In this case, the principle that no civil proceedings could be taken against a person on a wrong which constituted a felony unless criminal proceedings on the wrong had been taken against him and completed was laid down.

The court held that by virtue of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (of England), the rule in Smith V. Selwyn does not apply in any of the Northern states of Nigeria.

The rule in Smith V. Selwyn is that no civil action may be commenced against a person on a wrong which constitutes a felony without a criminal action having been commenced against him and determined.

In this case, it was held that no person is to be convicted of an offence unless the offence is defined by a written law and the penalty prescribed for it by a written law. Adultery was held not to be a criminal offence on the ground that it was not defined as such and its punishment prescribed in any written law.

The primary duty of the court in the interpretation of legislation was stated in this case. The court held that the primary duty of the courts in interpreting statutes, that is, laws enacted by the legislature, is to find the intention of the legislature.

It was held in this case that the courts are not entitled to fill gaps in statutes. Where there is a gap in a statute, it is only the legislature that can fill it -- by subsequent enactment.

The Federal Supreme Court had to interpret Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code which provided that where an offender who in the opinion of the court has not attained the age of seventeen years has been found guilty of murder, such offender shall not be sentenced to death but shall be ordered to be detained. The court found that it was clear from the wording of statute that the relevant age was the age at the time of the conviction and not at the time of the commission of the offence.

In this case, the court was called upon to interpret Section 33(10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria which empowered the Governor to remove the Premier if it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the House of Assembly. The court explained that by the words "it appears to him" the legislature intended that the judgment as to whether the Premier no longer commanded the support of a majority of the house was to be left to the Governor's assessment without any limitation as to the material on which he was to base his judgment. The court held that the Governor could remove the Premier from office under the provision without prior decision or resolution on the floor of the House showing that the premier no longer commanded the support of a majority of the House.

In this case, the court held that the principle that the wording of a statute is to be construed literally is only a general principle which must be applied only where the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous.

The golden rule was formulated in this case. The court in laying down the rule stated thus; it is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further.

The court held that the word "marries" in Section 370 of the Criminal Code was not to be construed as contracting a valid marriage but as going through a form of marriage known to or recognized by the law. To hold otherwise would negate the intention of the legislature.

In this case, the court held that where it is impossible to comply with the provisions of a statute when they are construed literally, the general rule is that the court will not adopt the literal interpretation.

The court had to interpret Section 21(5) (c) of the Constitution which provided that an accused person was entitled to defend himself in person or by legal representatives of his own choice. The court held that under that provision, the legal representative chosen, if outside Nigeria must be a person who could enter Nigeria as of right and who was not under any disability.

In this case, the court applied the golden rule of interpretation of statutes and construed the word "or" as "and" in such a way as to avoid absurdity.

The court held that although the interpretation enactments contain a presumption that the word "or" is to be construed as a disjunctive word, the presumption is subject to any contrary intention in the statute being interpreted.

The court considered the mischief rule in this case. The court stated that in order to interpret a statute properly, it is necessary to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy provided by the statute in such a manner as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

It was held that the court is to construe a statute in such a manner as to suppress the mischief which the statute was made to cure and advance the remedy provided by the statute.

The court held that it is a general principle that a statute is to be construed in such a manner as not to command the doing of what is impossible as captured in the Latin maxim -- lex non cogit ad impossibilia, that is, the law does not compel the doing of impossibilities.

In this case, the court held that in the interpretation of a statute, provisions being interpreted should not be read in isolation. Thus, the words are to be construed in their context and any section, part of which is being interpreted must be read as a whole. See also Stanbic IBTC Holding Plc. V. FRCN (2020) 5 NWLR 113, where the court held that in order to interpret an Act or a section of an Act, it is necessary to read the entire provisions together in order to discover the intention of the legislature in enacting the said provisions of the Act or a section of it.

The court held that where a provision in a statute is ambiguous, earlier statutes upon the same matter may be referred to in interpreting it.

The court held in this case that when interpreting statute, where a section being interpreted is not clear, all relevant sections must be considered.

The court stated in this case that the one of the presumptive principles of interpretation, the Ejusdem generis rule should be applied with caution. The principle of the Ejusdem generis rule is that where particular words of the same class are followed by general words, the general words must be construed to be similar in meaning to the particular words.

The court went further to state that the principle should be applied only where the application would be consistent with the intention of the legislature.

