year in the first instance, was removed from office without following the procedure laid down in section 17(1) of the University of, Lagos Act, 1967 under which the appellant was established. The Supreme Court relied on the testimony of the Secretary to the University Senate to the effect that employees on contract were governed solely by the terms of their contract, to conclude the case.

The Court held that, the appellant, a lecturer in Anambra State University of Technology employed on contract for a fix term, was removed from office without a hearing. Awogu, JCA said: '' a faithful servant may well want to know why he was being sacked without being given a hearing. If his contract of service does not so provide, his being told is a privilege, not a right.'' Nothing in the appellant's contract of employment expressly excluded her right to pre-removal hearing.

The Court held that the Respondent is the creation of a statute does not elevate all its employees to that status of master and servant is no longer existent or that their employment or determination of their appointment must necessarily have a statutory flavour.

The Court held that, it was not correct that the mere fact that the conditions of service were made pursuant to a provision of a statute, ''the tenure of all appointments which enjoy the conditions of service are protected by statute.

The respondent employer was established by the West African Examinations Council Act 1973. Section 4(3) of the Act provides that the tenure of office and other conditions of service of certain employees, including the plaintiff, were to be determined by the Council. The plaintiff claimed that his employment has statutory flavour because the conditions of service were made pursuant to section 4(3) of the Act. His contention did not meet with the Supreme Court's favour

The Court of Appeal held in this case that a confirmed staff who had been employed for over 16 years could be dismissed without hearing. When the respondent was arraigned before the miscellaneous Offices Tribunal, the appellant suspended him. He was subsequently discharged and acquitted, but before this, he was dismissed without a hearing. He sought a declaration that his dismissal was void and asked the court to reinstate him to his employment. Oduyemi, JCA held that the staff manual the respondent relied on was not made pursuant to the Central Bank of Nigeria Act and as such his employment did not enjoy statutory underpinning. The remedy he sought for were therefore not available to him.

The Supreme Court held that, the other issue raised is that since the Kaduna State Government held the largest shares of the total shareholding of the company, the appellant's appointment has statutory flavour and therefore a public officer. The court was inclined to disagree with this submission stating there was nothing to show that the conditions under which he was appointed are statutory nor that the post he was holding had any statutory impact. Mere participation of any government in a private company does not, ipso facto, convert such a company into a public one.

In this case the Court of Appeal rejected the argument as the respondent was not a creature of statute but was merely incorporated like any other company under the Companies and Allied Matters Acts 1990. The mere fact that the Imo State government had controlling shares in the respondent company didn't make the appellant a public servant

The Court held in this case the appellant was appointed as member of the board of Kwara Hotels Limited, an incorporated company in which the Kwara State Government had controlling shares. While occupying the position, he contested election into the House of Representatives and won. His opponent, the respondent, sought an order to declare his election void on the ground that he was a public officer at the time he contested contrary to section 17(2) of the Nation Assembly (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 1992. The petition succeeded.

Addressing the appellant's contention that he was not a public officer because he was not appointed by the Civil Service Commission, Tobi, JCA said:

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that it is only when a person is appointed by the Civil Service Commission that he qualifies as a public officer. This is certainly new learning to me and I am not prepared to learn it. it is not correct to say that the only criterion for determining a public officer is through the appointing body. I think a very major criterion is the content of the workload and the functions exercised by the person within the context of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.

The court held that the mere fact that the appellant was given a probationary appointment of two years does not mean and nor could it be implied that his appointment cannot be fully terminated within the probationary period on reasonable notice. The essence of a probationary appointment is that the employer retains the right not to confirm the appointment until after a specific period. where the contract of employment provides that the appointment is subject to a probationary period of a certain length of time, this does not give the the employee a legal right of to be employed for that length of time and the employer may dismiss him before that expiry period.

In the instance case, the Supreme Court accepted counsel's submission that once an employee has passed the requisite qualifying civil service examinations for confirmation and has spent the period required for confirmation without any adverse report, the issue of confirmation of the employee should be a fiat accompli.

The court held in this case that, the employee, a German, was employed on probationary period of six months. When the probationary period expired the employee was not notified that his services were no longer required but was permitted to continue in the same work as during the probationary period. The Court held that the appointment was deemed confirmed and a reasonable period of notice was required to terminate his service.

The Court held that, the probationary period expired on April 7 but the employee was neither confirmed nor terminated. On April 9 the employee was served eight months' notice of termination to expired in December. The court held that the employee was no longer a probationer, that his contract was deemed confirmed and was thus entitled to hearing before termination. The termination was declared wrongful.

The court held that, it is not all cases that an employee on probation is categorically assured that on completion of the trial period he would be confirmed.

In this case the letter of appointment states that the employee's future position with the company will be reviewed on the completion of a trial period of one year.

In this case the appellant was promoted before the expiry of his probationary period; shortly after he was dismissed. The issue before the court was whether his promotion was indicative that he had been confirmed. The Supreme Court decided against the appellant (the employee).

The facts of the case were that the plaintiff was employed as the State Deputy Account General for a probationary period of two years. Some 18 months later, his appointment was terminated with no reason given. The Court held that it is sheer administrative lawlessness for a Public Service Commission to terminate the appointment of a civil servant, probationary or pensionable, without any just cause and without complying with the relevant provisions of the General Orders and Regulations. Since the defendant failed to do this, the termination was declared unlawful and the plaintiff was reinstated to his office. Regulation 40(3) of the Oyo State Civil Service Rules provides that the appointment of a probationer shall only be terminated after he has been given opportunity to submit representations to his head of department.

In this case the Court of Appeal held that the appellant's employment was statutorily protected because the respondent was established by statute, that his letter of appointment expressly stated that his condition of service are as specified in the law that established the Corporation, and its condition of service were made pursuant to the statute that established the corporation.

