In this case, the court stated that a trial is not an investigation, and investigation is not the function of a court. A trial is the public demonstration and testing before a court of the cases of the contending parties. The demonstration is by assertion and evidence, and the testing is by cross examination and argument. The function of a court is to decide between the parties on the basis of what has been so demonstrated and tested.

The court held in this case that it has for long been established in Nigerian law that any case including a charge of murder, may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

The court held in this case that circumstantial evidence must be narrowly examined, if only because this type of evidence may be more easily fabricated to cast suspicion on innocent persons.

The court held in this case that to support a conviction, circumstantial evidence must not only be cogent, complete and unequivocal, but compelling and lead to irresistible conviction that it was the accused and no one else who had committed the offence.

The court held in this case that in drawing inference of the guilt of an accused person from circumstantial evidence, great care must be taken not to fall into serious error based upon the fallibility of evidence.

It was the holding of the court in this case that although in a charge of murder in which the body is not found, the fact of death is provable by circumstantial evidence, however, before an accused can be convicted, the fact of death should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain and leave no reasonable doubt.

The court held in this case that there is but one general rule of evidence and that is, the best that the nature of the case will allow. The best evidence rule stipulates that the best evidence in possession of a party must be given. The principle is mainly applied to documents. The best evidence that can be given of a document is the document itself.

The court held in this case that any rule of evidence or procedure which contrary to the rule of fair hearing must be void and of no effect.

The court held in this case that it is a fundamental principle of the administration of natural justice that a defendant and his witnesses should be heard before the charge against him is determined, and it is a denial of justice to refuse to hear a defendant's witnesses.

In this case, the court held that natural justice requires that an accused person must be given the opportunity to put forward his defense fully and freely and to ask the court to hear any witnesses whose evidence might help him.

The court held in this case that it is the duty of the court to ask an accused person if he has witnesses he wishes to call in support of his defense and it is desirable that the relevant question and answer should be recorded.

In this case, the Supreme Court stated that it is one of the cardinal rules of natural justice that a tribunal, unless it is otherwise empowered to so do, must base its decision on evidence of some probative value.

The case part-heard in one native court was transferred to another. The other court besides hearing witnesses, read the record of the evidence of a witness who had testified before the former court and who did not testify before it, and acted upon it. The court held that the trial was irregular and could not stand.

The court held in this case that the constitutional provision that an accused person is entitled to obtain the attendance of witnesses to testify on his behalf mean no more than that the court must take reasonable steps to ensure that defense witnesses attend court to give evidence.

The court held that if an accused person intends to call witness, he must take timely steps to have them at his trial, ready to give evidence at the stage the defense opens, which mean he must summon them in advance. He cannot complain if seeing that he has not summoned them, the trial court refuse to grant him an adjournment.

The court held in this case the defendant cannot be foreclosed from giving evidence if the accused was present in court with his witnesses when the trial was to commence but the court was unable to commence hearing, and when the court was ready to try the case, the witnesses were not present.

In this case, the court held that failure to afford an accused full opportunity to call witnesses is not necessarily fatal to a conviction if the intended witnesses could not reasonably have been expected to give material evidence.

The proceedings at the trial of the appellants in the native court were conducted in the Hausa language which the appellants neither spoke nor understood. They were Yoruba speakers by birth and understood English but not perfectly. The proceedings were interpreted by five different interpreters at successive stages. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, it was argued that whilst the evidence of the appellants was interpreted to the trial court sentence by sentence, the evidence in chief of the witnesses for the prosecution was not so interpreted to them and all they received was a summary of much of the evidence as the interpreter remembered or thought important, and that all the interpreters were selected at random, and that none of them was an experienced interpreter and that there must be serious doubt as to their ability to interpret satisfactorily. The court held that it was essential to be satisfied that the appellants had a fair opportunity to defend themselves, and that in particular that they were accorded in full the right conferred on by Section 21(5)(e) of the Constitution (now Section 36(6)(e) of the 1999 Constitution) and that this requires that there shall be adequate interpretation to an accused person of anything said in a language that he does not understand, and that there shall be adequate interpretation to the court of anything said by the accused in a language that the court does not understand.

The court held in this case that if the question is raised on appeal as to whether or not there had been adequate interpretation at the court of trial, and if the Court of Appeal is in doubt as to that, then and in that event, that court is in duty bound to take evidence in that regard, otherwise the appeal must be allowed.

In this case, it was held that if there is nothing on the record to show that an interpreter was present throughout a trial, the onus is on the accused to show that indeed, the interpreter was absent for some time, and that he did not have a fair hearing.

The court held that an Appeal Court will not quash a conviction solely on the grounds that the proceedings had not been interpreted, unless the court is satisfied that it has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice, where he is represented by counsel, that the accused had claimed at the proper time his right to have the proceedings interpreted to him.

The Supreme Court held in this case that where direct testimony of eye witness is not available, the court is allowed to infer from the facts proved, the existence of other facts that may be inferred.

The Supreme Court held in this case that circumstantial evidence is evidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation. In other words, it is the evidence of surrounding circumstances that by undersigned coincidence is capable of proving a proposition with accuracy of mathematics. Circumstantial evidence means that there is a number of circumstances that makes a complete unbroken chain of evidence that, if established to the satisfaction of the court, may be acted upon to convict the accused.

The Supreme Court held in this case that where direct evidence of an eye-witness is not available, the court may infer from the facts proved the existence of the facts that may logically tend to prove the guilt of an accused person from circumstantial evidence.

In this case, the appellant and the deceased were the only persons in a locked room. As they were there, what sounded like an explosion of a gun was heard. Later as the door of the room opened, the appellant was seen carrying the deceased in whose hand a gun was loosely and clumsily held instead of being tightly grasped. It was found that the entry point of a bullet lodged in the head of the deceased was about four inches behind the left ear. The injury could therefore not have been self-inflicted. A case of suicide was thus rule out. The appellant was convicted because from the evidence, the only reasonable inference is that the deceased was shot at from behind at a distance, by the only other person in the room with him, that is, the appellant.

In this case, the defendant was charged with murder. There was evidence by three different witnesses that the deceased was last seen alive with him being given a ride on the back of his bicycle. This evidence was accepted by the trial judge who rejected the denial of the appellant that he carried the deceased on his bicycle or even saw her. The Supreme Court held that the irresistible inference from the circumstances presented by the evidence is that the appellant killed the deceased.

It was held in this case that the appeal court should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect and be slow to reject a finding of primary fact as opposed to inference of facts especially when the finding is based on the credibility or demeanor of a witness.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 36(1) of the 1999 constitution (as amended), in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constitutes in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.

The court held in this case that in criminal proceedings, all facts except as may be permitted by law must be proved by direct oral evidence of a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in issue.

The court held that the basic principle is that facts which are irrelevant are inadmissible but the reverse is not to be taken as generally true as not every relevant fact is admissible.

It was held in this case that the court may exclude evidence of a fact, even though it is relevant, if in the opinion of the court, it is too remote to be material when all the circumstances of the case are taken into consideration.

The court held that facts showing motive are not in the ordinary case to be included among the facts in issue but among the other facts to be declared to be relevant.

In the case, the accused were conspiring to defraud the customs. One of the conspirators had made entries in two books, one of which was a necessary part of the fraud whilst the other was entirely for his own convenience. It was held that the former entry was admissible against both conspirators as it tended towards the furtherance of their common intention.

In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for a declaration of title to a piece of land which was a plot of land out of many other plots on a layout. In order to establish the identity of the land in dispute, the plaintiff tendered deeds of conveyance with plans attached in respect of other plots of land on the same layout which were executed in favor of other purchasers by the same person who sold the land to the plaintiff. The trial judge rejected these conveyances as being irrelevant. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that these conveyances were relevant.

In this case, on a trial for murder by poisoning, statements made by the deceased in conversation shortly before the time at which the poison was supposed to have been administered were held admissible to prove the state of health of the deceased at the time.

The court held the doctrine of res gestae as a legal respectable legal cloak for a variety of cases to which no formula of precision can be applied.

When a fact becomes relevant to a fact in issue because it throws light on it as a result of its proximity to it in point of time, place or circumstance, the first mentioned fact is usually said to form part of the res gestae.

The court held in that by virtue of Section 5(a) of the old Evidence Act, the doctrine of res gestae can be made use of in admitting evidence but not excluding evidence which is declared relevant under the Act.

The court held in this case that for an act to be admissible under the doctrine of res gestae, it is essential that it should be so associated with the action or event which it accompanies in time, place and circumstances, that they are part of the thing being done.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that by virtue of Section 6(1),(2),(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act 2011, any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

The court held in this case that although an admission may operate as an estoppel, it is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted.

In this case, the plaintiff sued to recover a sum of money alleged to have been paid by him on behalf of the defendant, and the defendant counter-claimed for the return of some of her goods wrongly detained by the plaintiff. In support of her claim, the defendant tendered in evidence a list of goods which also contained their value. The list was admitted in evidence by the trial court without objection by the plaintiff who did not cross-examine her as to the accuracy of the list. The court held that failure to cross-examine her as to the accuracy of the list was an admission that it was correct.

In this case, it was held that, like any other type of evidence; the court has to consider the circumstances under which an admission is made, and what weight is fairly to be attached to it.

The court in this case that where a person admits of that which he knows nothing, such admission is of no real evidential value.

The court held in this case that not much reliance can be placed upon an admission which is made by a mentally defective person.

The court held in this case that undoubtedly, when persons are speaking on even terms, and a charge is made, and the person charged says nothing, and expresses no indignation, and does nothing to repel the charge; that is some evidence to show that he admits the charge to be true.

In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of promise of marriage, and called her sister who deposed to the fact that she heard the plaintiff say to the defendant, "you know you always promised to marry me, and now you don't keep your word," to which the defendant made no answer beyond giving her money to induce her to go away. The court held that the defendant's silence amounted to an admission of the promise to marry the plaintiff.

In this case, the court held the defendant's failure to reply to letters from the plaintiff in which the plaintiff stated that the defendant had promised to marry her was held not to amount to an admission of the promise to marry her.

The court held that the facts of each case must be looked into to determine whether failure to reply to a letter amounts to admission.

The court held in this case that when a person is formally charged by the police with an offence, he is not obliged to say anything and his silence therefore can never amount to an admission.

The court held in this case that when a formally charged by the police with an offence, he is not obliged to say anything and his silence therefore can never amount to an admission.

The court held that evidence of the subornation of witnesses to perjure in support of a claim for damages for injury in a railway accident was admissible as active conduct may also amount to an admission.

In this case, the plaintiff claimed from the defendant's damages for injury caused to his house by vibrations during the building operations of the defendants. The defendants had written to him that his house would be repaired after completion of their store and that as it was not finished yet, they could not do anything until the completion of the building. The court held that the fact that the defendants in their letter cared to admit some damage and made no difference as no damage to the plaintiff's house was in fact proved.

The court held that before an admission by an agent can be admissible against the principal, it must have been made by the agent during the continuance of the agency.

In this case, the court held that when a party to a suit sues in a representative capacity, admissions which will affect him in his personal capacity cannot be proved against him.

The court held in this case that any statement made by a person from whom a party to a suit has derived his interest in the subject matter of a proceeding may amount to an admission if it was made during the continuance of such an interest.

In this case, the court held that any statement made by a person to whom a party to a suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute is an admission. In this case, the defendants, executors of a deceased person, referred the plaintiff to one R for information concerning the assets of the deceased. The court held that what r said could be proved against the defendants.

The court held in this case that an admission is admissible in evidence only against the person making it, and not against a third party. in this case, immediately after a collision had occurred between the plaintiff's and the defendant's motor vehicles, the defendant's driver told the plaintiff that his brakes had failed and that he had to choose between falling into the river or colliding with the plaintiff's vehicle. Subsequently, the driver made a statement to the police in which he admitted negligence and eventually pleaded guilty to a charge of driving with inefficient brakes. it was held by the court that the driver's statement to the police and his plea of guilt although evidence against the driver were not admissible in evidence against the defendant.

The court held in this case that usually, admission, in relation to a crime is used to denote the admission of some fact relevant to a crime, whilst confession is used to denote the admission of guilt.

The court held in this case that the definition of confession seems wide enough to include an incriminating admission falling short of a full confession. See also The State v. Enabosi (1962) 2 All NLR 116

The court held in this case that one very great important factor of confession is that it must be voluntary, otherwise it will not be a relevant fact and therefore, not admissible.

The court held in this case that admissions could not be treated as confessions for the purposes of proving a criminal charge where such admissions are not made by the accused himself but his counsel.

The court held that an extra-judicial confession though made orally, would carry no less weight than a confession that is made in writing.

The court held in this case that where an alleged confession is neither direct nor positive as to the items contained in the charges, it is not admissible.

The court held that a statement amounting only to a confession of implication in a crime cannot be regarded as a confession under the heading.

The court held in this case that a statement may amount to a confession even if made before the accused was charged with the offence. However, a statement made before the commission of an offence cannot amount to a confession.

The court held in this case that a confession does not become inadmissible merely because the accused person denies having made it and in this respect, a confession contained in a statement made to the police by a person under arrest is not to be treated differently from any other confession.

The court held that the fact that an accused person took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial but it is not in itself, a reason for ignoring the statement.

The court held in this case that once a confessional statement is properly admitted in evidence, it becomes part of the case for the prosecution and as such the judge is bound to consider its probative value.

The court held in this case that before a conviction can be based upon a retracted confession, it is desirable to have some evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession is true.

The court held in this case, that once a confessional statement is properly admitted in evidence, its probative value is to be considered; its having been retracted by the maker being of no importance.

The court held in this case that as a matter of law, conviction can be founded upon an uncorroborated confession provided that it is established that;

a. There is something outside the confession which shows that it may be true.

b. The statements contained therein are most likely to be true;

c. The accused had the opportunity to have committed the offence; and

d. The facts stated by the accused are consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and established.

The court held in this case that when a confessional statement is admitted, the exculpatory part must also be admitted. The court is free to accept or believe which portion of it or reject another if, for good reason, this course of action is warranted by clear evidence.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that when the admissibility of a confessional statement is challenged on the ground that it was not made voluntarily, it is incumbent on the judge to call upon the prosecution to establish that it was voluntarily made by conducting a trial within trial. Such a procedural step must be taken at the point when the objection is raised.

The court held in this case that the threat of harm by juju would not be sufficient to render a confession inadmissible. In this case, the investigation of the murder of the deceased had proved abortive and the local chief in the area invited the eighteen villages in the vicinity for purposes of investigating the death of the deceased. Juju was invoked for the purpose and it was believed by the people that the person who cause the death would go mad and confess. Eleven months later, the accused went to the chief and said that he had killed the decease. The court held that the confession was voluntary and properly admitted because to find otherwise would be getting perilously near to the fallacious theory that a genuine belief in witchcraft might be a possible defense to a charge of murder.

The court held in this case that in order to render a confession admissible in evidence, it must be perfectly voluntary and there is no doubt that any inducement in the nature of a promise or of a threat held out by a person in authority vitiates a confession.

In this case, the court held that it is a fundamental principle of law that no answer to a question and no statement is admissible unless it is shown by the prosecution not to have been obtained in an oppressive manner and to have been voluntary in the sense that it has not been obtained by threats or inducements.

In this case, a prolonged though interrupted interrogation leading to a confession was held to have been obtained from oppression.

The court held that a confession is a relevant fact only against the person making it and cannot be used against his co-accused if it is not adopted by him. See also Tanko v. The State (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 600.