The court held that where the history and structure of a statute strongly indicates that the intention of the legislature would be given effect only by applying the doctrine of Ejusdem generis, the doctrine ought to be applied.

The court held that where a preamble is declared by the statute to be part of the enactment, it ought to be examined in case of ambiguity. See also Stanbic IBTC Holding Plc. v. FRCN (2020) 5 NWLR 113 where the court stated that in an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute, the court can look at and take into consideration, the preamble or recitals which contain the concise purpose behind the provisions of the statute.

The court stated in this case that where the main part of a section in a statute is plain, a proviso cannot alter the plain meaning; but where the words used in the main part are reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, a proviso ought to be examined for it may show the meaning which the words are intended to bear. See Nahban v. Nahban (1967) 1 ALL N.L.R. 47

The court held in this case that the decisions of the courts of England are a mere guide to the Nigerian courts.

In this case, it was held that the court would be free to hold that local circumstances did not permit a statute to be in force if it produced results which were manifestly unreasonable or contrary to the intention of the statute.

In this case, the court held that the Mortmain Act 1735, a statute of general application, was not in force in British Honduras because it was framed for reason affecting the land of society of England, and not for reasons applying to a new colony and that the application of the statute would result in a declaration that the gift of land to certain churches was invalid.

The court held that one of the characteristics of ethnic customary law is that it is recognized as law by members of an ethnic group.(1931) A.C. 662

Recognition by members of an ethnic group as a characteristic of customary law.

The court held that one of the characteristics of ethnic customary law is that it is recognized as law by members of an ethnic group.

The court held the characteristic of ethnic customary law is that it is a mirror of accepted usage. Another case in point is the case of Biija v. Jime (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 866) 323, the court held that customary law is the organic or living law of the indigenous people in Nigeria regulating their lives and transactions. It is the organic in that it is not static. It is regulatory in that it controls the lives and transactions of the community subject to it and it is said that custom is a mirror of the culture of the people. See also Oyewunmi v. Ogunesan (1990) 3 NWLR (pt. 137) 182.

The court held that customary law rules change from time to time, in particular, they reflect the changing social and economic conditions.

The court speaking on the flexibility of customary law stated thus; that one of the most striking feature of West African native custom is its flexibility; it appears to have been always subject to motives of expediency, and it shows the unquestionable adaptability to altered circumstances without entirely losing its character.

The court held that a book or manuscript may be relied upon by the court in determining a question of customary law only if the book or manuscript by the indigenous people concerned as an authoritative document stating one or more customs accepted by them as binding among them and the book or manuscript had formed part of the evidence before the court.

The court in interpreting the Idi-Igi method of distribution of the estate of a deceased person under Yoruba native law and custom stated;

a. That the Idi-Igi method of distribution of the estate of a deceased person is an integral part of the Yoruba native law and custom.

b. That since it is a universal method it should be adopted except where there is a dispute among the descendants of the intestate as to the proportions into which the estate should be divided.

c. That where there is such a dispute the head of the family is empowered to and should decide whether Ori-Ojori ought in the particular case to be adopted instead of Idi-Igi; and

d. That any such decision must prevail.

The court held that where in any cause or matter before a customary court any party wishes to rely on the customary law of the area of jurisdiction of the court there shall be no need to prove the customary law before the court.

The court held that although the President of the Customary Court is required to apply the customary law of the area of jurisdiction of the court, he is not required by statute to be a native of the area of jurisdiction of the customary court or to have any special qualifications in the customary law of the area. The only statutory qualification is that he should be a legal practitioner.

The court held that it is wrong on the part of a court in Nigeria to rely on decisions given by a court in Ghana in taking judicial notice of a custom alleged to be applicable in a part of Nigeria.

The court held that a single decision could be enough in certain circumstances to make the court take judicial notice of a custom.

The court held that although customary law has to be proved in the High Court when exercising its original jurisdiction, that law is deemed to be within the judicial knowledge of the High Court when it is exercising its appellate jurisdiction from customary courts.

The court held in establishing a custom by judicial notice is an alternative to establishing it by proof. Another case in point is the case of Yampa v. Babareke (2017) All FWLR 676 where the court held that customary law is a question of fact to be proved by evidence, or by judicial notice if it has been established as required as provided by Sections 16, 17 and 73 of the evidence act. See also *Owoniyin v. Omotosho (1961) 1 All NLR 304.