The Supreme Court held that since the contract provided for an extension of the probationary period by another three years, the respondent remained a probationer unless at the expiry of the total six years he was retained in employment. His retention after the first three years was not conclusive that his appointment had been confirmed.

The Court held that unless there is a stipulation to the contrary or some other circumstance enabling the parties to determine it at some other date by notice,. The one month notice in writing as provided for in the conditions of employment must terminate with the current year and not 31st july 1972 as pleaded. furthermore, nothing in this agreement which suggests it can be given at some other date and in that event the general law applies.

The plaintiff was awarded a princely sum of 2,435 which was the difference between the annual salary he would have received under the broken contract and the actual salary he received in the employment he took up as a result of the breach of contract.

The Supreme Court held that, the university professors could not be terminated in accordance with the employment contract until the conditions of employment set out in the Act setting up the employer were complied with.

The court held that it is not necessary to express a formal opinion on the theory accepted in the Exchequer Court that the relations between the Crown and the holder of a public officer are in no degree constituted by contract. They contended themselves with remarking that in some offices at least it is difficult to negative some contractual relations, whether it be as to salary or terms of employment on the one hand and the duty to serve faithfully and with reasonable care and skill on the other.

The Court stated in this case that the terms and conditions of employment, to which assent of the employee was required, were mutually binding on both Crown and employee.

The Court held that, Upon engagement by the defendants the plaintiff became a holder of a public office. in section 5 of the Decree,which deals with the appointment of staff, contains provisions for the transfer to the Authority of members of the public service itself. Against the background of those statutory provisions, there was no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff was not a mere servant but become a holder of a public office on joining the staff of the Authority

The facts were that the appellant, an Assistant Registrar and Branch Controller was removed from office without due process. He sought to challenge the removal. The court held that It is now accepted that where the contract of service is governed by the provisions of statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provisions, they invest the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary one of master and servant. They accordingly enjoy statutory flavour.

The facts were that the appellant, an Assistant Registrar and Branch Controller was removed from office without due process. He sought to challenge the removal. The court held that It is now accepted that where the contract of service is governed by the provisions of statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provisions, they invest the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary one of master and servant. They accordingly enjoy statutory flavour.

The Supreme Court, in a pronouncement of major jurisprudential significance, stated that the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties...the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties or status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of those duties society has an interest.

The Supreme Court, in a pronouncement of major jurisprudential significance, stated that the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties...the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties or status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of those duties society has an interest.

The court held that The law is well settled that if, where there is an ordinary contractual relationship of master and servant, the master terminates the contract the servant cannot obtain an order of certiorari. If the master rightfully ends the contract, there can be no complain: if the master wrongfully ends the contract then the servant can pursue a claim for damages.

The court held that the suspension was irregular since only the Statutory Corporation Service Commission had authority to suspend the respondent and there was no evidence of delegation of such power to the Principal Medical Officer who suspended him. If the respondent were employed in a private establishment, he would have been terminated immediately he sued to recover his unpaid salary, perhaps even earlier.

The court held that the suspension was irregular since only the Statutory Corporation Service Commission had authority to suspend the respondent and there was no evidence of delegation of such power to the Principal Medical Officer who suspended him. If the respondent were employed in a private establishment, he would have been terminated immediately he sued to recover his unpaid salary, perhaps even earlier.

In this case the India Supreme Court stated that the service of an employee could be terminated by a public corporation only in accordance with the rules made by government. In this case, an employee who was dismissed without holding an enquiry and without giving him an opportunity to be heard challenged his dismissal. The Court held the dismissal void and issued a writ to quash the impugned order, directing the corporation not to give effect to the dismissal.

The Court held that the courts are invested with the power to declare an act of a statutory body invalid, ''if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do.'' The Court emphasized that this rule emanated from the norm that the powers of a statutory body are always subject to the statute which has constituted it, and must be exercised consistently with the statute, and the courts have, in appropriate cases, the power to declare an action of the body illegal or ultra vires, even if the action relates to determination of employment of a servant.

The Supreme Court held the dismissal wrongful as there was no duty on him to disclose facts that would disqualify him or render him ineligible for the employment.

The Supreme Court held the dismissal wrongful as there was no duty on him to disclose facts that would disqualify him or render him ineligible for the employment.

The Court held that the dismissal was wrongful in the absence of proof that there was a duty on the employee to inform the employer of the number of kidneys he possessed.

In this case the plaintiff was interviewed and offered appointment while he was in Britain; He duly accepted. Before he returned to Nigeria to assume duty, the employer detected that his passport contained a name other than the one he bore. On the strength of this, his contract was repudiated. The court held that the facts did not justify the repudiation and awarded the plaintiff damages

In this recent case, the Court held that where an employer states a reason for dismissing an employee, he is stuck with it and cannot be scrounging for other excuses when the reason given proves unviable

In this case, the respondent was dismissed for failure to follow his employer's purchasing policy. Later his employer found evidence of dishonest conduct while he was employed, and sought to advance that as the reason for dismissal, even though they did not know of it at the time. Their Lordships held that fairness indicates that regard should be had only to the reason shown by the employer at the time of dismissal. They however, failed to award the respondent compensation on the grounds that he suffered no loss.

It was held that the law on condonation was that an employer who with full knowledge of an employee's misconduct elects to continue him in his service could not subsequently dismiss him for the misconduct which he had condoned. An employee must however show that the employer had full knowledge of the employee's misconduct. The mere fact that an employer retains the services of the employee until he is satisfied of the employee's misconduct cannot amount to waiver.

In this case the employee sought to recover damages for wrongful dismissal, he argued that the employers were guilty of condonation. The court found that only two working days were actually involved in the so-called condonation, and this, the court held, was insufficient time to show that the employer had repudiated his right to dismiss the plaintiff.