The court held in this case that a confessional statement of a co-accused is no evidence against an accused unless the latter has adopted the statement either by words or conduct. It would amount to a travesty of justice and gross violation of all known rules of evidence to convict an accused on the statement of another accused to the police. See also Suberu v. The State (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1176) 495.

The court held that if the threat or inducement under which a first confession was obtained still persisted at the time of the taking of a second confession, then the latter would also be inadmissible, unless the trial judge after properly directing himself as to the inadmissibility of the first statement nevertheless comes to the conclusion that the threat or inducement had dissipated at the time of the second confession.

In this case, the accused was, following a complaint against him, taken to an army barracks where he was beaten up by soldiers for refusing to admit that the allegation made against him was true. He immediately afterwards taken by the soldiers to a police station where a police constable first cautioned and then asked the accused to tell him all that had happened. In these circumstances, it was held that the statement which the accused thereafter made to the police constable was not voluntary and thereafter inadmissible.

The court held that a statement taken from an accused person in answer to questions put by a police officer taking the statement is receivable in evidence under Section 31 of the Evidence Act provided it is voluntary, but if in any particular case, it should appear to the court that the taking of such a statement is not truly voluntary, the court would refuse to receive it in evidence.

In this case, the court held that where an accused person has made a voluntary confession both of the offences charged and other offences, the portion of the statement relating to the other offences must not be admitted in evidence and only the portion of the accused's statement dealing with the charge should be tendered.

It was held in this case that the courts must take care not to deprive themselves of the best chances of learning the truth by rules of practice.

The court held in this case that answers given by a suspect to questions put to him by an investigating police officer before the office has information that should enable him to charge the suspect to court, even though not given under caution, are admissible.

The fact that an accused person has made a statement in reply to a question put to him by a police officer after he has been taken into custody without the usual caution being first administered to him does not of itself render the statement inadmissible, although the judge has the discretion to exclude such a statement.

The Court of Appeal stated that the so called Judges Rule which lay down inter alia that persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being first administered, are rules of caution laid down by the judges in England as the procedure to be followed in England. They should be followed mutatis mutanda so far as possible and practicable in Nigeria. But it would also be impossible and impracticable to require, in the case of primitive and unintelligent accused, positive evidence not only that the necessary caution was given but also that it had been understood by them before statements voluntarily made could be admitted as evidence.

In this case, one of the persons made a statement mentioning some other accused persons. The police officer who took the statement later read it to him in the presence of two other accused persons. These were not cautioned but said that the statement was correct. It was subsequently read over to the other accused persons mentioned in it and they said nothing. It was held by the court that the statement was inadmissible except against the person who made it.

In this case, the Assistant Superintendent of Police investigating a criminal charge charged the accused persons together and read to them the confessional statement made by one of them. The trial magistrate in convicting the accused persons said that if they were innocent, one would have expected them to deny them (the allegations made against them in the statement but they kept mute. The High Court in allowing the appeal held that this was a misdirection, and that the procedure adopted by the police officer was contrary to the Judges Rules.

The court held in this case that statements obtained from prisoners contrary to the Judges Rules are not ipso facto inadmissible, such statements may be admitted if the trial judge, exercising his discretion judicially, is satisfied that they were made voluntarily.

The court held that the practice of taking an accused person who has made a confessional statement as soon as possible to a superior police officer or an administrative officer in order that the accused may deny or admit making a confessional is fair to the accused. It gives him an early opportunity of alleging if he wishes before a responsible person, that his statement has been improperly obtained.

The court held in this case that although it is desirable for an interpreter to sign or mark a statement when it is made by an accused who does not understand English, failure to do so does not make the statement inadmissible.

The court held in this case that before a statement can be admissible, the interpreter used in taking it down where the accused does not understand English and made it in any other language, must be called as witness in addition to the person to whom it was made.

In this case, the accused neither spoke nor understood the English language. a police officer who neither spoke nor understood the accused's language conducted an interview with him through an interpreter. The court held that the evidence of the police officer as to what the accused said at the interview was inadmissible as being hearsay since neither the police officer nor the accused understood what the interpreter said to the other.

In this case, a photograph taken by the police sometime after the commission of a murder showed the accused person, one of his co-accused, and the accomplice who gave evidence at the trial, all standing in a group and all pointing towards the same particular spot which they were said to have identified as the place where the murder was committed. The court held that before a person under arrest would be invited to pose for a photograph which may tend to strengthen the case against him, it would be in accordance with the spirit of the Judges Rule for him to be cautioned again and told that he is not obliged to pose.

The court held in this case that it is desirable to have, outside a confession, some evidence, be it slight, of circumstances which make it probable that the confession was true.

The court held that a voluntary confession of guilt, if it is fully consistent and probable, will usually be regarded as evidence of the highest and most satisfactory nature if there is an independent proof that a criminal act has in fact been committed by someone.

The court held that a voluntary confession is regarded as evidence of the highest and most satisfactory nature if the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence and that the confession was consistent with other facts which had been ascertained and proved.

In this case, the accused was charged with the murder of a woman. He had made a statement to the police confessing to the commission of the offence but beyond this there was very little else known by the prosecution of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased. As there were other circumstances which showed beyond any reasonable doubt that a criminal act had been committed by someone and as the accused's confession was fully consistent and probable, it was held that he could be convicted on such a confession.

The court held in this case that a free and voluntary confession of guilt by a prisoner whether under examination before a magistrate or otherwise, if direct and positive, and is duly made and satisfactorily proved, is sufficient to warrant a conviction without any corroborative evidence so long as the court is satisfied of the truth of the confession.

Under the Muslim law, it was held in this case that a person could be convicted on his own confession, and also on the evidence of a confession made in the presence of two witnesses of good character, even though he retracts his confession.

The court held in this case that the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained. There can be no difference in principle for this purpose between a civil and a criminal case. No doubt, in a criminal case, a judge always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused.

The court held that evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.

In this case, the plaintiff brought the suit for payment of money put on a mortgage deed and the defense was that the document had been fraudulently altered by one of the witnesses to the document who had since died. The defendant proposed to call a witness to depose to the fact that the dead man had orally admitted some improper dealing with the deed, but it was held that this evidence would be hearsay and therefore inadmissible.

In this case, a widow brought an action for a claim for workmen's compensation. It was held that her evidence about statements made by her husband concerning the cause of the injuries which resulted in his death was inadmissible.

The court held in this case that the general principle on which the specie of dying declarations are admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive of falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in the court of justice.

The court held in this case that one of the conditions of relevancy under the specie of dying declaration is that he declarant must have believed himself to be in danger approaching death and the trial court must make a specific finding that the particular deceased did in fact believe in the danger of approaching death when making the declaration.

In this case, the court held that the requirement in the regard of dying declarations is that the deceased must have made the statement under a settled hopeless expectation of death.

The above stated was an English common law requirement and not much reliance can be placed on it as there is no doubt that there is a distinction between the condition of a person who has a settled hopeless expectation of death and that of a person who only believes himself in danger of approaching death but who at the same time entertains hope of recovery.

In this case, the deceased who was in the hospital, weak and in pain, was asked by a police officer the following day after he had been wounded, whether he could make a statement. He said he could. The police officer then asked him if he thought he was going to die, to which he replied that he did not know if he was going to die. The deceased then made a statement as to the cause of his injuries which was taken down in writing. It was held that the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration as there was no proof that the deceased when making it, believed himself to be in danger of approaching death.

In this case, after suffering an attack which ultimately caused his death, the deceased told the first person who found him injured that he was going to die, that he had been beaten, and that one Momo had instigated the beating. It was held that this evidence was properly admissible as a dying declaration. After the deceased had been taken home and given water, he made a further statement as to how he received his injuries, in the presence of two persons. The trial court admitted the evidence, inspite of an objection against it, taking the view that the first statement made the second statement admissible as the former had contained words showing an expectation of death. The Supreme Court however held that that was too wide an expression because of the possibility that the expectation of death might have been, owing to his being at home and among friends, removed from the mind of the deceased, and therefore the evidence of the latter declaration was wrongly admitted.

The court held in this case that evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any person authorized to take evidence may be relevant for the purpose of proving in subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts it states, where the presence of the witness who gave evidence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, in the circumstances of the case, the court considers unreasonable.

The court held in this case that for the evidence of a witness in one judicial proceeding to be deemed relevant in a subsequent proceeding, such evidence must have been given on oath.

The court held that it is essential that evidence must be given to the existence of one or other of the conditions enumerated in Section 46(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 before the evidence given by a witness in a prior judicial proceeding will be deemed relevant in a subsequent proceeding.

Section 46(1) of the Evidence Act provides that evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any person authorized by law to take evidence may be relevant for the purpose of proving in subsequent judicial proceeding or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts it states if the following conditions are fulfilled-

a. If the witness is dead, or

b. Cannot be found, or

c. Is incapable of giving evidence; or

d. Is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or

e. When his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, in the circumstances of the case, the court considers unreasonable.

In the case, the accused was committed for trial in the High Court after a preliminary investigation. At the trial, two of the witnesses who had given evidence at the preliminary investigation were absent. One was dead and the other was on leave abroad and would not be back until the end of July. The trail was taking place in June and the accused had been in custody for about nine months. The trial court accepted the depositions of both witnesses. It was held that the trial court was right in accepting the depositions of both witnesses in the circumstances.

The court held that the medical evidence given at the preliminary examination into a charge of murder preferred against a nine year old illiterate girl from a remote village and who was unrepresented at the examination was not admissible.

The court held in this case that where a person employed in the public service is required to give evidence for any purpose connected with a judicial proceeding, a letter emanating from and signed by the Permanent Secretary of the appropriate Ministry will be sufficient for the purpose of explaining to the satisfaction of the curt his apparent default or non-attendance at the hearing of the proceedings.

The court held in this case once it is proved that the witness in a judicial proceeding is a person employed in the public service, it is sufficient proof to produce a gazette showing that the witness is dead, or has gone overseas on leave.

The court held that the method of proof of the reason of absence of a witness by a letter emanating from and signed by the head of his department is confined to persons employed in the public service and will not be extended to other persons such as persons employed in trading firms.

The court held that apart from relevancy and admissibility of evidence given in a former proceeding under Section 46 of the Evidence Act, evidence of a witness who is dead, cannot be found, or incapable of being brought to give evidence without unreasonable delay or expense is not admissible under any other Section of the Act although it may be used for purposes of cross-examining as to credit.

The court in giving the meaning of an admission stated that by Section 20 of the Evidence Act, 2011, an admission connotes a statement, oral or documentary, made by a party which suggests an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. It is:

a. A concession or involuntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of certain facts,

b. A statement made by a party of the existence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary,

c. A voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of the truth, of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claims in an action.

It is classified as the best evidence against the party making it. It constitutes a concession against the interest of the party making it.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that an admission is a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of the truth on certain facts which are inconsistent with his claim in an action. It could be a statement, oral or documentary. it is the concession of voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of certain facts; a statement made by a party of the existence of certain facts; a statement made by a party of the existence of a fact relevant to the cause of the adversary.an admission is the best evidence in the sense that the opposing party need not make effort to prove it, therefore a court is entitled to give evidence based on an admission by a party if the admission is relevant to the facts in issue. An admission binds the maker. Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 532.

The Supreme Court held in this case that an admission is a statement of fact acknowledging the correct state of facts in issue which is against the maker's interest.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 2011, an admission may operate as estoppel.

The court held in this case that an admission is binding on its maker if it is clear, unequivocal and devoid of misapprehension of facts.

The court held in this case that any statement contained in a report by an agent to his principal cannot be regarded as an admission to a third party.

In this case, the court held that the existence of agency must be proved before any admission by the agent may be admissible against the principal.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of section 21(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, statements made by a party to the proceeding or by an agent to any such party, whom the court regards, in the circumstance of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions.

In this case, the court held that any statement made by a person to whom a party to a suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute is an admission. In this case, the defendants, executors of a deceased person, referred the plaintiff to one R for information concerning the assets of the deceased. The court held that what r said could be proved against the defendants.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 23 of the Evidence Act 2011, statements made by persons to whom a party to the suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in disputes are admissions.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 27(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime. Confessions, if voluntary, are deemed relevant facts as against the persons who make them only. For a confessional statement to be admissible, it must be voluntary.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a confession is an admission against the interest of the maker, the accused person. Confession alone can sustain the conviction of an accused.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime.

The court held in this case that usually, admission, in relation to a crime is used to denote the admission of some fact relevant to a crime, whilst confession is used to denote the admission of guilt.

The court held in this case that where a confessional statement is retracted, it is for the trial court to determine whether the accused indeed made the statement and the weight if any to attach to it. The test for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement is to seek any other evidence, be it slight of circumstance, which make it probable that the confession is true. The test or determinants are:

a. Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true;

b. Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slightly;

c. Whether the facts contained therein so far as can be tested, are true;

d. Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence;

e. Whether the confession of the accused person was possible;

f. Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.

The court held in this case that a confessional statement must be first recorded in the language in which it is made by an accused person before translating it into English as that would ensure the accuracy of the accused person's statement. in order to ensure the correctness and accuracy of a statement made by an accused person and to protect his right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36(6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), where he volunteers a statement in a language other than English language, which is the language in which it was recorded as well as its translation into English language must be tendered in court.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a confessional statement can only be used as a ground of conviction when an accused person confesses to a crime in the absence of an eye witness; he can be convicted on his confession, if it is positive, directly and properly proved. Confession is the best way to prove the commission of an offence.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the retraction of a confessional statement by an accused person does not render the confession inadmissible. The fact that the accused person took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial but it is not a reason for ignoring the statement, particularly where the court is satisfied that it was the truth and sufficiently corroborates the ingredients of the offence.

The court held that the fact that an accused person took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial but it is not in itself, a reason for ignoring the statement.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a confessional statement does not become inadmissible merely because the accused subsequently denies making it and the fact that the accused took the earliest opportunity to deny having made it may lend weight to his denial, but it is not sufficient reason for ignoring the statement.

The Supreme Court held in this case that an accused person can be convicted on his confession, notwithstanding that he later retracted the confession.

The court held in this case that where during trial, an accused person who desires to impeach his statement is duty bound to establish that his earlier confessional statement cannot be true or correct by showing any of the following:

a. That he did not in fact make any such statement as presented; or

b. That he was not correctly recorded; or

c. That he was of unsettled mind at the time he made the statement; or

d. That he was induced to make the statement.

In this case, the appellant was convicted of murder. A hue and cry was raised and he was apprehended running away from the scene of the crime, and brought before the village head, who said to him that he should not trouble his fellows and if he had done it, he should say so. His counsel submitted that any statements, following that observation were inadmissible as no caution had been given. The court held that the remark of the village head was merely a moral adjuration and did not therefore render inadmissible the appellant's reply to it.

The court held in this case that where a statement has been induced by threat or promise, it is inadmissible even though the threat or promise does not relate to the charge but to some other matter.

In this case, the accused made an inadmissible confession and in it he stated that he threw a lantern in a particular pond. The lantern was subsequently found in the pond. Evidence of this fact as well as of part of the confession disclosing the whereabouts of the lantern was admitted.

The court held in this case that a confession is evidence only against the person who made it and not against his co-accused.

The court held in this case that it is always better that the statement of an accused should be written down in the language in which it was made, but a statement, which is admissible in other respects is not inadmissible on the ground that it was taken down in English and not in the language used by the person making it.

In the case, the appellant in making his statement to the police spoke Ijaw and a court messenger interpreted it to a police constable in Pidgin English and it was recorded. It was held that the statement was admissible. In the interest of the accuracy however such a statement should in the language in which it was made, read over to the maker in that language and then translated into English so that both the vernacular and English versions may be put in evidence.