The court held that where a custom cannot be judicially noticed by the court, it may be established by evidence.

In this case, the appellant had paid dowry in respect of a woman when she was a child. Later, the respondent paid dowry in respect of the same woman to the woman's parents and took her as his wife. The appellant claimed custody of the children of the union on the grounds that under customary law, he was the husband of the woman and the woman could not contract another legal marriage until the dowry paid by him was refunded to him and that he was entitled to the children borne by the woman until the dowry was refunded to him. The court held that the alleged rule of customary law had not been established and even if such rule had been established, it was of the opinion that the custom was repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.

The court stated in this case that a custom whereby the former owner of a slave was entitled to administer the personal property of the salve after the slave's death failed the repugnancy test.

The court, in holding that it is not within the province of the courts to modify an uncivilized custom and apply the modified version of the custom stated that the court cannot itself transform a barbarous custom into a milder one. If it still stands in its barbarous character it must be rejected as repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.

The court further stated it is the assent of the native community that gives a custom its validity, and, therefore, barbarous or mild, it must be shown to be recognized by the native community whose conduct it is supposed to regulate.

The court held that a rule of customary law on a subject matter is incompatible with a local statute or local subsidiary legislation if the local enactment is manifestly intended to govern that subject matter to the exclusion of customary law.

The court stated in this case that a custom which encourages promiscuity is contrary to public policy. The test of public policy is a common law rule forming part of the incompatibility test.

The court held that the Yoruba custom of legitimation by acknowledgment of paternity was void on the ground of public policy in its application to a child outside wedlock during the subsistence of marriage under the marriage ordinance.

The court held that with respect to the question whether a principal is answerable for the act of his agent in the course of his master's business, and for his master's benefit, no sensible distinction can be drawn between the case of fraud and the case of any other wrong. The general rule is that the master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the course of the service and for the master's benefit though no express command or privity of the master be proved.

The court held that where a court bases its decision in a case on more than one legal principle, each principle constitutes a ratio decidendi.

The court held that in principle, a lower court is entitled to choose which of two conflicting decisions of a higher court or of higher courts of equal standing it will follow.

The court held that the Federal Court of Appeal is bound by its previous decisions subject to the following exceptions:

A. The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow.

B. The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which though not expressly overruled cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision of the supreme court of Nigeria.

C. The court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam.

The court in this case stated the practice of the High Court of England when constituted by a single judge. The court stated that the practice is that a judge of the first instance, though he would always follow the decision of another judge of first instance unless he is convinced the judgment is wrong, would follow it as a matter of judicial comity. He is certainly not bound to follow the decision of a judge of equal jurisdiction. He is only bound to follow the decisions which are binding on him, which, in the case of a judge of first instance are the decisions of the court of appeal, the House of Lords and the divisional court.

In this case, the court held that a judge of a High Court sitting as a court of first instance is not bound by the decisions of another judge of the High Court sitting as a court of first instance.

The court in holding that it was not bound by the decision of the English Court of Appeal stated that the judgment of an eminent judge in England would certainly be of the most persuasive authority and would not be followed except the court feels otherwise strongly about the ratio decidendi of such decision.

The court held that decisions of foreign courts on the common law, equity or statutes are of persuasive authority in Nigerian courts.

In this case, the court had to determine what law governed a dispute on petrol supply between two Igbos resident in Jos in northern Nigeria. One of the parties was the transport owner and the other operated a petrol station. The court expressed the view that having regard to their respective occupations and the nature of transaction between and the nature of the commodity they dealt, the parties did not intend that Moslem law or Igbo customary law should apply. According to the court, the only presumption which seems open to the court to make is that the parties intended that their relationship should be regulated by the principles of English law.

The court held that where a party has agreed to be bound by the English law in relation to property, that agreement necessarily binds his successors in title.

In this case, the plaintiff brought an action claiming possession of a piece of land. He had bought the land at a public auction and having intended that the purchase be governed by English law he had obtained in relation to the purchase, documents of title couched in English law form. But the defendant who had openly occupied the land for 20 years without any interruption or challenge from anyone contended that English statute of limitation applied to the action. But the plaintiff argued that English law could not apply as there was no agreement between him and the defendant to be bound by that law. The court rejected the argument and stated that it was clear that the plaintiff had agreed that his rights in relation to the property should be governed by English law and that notwithstanding the fact that that agreement was not entered into with the defendant, the plaintiff remained bound by English law.