The Court held that a master may lose his right to dismiss by continuing the servant in his service. This waiver sometimes termed condonation must be made with the fullest knowledge of all the facts. If there is any denial or concealment of the facts by the servant, there is no condonation and the master upon being fully informed, may instantly dismiss the servant. If the master elects, after knowledge of the fraud, to continue him in his service, he cannot at any subsequent time dismiss him on account of that which he has waived or condoned. This right the master may use for his own protection.

In this case, it was evidence that the defendant was fully aware of the plaintiff's competence and conduct in his duties. It was held that a stale complaint against the plaintiff could not be ground for his subsequent dismissal.

The Courts have come a long way in attenuating employee's obligation to obey their employer's orders. The old rule was that wilful disobedience of any lawful order justified summary dismissal. In this case, a domestic servant, against her employer's order, absent herself for a night to visit her mother who was sick and in danger of death. Alderson, B conceded that there might be exceptions to an employee's obligation to obey lawful orders, but this would arise only '' where the servant apprehends danger to her life, or violence to her person ... but the general rule is obedience and willful disobedience is a sufficient ground of dismissal.''

The Court held that at both common law and statute law brook no disobedience of lawful order from any servant, high or low, big or small. such conduct normally and usually attract the penalty of summarry dismissal.The court further remarked that disobedience ranks as one of the worst forms of misconduct in any establishment.

The court held that the terms of the training award ought to have been communicated to the plaintiff at the time of the award so that he might have the opportunity to accept or reject the award. in fact he was not bound to accept the award however unreasonable its terms might be. The court further remarked that the request that the plaintiff should sign a bond after his training might be lawful; but it is clearly unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that lack of accommodation for an employee's family, and the probable injury to his wife's health if she accompanied him, were irrelevant to the question whether available employment was suitable' under the workmen's Compensation Act 1925 (England).

In this case, B, a mobile worker, had refused a transfer to Scotland because his wife's '' serious illness required him to be at home at nights''. The industrial tribunal was sympathetic and held that B's resignation amounted to a constructive (and unfair) dismissal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), in allowing the company's appeal's, stated that B had resigned rather than carry out his contractual obligation to move his place of work.

The Court held, the appellant was transferred from Lagos to Funtua. He occupied his employer's apartment in Lagos and not having an alternative accommodation to resettle his family members, some of whom were in school, he pleaded to retain the accommodation until the of June 1979. Much correspondence proceeded from both parties, including a query which the appellant replied. At a point the respondent gave him up to end of April 1979 to vacate. But on April 11, 1979, he was compulsorily retired for insubordination and failure to obey the order to vacate the apartment. The Supreme Court held that he should count himself fortunate to have been retired; he should have been dismissed without benefit.

In this case, Rush disregard his employer's instructions and took a day off to be present at the christening ceremony of his master's child. He was dismissed. The facts showed that he decided to ignore instructions only when a suitable substitute could not be found. The Court held that while the (employee's) offence was a grave one, the facts to which we have referred mitigation its gravity to an appreciable extent, and it is right and just that the penalty of dismissal should be varied to one of suspension without pay for a period of three months.

The court held that the word "insubordination" connotes disobedience and wilful disobedience to lawful order or command of a superior officer has been judicially interpreted as 'insubordination'.

The Managing Director alleged that the plaintiff insulted him and summarily dismissed him. The court held that the plaintiff's insolence was unrelated to the continuance of the due performance of his duties, nor did it amount to repudiation of the contract of service.

The facts of the case were the parties were in an alteration. It was in evidence that the defendant first used provoking words, and the plaintiff replied in the same way. The next day the plaintiff was summarily dismissed. In an action for wrongful dismissal, the court awarded the plaintiff damages.

The appellant was alleged to be sabotaging the implementation of the employer's policy on indigenization and working against the essential interest of the employer. The Court held this conduct gross enough to ground dismissal.

The Court of Appeal held that a management staff like the appellant was by virtue of his position under a duty to disclose serious misconduct calculated to harm his employer

The Court held that an employee owes his employer a duty to report whatever he finds in the course of his duty which might be injurious to his employer. The plaintiff in the case was the company bursar. He fails to report to the employer that cheques exchanged for by another employee of the company were returned unpaid on two different occasions. It was held that this amounted to misconduct of such severity as to justify summary dismissal.

In this case the court extended the exception of 'there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity'. It was held that it extends to any misconduct of such a nature that it ought in the public interest to be disclosed to others.

In this case the facts are the company sought an injunction to prevent publication of the information on the grounds of breach of confidence. The action failed because the employees were found to have just cause or excuses for disclosure.

The Court of Appeal held that where the employee is tardy or where there is lack of diligence in his approach to his duty or is negligent and the master by the same suffers loss, he is guilty of misconduct to which appropriate disciplinary action can be taken.

In this case the court declared the dismissal void for defendant's failure to give the plaintiffs opportunity to defend themselves. It held that the worcs "Without Permission" presupposes that the teacher be given an opportunity of being heard before he could be dismissed. There cannot be any question of the teacher being dismissed without being given an opportunity of showing whether he had permission or not to absent himself or whether his absence from duty was without just cause or excuse.

The Appellant absconded from his duty post at Abuja to pursue post-graduate studies at University of Lagos. The Court held that the appellant's misconduct was gross enough to earn him dismissal

The facts in this case were that a High Court Judge was accused of sexual harassment. The Court of Appeal held that the demands of the office of a Judge are such that his private life is inseparable from his public life. His private life mirrors his public life. A Judge must be as much careful as to what he says or writes in private and in public.

The facts of the case were the appellant was accused of malpractice in the treasury department. The allegation was investigated by the police who later exonerated the appellant. The Court of Appeal held that by the contract of employment, the respondent's authority to suspend the appellant abated when the police exonerated him.