In the case, it was held that where an interpreter has been used in taking down a statement, the statement is inadmissible unless the interpreter as well as the person who wrote it down are called as witnesses.

In the case, the appellant stabbed the deceased with a knife in the presence of two witnesses. After the stabbing, the appellant ran away with the knife. The deceased died later on. Thereafter, the appellant, went to the local police station to give himself up. At the police station, the police officer in charge could not understand or speak the appellant's language. So he asked another police man to act as interpreter. As a result of what the interpreter told the police officer in charge about an admission made by the appellant, the appellant was asked to take the police officer to the place where he, the appellant, had hidden the knife with which the deceased was stabbed. The appellant duly took them to the place and the knife was recovered. At the trial of the appellant for murder of the deceased, the police officer testified as to the admission made to him by the appellant through the interpreter. Although the interpreter did not give evidence at the trial, the trial judge nevertheless relied on the admission and other evidence in convicting the appellant. On appeal, it was held that as the interpreter who interpreted the alleged admission of the appellant to the police officer did not testify at the trial, the admission, in those circumstances, was certainly hearsay and was therefore not admissible.

The court held in this case that the criteria for admissibility of a document in civil cases are:

A. It must be relevant;

B. It must be pleaded;

C. It must be admissible under the Evidence Act 2011 or any other statute governing its admissibility.

In a criminal trial, only the criterion of pleading the document does not arise but the prosecution must produce and serve copies of the documents it intends to rely upon to prosecute the accused person or defendant on him or his counsel in compliance with Section 36(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 1999(as amended).

The court held in this case that by virtue of Sections 14(a), (b) an 15 of the Evidence Act 2011, evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of a law, shall be admissible unless the court is of the opinion that the desirability of admitting the evidence is out-weighed by the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the matter in which the evidence was obtained. The matters which the court must take into account include:

a. The probative value of the evidence;

b. The importance of the evidence of the evidence in the proceeding;

c. The nature of the relevant offence, cause of the action or defense and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding;

d. The gravity of the impropriety or contravention;

e. Whether the impropriety or contravention was deliberate or reckless;

f. Whether any proceeding (whether or not in a court) has been or is likely to be taken in relation to the impropriety or contravention; and

g. The difficulty, if any, of obtaining the evidence without impropriety or contravention of law.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 37 of the Evidence Act 2011, hearsay means a statement;

a. Oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding; or

b. Contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of the Evidence Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it.

The Supreme Court held in this case that hearsay is testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows personally, but what others have said; it is therefore dependent on the credibility if someone other than the witness. Generally, such a testimony, under the rules of evidence, is inadmissible.

The court held that evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.

The court in considering the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence held that hearsay evidence is inadmissible when it is sought to be used as a statement to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when the statement is proposed to establish by evidence the fact that it was made and not the truth of the statement.

The court held in this case that entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business are relevant and admissible if they refer to the matter into which the court has to inquire and books of account under section will not be confined to books which are usually bound and whose pages are not easily replaced and include loose-leaf ledgers.

The court held in this case that where entries in a book of account are relevant, the court cannot act on such entries except those that are brought into notice in court by oral evidence or by examination of the books in court.

The court held the minutes book of a native authority as being a public document under section 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and hence an entry in it was held admissible as evidence of reputation as to the ownership of a piece of land.

Section 102 of the Evidence Act defines public documents as documents forming the official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, or public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of Nigeria or elsewhere, and also public records kept in Nigeria of private documents.

The court held that a certificate issued by a government ballistician was inadmissible because of the law in Section 55 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which states the specified officers whom a certificate produced by them may be taken as sufficient evidence of the facts contained in them.

The officers concerned are the following:

a. The Government Chemist, a Deputy Government Chemist and an Assistant Government Chemist;

b. A Government Pathologist, or Entomologist;

c. The Accountant General (whether any such office is known by that or any other title in the service of a State or of the Federal Government);

d. The Governor, the Deputy Governor or the General Manager of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

The court held in this case that when a request is made by an accused person for the maker of a statement under Section 55 of the Evidence Act, 2011 to be called as a witness, such an application is not to be lightly refused.

The court held that where there is some difficulty in holding that a previous judgment is conclusive evidence for the purpose of the proof of the facts upon which it was founded, such a judgment will be regarded as relevant under the provision of Section 59 of the Evidence Act.

Section 59 of the Evidence Act provides that the existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or hold such trial.

In this suit, a police officer was charged before an orderly room under police regulations, with using unnecessary violence to a person in his custody, he was tried and acquitted. He was subsequently charged in the then Supreme Court with assault under the criminal code. It was held that he could not raise the special plea of autrefois acquit under Sections 181-185 of the Criminal Procedure Act which is now Section 238 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act.

In this case, the defendant was sued for trespass on a piece of land and in answer he alleged that he was exercising a public right of way. He then tendered in evidence a conviction of the plaintiff's predecessor in title for public nuisance by obstructing the way. It was held that although this did not operate as an estoppel, it was admissible in proof that the land was a highway.

In this case, the court held that there is no limitation upon the right of a person to raise lack of jurisdiction in respect of a judgment and a plaintiff in the court may challenge the jurisdiction of the court subsequently.

The court held that a judgment given by a court or any tribunal without jurisdiction cannot be held relevant and admissible in a subsequent case.

In this case, it was held by the court that the conviction of one of the drivers of the defendants for careless driving was not admissible as evidence of his negligence in a civil claim for damages brought against the driver and his employers.

In this case, the plaintiffs claimed special damages being the value of their properties allegedly wilfully damaged and looted by the defendants. The trial court refused to admit a certified copy of the criminal proceedings in which the defendants were convicted of riot in which the plaintiff's properties were damaged. The Court of Appeal held however that the document ought to have been accepted not only to prove the fact of the convictions but as presumptive proof of the commission of the offences.

In this case, the plaintiff was charged with stealing a certain sum of money from his employers, the defendants, and was convicted. The plaintiff later brought this action for recovery of some arrears of salary whilst the defendants counter-claimed for the amount which the plaintiff was convicted of stealing and offered no evidence beyond the fact of the conviction. The court held under Section 51, now Section 63 of the Evidence Act that the result of the criminal case could not be used to establish the civil claim.

In this case, the defendant was prosecuted for the theft of the plaintiff's property on the complaint lodged by the plaintiff, but acquitted. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in connection with the goods he had lost. It was held that the record of the criminal proceedings was not admissible.

The court held in this case that expert opinion is only necessary where the expert can furnish the court with scientific information that is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the judge of facts.

In this case, it was held that where there are conflicting opinions of two experts, the court may prefer the opinion of the expert who shows the data upon which he has based his opinion. In this case, an expert in property evaluation with high academic qualifications and of many years standing gave the value of a certain property as 2,500 euroswithout giving the basis of his evaluation. Another expert with equally high professional qualification and experience gave the value of the same property as 9,000 eurosand also gave the data as to how he arrived at such valuation. The court rejected the opinion of the former and accepted that of the later.

In this case, a witness gave evidence that he was the Inspector of Mines appointed under the Minerals Act and that he made certain tests in order to ascertain the nature of the ores in question. He was not cross-examined as to his personal qualifications, as to his ability to make the tests or as to the accuracy of the conclusions he drew therefrom. The court held that the nature and duties of the witness's public office and technical or scientific tests he made, which were not challenged, constituted prima facie evidence of his qualification to be admitted as an expert witness.

The court held in this case that a solicitor who has acquired knowledge of handwriting as an amateur could be treated as an expert in the field.

In this case, the court held that where an adverse party wants to challenge the qualifications and experience of an expert witness, he must cross-examine on them with a view to discrediting the witness as an expert. If however, the adverse party fails to do this, he may find it difficult to challenge the status of the witness as an expert on appeal.

The court held in this case that it is not bound to accept the opinions of an expert and act on it especially where such opinion conflicts with common sense and the usage of mankind.

The court held in this case that where there is expert evidence, the court is bound to accept such expert evidence and act on it.

In this case, it was held that where there is a conflict in the opinions of experts, it is the duty of the court to come to a conclusion in the case by resolving such a conflict, and can do so by rejecting the opinion of one or the other of such experts.

It was held in this case that the court will not allow an expert to testify as to the ultimate issue in a case.

In this case, the defense of the accused to a charge of murder was that the deceased had committed suicide. A doctor who did not see the deceased but had heard the evidence in court was asked whether in his opinion the wound which caused the death of the deceased was inflicted by someone other than the deceased. He said that in his opinion, the wounds were not self-inflicted, and this opinion was held by the court to be admissible, it being an opinion based on an assumed state of facts, although it was the ultimate issue in the case.

The court held in this case that where the opinion as expressed in a textbook of a renowned expert who cannot be called as a witness is to be confirmed by another expert in that field in a proceeding, if the latter confirms the opinion, then it properly becomes part of the evidence in the case and will be considered as such by the court.

The court held a reader in Roman-Dutch law to the council of legal education in London to be an expert in Roman-Dutch law.

The court held in this case that the court will assume the law in any foreign country to be the same as the law in Nigeria if no evidence to the contrary is tendered before it.

The court held in this case that the witness put forward as an expert in foreign law need not be a person of the legal profession if his official position makes him conversant with the particular branch of the foreign law.

The court held that the subject on which the witness is testifying must be one upon which competency to form an opinion can only be acquired by a course of special study or experience. It is upon such a subject and such a subject only that the testimony is admissible.

The court held in this case that if there is a rule of customary law applicable to the matter in controversy before a court between two Nigerians, the matter must be determined in accordance with such rule of customary law unless such rule is repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, or it is established that it was intended by the parties that the obligations under the transaction should be regulated by the common law.

The court held in this case that where both parties to a transaction have agreed that a transaction is based on customary law and the previous decisions in suits relating to the transaction have been given on that basis, the parties are estopped from contending in a subsequent action that the transaction is based on the received English law.

The court held in this case that it is a well-established principle of law that native law and custom is matter of evidence to be decided on the facts presented before the court in each particular case, unless it is of such notoriety and has been so frequently followed by the courts that judicial notice would be taken of it without evidence required in proof.

The court held that the trial judge who refused to accept the contents of three well known works on Benin customary law was correct in the absence of evidence that any of the books were generally acknowledged in Nigeria or elsewhere as a standard work or as appropriate authority on Benin traditional history, and in the absence of any evidence by the authors of the books or an explanation as to the omission to call them.

The court held that a trial court is presumed to know the law applicable in a civil case, the customary law prevailing in its area of jurisdiction unless and until the contrary is shown.

In this case, the President of the Benin customary court, himself a Benin man and a lawyer, decided a point of Benin customary law of inheritance from his own knowledge, without evidence and gave judgment for the respondent. The High Court held on appeal that the President was wrong to have acted on his own personal knowledge of the law since the President is not required by statute either to be a native of the area of jurisdiction of the customary court or to have any special qualification in the customary law of the area.

The court held that general custom must be strictly proved. The ipse dixit of the person who alleges it is certainly not sufficient, although no particular number of witnesses is required.

The court held that even where a particular custom is proved by evidence, it will nevertheless not be enforced as law if it is held to be contrary to public policy or is not in accordance with natural justice, equity and good conscience.

In this case, the court held that where an alleged custom is very unreasonable, it may not be easily accepted by the court.

In this case, the court held that a custom requires frequent proof before the court before it can be held to be judicially noticed.

In this case, it was held that it is unnecessary to bring evidence to prove particular customs which have come so frequently before the courts as to be well established and notorious.

It was held in this case that a court will permit a party to lead evidence to show that a custom which has been judicially noted has ceased to be a custom in the particular area.

In this case, it was held that the mere fact that a custom was held proved before a Calabar court did not make it necessarily applicable to the people of Epe in Lagos state in a case brought before the court in Lagos.

In this case, a trial magistrate accepted the evidence of opinion of a witness who was not an expert but stated that he was conversant with the appellant's signature as they had worked together, as proof that the appellant had made certain signatures in dispute. It was held that the trial court was right in doing so.

The court held that a police officer could be regarded be as an expert witness in the case of a disputed handwriting and handwriting was held to include typewriting.

The court held an instrument to be that which, on the face of the instrument, it more or less accurately resembles. The definition of purporting is the same whether applicable to the whole or to part of an instrument. There must be a resemblance more or less accurate.

Section 101(1) of the Evidence Act provides that in order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or finger impression is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing, or finger impression admitted or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved although that signature, writing or finger has not been produced or proved for any other purpose.

In the case, there was no evidence as to what stage of investigation to the charges a witness was shown the photographs of suspects, whether it was before or after the identification parade. The Supreme Court held that unless it was clear that the photographs were shown to the witness in order to enable him to identify the suspects at a subsequent identification parade, it cannot be seen how the propriety of the identification parade in the circumstances has been impugned.

The court held in this case that cross examination under Section 1 (j) (iii) of the English Criminal Act, which is in pari materia with Section 180 (g) (iii) of the Evidence Act should not be allowed where a witness who testifies against a co-accused and the co-accused are not charged with the same offence.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that an expert must be called as a witness before he can give evidence in court, and his evidence is necessary where he can furnish the court with scientific or other information of technical nature that may be outside the experience and knowledge of the judge. Although expertise, for evidential purposes, cannot be equated with scholastic knowledge or professorial attainment, an expert is, all the same, a person who is specially skilled in the field he is giving evidence. A person who is paraded as an expert must furnish the court with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusions so as to enable the court to form its own independent judgment by the court to form its own independent judgment by the application of those criteria to the facts proved in evidence. In other words, the opinion and conclusions, which such an expert proffered before the trial court must be supported by scientific analysis, otherwise his evidence would be valueless or worthless. An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a jury. If on the proven facts, a judge can form his own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary.

The court held that a conviction of an accused will be quashed on appeal if the court is of the opinion that the disclosure of the previous conviction of an accused has resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice where a previous conviction of an accused person was brought to the notice of the trail court before verdict was given.

In this case, the court held that the conviction of an accused person will be allowed to stand if no miscarriage of justice is occasioned by the disclosure of the previous conviction of an accused person or if the jury has been adequately warned to disregard the previous conviction.

The court held in this case that the only kind of previous conviction which a court is entitled to take into account when assessing sentence is one which the conviction took place before the commission of the offence for which the accused is instantly charged and convicted.

In this case, the appellant was convicted by a magistrate and in an attempt to get enhanced punishment, the prosecution tendered a document showing a record of alleged previous convictions of the accused which was signed by an Assistant Superintendent of Police. The court held that such was not a proper mode of proving previous convictions.

The court held in this case that a police accident report book is not a public record as it is not a document forming the acts of public officer, as the acts in the definition will not cover the inquiries which a police officer may make.

The definition of a public document under common law was laid down by the court in this case. The court held that a document will not be held to be a public document for three reasons namely,

a. That the document or report is not made under a strict duty to inquire into all the circumstances it recorded;

b. It is not concerned with a public matter;

c. It is not meant to be retained nor meant for public inspection.

The court held in this matter that in civil cases, formal proof of a document can always be waived.

In this case, on an application for a writ of certiorari for the removal into the High Court for the purpose of being quashed, an order made by the Governor of approval and recognition of the appointment of a chief, the court directed the Governor to file an affidavit in reply to the chieftaincy, had been deposed or not. An affidavit was sworn by the secretary to the premier and Executive Council to which was attached a copy of the order of deposition of the applicant, which was signed by the Governor who was the person who made the order. The court held it sufficient proof of the original order by Section 112(a) (ii) which is now Section 106(a) (ii) of the Evidence Act, even though it was not certified.