The court, in discussing the nature of transactions unknown to customary law stated that customary law relates to and governs those things which are closely connected with the customary way of life and which exist or are usually kept in the locality in which their possessors live, such as land and simple chattels of a domestic or agricultural use which are normally confined to the area in which the customary law was operative.

The court held that customary changes from time to time as it reflects the rapid development of social and economic conditions.

The court held in this case that the use of writing did not necessarily indicate that the transaction in question in this case was covered by English law.

A transaction is unknown to customary law where the transaction is of such a nature that the members of the community concerned do not consider it to be subject to any of the existing customs accepted as binding upon them. Thus, in this case, where the essential element of the transaction was a promissory note, the court held that the transaction was unknown to customary law.

The court held in this case that where a conveyance in English law form constitutes an essential part of a transaction, the transaction is unknown to customary law.

The court held in this case that in the case of succession to the property of a deceased, where is a conflict between parties, the personal law of the deceased, which is the customary law to which the deceased was naturally subject, should in general, be regarded as the law binding between the parties.

The court held that where the personal law of a deceased is unknown or is not established before the court, where there is a conflict, the law prevailing in the area of jurisdiction of the court is to be applied.

The court held that where the law binding between parties cannot be ascertained, that law rather than the law of the area of the jurisdiction of the court should be applied, where the two laws are different from each other. The court in holding thus, said;

"We suggest that when the law of the court is the law prevailing in the area but a different law binds the parties, as when two Ibos appear as parties in a Moslem court in an area where Moslem law prevails, the native court will -- in the interest of justice -- be reluctant to administer the law prevailing in the area, and if it tries the case at all, it will -- in the interest of justice -- choose to administer the law which is binding between the parties.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that an Edict which is inconsistent with the constitution is void.

The court held that if a plaintiff in a suit adduces evidence constituting the plea of res judicata, a defendant in the case who did not specifically plead the defense could rely on it.

The court held in this case that sometimes, the order of certiorari, which in general, is not issued where there is an alternative remedy, may be issued even where there is an alternative remedy in the interest of justice.

The court held in this case that a pleading must contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be.

The court held in this case that at common law, a set-off could not pleaded unless:

a. Both claims were due between the same parties and in the same capacity, and;

b. Both claims were liquidated.

The court held in this case that on the principle of equity, a set-off may be pleaded against unliquidated claims.

The court held that as a general rule, the amount of money to be set off must have been due before the commencement of the action.

The court held that the court has a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and order, but also the moral welfare of the State.

In the case, the plaintiff sold tea to the defendant in Dunkirk with full knowledge that the tea was to be smuggled into England. In a suit for recovery of the price, it was objected that the contract was void for illegality. The court rejected this contention based on the principle that no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another country. The court held that the seller had no concern with the smuggling scheme and did not violate any English law. To uphold the claims of the defendant would be tantamount to giving the English law extraterritorial effect.

In this case, the Supreme Court was faced with a jurisdictional issue, whether it has the power to declare an Edict of the Western Nigeria Military Government Decree void for its inconsistency with a Federal Military Government Decree. The Edict was inconsistent with the Decree but however the Decree ousted the court's jurisdiction to entertain any matter as to the validity or otherwise of Edicts and Decree. It was argued that by the literal interpretation of the section ousting the jurisdiction of the court, the Supreme Court could not declare the Edict void, but the court held that it could not have been intended that an inconsistent and therefore void law will be permitted to coexist with the superior law as this will not only be absurd but be legally anomalous as well and it therefore declared the Edict void by reason of its inconsistency with a Decree.

The court held that it is better that law should be certain than that every judge should speculate upon the improvement in it.

The court held that there must be a certain irreducible minimum area of personal liberty which must be granted to every individual and such liberty must not be encroached upon by the state.

In the more recent case of Dasuki v. Director General, S.S.S (2020) 10 NWLR 137, the court stated that under the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the right to personal liberty has been guaranteed and a person must not be allowed to perish in detention while he is undergoing trial.

The court held that Criminal Law is the branch of law which seeks to protect the interest of the public at large by punishing certain conducts which are believed to be harmful to the society to permit such conducts to exist or continue.