The Court held that a man may be suspended on full pay pending inquires. Suspicion may rest on him; and so, he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No question may be heard against such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself, and so forth. As such an Employee may be suspended without the opportunity of being heard.

The appellant, a general manager at the respondent company was suspended with half pay and was not recalled for several months. The Supreme Court held that by failing to recall the plaintiff, the defendant had repudiated the contract and the plaintiff's claim amounted to a claim for reinstatement which the court would not make in a contract with no statutory flavour.

The Court held that the fact that the letter of suspension not only suspended the appellant indefinitely without pay from the service of the respondent but also restricted his presence at the premises of the respondent, showed the clear intention of the respondent to dispense with the services of the appellant. Thus, intention to terminate the services of the appellant can rightly be read into the contents of the suspension letter. And no more.

The Court held that the employer's conduct was sufficient evidence of a repudiation of the employment contract, and the employee was awarded damages for wrongful dismissal, the measure being his salary for the remaining term of the contract.

The Court held that by the suspension of the plaintiff the defendants evinces (sic) an intention no more to be bound by the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; in other words, it seems to me that the effect of the suspension is that the plaintiff was dismissed from the services of the defendants more so when since the plaintiff was never recalled to resume his duty.

The court held that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, when an employee is suspended, he cannot be dismissed without payment of his wages for the period of suspension.

The Supreme Court upheld the sick reports, holding that there was no abandonment of employment and awarded the respondent salary for one year as damages for wrongful dismissal.

The facts were that the victim of a vehicular accident, proceeded to Belgium and the United States for medical care. In his action to recover his expenses incurred from the tortfeasor, the latter contended that it was absolutely unreasonable for him to proceed abroad for medical care while there are medical facilities for his treatment in Nigerian hospitals. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention, it held that a person is entitled to seek the best medical treatment anywhere to save his life provided he can afford to pay for it.

The Court held that the plaintiff was bound by this practice which is implied into his contract of employment. The Court accepted his employer's evidence that during his initial absence due to ill health he was told that the first two weeks absence through ill health was with full pay, the following two weeks, half pay - in any one year; and if one was off sick for more than four weeks it was without pay.

The Court held that in cases of long sickness or injury the appropriate test should be, was the employee's incapacity to work of such a nature that further performance would be either impossible or be something radically different from that which he undertook under the contract.

The Court held that it is now well recognised that by reason of the statutes cited, employees may lawfully withhold their labour in combination free from the restrictions and penalties which the common law formerly imposed. in this sense there is freedom to strike.

The Court held that It is an elementary principle of law which requires no citation that, generally, only a party to a contract can sue on it. The appellant's action was not properly constituted as the appellant had no locus standi to maintain it since there was no privity of contract between it and the respondent in respect of the contracts of employment between the respondents and its workers whose employments were terminated.

The Court held that Contrary to the Respondents claim of infringement on his constitutional right to join any union of "his choice" the phrase "of his choice" is absent in section 37 of the 1979 Constitution. The section provides that employees may belong to a trade union for the protection of their interest. Since the employer was able to prove that the employees' interest would be better protected as members of the Union of Seamen rather than NUPENG, and the respondent was unable to show how membership NUPENG would protect his interest better than being a member of Union Seamen,

The Court held that the teachers should have been given an opportunity of being heard before any disciplinary action was taken against them. Even if the strike could be by any stretch of the imagination be said to be illegal the striking teachers cannot be disciplined, in my view, without first being given an opportunity of being heard.

The Court held that dismissal involves far more than unfairness to the employee. It is a blow aimed at the union itself, particularly in the case of the dismissal of a union official. As the union sees the situation the whole prestige and credibility of the union is at stake. Monetary compensation for the man or the union itself is an inadequate remedy. The man must be offered reinstatement, in the union's view it has no alternative but to take industrial action in its own defence and that of its member.

The Court held that a strike notice should not be construed as a notice to terminate their employment since that is the last thing the strikers desire; a strike notice is nothing but a notice that the striker would not report for work.

The Court held that it is an implication read into the contract by the modern law as to trade disputes. if a strike takes place, the contract of employment is not terminated , it is suspended during the strike and revives again when the strike is over.

The Court held that a servant who deliberately absents himself from work commits a breach of contract of a kind which in many circumstances will justify the master in dismissing him summarily, but he does not merely by absenting himself terminate the contract of service unless there is something to show an intention no longer to be bound by it. On the other hand, the whole of the circumstances, including the duration of the strike, may be such as to warrant the employer in treating the striker as having manifested an intention to repudiate. It is therefore, impossible to lay down any rule of universal application, and each case must depend on its own facts.

The Court held that going on strike does not terminate the contract. Rather it gives the employer a right to and to dismiss him.

The Court held that any form of industrial action by a worker is a breach of contract which entitled the employer at common law to dismiss the worker because no employer is contractually bound to retain a worker who is intentionally causing harm to the employer's business.

The Court held that the servant discharges his duty while his contract lasts if he is ready and willing to do that which his contract of service binds him to do. If he refuses to render these services, or is unable to render them, that may, and under most circumstances would, furnish just cause for his dismissal, but does not of itself terminate his contract of service.

The House of Lords held that where an employer dismissed all those taking part in a strike at the time of the dismissal and does not dismiss at the same time all persons who had taken part but who come back to work before the dismissal took place, the Act renders him guilty of unfair dismissal.

It was held that the bank was estopped when cognizant of its rights under the law, it voluntarily made payments to the employees for the period of the strike. A second ground of the judgment is that an order permitting deduction would not promote good industrial relations.

The facts of the case were that four union officials refused to work at a flow station. On the second day of the strike two of them were on night duty; rather than work, they went to sleep and hid the recording tickets. On the third day the four restrained their superiors from leaving the flow station. On the fourth day they allowed certain equipment at a flow station to overflow with attendant danger of oil spillage and fire outbreak at Escravos. They refused to respond to the query issued them; the National Industrial Court upheld their subsequent termination.