The court held in this case that to be admissible in evidence, the public document of a foreign country must comply strictly with this provision,

a. Public documents of any other class elsewhere than in Nigeria, by the original, or by a copy certified by the legal keepers of such documents, with a certificate under the seal of a notary public, or of a consul or diplomatic agent that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the legal custody of the original and upon proof of the character of the document according to the law of the foreign country.

The court held in this case that if a document requires attestation for its validity, such a document may, generally speaking, be proved by calling at least an attesting witness.

The court held in this case that at least one of the attesting witnesses of an attested document must be called unless they were all unavailable.

The court held that if an attesting witness to a document denies or does not recollect the execution of it or refuses to testify, the execution of such a document may be proved by other evidence.

The court held that if denial of an attesting witness to a document is categorical and there is no evidence from which a doubt can be cast on such denial, the attestation may be rejected.

In this case where the two attesting witnesses gave evidence that the testator did not subscribe the will until after they had done so, it was held that other persons who were present at the time of the attestation could be called to prove that the attesting witnesses were mistaken as their evidence on the issue was not conclusive.

The court held that the formal proof of a document can always be waived by parties to a civil suit, but not by parties to a criminal case.

The court held in this case that a typist is not a writer within Section 7 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

Under Section 7, a writer is defined as any person who shall write any letter or document at the request, on behalf, or in the name of any illiterate person.

The court held in this case that the word illiterate in the Evidence Act in Section 7 should be construed in its ordinary meaning as defined in the dictionary as the appellant in the case was not illiterate within the meaning as he was not ignorant of letters, unlearned, unable to write.

The Supreme Court held in this case that although a person may be sufficiently literate to sign his name and read figures, he may not be sufficiently literate to understand the meaning and the effect of the document he is signing; in such a case, the provisions of Section 3 of the Act must be complied with.

In this case, the first defendant borrowed a sum of money from the plaintiff company and the second defendant stood surety for him. The debt was witnessed by a document, the writer of which was the record clerk of the plaintiff company who, for this purpose was regarded by the court as the agent of the plaintiff. The second defendant was found by the court to be an illiterate person and it was established that the document witnessing the debt did not comply with the provisions of the Act. It was held that the document was inadmissible against the second defendant. The court stated that the object of the Act was to protect an illiterate person from fraud, and strict compliance with its provisions was obligatory as regards the writer of the document.

The court held in this case that if a document which does not comply with the provisions of the Act creates legal rights between an illiterate and a third party, then evidence may be called to prove what happened at the time the document was prepared by the writer and the parties signed it.

The court held that a document which does not comply with the Act may nevertheless be admissible for example, in support of the case of an illiterate.

In this case, the court held that a document which did not comply with the provisions of the act was inadmissible.

The court held in this case that non-compliance with the requirements of the Illiterates Protection Act by the preparer of a document renders the document void but a document is not rendered void in the strict sense, as obviously the illiterate can rely on it but it is unenforceable by the preparer against the illiterate in respect of the legal rights created by it in favor of the former.

The court held in this case that if a document which does not comply with the provisions of the Act creates legal rights between the illiterate and a third party, then evidence may be called to prove what happened at the time the document was prepared by the writer and the parties signed it.

The court held that any paragraph of an affidavit which offends against any of the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act may be struck out by the court, but if it is not struck out, then the court may not attach any weight to it.

The court held that there is nothing objectionable in principle in counsel swearing an affidavit on behalf of a person he is representing.

The court held that oral evidence will not be allowed in proof of facts by affidavits in all cases unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the reception of such evidence.

It was held in this case that when a court is faced with affidavits which are irreconcilable on the facts deposed to, the judge hearing the case, in order to resolve the conflict properly, should first hear oral evidence from the deponents or such other witnesses as the parties may be advised to call.

The court held that an omission by the parties to cross examine the deponents to an affidavit or call any witness should not be taken to amount to consent that affidavit evidence only, should be used in such circumstances.

In this case, the confessional statement of the accused was reduced into writing. This was however not tendered at the trial. It had been tendered before at the Magistrate Court in the preliminary investigation and was said to have lost thereafter. The exhibits clerk of the Magistrate court was not called at the trial to testify that it was lost and that all possible search had been made for it. Oral evidence was given of what the accused had stated in the confession. The court held that before the oral evidence was admitted, the exhibits clerk of the magistrates court ought to have been called to testify to the loss of the written statement and that it could not be found after all possible search had been made.

The court held in this case that an objection to admissibility of secondary evidence on the ground that all possible search has not been made must be clearly made at the time the secondary evidence is being tendered, if not so made, it will be improper to allow the party objecting to call evidence later contradicting the document.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that it is not the length of evidence given in tendering a bank statement of account that matters but the substance of the evidence given.

The court held that where a statement of account is not proved at all to have been examined with the original entry, it cannot be admitted as a copy of an entry in a banker's book.

The court held in this case that mere existence of a file containing one or more documents of a similar nature dealing with the same kind or a kindred subject matter does not necessarily make the contents of the file a continuous record within the meaning of Section 83(1) of the Evidence Act.

The court held that a witness who swore before a commissioner as to certain facts, supplied the commissioner with those facts.

The court held that if a man dictates a letter giving information to the person to whom he is writing, it is an abuse to language to say that he is engaged in supplying information to his shorthand typist.

The court held in this case that a statement made by a person interested at a time when a dispute is anticipated is inadmissible, and that the word anticipated must be construed as meaning likely.

The court held that the proceedings being anticipated means proceedings were regarded as likely or even reasonably probable.

The court held that "a person interested" is not confined to the maker of the document. It means "any person whatsoever provided that he is interested."

The court held in this case that the mere fact that a maker of a statement is one of the servants of one of the parties to a suit will not make him a person interested under Section 83 (3) of the Evidence Act.

In this case, a statement was made by a tester employed by the plaintiff was tendered in a civil suit for breach of contract and passing off. The court held the statement inadmissible on the ground that he was a person interested in the result of the proceedings, which result might affect his pay and prospects.

The court held notes of the evidence of a deceased witness of an accident taken by a magistrate were admitted under the provisions of Section 83(4) of the Evidence Act even though they were not signed by the witness.

The court held that Section 129, now Section 162 of the Evidence Act raises a presumption as to the correctness of a recital in a document twenty years old, whilst Section 90(1) now Section 83(1) of the Evidence Act provides for the admissibility, on certain conditions being fulfilled, of a statement in a recital no matter what the age of the document containing it.

In this case, the master of a ship involved in a collision was held to be interested persons, while the two engineers and the lookout man were held not to be persons interested under the provision.

The court held that an unsigned carbon copy of a letter is not the primary evidence of the contents of the signed top copy; the position is the same with an unsigned copy made by a duplicating machine.

The court held in this case that where a letter is typed from a draft, each copy of the letter is the primary evidence of the contents of other copies, including the top copy, but not of the draft.

The court held in this case that the written message handed over to a counter clerk in a post office for dispatch by telegraph or cable is the primary evidence of the message sent by the sender.

The court held that a document in possession of a party's man servant or houseboy is under the power of the party and it will therefore be in order to serve the party with a notice to produce the document.

The court held that it is unnecessary for a party to serve a notice to produce a document which the other party has in his possession and which he, the other party, requires in proof of his own allegations.

The court held in this case that once a notice to produce a certain document has been served, then secondary evidence of it of the type permitted by law may be given if the document is not produced provided possession of the original is admitted by the party served with the notice, or such possession is proved to be in him or in any other person over whom the served person has control.

The court held in this case that documentary evidence is the best form of evidence where the existence of facts are sought to be proved. The best proof of facts in issue is the documentary evidence that tends to establish the fact alleged, unless and until same is established to have been forged or produced in aid of nonexistent facts.

The court held in this case that the most reliable, if not the best evidence, is documentary. It is certainly more reliable than oral evidence. See also Osunbor v. Oshiomhole (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 463) 1366.

The court held in this case that the convenient course where secondary evidence alone is available is to admit the copies provisionally when the plaintiff is giving evidence provided that the evidence raises a prima facie case that the original reached the defendant's hands, and after hearing the evidence for the defendant decide, whether the originals were received by the defendant or not, and treat the copies accordingly.

The court held in this case that the object of the notice is to enable the adversary to have the document in court, and if he does not, to enable his opponent to give secondary evidence thereof so as to exclude the argument that the latter has not taken all reasonable means to procure the original.

The court held that notice to produce can be served in court during the trial if the original is in court.

The court held that a party making allegations in proof of which he is in possession of documents is not entitled to say that he received no notice to produce, especially when the allegations have not been admitted by the other side.

The court held in this case that in civil case, formal proof of a document may be waived by parties but in civil case, every document must be strictly proved.

The court held in this case that a copy of an instrument retained in the registry is therefore not conclusive proof of the due execution of the original.

The court held in this case that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

The court held in this case that the burden of proof in criminal cases remains on the prosecution and never shifts.

The court held that where there was evidence of a fight between two persons and no evidence one way or the other as to what actually happened leading to the death of one of them, the benefit of the doubt thus created must be given to the accused.

The court held in this case that it is to be remembered that it is an essential principle of criminal law that a criminal charge has got to be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the deceased was found lying on the ground with a deep cut across the throat in a room occupied by the deceased; the appellant was found helping her. The appellant was later arrested and charged with the murder of the deceased and he put up the defense that the deceased committed suicide. The Federal Supreme Court held that as the general burden of proof lay on the prosecution, this must include the elimination of the possibility of suicide.

The court held in this case that it is a principle of law that the burden of proof lies upon the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and generally in criminal cases unless otherwise directed by statute, the presumption of innocence casts on the prosecution the burden of proving every ingredient of the offence.

In the case, the appellant's tribe claimed against the other two tribes of the town, exclusive ownership of an island of about four square miles and called witnesses who gave traditional evidence of user of isolated places. The Court of Appeal held that the onus is on the plaintiff throughout to prove the title which he seeks to have confirmed, that onus never shifts and it is not sufficient for the plaintiff in such an action to show possession and argue that the defendant proved no better title.

The court held in this case that the burden of proving title to land by long possession lay on him who alleged it; but once it is proved that the original ownership of property is in a party, then the burden of proving that that party has been diversted of the ownership rests on the other party.

In this case, one Cole, who had a lease of crown land, gave a sub-lease of it to the defendant. The plaintiffs claimed possession on the ground that the lessee had mortgaged his interest to another person before giving the sub-lease to the defendant and that the other person had exercised his power of sale and conveyed the residue of the lessee's term to the plaintiff. The only evidence adduced by the plaintiffs was the deed of conveyance executed by the mortgagee reciting that a mortgage had been made to them by the lessee and that they had exercised their power of sale, the plaintiffs submitting that it was for the defendant to dispute the mortgage and the propriety of sale. It was held that the burden was on the plaintiffs to show that the assignment to them by the mortgagee was valid and effective and that the sub-lease granted by the lessee to the defendant did not bind them and was void.

In this case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants to set aside the sale and conveyance of a piece of their family land by some members of the family on the grounds that they did not consent to the sale. The trial court held that the onus of proving that the plaintiffs consented to the sale was on the defendants. The Supreme Court held that the onus was on the plaintiffs and since after hearing all the evidence, the trial judge was not satisfied that the plaintiffs did or did not give their consent, the plaintiffs had failed to establish their case.

The court held in this case that the onus is on him who alleges that he has exclusive grant of family property to establish his grant.

In this case, the defendant refused to register a trademark submitted by the plaintiff on the ground that it so nearly resembled another trademark relating to goods of the same description as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. It was held that the burden of proving the absence of reasonable probability of deception under the trade act was on the plaintiff.

In this case, the defendants dismissed the plaintiff, their employee, for incompetence. The court held that the burden of proving incompetence of the plaintiff was on the defendants.

In this case, the plaintiff, in the absence of detailed information as to his annual income was assessed for tax by the defendant. The court held that the burden of proving that the assessment was excessive under the Eastern Nigeria Finance Law was on the plaintiff.

The court held in this case that incompetence is obviously a ground for summary dismissal of a servant. Where a master has dismissed his servant summarily for lack of skill, the onus is on the master to prove to the satisfaction of the judge that his servant was incompetent.

The court held that in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the absence of reasonable and probable cause even though there is evidence of malice.

In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant, an alkali, in respect of acts done in exercise of his power as an alkali under the northern Nigeria Native Courts Law, Section 8 which gives the defendant exemption from civil liability for acts done in the exercise of his powers as a court except such acts are not done in good faith. The court held that the burden lay on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant did not act in good faith.

The court held that where one spouse seeks divorce from the other on the grounds of adultery, the burden of proof is on the petitioner and where there is evidence that the adultery has been condoned, the burden is also upon the petitioner to disprove such condonation.

The court held in a petition for divorce on the ground of desertion that the legal burden throughout the case is on the husband as petitioner to prove that his spouse deserted him without cause. To discharge that burden, he relies on the fact that he asked her to join him and she refused. That is a fact from which the court may infer that she deserted him without cause but it is not bound to do so. Once he proves the fact of refusal, she may seek to rebut the inference of desertion by proving that she had just cause for her refusal. Even if she does not affirmatively prove just cause, the court still had, at the end of the case, to ask itself whether the legal burden is discharged.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that by virtue of the provisions of Section 133 of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of first proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment will be given if no evidence were adduced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleadings.

In this case, the plaintiffs who were the executors of a will asked the court to declare in solemn form for the will and the codicil of the testator. The widow challenged the will on the ground that it was not properly executed. The court held that in a case of the nature, the burden was on the plaintiff to show prima facie that the will is in order; but thereafter the burden is cast upon those who attack the will to prove affirmatively the charges made against the will.

The court held in this case that if a party adduces evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy the court that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies on the party against whom judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced, and so successively, until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with.

In this case, the petitioner in an election petition submitted that once he had shown the non-compliance with the regulations, he needed not show that such compliance did not affect the result of the election. The court held that a petitioner who alleges in his petition a particular non-compliance and avers in his prayer that the non-compliance was substantial, must so satisfy the court.

The court held in this case that in bailment, in case of loss or damage to the property, the onus of proving that there is no negligence is on the bailee.

In this case, the plaintiff, a licensed chemist and druggist supplied the defendant with drugs on credit over a period of time. Some of the drugs were poisons as defined by the Pharmacy Act. The defendant contended that the supply of the poisons was illegal under the Act. It was, however, held that as a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant for the supply of poisons was not on its face illegal, the onus lay on the defendant to prove the illegality.

This was an action for libel brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for writing a letter to the chairman of the education committee of a local government council, which was the proprietor of the school where the plaintiff was a headmaster, which letter alleged immoral behavior against the plaintiff. The court held that the occasion of the publication being privileged, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove malice.

The court held that where the owner of a piece of land brought an action to recover possession thereof, the defendants being in possession, the burden of proof of their right to possession lay on the defendants.

The court held in this case that if it is alleged that someone in possession of land is a trespasser, the person alleging has the onus of showing that he has a better right to possession which has been disturbed.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for negligence allegedly committed by the defendant's servants or agents. The crane which was being operated by the servants or agents of the defendant in the course of building operations carried on by the defendants fell on the plaintiff whilst making use of a public path normally used by members of the public. It was held that the maxim res ipsa loquitor applied to put the onus on the defendant to disprove negligence.

In this case, the deceased who was an in-patient in the defendant's hospital, was one night discovered missing from her bed. She had just given birth and was diagnosed as a suspected case of post-natal psychosis. She had been given some sedative, and the doctor on duty had instructed a staff nurse to keep an eye on her. The court held that the facts of the case raised the presumption of negligence, and the maxim res ipsa loquitor put the onus on the defendant to disprove negligence.