In this case, the rule of equity was used to mitigate the hardship that would have occasioned by the strict application of the common law. In the case, the plaintiff assignee of a lease had built a house on the parcel of the land and subject matter of the assignment, had planted trees in the garden. The defendant owner forcefully ejected him. The plaintiff sued the defendant at the common law court for wrongful ejection. The court gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff brought an action in the court of chancery praying the court to restrain the defendant from ejecting him from the house he had built. The court, in granting his prayers stated thus; "...by the law of God, he that builds a house must live in it, yet the defendant in this case would have the house, gardens and orchards which he did not build or plant."

The principle of legal personality was established in this case. The court, in laying down this principle emphatically stated that either a company is a legal entity or it is not and that it is impossible to say at the same time that there is a company and there is not.

The court held that care should be taken by the court always not to sacrifice justice on the altar of technicalities and that the time is no more when disputes are dealt with rather on technicalities and not on the merit. In the case of Ekwuruekwu v. State (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1713) 114 SC, the court stated that the courts must strive to do substantial justice in the administration of justice as opposed to technical justice.

The fact that legal reasoning in judicial process should be preoccupied with justice was emphasized in this case. The court stated that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done and next to the tribunal being in fact impartial is the importance of it appearing so.

The court held that where a thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.

The court invoked the rule of duty of care where a scaffolding collapsed

The court held that the duty of care was owed to the patient where a swab was left inside a patient after an abdominal surgery.

The court held in this case that a lawyer is forbidden by the rules of professional ethics from resorting to sharp practice to circumvent the rules. In this case, the court strongly criticized the lawyer for the plaintiff for doctoring the expert's evidence along a particular line.

The court held that the refusal to permit cross examination of witness at an administration hearing will usually be a denial of natural justice. However, deprivation of the opportunity to test evidence by cross examination is not a violation of natural justice if the tribunal can and does decide merely on the strength of an inspection or oral or written submissions supplemented by its own local or specialized knowledge.

The court held that until accepted, it is open to any of the parties to an arbitration to withdraw, but once accepted, a party will not be permitted to go back on his word.

The court held inter alia that the court should not be seen to encourage the breach of a valid arbitration agreement particularly if it has international flavor. Arbitration, which is a means by which contract disputes are settled by a private procedure agreed by the parties, has become a prime method of settling international commercial disputes. A party generally cannot both approbate and reprobate a contract. A party to an arbitration agreement will in sense be reprobating the agreement if he commences proceedings in court in respect of any dispute within the purview of the agreement to submit to arbitration. Where parties have chosen to determine for themselves that they would prefer any of their disputes to arbitration instead of resorting to regular courts, a prima facie duty is cast upon the courts to act upon their agreement.

In the case, both the plaintiff and defendants were members of a family. It was common ground between them that the land in question originally belonged to their family even though the defendant had been in occupation for years. The main question was therefore whether the defendant had been granted the land outright or had been given limited possession. The trial judge held that the onus was on the plaintiff particularly in this case where the defendant had been in long possession.

The Supreme Court in buttressing the exception to the general rule that the onus lies on a plaintiff to prove the fact as to his title in an action for declaration of title to land, held that the general rule must be modified where the dispute involves what is accepted by both sides as originally family land. The court went further to hold that the onus should have been on the person who claims to be exclusively entitled to the family land to prove it.

The court held that while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no such burden laid on the prisoner, to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt, he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence.

The court held that while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no such burden laid on the prisoner, to prove his innocence and it is sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt, he is not bound to satisfy the jury of his innocence.

The court held that it is a trite law that suspicion, no matter how grave, can never ground a conviction. A more recent case which buttresses the point is the case of Osadolor v. State (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 895) 1581 where the court held that suspicion, however strong will not lead to a conviction as it cannot take the place of legal proof.

In this case, the court held that the allegation of mere suspicion, no matter how strongly presented cannot displace the heavy duty of proving an accused's guilt.

The court held in this case that it is not for the accused to prove his innocence.

The court held in this case that where there is no discernible ratio decidendi common to the majority in the House of Lords, where the Court of Appeal is not bound by the reasoning in those different majorities, it is free to adopt any reasoning which appears to be correct provided it supports the actual decision of the House of Lords.