The National Industrial Court held that it had no basis to disturb management's decision to terminate their appointment especially since the termination was done in accordance with the contract of employment.

In this case it was held that participation in an illegal strike disentitled the workmen to the benefits of gratuity which were available to them in normal circumstances. It was held that the illegal strike caused a break in the continuity of service of the employees concerned for the purposes of gratuity.

The Court held that it is difficult to hold that merely because an employee is absent without obtaining leave that itself would bring to an end of his service. Similarly, participation in an illegal strike which may incur the punishment of dismissal may not by itself bring to an end the relationship of master and servant.it may be a good cause for termination of service provided of course the relevant provisions in the standing orders in that behalf are complied with: but mere participation in an illegal strike cannot be said to cause breach in continuity for the purposes of gratuity.

In this case at hand, the respondent was charged for participation in various demonstrations. In discharging the respondent, the Supreme Court stated as follows: If he joined demonstrations organized in connection with strike, or if he took part in the preparation for the strike, it cannot be said that he took part in strike as such, and so the charge cannot be reasonably construed to mean that his conduct amounted to a contravention of the rule which prohibits strike.

In this case the majority of the Indian Supreme Court held that the employer did not prove that the affected employees were on strike during the period. They further remarked that mere failure to report for duty, when a strike is on, necessarily means misconduct. Many a workman, as a matter of prudence, may not take the risk of facing the militant workmen or the management's hirelings for fear, especially when there is evidence in the case from the sabha that the management had hired goondas and from the management that striking vanguard was violent. It is also possible, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that several workmen might not be posted with the management's notice of recall or the terms on which they were being recalled.

An employer who promised not to dismiss a striker if she resumed work before a certain date was held to have acted unreasonably by dismissing her before the appointed date.

In this case at hand, the Supreme Court observed that '' the mere fact that Bank may have employed some other persons in the meanwhile would not necessarily defeat such a claim of instatement.'' It held that in the case of wrongful dismissal the rule would be that the employees thus wrongfully dismissed must be reinstated

The facts of this case were that the contract of employment contained a clause stating that the employers may at any time hereafter, at their absolute discretion, terminate his engagement at any earlier date than specified if they may desire to do so. The Court held that the discretionary power to terminate the engagement at any time can only be exercised after reasonable notice of their intention has been given by the employers.

The Court held in this case that What is reasonable notice must vary with facts of each given case, and in determining what amounts to reasonable notice regard must be taken of the circumstances and type of employment, local professional or trade customs; and generally, decided cases can only be looked upon as guides for they do not, in the circumstances, lay down any rule of law

In this case, it was held that one-year notice was reasonable because the employee who was wrongfully dismissed was a general manager. In addition, the Court of Appeal held that the intervals at which the remuneration is paid or the period in relation to which the remuneration is stated has to be considered. The employee in this case was to be paid annually.

The Court granted the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that his office as company secretary subsisted. The Court further remarked that the ratification was ineffectual; the board's resolution preceded his appointment, and his removal must take the same course.

The court of appeal held that his immediate superior had no authority to permit his absence from duty and so he was duly dismissed.

The Court held in this case that if an employee, with the others, takes steps willfully to disrupt the undertaking, to produce chaos so that it will not run as it should, then each one who is a party to those steps is guilty of a breach of his contract.

The Plaintiff claimed in this case that her termination was grounded on her refusal to her superior's sexual harassment. The Court held that the treatment meted out to the plaintiff was a bit rough'' however the motive which compels an employer to terminate an employee is irrelevant.

The Court held that If the contract gives the employer the power to terminate the services of his employee after a month's notice or subject to some other conditions, it would be open to him to take recourse to the said term or condition and terminate the services of his employee; but when the validity of such termination is challenged in industrial adjudication it would be competent to the industrial tribunal to enquire whether the impugned discharge has been effected in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred by the contract.

The Court of Appeal held that While it is a truism, that he who pays the pipper (sic) dictates the tune and that he who has the power to hire has the power to fire, even in the case of a servant on probation who has not yet been confirmed, the employer or master can summarily dismiss the servant for gross misconduct. The court held that the manner of the termination of the appointment of the respondents as grossly irresponsible, wrongful and naked exhibition of power devoid of human milk and an unwarranted humiliation of the respondents without any reasonable cause.

*MAJORITY DECISION The Court held that there was no need for a reply to make the resignation effective. The Court went on to say that there is a right to resign unless there is reason to show that the holder of the office cannot, a power of resignation to those competent to receive it is by the common law incident to every corporate office.

The Court held that the giving of a notice terminating the employment, whether by employee or employer, is the exercise of right under the contract of employment to bring the contract to an end, either immediately or in the future. It is a unilateral act, requiring no acceptance by the other party, and, like a notice to quit a tenancy, once given it cannot in my view be withdrawn save by mutual consent.

In this case, the facts were that the appellant gave notice of voluntary retirement from the Ondo State Civil Service, but the respondent rejected it. He returned to work but he was subsequently dismissed. The Court of Appeal found the dismissal to be unlawful and held that the employer could not rely on his notice of retirement which they had rejected to avoid liability in damages to him.

The Court held that the cross-appellant knew his right under his contract of employment and fully exercised it to resign from the appellant's employment and cannot now turn round to claim salaries for periods when his employment with the appellants had effectively ended. If the cross appellant had returned to his work with the appellants after his letter of resignation was rejected, then the appellants would be stopped from saying that he was no longer in their employment and would have been held liable for any consequences arising from their conduct towards him with regards to his employment.

The Court held that situation sometimes arises where an employee who has been given notice of the termination of his employment, rather than work out the length of notice, serves a counter- notice with immediate effect and stops going to work. the effective date even though it is earlier in time than the end of the notice given by the employer. It will be contrary to good sense to hold otherwise.