In this case, the defendant who occupied the floor above the plaintiff's shop and store went away leaving his servants behind and the premises in the charge of a friend. Water seeped through the floor above. There was evidence that the tap was not defective but that someone had let it run thus causing an overflow. The court held on these facts that the onus was on the defendant to prove facts inconsistent with liability, there being a presumption that the accident had been caused by negligence on the part of someone for whom he was responsible.

In this case, a pedestrian who was walking along the road was struck by a piece of metal which flew out when the tyre of a bus belonging to the appellants burst. The pedestrian sued in negligence. The court held that the maxim res ipsa loquitor did not apply in a case of this nature because the mere bursting of a tyre was not more consistent with negligence on the part of the driver than with other causes and that therefore the burden to prove negligence remained on the respondent.

In this case, the applicant sought a declaration that certain sections of the Northern Nigeria Children and Young Persons Law were void as being repugnant to certain fundamental human rights provisions of the constitution. The court held that the presumption in favor of constitutionality throws the burden of proof on the person who alleges that the legislature has infringed a fundamental human right.

Burden of Introducing Evidence in Criminal Cases.

In the case, b was driving at a great speed, a lorry with left hand drive and A was seated on his right. X, a cyclist coming from the opposite direction, was forced to his left-hand side and dismounted. In passing, a hit X with a stick. X fell against the rear of the lorry and was killed. It was held that the prosecution had the duty not merely to prove that A and B might have been acting in concert but they were in fact so acting, that as B's action was explicable as due to unskillful driving, the inference of concerted action on the part of A and A was not inescapable and that the doubt which thus existed must be resolved in favor of the accused persons.

In this case, the plaintiff and the defendants entered into a partnership agreement under which the plaintiff supplied goods to the defendants for sale on behalf of the partnership. When stock was taken, a shortage was discovered. The plaintiff thereupon sued for the recovery of this shortage. The court held that once the plaintiff established the shortage, the onus shifted onto the defendants to account for it.

In this case, the appellant was convicted of stealing, and an order of restitution with respect to the sum alleged stolen by him was made by the court. He did not appeal against the conviction but against the order. The court held that in this type of case, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the identity of the property but that the burden of introducing evidence may shift and in this case had shifted onto the accused.

In this case, the accused was charged with fraudulent appropriation in accounting in his capacity as director of a company. It was proved that cement belonging to the company had been sold by the accused as his personal property. The court held that upon such proof, the onus was upon the accused to show how and when the cement became his property. The trial court was held to be in error. The correct view is that if the evidence raises a presumption of guilt, then it is for the accused to rebut that presumption and all that he is required to do is to establish a balance of probabilities in his favor.

The court held that if the evidence raises a presumption of guilt, then it is for the accused to rebut that presumption of guilt and all that he is required to do is to establish a balance of probabilities in his favor.

The court held that the burden on the prosecution is only discharged when the essential ingredients of the offences charged have been established and the accused person is unable to bring himself within the defense or exceptions allowed under law generally, or the statute creating the offence.

The court held that proof beyond reasonable doubt is attained when the evidence is so strong as to leave only a remote probability in favor of the defendant which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible but not the least probable.

In this case, the trial court found that the appellant had entered a dwelling house for an illegal purpose on a charge of entering the dwelling house for an illegal purpose with intent to commit a felony. The court held that it being of the essence of the offence that there should be an intent to commit a felony, the conviction was unwarranted in the absence of a proper finding to that effect.

The court held although the burden of introducing evidence in proof of the defense of alibi lies on the accused, once he has introduced that evidence, then the onus is not on him to satisfy the court that the alibi is established but for the prosecution to disprove it.

The court held that the onus is on the prosecution to disprove the defense of accident and the justification of self-defense once these are raised by the accused.

The court held that where the admissibility of a confessional statement is challenged on the ground that it is not voluntary, the person who alleges that it was voluntary has the onus of establishing that it was.

The court held that although the burden of proof of the guilt of an accused person is on the prosecution, yet if the prosecution adduces evidence which calls for rebuttal or an explanation, the failure of the accused to make any statement could legitimately result in the court accepting and convicting him upon the uncontroverted evidence of the prosecution.

The court held in this case that on a charge of carrying on business as a money lender without being in possession of a valid lender's permit, the burden of proving that he had a license was on the accused, as being a fact peculiarly within his knowledge.

The court held that where the defense of alibi is set up, it is the duty of the prosecution to investigate that defense if it was made known to it.

The court held that the evidential burden of proof is on the accused where he puts up the defense of alibi in a criminal matter.

The court held that if on the whole, there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused, then he will be entitled to an acquittal.

The court held that when the defendant raises the defense of accident, the onus is on the prosecution to rebut the defense.

The court held that if the defense of an accused person is that the crime was committed by someone else, the onus is on the prosecution to disprove that defense.

In this case, the appellant, who held a learner's permit, and had passed her driving test, but had not obtained he driving license, was found driving a vehicle. It was held by the court in a charge under Section 7(1) the Road Traffic Act that the burden of proof that her case came within the Act was on her.

The Federal Supreme Court held that the burden of proof required from an accused person is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution in proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the burden may be discharged by evidence satisfying the jury of the probability of that which the accused is called upon to establish. See Section 139(2) of the Evidence Act.

In this case, the accused was charged with knowingly and with intent to defraud the Government of duty payable on certain goods, acquiring possession of them contrary to Section 145(a) of the Customs and Excise Ordinance of 1958. The court held that the burden of disproving knowledge and intent to defraud which rested on the accused by virtue of Section 68 of the Ordinance was less than that required of the prosecution in criminal cases.

The court held in this case that though the burden of proving insanity lay on the accused, the burden could be discharged by the accused tendering evidence suggesting that it was most probable that he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act, or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to the law.

The court held that strict proof in a claim for special damages will depend upon the character of the acts which have produced the damage and the circumstances under which they were done.

The court held that where the law puts the onus of establishing a particular fact on a party, it is enough for him to say that his own evidence is just as good as that of his opponent; what the law says is that to discharge the onus on him, he must prove by evidence that convinces the court or tribunal of the probability of his case rather than that of his opponent on the point in issue. It is not an argument that the scales are evenly weighted, for evidently in that case, he has not discharged the onus.

The court held that in a civil claim for an assault, the assault must be proved as in a criminal cases, which is beyond reasonable doubt.

The court held in this case that in an election petition where bribery is alleged to be the basis of the petition, the bribery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The court held that the rule that if the commission of a crime is directly in issue in a civil case, the party who raises the issue must prove it beyond reasonable doubt applies only where there is specific allegation of a crime in the pleadings so that it can be said to be the basis or foundation of the claim or defense as the case may be.

The court held in this case that if it cannot be held that the allegation of a crime is the basis or foundation of the claim, then the rule that if the commission of a crime is directly in issue in a civil case, the party who raises the issue must prove it beyond reasonable doubt does not come into operation.

The court held in this case that a general allegation of wrong doing will not call into effect the provision of Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act.

The court held in this case that in a suit for declaration of title to land, the onus of proof lies on the plaintiff and that he will succeed on the strength of his case not on the weakness of the defendant's case.

The court held that in considering the weight of the plaintiff's case, the trial judge is entitled to take into account those weaknesses in the defense which tend to strengthen the plaintiff's case.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the rule is that in a claim for a declaration of title the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his title, and that he has to do so without relying on the weakness of the defendant's case. The onus never shifts. This rule of law is now so firmly established that nothing can shake its foundation.

The Supreme Court held that although the failure of the police to take a confessional statement of an accused person to a superior police officer contrary to the usual practice in such matters does not eo ipso render the statement inadmissible in evidence, it is certainly a matter to be considered in deciding upon what weight to attach to such a statement.

The Supreme Court held that if it appeared that a witness had formerly said or written the contrary of what he later swore in evidence unless the reason of his having done so was satisfactorily accounted for, his evidence should not have much weight with a jury.

The Supreme Court held in this case that where a witness had given a testimony in court which is inconsistent with a statement previously made by him, a court of trial is entitled to treat both the testimony at the trial and the previous statement as of little or no probative value rather than choose to believe either.

The court held that the rule that a court of trial is entitled to treat both the testimony at the trial and the previous statement as of little or no probative value rather than choose to believe either should be confined to the case of an ordinary witness and not to a retraction in court of a confessional statement made by an accused person to the police in which case the court is free to believe either of the two statements.

The court held in this case that if there is evidence on a point which is credible and stands unchallenged by evidence from the opposing party, the trial court is free to accept and act on such evidence, even if it is uncorroborated.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proof is placed on the party who will fail if no evidence at all was given on either side. therefore, whosoever in civil proceedings desires any court to give judgment as to any legal liability which is dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove those facts exist.

The court held that the principle governing the incidence of burden of proof on the pleading is that he who asserts an allegation, whether affirmative or negative must prove it and not him who denies it.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Sections 131, 132, 133, 136 and 138 of the Evidence Act, 2011, in civil cases, the onus of proof squarely lies upon the party who alleges the existence or non-existence of a fact on the balance of probability or preponderance of evidence. See also Akande v. Adisa (2012) 15 nwlr (pt. 1324) 538.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Sections 131 and 132 of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of proof in civil cases and matters is on the plaintiff who asserts the affirmative of the issue in controversy, who desires a court to give judgment in his favor, and who will fail in that desire if no evidence is called from either sides. See also W.A.C.C. Ltd v. Caroline Poultry Farms Ltd. (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 644) 197.

The court held in this case that the effect of traverse in a pleading is to cast upon the plaintiff the burden of proving the allegation denied.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 135(2) of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to the provision of Section 139 of the Act, on the person who assets it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action.

The Supreme Court held in this case that in every criminal proceeding, the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. In discharging the burden, the prosecution may rely on:

a. Direct evidence of eye witnesses; or

b. Circumstantial evidence; and/or

c. Confessional statement of the accused.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 133(2) of the Evidence Act, a claimant has the duty to adduce evidence of the facts sought to be proved to the satisfaction of the court before the burden of proof can shift to the defendant.

In this case, the plaintiff sued for a declaration of title in fee simple to a piece of land. The defendant n his defense pleaded laches, undue delay, long possession and acquiescence. The trial judge held that it was for the plaintiff to prove that there had been no acquiescence. allowing the plaintiff's appeal against the dismissal of his case on the ground that he did not discharge that burden, the Federal Supreme Court held that when the defense pleads acquiescence, it is not for the plaintiff to prove that there had been none, but for the defendant to prove the acquiescence.

The court held in this case that where a given allegation whether affirmative or negative forms an essential part of a party's case, the proof of such allegation rests on him.

The court held in this case that if an accused person raises unequivocally the defense of alibi, that he was somewhere else other than the locus delicti at the time of the commission of the offence with which he is charged, and he gives some facts and circumstances of his whereabouts, the prosecution is duty bound to investigate the alibi so set up to verify its truthfulness or otherwise.

The Supreme Court held in this case that there is no burden placed on the accused to prove his defense of alibi. However, he is not expected to merely state that he was not at the scene of the crime without more. He owes a duty to give or supply the lead and particulars of his whereabouts at the earliest opportunity and clearly, which will guide the prosecution in their investigation of the alibi.

The Supreme Court held in this case that in law, there is a presumption of sanity. If in rebuttal, an accused pleads insanity, he has the onus to establish the fact of his insanity to the satisfaction of the court.

The court held in this case that standard of proof means that a party has to persuade the court that his version of the facts is more probable than that of his opponent.

The court held in this case that the standard of proof required in civil cases is that the party on whom the burden of proof on the pleadings lies must establish a preponderance of probability or balance of probabilities in his favor.

The Supreme Court held in this case that by virtue of Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding, civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The court held in this case that the standard of proof required before a verdict of guilty can be returned is that the jury should be satisfied so that they feel sure of the guilt of the accused.

The court held that where the totality of the evidence in a criminal trial is equivocal, in the sense that it is consistent with both the guilt and innocence of the accused, a verdict of acquittal should be recorded in his favor.

The court held in this case that if on the whole of the evidence, the court is left in a state of doubt, the prosecution would have failed to discharge the onus of proof which the law lays upon it and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.

The court held in this case that the mere telling of lies by the accused person is not evidence of commission of any offence and the prosecution must still prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

It was held in this case that the court must evaluate the totality of the evidence called by the prosecution in order to determine whether it has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is not for it to pick and choose which prosecution witness to believe and which not to believe where there is inconsistency in the evidence of the witnesses called by the prosecution and no explanation has been furnished by any of the witnesses for the inconsistency.

The court held in this case that suspicion however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and is not sufficient to justify conviction.

The court held that the standard of proof required of the prosecution in establishing that a confessional statement was made voluntarily by the accused is also proof beyond reasonable doubt, once the issue is raised by the counsel for the defense.

The court held in this case that even where no evidence is offered by the accused in his defense, the prosecution still has to prove the guilt of the accused to the requisite standard.

The court held in this case that the prosecution has a discretion as to which witness to call.

The court held in this case that the prosecution may not call a witness whom it has reasonable ground to believe will not speak the truth or whose testimony is not relevant to the charge being tried.

The court held in this case that where in a trial on information, a witness whose name appears on the information is not called by the prosecution, the witness should on request by the defense, be submitted for cross examination.

The court held that in a charge of murder or manslaughter, it is not enough to show that the act of the accused person could have caused the death of the deceased.

The court held that the standard of proof required of the prosecution makes it necessary that that in a judgment, there should be a proper finding on the intent required to constitute the offence.

The court held that the required degree of conviction in the court's mind is proportional to the seriousness of the charge.

The court held in this case that for a conviction for murder to be based on circumstantial evidence, that evidence should be so cogent and compelling as to convince the court that on no rational basis other than murder can the facts be accounted for.

The court held that if the evidence whether of the prosecution or of the parties leaves the court in a state of real doubt, an accused must be acquitted.

The court held that where the onus of proof a particular issue is cast upon the accused by statute, all that an accused has to do in such a case is to persuade the court that his evidence on the issue is more probably true than false.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that where some matter is presumed against an accused until the contrary s proved, the burden of proof required of him is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution in proving the case beyond doubt and may be discharged by evidence satisfying the judge or jury of the probability of that which the accused is called upon to prove.

The court held in this case that the onus of proof of the defense of insanity may be discharged if the facts proved by the defense are such as to make it most probable that the accused was, at the relevant time insane.

In this case, the court held that where the onus of proof of a particular issue is cast on the accused by statute, the burden is not higher than that which rests on the plaintiff or defendant in civil cases.

The court held that where the onus of proof of a particular issue is cast on the accused by statute, the burden of proof is not discharged merely by evidence showing that the accused was suffering from a disease which was capable of affecting his mind without further evidence as to the extent to which the disease had affected his will and ability to control his action at the time of the offence.

The court held that amnesia in itself is not conclusive proof that the accused was insane at the time, although at the highest, it may be said to increase the burden of proof on the prosecution.

The court held that it is not sufficient for the accused to show that he was mentally abnormal at the time of his trial. He must show that at the time of doing the act complained of, he was legally defined.

The court held that the standard required for the discharge of the onus of proving unfitness to stand trial, if the question is raised by the defense, is satisfied on the balance of probabilities.