The court held that a Magistrate is bound by a High Court decision and has no discretion as to whether it ought to follow the decision or not. If the High Court decision is wrong, the Magistrate is still bound with it as it is not within its jurisdiction to condemn a decision of the high court. If he has any doubt, he may express it only as an orbiter dictum.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that it would not depart from a precedent unless three conditions were prayed and satisfied;

The Supreme Court held in this case that although it will respect its previous decision, as a court of last resort which is not bound by precedent, the court will not hesitate to overrule any decision of its own which she is satisfied was reached on wrong principle, since this is the only way to keep the stream of justice pure.

The court held that a Court of Appeal is bound by its previous decision subject to three important exceptions. These exceptions are;

a. The Court of Appeal is entitled and bound to decide which of its two conflicting decisions it will follow.

b. The Court of Appeal is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which though not expressly overruled cannot in its own opinion stand with a decision of the House of Lords.

c. The Court of Appeal is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it was given per incuriam e.g. where a statute or rule having statutory effects which would have affected a decision was brought to the attention of the court.

In this case, the court held that though it does not regard itself bound by its decision in Criminal matters, but it would refuse to apply anyone which it considers to be wrong.

The Court of Appeal held that it does not deem itself bound by its previous ruling in criminal matters, but feels reluctant to depart from such decisions

In this case, it was held that a judge of a High Court does not feel himself bound by his own decision or by those of other judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction.

The court held that punctuations form part of statutes and are to be taken into consideration when construing an instrument.

The court held that punctuations form part of statutes and are to be taken into consideration when construing an instrument.

The court observed in this case that it is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.

In the case, the court held that the golden rule of interpretation is a modification of the literal rule of statutory interpretation. It is used to avoid an absurd outcome. It is used where the literal rule produces a result, where the lawmakers' intention would be circumvented, rather than applied. By this rule, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words are to be adhered to, unless it would lead to some absurdity or repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but no farther.

The court held that a statute ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly. If such provision is reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the jurisdiction of the courts. See also Yampa v. Babareke (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 901) 679.

There exists some presumptions which the court employs as an indicator of parliamentary intention in the interpretation of statute. One of such presumption is one against the ousting of the jurisdiction of the court. Individuals cannot by contract exclude the jurisdiction of courts and where the parliament, for whatsoever reason, decides to make law with such effect, the provisions must be clear and unambiguous as they will be construed strictly.

The court held that the only rule for the construction of acts of parliament is that they should be constructed according to the intent of parliaments which passed the act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver.

The court held in this case that the literal rule of interpretation is one of the three basic rules of statutory interpretation and is the first rule applied by judges. In using the literal rule of interpretation, the exact wording of the statute is relied on. The statute is read literally and the ordinary and natural meaning of the word is applied, even if doing so creates an absurd result.

The court in cautioning on the limitation of precedents in construction of statutes stated that a question of statutory construction is one which the strict doctrine of precedent can only be of narrow application. The ratio decidendi of a judgment as to the meaning of particular words or combinations of words used in a particular statutory provision cannot have more than a persuasive influence on a court which is called on to interpret the same word or combination of words appearing in some other statutory provision. It is not determinative of the meaning of that provision.

The court held that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to statute interpretation. The court stated that judicial statements as to construction and intention of an act must never be allowed to supplant or supersede its proper construction and courts must be aware of falling into the error of treating the law to be laid down by the judge in construing the act rather than found in the act itself.

In this case, the court defined the phrase "statute of general application" by applying a rough but infallible test which the court stated thus; two preliminary questions can however be put by the way of a rough but infallible test of which one is; by what courts is the statute applied in England? And the second, to what classes of community in England does it apply.

The court rejected the rule of customary law that denies a person accused of highway robbery the right to defend himself at trial as repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right, 1981 is to all intent and purposes enforceable in Nigerian courts. In Usman V. C.O.P (2020) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1732) 269, the court held on the status and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in Nigeria. The court held that by section 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Enforcement and Ratification) Act, the provisions of the charter set out in the Schedule of the Act have the force of law in Nigeria and constitute part of the laws of Nigeria which must be upheld by the courts in Nigeria. The court further stated that the African Charter is also given recognition by Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) as well as the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules enacted pursuant to section 46(3) of the Constitution which is one of the ways to enforce the right guaranteed by the African Charter and Chapter IV of the constitution.