The Plaintiff in this case was called upon to resign; in a suit to recover terminal benefits if he resigned with the Director's Consent. The Court held that he was dismissed, the court further remarked that when an Employee is invited to resign, the courts should examine the facts to ascertain whether the facts points to a breach of the contract of employment.

The facts were that the plaintiff was compelled to resign his appointment under duress, his claim for damages succeeded on the ground that his resignation was not voluntary. The Court held that a letter of resignation is a voluntary offer by one party to a contract of service requesting the other party to allow him to determine that contract of service either forthwith or after the expiration of notice.

The Plaintiff sought an Interlocutory injunction to restrain the second defendant from resigning until final judgement. The Court granted the application and held that; There was a distinct negative covenant not to canvass for anyone else until the expiration of six months' notice. There being that negative covenant, there was no substantial reason why it should not be enforced.

The Court held that the respondent who was a confidential clerk who was acting in deliberate violation not only of his agreement but of his general relation of confidence towards his employers.

The Court held in this case the plaintiff applied to retire when he was aware that his good conduct as a civil servant which would enable his application for retirement benefits to be considered was being questioned. The reasonable and prudent answer to the situation would be either to make sure his good name was cleared with the authorities so that he got his full benefit of his past service, but surely not to ride a high horse and resort to litigation in the law Court over an issue to which he has no legal rights.

The Supreme Court held that the retirement was ineffective because he did not give three months' notice or salary in lieu. The unpaid salaries owed to the appellant at the date of his letter of retirement should have been as payment of three months' salary in lieu of notice is simply not tenable because the letter of retirement is to the effect that he had given his employers three moths notice of his intention to retire. He cannot now seek to alter that by hiding under some alleged money owed to him by the respondents

The Court held that if an employer elects to terminate an employee with salary in lieu of notice, the payment cannot be deferred until sometime later. The Court remarked that since the salary was not there and then given to him, nor he was directed to receive it from the cashier- the normal process in such termination; the said letter of termination of appointment is of no effect and therefore null and void.

The Supreme Court held where a contract of service gives a party a right of termination of the contract by either giving a particular length of notice or payment of salary in lieu of the length of notice and the latter course is chosen, the party seeking to put an end to the contract must pay to the other party the salary in lieu of notice at the time of termination of the contract. It is not enough that in the letter of termination he offers to pay salary in lieu of notice. payment made three months after termination cannot be in fulfilment of defendant's obligation

The Court held that the appellant willingly accepted the termination of his engagement with the respondent, in accordance with the conditions of his employment. The appellant after pocketing the lump sum salary or three months in lieu of notice of his termination (cannot) after approach the court seeking the reliefs of reinstatement and damages for wrongful dismissal. The termination was not wrongful. It was proper and in accordance with his contract.

The Court held in this case that if an employer unequivocally says that he is determining an employee's service, that he does not want the employee to come to work anymore and that he is paying him money in lieu of notice, such conduct operates as a unilateral summary dismissal of the employee and the employee cannot in law modify the legal effect of the summary dismissal by refusing to accept the money or protesting, because the dismissal is a unilateral repudiation of the employer and, on a long -- established line of authority, requires no acceptance by the employee.

The Court rejected the contention of the respondent on two pedestals. First he said that at the time of the application, the appellant did not know that his retirement was invalid, and since waiver is founded on full knowledge, he could not have waived a right which he was not aware of. Secondly, since the respondent acted ultra vires the statute under which the appellant was retired, the appellant's receipt of his benefit could not validate an invalid act.

The Court held that by drawing on his pension, the appellant waived his protest and right to sue and rendered his compulsory retirement mutual. Like the proverbial saying, the appellant cannot eat his cake and have it.

The Court held that, the law does not permit a person to contract himself out of or waive the effect of a rule of public policy laid down by a statute and consequently the courts may not invoke estoppel against a person who purported to have contracted himself out or waived such rule.

The Court held that there must be a change in the circumstances of the business in which the employee is or has been employed and this change must result in a state of affairs where the employers find themselves with too many employees or too many employees in a particular place or for work of a particular kind. This is what excess manpower means and it must be shown to exist before a claim to have been made redundant may properly succeed

The Court held that Redundancy is a mode of removing off (sic) an employee from service when his post is declared ''redundant'' by his employer. It is not a voluntary or forced retirement. It is dismissal from service. It is not a voluntary or forced resignation. It is not a termination of appointment as is known in public service. It is a form unique only to its procedure where an employee is quietly and lawfully relieved of his post.

The Court held that the very act of dismissal shows that the employer's services are no longer required by his employer and that he may, in a popular sense, be said to have become redundant, but if the dismissal was attributed to age, physical disability to meet his employer's standards he was not dismissed on account of redundancy within the meaning of the Act.... if new methods alter the nature of the work required to be done it may follow that no requirement remains for employees to do work of the particular kind which has been superseded and that they truly redundant.

The facts were that A condition of service in the company's handbook provided that before retrenchment, the defendant would attempt to find an affected staff alternative employment. It is on the failure of this that the employee would be declared redundant. The evidence before the court showed that the employer did not make any research for alternative employment before the plaintiff was declared redundant. The plaintiff was awarded damages for the employer's failure to comply with this term of the employment contract.

The Court held that the respondents were forced out of employment in total and flagrant violation of the procedure laid down precedent to declaring them redundant without regard to their length of service and loyalty.

The Court held that an employee can only escape being retrenched if has shown that he is relatively better, in merit, skill, ability than the other workers who are in the same category with him. In this appeal under consideration, the respondent has not led any evidence to show that she was better qualified than the person whose service was retained by her employers.

The Court held that where the management bona fide retains staff possessing special aptitude in the interests of the business cannot be assumed to have acted unfairly merely because the rule "first come, last go" is not observed.