In this case where a defendant pleaded justification in a civil action for libel by alleging conduct amounting to criminal indecency, it held that the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant, a motor vehicle inspection officer for the loss of earning caused by the defendant's refusal to issue to him for his vehicle a certificate for road worthiness. The plaintiff's evidence was that the defendant was extorting money from him and wanted more in order to issue the certificate. The trial magistrate gave him judgment which was upheld by the High Court. On further appeal, the Supreme court held that no question arose that the extortion had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt because evidence that the defendant refused to issue the certificate so as to extort money showed motive for refusal and as the plaintiff could have succeeded in his claim without proving any motive, the alleged motive was not a fact in issue.

The Australian Court held in this case that the seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of any occurrences of a given description, or the gravity of the consequence flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.

The court held in this case that in order to invalidate a marriage under the marriage act on ground of prior marriage by native law and customs, the alleged prior marriage must be established with a high degree of certainty.

The court held in this case that subsection 1 of Section 135 of the Evidence Act only applies where there is a specific allegation of a crime in the pleadings so that the commission of a crime can properly be said to be a basis or foundation of the claim or defense as the case may be in the civil suit. For example, the subsection would apply where a defendant in an action for libel pleaded justification of an allegation that the plaintiff had committed a criminal offence or where a petitioner sought divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act, on the grounds of rape, sodomy or bestiality.

This was a case of running down a person to death. The court held that the case not being a criminal case, it is not particularly necessary to prove the direct cause of death. It is enough that the accident or collision was the primary cause of her death; that she died as a result of the accident.

In this case, the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff as to the identity of the property the declaration of title to which he had sued the defendant for was conflicting. His witness gave divergent and inconsistent evidence of the boundaries of the land. The high court, after hearing the evidence adduced by both parties, dismissed the claim on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to discharge the onus cast on him of showing the correct dimensions and location of the land. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the High Court held that in a claim for declaration of title to lands, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove title to a defined area to which a declaration can be attached.

The court held that a presumption saves the party who can invoke it from proving certain facts in the first instance and puts the onus on the other side.

The court held that a portion of land demarcated and allocated to a party must be presumed to be in his possession; the burden of proving that he is not the owner nor in exclusive possession is on the person who alleges the contrary.

The court held that where an owner of land brings an action to recover possession thereof, the defendant being in possession, the onus of proof of his right of possession lies on the defendant.

The court held that if a defendant is in possession but the plaintiff traces his title to one whose title has been established, then the onus is upon the defendant to show that his own possession is of such a nature as to oust that of the original owner.

The court held that if it is proved that the original ownership of property is in a party, the burden of proving that that party has been diverted of ownership rests on the other party.

The court held that the onus is on the party claiming family land to prove that he is in fact entitled to the family land as against all other members of the family.

The court held in this case that where a custom is relied upon in a suit, the burden of proving that custom lies on the party who alleges its existence.

The court held in this case that if a plaintiff founds his claim on a right emanating from a statute, the onus lies on him to establish that the particular statute applies to the claim.

The court held that the burden of proving the accused guilty rests throughout the prosecution; it is not for the accused to prove his innocence.

The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving the accused's guilt still remains on the prosecution even where a defense of self-defense, accident or provocation is set up in a criminal case.

In this case, the appellant in his trial for murder admitted in evidence that he killed his wife and explained how he came to do so in the course of a struggle. The trial court held that he had not established either the defense of self-defense or provocation. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that this was a serious misdirection and that the onus does not shift on the defense to establish any defense.

The court held that it is for the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof by negativing the defenses raised by an accused.

The court held in a murder trial that the onus is on the prosecution to eliminate the possibility of suicide.

The court held in this case that there in law, no burden of proof on accused person who puts forward an alibi which means "elsewhere" as his defense.

The court held in this case that if a man puts forward an answer in the shape of an alibi or self-defense he does not in law thereby assume any burden of proving that answer.

The court held that where the prosecution fails to adduce evidence whether a case of homicide is manslaughter or justifiable homicide, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

It was held in this case that in the case of trial before a judge or professionally qualified magistrate, it is to be assumed that he has in mind the elementary principle that the onus of proof lies on the prosecution though it is of course, open to the appellant to show, if he can, from the terms of the judgment that the magistrate either had not the rule in mind or departed from it.

The court held in this case that for the prosecution to discharge the onus of proof laid upon it, it is not necessary for it to call a host of witnesses, it is enough if evidence is called sufficient to discharge the onus.

In this case, the court held that the question that the prosecution has proved the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt cannot be decided until the court has heard all the evidence from both parties.

The court held that the verdict that the prosecution has proved the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt is based on the totality of evidence heard from both parties.

The court held that the evidence for the defense may have one of the three results;

a. It may convince the court of the innocence of the accused;

b. It may cause the court to doubt the guilt of the accused in which case he is entitled to acquittal and

c. It may sometimes strengthen the case for the prosecution.

The court held that the burden of proving insanity lies on the accused and this burden derives from the legal presumption that every person is of sound mind at any time until the contrary is proved.

The court held that the onus of proving that the accused is unfit to stand his trial is also on the defense whenever the issue arises.

In the case, the appellant was convicted of cheating by impersonation. He had represented himself to a hotel as a pilot of an airline which had arrangements with the hotel to accommodate their pilots. The trial judge found that the hotel was deceived by the appellant's representation whereby he was offered accommodation and food. The prosecution did not adduce evidence that the appellant was not a pilot of the airline. The appellant reserved making a statement to the police and did not give any evidence at the trial. At the appeal, it was argued that the onus was upon the prosecution to show that the appellant was not such a pilot as he claimed. Rejecting this submission, the appeal court held that the fact whether the appellant was a pilot of the airline was peculiarly within his knowledge and the burden of proving it lies on him.

The court held that an accused can elicit from the prosecution witnesses materials in proof of matters peculiarly within his knowledge, but if he is unable to do this, then the burden of proving such matters must rest with him.

The court held in this case that where a person is charged with carrying on the business of a money lender without a valid license under the Money Lenders Ordinance, the onus of proving that he has a license is on him as being a fact peculiarly within his knowledge.

The Supreme Court stated in this case that in the arena of proof in a civil case, the onus of proof does not remain static but shifts from side to side. The correct position in law is that the onus of adducing further evidence is on the person who would fail if such evidence were not produced.

The court held in this case that even where the defendant pleads a general traverse in his statement of defense, it may still be necessary for him to give evidence in support of his pleading or to challenge the evidence of the plaintiff, otherwise he must be assumed to have accepted the facts adduced by the plaintiff.

The court held in this case that in the course of trial, the evidential burden rests on the party against whom the tribunal at the time in question would give judgment if no further evidence were adduced.

The court held in this case that if in an action for negligence, the defendant alleges contributory negligence, the plaintiff has to prove negligence and damages.

The court held in this case that in an action on contract, the terms of the contract may determine the party on whom the proof of the different issues involved lies.

The court held in this case that the breach of a condition precedent is a matter which must be proved by the party who will stand to benefit from the occurrence of that breach and normally, in a policy of insurance, it is the insurer.

The court held in this case that where there are exceptions to liability under a contract or exceptions to exceptions of such liability, as a general rule, the burden of proving the exceptions lies on the party who relies on them.

The court held in this case that if a contract is on its face legal, and the defendant wants to set it aside on grounds of illegality, the onus is on him to prove illegality.

The court held in this case that the onus to establish the defense of self-defense or provocation does not lie on the accused.

The court held in this case that if an assault or murder appears from the evidence to have been committed under provocation, the point must be considered even if the accused does not rely on that defense.

The court held in this case that a court must decide a case on evidence and not act on mere speculation.

The court held in this case that the burden of introducing evidence of alibi lies on the accused where his alleged whereabouts at the time of the offence are matters within his personal knowledge. The prosecution does not have to disprove it. The evidential burden in such a case rests on the accused.

The court held in this case that if prosecution witnesses testify that they saw the accused committing the offence charged but he sets up alibi, there is a straight issue of credibility and it is therefore necessary for him to call or adduce evidence to prove the alibi.

The court held in this case that the onus to disprove alibi falls squarely on the prosecution where the evidence against the accused is wholly circumstantial.

The court held that where an accused has disclosed in advance of the trial that he is relying on alibi, but the police fail to check on the alibi, it will be inferred that they accepted his story on the issue.

It was held in this case that the evidence of an alibi should not be disregarded by a trial court unless there is a stronger evidence against it.

In this case, the court held that in civil proceeding, the aim of pleadings is to give notice of the case to be met, which enables either party to prepare his evidence and arguments upon the issues raised and saves either party from being taken by surprise.

The court held in this case that the main purpose of charge is to give the accused notice of the case against him.

The court held in this case that parties are bound by their pleadings and evidence of any fact not pleaded is inadmissible.

The court held that evidence of any fact not pleaded in a pleadings, if for any reason it is given in evidence, it is disregarded.

The court held that in considering the weight of the plaintiff's case, the trial judge is entitled to take into account those weaknesses in the defense which tend to strengthen the plaintiff's case.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the rule is that in a claim for a declaration of title the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his title, and that he has to do so without relying on the weakness of the defendant's case. The onus never shifts. This rule of law is now so firmly established that nothing can shake its foundation.

It was held in this case that although one accused may be a competent witness to give evidence against a co-accused, the court should exercise great caution before attaching weight to such evidence.

The Supreme Court held that although the failure of the police to take a confessional statement of an accused person to a superior police officer contrary to the usual practice in such matters does not eo ipso render the statement inadmissible in evidence, it is certainly a matter to be considered in deciding upon what weight to attach to such a statement.

The Supreme Court held that if it appeared that a witness had formerly said or written the contrary of what he later swore in evidence unless the reason of his having done so was satisfactorily accounted for, his evidence should not have much weight with a jury.

The court held that the rule that a court of trial is entitled to treat both the testimony at the trial and the previous statement as of little or no probative value rather than choose to believe either should be confined to the case of an ordinary witness and not to a retraction in court of a confessional statement made by an accused person to the police in which case the court is free to believe either of the two statements.

The court held in this case that if there is evidence on a point which is credible and stands unchallenged by evidence from the opposing party, the trial court is free to accept and act on such evidence, even if it is uncorroborated.

The court held in this case that a man is presumed to intend all the consequences likely to follow directly from his conduct.

In this case, a man who posts a letter containing a criminal libel, was held to have delivered it with intent that it should be read by the addressee.

The court held in this case that a man who struck another on the head with a heavily weighted haft of an axe, thus causing the death of the latter, was presumed to have intended to kill him.

The West African Court of Appeal held that the second accused must be presumed to have guilty knowledge that some goods were stolen because the thief, the first accused, who had just left prison where the second accused was warder, and lodged with him, and he, the second accused, had shortly after the goods were stolen, sent them to his brother in another town with the instruction to sell them at any prices he thought good.

The court held that the fact that the accused was found in possession of goods stolen through burglary five months earlier, attempting to sell them, raised the presumption of guilty knowledge but not a presumption that he was the burglar.

The court held that the accused who was found to be in possession of stolen goods as a result of burglary committed a few hours earlier could be presumed to be the burglar.

The court held that the presumption of guilty knowledge could not be properly made on the facts of the case which were as follows: A motor lorry had been stolen and its wheels, complete with tyres, were removed. Two of the wheels were brought to the shop of the accused, a tailor, who later sold them to the other accused person, a lorry driver, who was the appellant in this case. The appellant had made inquiries from the tailor who had given him some explanations as to how he came by them.

In this case, the plaintiff representing the Oloto family, sought a declaration of title to, and possession of, premises within the Glover Settlement Area in Lagos. The defendant and his ancestors were proved to have been on the land for fifty years. The court held that the defendant's long possession raised a presumption that he was the owner and imposed on the plaintiff the burden of proving that the defendant was not the owner under Section 145 (now 167) of the Evidence Act.

In the case, the appellant hired a lorry and driver from the first respondent. Whilst the lorry was being driven by the first respondent's driver with the appellant in it, it had an accident as a result of the negligence of the driver and the appellant was injured. It was held that the presumption was in favor of the driver's continuing to be under the control of the first respondent.

In this case, the car belonging to J and driven by P collided with a car belonging to S which was properly parked in the highway. S brought an action for damages against J. the court held that the fact of ownership of the car by J raised the presumption that the motor car was at the material time being driven by J or his servant or agent.

The court held that there is a presumption that a properly addressed, stamped and duly posted letter was received by the addressee.

The court held that a person charged with an offence and to whom a caution has been administered is presumed to have understood it.

The court held that it must be presumed that the statement of any witness to a police officer, if reduced to writing must be set forth in the police case diary.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation as a result of a passage of a broadcast made by the second defendant which was broadcast over the first defendant's broadcasting networks. There was no evidence that the script was used for the broadcast. The Supreme Court refused to accept the contention that since such broadcasts are usually made from scripts, this particular broadcast was made from a script without any evidence in support.

In the case, the appellant was convicted of stealing and obtaining money and other property by false pretenses. In the course of trial, it was alleged that the complainant had made a report to a paramount chief to the effect that the chief had spoken to him or advised him to return them. The appellant denied that the chief had spoken to him or advised him as alleged. The chief was not called as a witness. In convicting the appellant, the magistrate held that the appellant should have called him as a witness and that it must be presumed that the evidence of the chief would be unfavorable to the appellant. The court held that the provisions of Section 148 (now 167) could not be applied in a case of this nature to shift the onus of proof which is on the prosecution in all criminal cases.

The court held that a party is not bound to call a particular witness if he can prove his case otherwise.

The Court of Appeal held that before the presumption under subsection (d) of Section 167of the Evidence Act can apply, the party against whom it is sought that it should operate must have in fact withheld evidence.

Mere failure to produce the evidence would not necessarily amount to withholding such evidence.

The court held that it is not the duty of the accused to prove his innocence, it is the duty of the accuser to prove his guilt.

The court held that Section 21(4) of the Constitution enshrines a principle which has always been observed in the courts which is that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall presume to be innocent until he is proved guilty.

In this case, a marriage was celebrated in a private house, and although there was no evidence that the required special license was ever granted, yet the court pronounced in favor of the validity of the marriage on grounds of this presumption.

The court held that a marriage to the form of which no exception can be taken remains valid until some evidence is adduced that the marriage is in fact a nullity.

The court held that the lower court erred in holding that the plaintiff who contended that she had validly married according to Tamil customs, had to prove either their nature or that the alleged marriage complied with them.

The court held that the fact that Nigerians married according to the rites of the church of the Church of England raised a presumption that they intended their lives and their property should be regulated by English laws and standards but that this is not conclusive evidence of such an intention, and that in deciding the question, the court should be guided by consideration of the position in life occupied by the parties and their conduct with reference to the property in dispute.

In this case, one of the witnesses called for the prosecution described herself as the wife of one of the accused persons. She was sworn on the bible, as also her husband. The court held that it must be presumed that they were husband and wife of a Christian marriage.

The court held that where a spouse of an accused person is called as witness for the prosecution and is sworn on the Qur'an or the Bible, a presumption arises that such a spouse is the spouse of a Muslim or Christian marriage respectively.

The court held that where the wife of an accused person was sworn on the Koran, it could be presumed that she was a Moslem but that it was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that she was the wife of a monogamous marriage.

The court held that the mere fact that both husband and wife denied marriage under Muslim rites, and were not asked if they were married under Christian rites, raised the presumption that they contracted Christian marriage.

The court held that the presumption that a child conceived or born in lawful wedlock is legitimate is a corollary to the presumption that there is access between the parties and that sexual intercourse has taken place between them, except where there is judicial separation.

The court held that the presumption that there is access between parties and that sexual intercourse has taken place between them is a very strong presumption which cannot be displaced by mere balance of probabilities but by strong preponderance of evidence.

The court held in this case that the presumption of law is not lightly repelled. It is not to be broken in upon or shaken by a mere balance of probability. The evidence for the purpose of repelling it must be strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive.

The court held that where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.

In this case, a driver was presumed negligent where the driver, by sudden application of his brakes to a fully loaded vehicle at a corner on a wet day caused an accident and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applied.

The court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor may be raised specifically by reciting the Latin maxim or merely by making it known that the plaintiff intends to rely on the very accident itself as evidence of negligence.

In this case, the plaintiff claimed damages for negligence of the defendant's servant or agents as a result of which he was injured. the facts were that while the plaintiff was making use of a footpath near where the defendants was carrying out building operations, a footpath normally used by members of the public, a crane being operated by the defendant's servants or agents fell on the plaintiff. The evidence given by the defendants and his witnesses were that they were unable to explain why the crane fell. The court held that the presumption of negligence on the defendant was not discharged and the defendant was therefore liable.

The court held that the presumption of negligence which arose was not rebutted by the defendant. The deceased, who was an in-patient in the defendant's hospital, was discovered missing from her bed one night. She had just given birth and was diagnosed as a suspected case of post natal psychosis. She had been given some sedatives and the doctor on duty had instructed a staff nurse to keep an eye on her.

In this case, an omnibus fell over an embankment as a result of a tyre burst which was shown to have been due to the negligence of the defendants in their system of tyre testing, and cause injury to the plaintiff. The court held that the maxim of res ipsa loquitor did not apply.

The court held that the wheels of business will not go round unless it is assumed that that is in order which appears to be in order.

The court held that where a testamentary instrument is ex facie perfectly regular as regards all of the formalities of signature and attestation, and no question of incapacity or fraud exists, a presumption of due execution arises, to which great weight must be given.

The court held that the existence of speed limit signs is presumptive evidence that the local authority had carried out the duties upon it by the Road Traffic Act.

The court held that a person shown to have acted as a member of a statutory corporation must be presumed to have been duly appointed.

The court held that it may be safely stated that there is a rebuttable presumption of law that a person who is acting in an official capacity is doing so after due appointment.

The Supreme Court held in this case that as the main object and intention of Section 149 of the Evidence Act is to cover all parts of the commonwealth, the only sensible way of preventing that manifest intention from being defeated is to read paragraph b as if the five words were not there.

Section 149 of the Evidence Act provides that when any document is produced before any court, purporting to be a document which, by law in force for the time being in any country other than Nigeria would be admissible in proof of any particular in any court of justice in that country without proof of the seal or stamp or signature authenticating it, or of the judicial or official character claimed by the person by whom it purports to be signed, the court shall presume

a. that such seal, stamp or signature, is genuine, and

b. that the person signing it held, at the time signed it, the judicial or official character which he claims, and the document shall be admissible for the same purpose for which it would be admissible in the country where the document is produced.

In the case, the plaintiff, as attorney of the landlord of the defendant, sued for arrears of rent and recovery of possession. He produced to the court a power of attorney, executed not before any of the person named in Section 150 of the Evidence Act but before a solicitor's clerk. The court held that in these circumstances, the presumption as to powers of attorney under Section 150 of the Evidence Act would not be made.

The court held in the case that the presumption created by Section 162 of the Evidence Act was not available to a party who could not refer the deed he was relying upon to a contract 20 years or more after the date of the deed.

In the case, the appellant appealed from an order of a Magistrate's court. The record of appeal showed that he had not quite made the requisite deposit for the preparation of the copies of the proceedings within the period ordered by that court. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal should be struck out because of failure to make the deposit within the required time. The appellant contended that the entry in the record on appeal was not conclusive as to the date of making the deposit. The court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the date of the receipt of the payment must be assumed to be the date of payment and the court is bound to rely on the entry in the record.

The Supreme Court held in this case that there is a presumption of regularity of the proceedings of a court of law.

In this case, the court held that it is to be presumed that any person acting in a public capacity has been duly appointed and is entitled to act.

In this case, some customary court members were shown to have sat on one occasion as a panel in respect of one suit, and there was no indication as to which of them sat on other occasions in respect of the same suit. It was held that the court would presume that it was the same members that sat throughout the adjudication in the same suit.

In the case, the accused was indicted on an information in the High Court for offences of official corruption and extortion. After plea, the counsel for the prosecution applied to quash the information because it would appear from the record of the committal that the magistrate in committing the accused had done so without giving him the opportunity of being heard in his defense. It was held that under the provision of subsection 2 of Section 168 of the Evidence Act, there was a presumption that the Magistrate had complied with the formal requisites for the committal.

In this case, the applicant sought a declaration that certain sections of the Northern Nigeria Children and Young Persons Law 1958 which forbid persons under a certain age from taking part in politics, were void because they were repugnant to sections of the constitution. The court held that there must be a presumption that a law is constitutional and that its provisions are reasonably justifiable and necessary.

The court held that relationships which presume undue influence are; parent and child, fiancé and fiancée; solicitor and client; doctor and patient; guardian and ward; spiritual adviser or clergyman and parishioner.

The court held that undue influence can be presumed from any relationship where one party has exercised a predominant influence upon another and benefits inter vivos have been received.

The Supreme Court held that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequence of his act. Therefore, a man who shoots at his victim with a lethal weapon, like a gun, as in the instant case, is presumed to intend to cause grievous body hurt or has knowledge that grievous bodily hurt or death of the victim is the probable natural consequences.

The Supreme Court held in this case that parties are presumed to intend what they have said or set down in a written document. It becomes stronger when such representation in a document is purportedly verified by a solemn declaration on oath that such statement or document is true.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the presumption of innocence in favor of an accused as entrenched in Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999, provides that every person who is charged with criminal offence should be presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty.

The court held in this case that any person born during the continuance of a valid marriage shall be presumed to be a child of that man. The burden of proving otherwise rests with the party alleging the contrary.

The court held in this case that any party wishing to rely on the plea of estoppel must raise it in his pleadings and state the relevant facts upon which he hopes to rely at the trial to make out the plea.

The court considering the matter of estoppel, held that estoppel must be pleaded before the trial court otherwise it could not be raised on appeal.

The court held that if the estoppel relied upon is one by conduct, then a party can rely on it at the final court of appeal. In this case, the first time the defense of estoppel by conduct was raised was at the Supreme Court even though the case had been adjudicated upon by the Magistrate court and the High Court sitting as a court of appeal.

The court held that when an estoppel is asserted, it should, whether by the formality of pleading, as in the High Court, or in some other appropriate way, be brought to the notice of the tribunal alleged to be affected by it, and, having been brought to the notice of the court, it should be supported by specific evidence of the matters from which the estoppel is said to rise.

The court held that a judgment need not be pleaded, and will be nevertheless admissible where it is a relevant issue in a case even though it is not relied on as an estoppel.

In this case, the judgment relied upon as operating as res judicata was not given in evidence and no evidence was offered concerning it. The court held that it would be wrong for the court to act on it.

The court held that estoppel by its very nature, is so important, so conclusive, that the party whom it affects is not allowed to plead against it or adduce evidence to contradict it. However, it operates against both parties.

The court held that res judicata operates not only against the party whom it affects but also against the jurisdiction of the court itself. The party affected is estopped per rem judicatam from bringing a fresh action before the court.

The Supreme Court defined estoppel per rem judicatam as a rule of evidence whereby a party or his privy is precluded from disputing in any subsequent proceedings matters which have been adjudicated upon previously by a competent court between him and his opponent.

In this case, the court held that estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence whereby a party or his privy is incapable of disputing, in any subsequent proceedings, matters which had been adjudicated upon previously by a court of competent jurisdiction between him and his opponent.

The court considered the essence of the doctrine of res judicata in this case. The court stated that the essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that there must be an end to litigation. Once a matter has been finally and judicially pronounced upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, neither the parties thereto nor their privies would be allowed to subsequently re-litigate the matter in court.

In this case, the court held that a judgment prevails as an estoppel in favor of the successful party, his privies and successors in interest, and against the unsuccessful party and his privies and successor in interest, on the issues therein decided.

The Court of Appeal held that, for the purpose of estoppel per rem judicatam, 'party' means not only a person named as such, but also one who, being cognizant of the proceedings and of the fact that a party thereto is professing to act in his interest, allows his battle to be fought by that party intending to take the benefit of the championship in the success.

The court held that a privy is a person whose title is derived from and who claims through a party.

The Supreme Court stated in this case that there are three classes of privies namely;

a. Privies in law;

b. Privies in blood;

c. Privies in estate.

The court held in this case that a person claiming as heir-at-law to a party to a proceeding can be regarded as a party to that proceeding.

In this case, the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was for declaration of title to land. The present plaintiff had been plaintiff in a previous suit for a similar declaration, the second defendant being the first defendant in the suit whilst the present first defendant was a witness in that suit. Throughout the trial of the previous suit neither the plaintiff nor any of his witnesses mentioned the name of the present first defendant and the only allegation against the present second defendant was that he had granted the land to certain persons without consulting the plaintiff. Furthermore in the previous action, both the present second defendant and his witnesses deposed that his father owned the land in dispute. The court held that the present first defendant was not a privy to the previous suit as required by the law for the purpose of creating an estoppel against him.

The Supreme Court held in this case that there are two kinds of estoppel by record, inter parties or per rem judicatam, as it generally known the first is usually referred to as cause of action estoppel and it occurs where the cause of action is merged in the judgment.

The court stated the conditions for a successful plea of res judicata in this case. The court stated that for a successful plea of res judicata, the following conditions must be met:

a. There must be an adjudication of the issues joined between the parties; and

b. The parties or their privies, as the case may be, must be the same in the previous as in the present case;

c. The issues and subject matter must be the same in the previous case as in the present case; and

d. The adjudication on the previous case must have been by a court of competent jurisdiction; and

e. The previous decision must have finally decided the issue between the parties, that is, the rights of the parties must have been finally determined.

The court held that before the doctrine of estoppel per res rem judicatam can operate, it must be shown that the parties, issues and subject matter were the same in the previous case as those in action in which the plea of rem judicatam is raised.

The Supreme Court restated the law succinctly in this case that before a party to a dispute can rely on a previous judgment of a court as creating estoppel per rem judicatam, he must be show the following;

a. That the parties in the two cases were the same;

b. That thee subject was the same; and

c. That the issues being litigated upon were the same.

In the case, the plaintiff claimed and was awarded damages for trespass on a particular piece of land in the native court. In a later action in the High Court he also claimed ownership of an area of land. There was nothing to show that the land in the earlier case was the same as that in dispute in the High Court. A plea of res judicata based on the native court judgment was rejected on this ground.

The court held that before a judgment can operate as an estoppel in a subsequent proceeding, the parties to the two proceedings must be the same.

In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for declaration of title to a piece of land. Prior to this, the defendant had successfully sued the plaintiff in a native court for declaration of title to the same piece of land. The present action was commenced after the defendant's action in the native court had been commenced but before judgment was delivered. The defendant raised the plea of res judicata and the court upheld the plea.

The Supreme Court in this case listed some examples of situations in which there can be no estoppels, and these are:

a. A person against whom judgment was given when he sued in a representative capacity cannot be stopped from afterwards suing the same person if he is doing so in a totally different representative character.

b. A decision declining an order of possession of premises which is protected by the Rent Restriction Act on the ground that the balance of hardship does not warrant the making of the order sought will not bar further proceeding later, for, the hardship may have passed away.

c. A decision refusing an application for an extension of time to appeal does not constitute a bar.

d. A decision in an action for trespass will not bar a claim for possession.

e. Where it is clear from the provisions of a law that a decision on a particular issue is not meant to bar further proceedings on the issue.

The court held that a plea of res judicata cannot be entertained by the court unless the record of the court upon which it is based is produced or a good reason is given for its non-production.

The court held that where what is raised in a matter is issue estoppel, then, it is only in regard to that issue, that has been raised that the parties to the action shall be bound, and the proper curse to take would be one of striking out all the paragraphs in the pleadings raising that issue.

In the case, one of the reasons for holding that the judgment dismissing the commissioner's previous suit did not operate as estoppel was that the issue in the case in hand was to ownership of land whilst that suit was merely dismissed on the ground that there was no evidence of trespass to that land.

The court held that if a party brings an action against another for a particular cause and judgment is given on it, there is a strict rule of law that he cannot bring another action against the same party for the same cause.

The court stated in this case that issue estoppel might not be successfully raised in a case where further material which is relevant to the correctness or incorrectness of the assertion of the party in the previous proceedings has since become available to him.

The court held that while there cannot be cause of action estoppel as between a criminal trial and a civil action, there can be issue estoppel.

In this case, the court held that as between a criminal trial and another criminal trial, issue estoppel applies.

The court held that issue estoppel is available to both parties in an action.

The court held in this case that issue estoppel does not in general apply where the earlier judgment is impugned on the ground of fraud.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply where the earlier judgment is impugned on the ground of fraud, most typically where the fraud consists of perjury.

In the case, the Supreme Court held that before the doctrine of estoppel by record can operate, it must be shown that the parties, issues, and the subject matter were the same in the previous case as those in the action in which the plea of res judicata is raised.

In the case, there had been a prior suit to which the plaintiff was not a party but in which the court found that she had in her own right no beneficial interest under and by virtue of a deed of settlement. In the present action, the plaintiff claimed against the defendant that she was the sole beneficiary under the deed of settlement. The defendant sought to use the finding in the prior suit against the plaintiff. The court held that since that suit was not between the plaintiff and the defendant, its judgment could not be used as res judicata.

The plaintiff sued the six defendants for a declaration for a declaration of title to a piece of land. The statement of claim showed that five of the defendants had wrongly sold the land to the third defendant against whom he subsequently withdrew. In a previous case, the plaintiff had sued the third defendant alone for declaration of title to the same piece of land and failed. The court held that the plaintiff was estopped from bringing the present action as he might, had he so chosen, have sued all the present defendants along with the third defendant in the first action.

It was held in this case that in considering a plea of res judicata, one of the criteria of the identity of the two actions is the inquiry whether the same evidence would support both.

The court held in this case that when it is clear that the same question is substantially in issue in two suits, the precise form in which either suit is brought, or the fact that the plaintiff in one was the defendant in the other is immaterial, the estoppel subsists between the parties.

In the case, the plaintiff agreed to buy a motor vehicle from the defendants and paid the purchase price. The defendants did not deliver the lorry and the plaintiff thereupon sued the defendants in the district court and obtained judgment for the purchase price as money paid for consideration which had totally failed. The plaintiff then sued the defendants in the High Court, claiming general damages for the breach of the contract for the sale of the vehicle. The court held that the plaintiff was estopped because it was the same cause of action which gave rise to the two different forms of relief.

In this case, the respondent had, as plaintiff, sued the second appellant and the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works, Kwara State challenging the validity of a certificate of title issued by the Permanent Secretary in respect of land covered by the land tenure law to the second defendant on the ground that the Permanent Secretary irregularly approved the allocation. The second defendant raised a plea of estoppel by res judicata in that in a previous case between him and the plaintiff, it was decided in effect that the plaintiff as against him had no right to the land. The trail judge acceded to his plea and it was upheld by the Supreme Court as the Permanent Secretary added in the second suit was only a nominal arty.

The court held in this case that under Section 173 of the Evidence Act, every judgment is conclusive proof as against and their privies, of facts directly in issue in the case, actually decided by the court, and appearing from the judgment itself to be the ground on which it was based.

The court in this case that once the principles of estoppel apply, the mere fact that certain evidence was not tendered in the previous case would not prevent it from operating as an estoppel in a subsequent case.