The Court affirmed affirmed that there could not and cannot be any investigation into the rights and wrongs of the declared redundancy.

The Court held that declaration of redundancy does not carry along with it any other benefit except those benefits enumerated by the terms of contract to be payable to an employee declared redundant. Redundancy benefits do not include gratuity benefits.

The Borno High Court held that the fact did not establish a redundancy; the plaintiff was awarded a princely sum as damages for wrongful dismissal.

The House of Lords held that a fundamental principle of our common law is that a free citizen, in the exercise of his freedom, is entitled to choose the employer whom he promises to serve, so that the right to his services cannot be transferred from one employer to another without his assent.

The Court held that the agreement of contracts of personal service is not included in a general assignment of all the properties of a company about to be dissolved to a new company formed for the purpose of taking over the business of that company.

The Court held that a faithful servant may well want to know why he was being sacked without being given a hearing. If his contract of service does not so provide, his being told is a privilege, not a right.

The Court held that a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence; it depends on whether the facts emerging at the trail prove breach of contract.

The Court held that when a valid and lawful contract has been entered between two parties, there can be no room for invoking or inviting natural justice to intervene if there are no particular rules and regulations in support of that course; or if there are no special occasions making a hearing or, indeed, that observance of the rules of natural justice imperative.

The Court held that where an employer dismisses or terminates the appointment of an employee on ground of misconduct all that the employer needs establish to justify his action is to show that the allegation was disclosed to the employee, that he was given a fair hearing, that is to say, that the rules of natural justice were not breached and that the disciplinary panel followed the laid down procedure, if any, and accepted that he committed the act after its investigation.

The Court held that if there is provision in the contract of employment that the appointment of any employee cannot be terminated unless and until certain procedure are gone through, then a failure to go through those procedures before terminating the employee's appointment renders the employer liable to pay damages to the employee for the breach of his contract of employment.

The facts were that the Plaintiff was dismissed without a hearing, upon intervention from the local trade union a panel was set up and amongst their findings a less severe sanction was recommended; The employer insisted on the dismissal. The Court upheld the panel's recommendation and awarded the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal. The Court further remarked that though not a judicial proceeding but since its decision is likely to affect the civil rights of another person it is bound in law to observed the principles of natural justice.

The Court held that the respondents were entitled to look at the whole circumstances and come to the conclusion, as they did, and be satisfied that there were good grounds for terminating the appellant. If their decision is challenged, the main issue would be whether the grounds for the termination were reasonable not whether there was a hearing.

The Court held that a duty to act fairly is implied in the Statutory provision since the exercise of that power may adversely affect the interests of individuals and the duty connotes that the commissioner must give a union which is being accused an opportunity to say say something in relation to the accusation upon which he acts.

The Supreme Court held that the right to fair hearing arises where there is an allegation of misconduct which may result and in fact did result in some form of punishment, deprivation of some right or loss of means of livelihood to the appellant. In every case of dismissal or termination of appointment which may vitally affect a man's career or his pension in such a case it is equally vitally important that the appellant afforded ample opportunity to defend himself.

The Court of Appeal held that the trend has been to extend the application of the rules of natural justice entrenched in section 33(1) 1979 Constitution to any decision maker who determines questions affecting the right or legitimate expectations of individuals.

The facts were that the employee admitted to wrongdoing in his workplace and was then dismissed by the appellant The Court held that it was held that there was no need for the employer to go through the laid down procedure of affording him an oral hearing before he was dismissed

The industrial tribunal held that the dismissal was wrongful on several grounds. One of the grounds was that the enquiry officer was an eye- witness of one of the one the incidents mentioned in the charge- sheet and, therefore, he was not a proper person to make the enquiry.

In this case the plaintiff made a series of allegations of financial impropriety against the Vice- Chancellor, and the Vice Chancellor chaired the panel that decided that the plaintiff's appointment should be dismissed. Savage, J set aside the panel's decision.

The facts were that the appellant was invited to testify on what he knew about the loss of the employer's N12,000 intended to pay salaries. After testifying along with others, he was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was wrongful since he was entitled to a formal notice of a charge for stealing the sum and a hearing on that.

In this case the Supreme Court reinstated him to his position on the ground that he was not specifically accused of any wrongdoing before he testified. The Court further remarked that to point an accusing finger without real accusation of the charges and the denial of opportunity to defend falls far short of the principle of fair hearing and cannot and must not be a substitute for the accusation of the particular misconduct and explanation expected from the man accused of the misconduct. In a case where witnesses were merely called and the appellant had no opportunity to ask questions or opportunity to contradict them, the appellant was in fact and in law denied a fair hearing.

The facts were that the appellant appealed on the ground that patient's statement should not have been taken into account without their being available for cross-examination. The industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed her complaint. It was held that it was sufficient that the appellant knew the case against her, had an opportunity to rebut it., and the inquiry was conducted in good faith.

In this case the appellant wrote to know the outcome of an inquiry upon which he was being accused. He was told that the report could not be released to him. Shortly thereafter, he was dismissed on the basis of the report without having been accused of any misconduct. The Supreme Court held that this was a gross violation of both the Civil Service Rules and the principle of natural justice

The Court held that the letter of query constituted the charge and appellant's reply was his defence and since there was no obligation for an oral hearing, the written hearing was fair enough.

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was overawed into stating his case without his counsel. Besides he reiterated his handicap, not being a lawyer, in presenting his case in the absence of his solicitor. It further remarked that the plaintiff, a layman in law, stood before a galaxy of great academicians and a celebrated legal luminary as solicitor to the Council left the plaintiff in awe of the council and made the hearing unfair.

The House of Lords held that it is not lightly to be affirmed that a regulation that has the force of law is unfair when it has been more on the advice of the responsible Minister and on the joint recommendation of organizations representing teachers employed and those employing. Nor is it the function of the court to redraft this code.

The Supreme Court held that where the reputation and means of livelihood of the subject of enquiry is at stake the minimum requirement must include not only adequate opportunities given to him to adduces evident but also opportunities to challenge hostile evidence by adducing contrary evident or by cross-examination

The facts were that the Employee insisted on having his accuser appear before the panel of inquiry to ascertain his liability but was always turned down; he was subsequently dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that The question is- was the principle of natural justice (fair hearing) observed in the way and manner the inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the respondent was conducted. The principle of fair hearing in a case such as this presupposes not only that the employee or the aggrieved should be given an opportunity of stating his case but also he should be given an opportunity of confronting his accuser before the panel investigating his alleged misconduct. The Court further remarked that the Manner the enquiry was conducted, and verdict passed against the respondent without giving him the opportunity of confronting his accuser before the panel is a breach of the principle of natural justice. The respondent's alleged misconduct has not been proved in a manner that accords with the principle of natural justice (fair hearing) and before a termination of his appointment based on such as inquiry is wrongful.

The Court held that when judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, this court would be required to be satisfied that the decision has been reached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of policy or expediency.

The facts were that the appellant a physician in a government hospital, was alleged to have indecently assaulted an 18-year-old female patient in the pretext of conducting a clinical examination on her. The Supreme Court held the charge was a crime and by section 22(2) of the 1963 Constitution, only a court could try the appellant; the panel was not seized with jurisdiction to charge, try or find him guilty of a misconduct that is criminal in nature.

The Court held that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to try any allegation of crime is a radical and fundamental tenet of the rules of law and the corner stone of democracy. If the Executive branch is allowed to operate through Tribunal and Executive investigation panels that surely will be a very dangerous development. This court cannot be a party to such dangerous innovation.

The Supreme Court held that where gross misconduct can be proven without the need to find an employee guilty of acts amounting to a criminal offence, a tribunal conducting disciplinary proceedings cannot rightly be held to be trying a criminal charge.

The respondent argued that he ought to have been tried for stealing before dismissal. The contention was dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that he was found guilty of gross misconduct and negligence of duty. These are not crimes in law. the Tribunal was therefore not a court trying the respondent for crime.

The Court held that the question then is whether what took place during the investigations conducted by the (secretary for Administration, Finance and Establishment) was in fact a trial of the appellant for the offence of fraud. I have no doubt in holding that the answer to that question is in the negative. This is because the concern of the top officials of the ministry...was to find out what exactly what happened and after finding out what happened, to take any necessary administrative action, if need be, against any of the officials found wanting. I also believed that whatever actions they took to this end could not be regarded as a bar to any possible prosecution for criminal offence that might have been committed by any of the officials.

The Court held that it was because of misconduct, negligence and other sins attributed to the respondent in the report of the committee which investigated the crisis where the respondent was the head. I hold and rule that the appellants were within their right to terminate their services of their servant whose conduct is no longer acceptable to them.

The Court held that all that the employer is to establish to justify the dismissal or termination of the appointment is to show that the allegation was disclosed to the employee, that he was given a fair hearing, that is, that rule of natural justice were not breached and that the disciplinary panel followed the laid down procedure, if any, and that the panel believed he committed the offence after hearing witnesses.

In this case Lord Wright said that where essential principles of natural justice are departed from in respect of any decision, it must be declared to be no decision.

The Court held that if the employer fails to take the preliminary steps which the law requires as essential, he has no power to dismiss any purported dismissal is nullity. We are not referred to any case where a dismissal after failure to afford a hearing which the law required to be afforded was held to be anything but null and void.

The Court held the word 'may' used in section 4 (2) is merely permissive and ''it cannot properly be interpreted to mean that every retirement after the age of 45 years will be made by the minister''.

The Supreme Court held that even though section 4(2) empowers the minster to compulsorily retire a public employee after he has attained the age of 45, the Minister must prove that he did not abuse his powers, that he acted in good faith and reasonably; otherwise the retirement would be void. The retirement was declared irregular, and void and the respondent was instated a second time.

There are several provisions in the Pensions Act which cannot be drafted or made applicable to the service of an employee under a private limited liability company. The Court further remarked that several of the provisions of the Act employ nomenclature and service regulations related to payment of pensions which are not applicable to service under private limited companies

The Court held that it is not enough for the pension act to refer to the appellant as one of the organizations in civil service to which the Act applies without the contract of service incorporating same. We are dealing with a contract of service between a master and servant in which all the rights and obligations of the parties are contained in the written instrument between the parties... it is trite law that the relation of master and servant is not pensionable.

The Court held that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to a refund of his contributions which had been deducted from his due salary each month. To deprive him of such refund will amount to expropriation of his property contrary to law.

The Indian Supreme Court held that having regard to the nature of gratuity it will not be proper to deprive an employee of the gratuity earned by him because of his dismissal for misconduct and the proper provision to make in this connection is that where an employee is dismissed for misconduct which has resulted in financial loss to the employer the amount lost should be deducted from the amount of the gratuity due.

The Court held that What an employee, loses by premature determination of his contract may be co-extensive with the amount of his presumed salary or wages for the unexpired residue of the life of the contract, the award by the court must be based on the loss naturally flowing the breach, and it is the duty of the court to apply the legal method of assessment to any quantification and clearly not to take any pre-estimated determination as if the damage were special and so provided for in the contract.

The Supreme Court held that he could not recover as damages for wrongful dismissal his wages for the unexpired period of the contract. All he was awarded as damages was his salary for three months.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the supervisor was held entitled to one-year notice, because the Supreme Court considered that he needed that period to seek suitable employment.

The Supreme Court refused to order the reinstatement of the appellant where it was evident that he admitted being guilty of disobedience and insubordination.