The court held in this case that the principle underlying the rule as to estoppel by record is that it is for the common good that there should be an end to litigation (interest republicae ut sit finis litium.)

The court held that the fact that a judgment was wrongly decided will not prevent it from operating as res judicata.

The court held that the fact that a judgment was given by default will not prevent it from operating as res judicata.

The court held in this case that the fact that both parties to a present suit were joint defendants in the former suit will not prevent an estoppel so long as there was a conflict of interest between them.

The court held that if a person was content to stand by and see his battle fought by somebody else in the same interest, he is bound by the result and should not be allowed to reopen the case.

The court held that the principle is that where a person who was virtually interested in a previous suit between other parties, because his interest was bound up with the interest of one of the parties in the suit, did not apply to be joined with that party, then he is bound by the result in the suit and is estopped from re-opening the issue determined in it.

The court held that the doctrine of standing by cannot be applied where during the pendency of an action, the person sought to be estopped brought his own action before judgment was given in the former or pending action.

In this case, the Government acquired an area and took out a summons to determine from amongst the claimants the person entitled to compensation owing to conflicting claims; the parties to the present suit were among the defendants in that case. The present plaintiff's claim in regard to a piece of land was dismissed by judgment in the case, and he brought an action claiming the compensation payable under that judgment to the defendants; they pleaded res judicata. The court held that the plaintiff's claim having been dismissed in the compensation claim, he could not revive it; and the fact that he and the defendants in the new suits were all defendants in the compensation case did not matter as there was a conflict of interest between the claimants which the judgment in that case resolved.

The court held in this case that if a claim included in an action was not decided by the court, the judgment in that action will not be res judicata in a subsequent suit as far as the undecided claim is concerned.

In the case, the plaintiff sued the defendant, his former land-lord, in the Magistrate's Court for two causes of action namely, conversion of goods on the 1st of June, 1957, and for breach of implied warranty to have quiet enjoyment and later sued him also in the High Court for detinue for his goods on June 25th, a plea of the Magistrate court suit as res judicata was overruled since there was no claim for the detinue of the 25th June in the Magistrate court.

In the case, the plaintiff, while driving at night, collided with a tree felled across the public road by the defendants. Before bringing the suit, he had sued the first defendant for damages for delay and inconvenience suffered by him as a result of the defendant's failure to carry out his undertaking to repair the plaintiff's car damaged in the collision. In that action, the plaintiff recovered judgment for a certain sum of money. Thereafter he brought the present action against the defendant claiming damages for personal injuries suffered by him on the same collision. At the time of the first action, he knew the extent of these injuries. It was held that he was estopped from bringing the present action since he could and should have claimed for these injuries also in the first action.

The court held in this case that where a plaintiff entitled to two separate forms of relief under one cause of action pursues one form of relief to judgment, he cannot later successfully bring a separate action on the other form of relief since the matter is res judicata.

The court held in this case that there is no estoppel if an action does not end in a judgment, that is, it is dismissed for want of prosecution or because it was discontinued before hearing.

When an order of non-suit is made on any case, all the findings of fact in that case are treated as not having been made and any plea of issue estoppel cannot rise in the subsequent proceedings between the same parties on the basis of the findings on the earlier case.

The court held in this case that a plea of res judicata can only be founded on a final judgment. Such a judgment is one that finally disposes of the rights of the parties.

The court held that where an appeal court orders that a case be tried de novo, any findings made in the first trial do not constitute res judicata binding in the new trial court.

The court held that a final judgment even if obtained by default of appearance of any of the parties is res judicata.

The court held in this case that compromise takes place when there is a question of doubt and the parties agree not to try it out, but to settle it between themselves by a give and take agreement.

The court held in this case that a privy who had neither the notice nor the knowledge that there was going to be a compromise, could not be estopped from bringing another suit subsequent to the compromise judgment.

The court held that where some members of a family, conveyed family land without the concurrence of the head of the family, the conveyance is void ab initio and it would be a misconception to hold that the doctrine of implied agency or estoppel arises because the head of the family became aware of the sale and did nothing.

The court held in this case that estoppel will not operate even if the parties to both suits are the same once the issues and or the subject matter of both suits are different.

In the case, the plaintiff sued for a declaration of title to a piece of land and the defendant pleaded estoppel per rem judicatam and relied on two previous judgments, one of which was between the privies of the parties to the present action. But with regard to the other, there was no evidence that the parties were privies or the same as in the present. With regard to the first, there was no evidence that the pieces of land concerned in that and in the present suit were the same. Furthermore, that action was one of criminal prosecution for trespass. The court held that the two earlier cases did not create an estoppel because both the issues and the subject matter in the earlier cases were different from those in the present case.

In the case, the plaintiff sued one Aromire for trespass on crown land and claimed recovery of possession. Armoire denied trespass, disclaimed any personal title, and pleased that the land belonged to the Aromire Chieftaincy family. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that there was no evidence of trespass. The plaintiff then instituted this action for the recovery of the same land from some persons who claimed to be tenants of the Aromire Chieftaincy family. Aromire on his own application was joined and permitted to defend as the representative of the family. the court held that the previous judgment could not operate as estoppel because Aromire was then sued in his personal capacity whereas in the present suit, he was defending as the representative of the Aromire Chieftaincy family an because the issue was now as to ownership whilst the previous suit was dismissed merely on the ground that there was no evidence of trespass.

In this case, the court held that where a case relied on as constituting res judicata against a community was not representative in character, the community was not a party to it and so the plea cannot be sustained against that community.

The court held in this case that where an action is brought by a person in a representative capacity against another person, personally, and the action is prosecuted to judgment whereby the defendant succeeds, the judgment is res judicata to the extent that it determines the personal rights of the defendant in the subject matter of the action; but it is not res judicata of any interest the defendant may later represent in an action brought against him in representative capacity. Also, where an action is brought against a person personally and prosecuted to judgment, and later a further action is brought against him in a representative capacity by the plaintiff in the original action, the judgment is not res judicata as the parties to the respective actions are not the same, since in the one action, the defendant is sued personally and in the other as representative of a class of persons.

In this case, the court held that where parties in an earlier action merely purported to be suing on behalf of their family, which did not genuinely press the claim or authorize the action, the judgment could not bind the family as res judicata.

The court held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that action to bring forward their whole case; and will not allow them except under special circumstances to open the same subject of litigation in respect of a matter which should have been brought forward, merely because they have, from negligence, inadvertence or accident, omitted part of their case.

The court held in this case that where a person appears in a representative capacity in a suit, a decision for or against him is not res judicata in favor of or against him in a subsequent proceedings by or against him as an individual or in a different capacity.

The court held that the plea of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but also to every point which properly belonged to the subject of that litigation and which the parties exercising diligence might have brought forward at the time.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for declaration of title to a piece of land. This piece of land however included another piece of land, part of which had already been adjudicated upon. The court held that the plea of estoppel failed.

The court held that where a claim is included in an action but it is not adjudicated upon, res judicata will not operate in a subsequent case with respect to that claim.

In this case, the previous suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff had a right to farm on the land, but it was clear from the pleadings and the evidence in court that the plaintiff's claim was as to the titular ownership of the land. The court held that the plaintiff was estopped from bringing the action.

The court held in this case that a party is precluded from contending the contrary of any precise point which, having been once distinctly put in issue, has been solemnly pronounced upon or decided against him.

The court held in this case that the judgment which is to operate as an estoppel must be a final, valid and subsisting one.

The court held that an order of interim injunction does not generally constitute an estoppel per rem judicata in respect of the matters in controversy in the main action.

In this case, the court held that once it is proved that a final, valid and subsisting judgment exists, then both parties are estopped from re-litigating on the same issues.

The court held that an order made by a district officer acting under the inter-tribal boundaries settlement ordinance is a judicial decision and will operate as an estoppel.

In this case, the court held that an order made by a district officer will not operate as an estoppel if the district officer did not decide any dispute between two or more tribes as to the boundaries between the lands of such tribes.

In this case, cross suits which had been filed by the parties were consolidated. On the day fixed for hearing, the present plaintiff did not appear. After hearing evidence for the present defendant, the court dismissed the present plaintiff's claim and gave judgment for the present defendant on his own claim. An application to have his action re-listed failed and he then brought this action on the same claim. The court held that he was estopped.

The court held in this case that a judgment by consent can operate as an estoppel.

The court held that the fact that a judgment is liable to be appealed will not prevent it from operating as an estoppel unless an appeal is in fact pending on it.

The court held that a judgment which has been given by the court without jurisdiction or which is otherwise a nullity for any reason cannot operate as an estoppel.

The court held that a judgment which has been given by the court without jurisdiction will operate as an estoppel only to the extent to which the court has no jurisdiction.

In the case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for trespass to a piece of land and an injunction. At the trial, the defendant pleaded res judicata, relying on a previous judgment given by default in 1931 in respect of the same land. The suit had been for damages of trespass, an injunction, and demarcation of boundaries. The trial judge held that the plea of res judicata could not succeed on the ground that the court which gave the judgment had no jurisdiction in real actions. The Court of Appeal held that although the court which tried the previous suit had no jurisdiction to try the demarcation issue, it had jurisdiction to try the trespass issue and since the present case was one for trespass, the previous one did operate as an estoppel so as to bar it.

The court held in this case that the mere fact that a judgment was wrongly decided will not prevent it from operating as estoppel in so far as it has not been upset by a higher court.

The court held that that the mere fact that a judgment was wrongly decided will not prevent it from operating as estoppel in so far as it has not been upset by a higher court provided the judgment was not a nullity, nor will the fact that both parties were dissatisfied with the judgment.

In this case, the court held that a judgment which has been procured by fraud or collusion or which is void for any reason whatsoever will not sustain a plea of estoppel.

The court held in this case that the judgment of a body of people which had no judicial power could not operate as an estoppel.

The court held in this case that the provision of Order 11, Rule 10 of the Northern Nigeria High Court (Appeals from Native Courts) Rules, 1960 shows a clear intention that the question of bail is to be left open for consideration from the time an appeal against a conviction is entered until it is determined and that no estoppel per rem judicatam was meant to apply.

In this case, the defendant in 1945, obtained a judgment against the plaintiff for trespass in the High Court. In 1949, the plaintiff obtained judgment in a Native Court for declaration of title to the same land. The court held that it was the 1949 judgment which operated as an estoppel in the present suit.

The court held in this case that issue estoppel applies where there has been an earlier proceeding involving the same accused in which issues had arisen and been established which could be determined with precision and certainty by referring to the earlier record and by what had transpired in the course of the earlier proceedings in relation to those issues.

The court held in this case that a receipt for money acknowledged in a deed does not bar the party who made it from denying the fact of payment, but he if he cannot prove that payment was not in fact made then the receipt is enough evidence against him.

The court held in this case that a party who has executed a deed will be estopped by a court from saying that the facts stated in the deed are not true.

The court held in this case that estoppel by deed applies only to litigation which arises on the deed in question.

The court held in this case that where the statements in a deed have been mutually agreed by the parties to be true, the deed is binding on them, and their privies but if the admission of the truth of the statements is by one party only, only he and his privies are estopped.

The court that estoppel by deed does not apply to actions on collateral matters to the deed. For estoppel by deed to apply in an action, the litigation must arise on the deed.

In this case, the court held that as in the case of estoppel by record, the matter in which estoppel by deed is pleaded must be confined to parties to the deed and their privies and to statements in the deed which are material in the transaction and which are clear and unambiguous.

In this case, the court held that a deed which can be declared void because of illegality, fraud or any other cause whatsoever cannot operate as an estoppel.

The court held in this case that a tenant of immovable property, or a person claiming through such a tenant, is estopped during the continuance of the tenancy, from denying that the landlord had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property.

The court held that a tenant can prove that the title of the landlord has expired.

The court held in this case that a tenant may prove that he had been evicted by title paramount to the landlord's.

In this case, the court held that a bailee is estopped from denying that the bailor by whom any goods were entrusted to him was entitled to those goods at the time they were entrusted.

The court held in this case that estoppel by conduct is also called estoppel in pais. The doctrine of estoppel by conduct, which is usually employed as a shield in litigation, is anchored on the rule of equity and good conscience. Its goal is to ensure honesty and good faith in human transactions to the triumph of justice between the parties. It is a bar which forbids a party from blowing hot and cold, approbating and reprobating in the same transaction.

In this case, the court stated that if a man by his words or conduct wilfully endeavors to cause another to believe in a certain state of things which the first knows to be false and if the second believes in such state of things and acts upon his belief, he who knowingly made the false statement is estopped from averring afterwards that such a state of things does not exist at the time; again, if a man either in express terms or by conduct, makes a representation to another of the existence of a state of facts which he intends to be acted upon in a certain way in the belief of the existence of such a state of facts, to the damage of him who so believes and acts, the first is estopped from denying the existence of such a state of facts. thirdly, if a man whatever his real meaning may be, so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take his conduct to mean a certain representation of facts and that it is a true representation, and that the latter was intended to act upon it in a particular way, and he with such belief does act in that way to his damage, the first is estopped from denying the facts as represented.

The court held in this case that the defensive doctrine of estoppel by conduct is not an automatic right. A court does not award it to a party who pleads it as a matter of routine. The ingredients of the doctrine are:

a. That there was a false representation or concealment of material facts;

b. That the representation was known to be false by making it or the party was negligent in not knowing its falsity;

c. That it was believed to be true by the person to whom it was made;

d. That the party making the representation intended that it be acted on or the person acting on it was justified in assuming the intent; and

e. That the party asserting estoppel acted on the representation in a way that will result in substantial prejudice unless the claim of estoppel succeeds.

The court held in this case that there are three components of estoppel by conduct;

a. If a man by his words or conduct wilfully endeavors to cause another to believe in a certain state of things which the first knows to be false an if the second believes in such a state and acts upon his belief, he who knowingly made the false statement is estopped from averring afterwards that such a state of things does not exist at the time;

b. If a man either in express terms or by conduct, makes a representation to another of the existence of a state of facts which he intends to be acted upon in a certain way and it be acted upon in that way, in the belief of the existence of such a state of facts, to the damage of him who so believes and acts, the first is estopped from denying the existence of such a state of facts;

c. If a man, whatever his real meaning may be, so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take his conduct to mean a certain representation of facts and that it was a true representation and the latter was intended to act upon it in a particular way, and he with such belief, does act in that way to his damage, the first is estopped from denying the facts as represented.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants jointly as partners trading under the firm name Bryden, Gheye & Co. for an amount of money on account stated between them. The second defendant admitted the claim whilst the other two defendants denied liability on the grounds that they were not partners in the firm and that nay agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the second defendant was entered into by the second defendant in his personal capacity only. It was proved that the transactions, subject matter of the litigation, arose between the plaintiff and the firm at a time when all the defendants were registered members of the firm. They had all filled their names in the applications to the registrar of business names for registration as a partnership. It was the second defendant who in fact carried out most of the business of the firm. The court held that the first and third defendants must be taken to have impliedly authorized the second defendant to hold them out to the plaintiffs as partners in the firm, and they were consequently now estopped from denying that.

In this case, the court held that if A in his pleading admits the title, right and interest of B as defined in a lease and obtains judgment against B for rent reserved in the deed of lease, A by that act in effect has acknowledged his authority to execute the lease, and is thereby estopped both by his conduct and per rem judicatam from asserting that he is bound by the document under which he has thus derived benefit.

In this case, the accused was charged with house breaking with intent to commit rape, and evidence that the accused on the same night went down the chimney of another house and had sexual intercourse with one of the inmates with her consent was received, the judge considering such evidence to be of some relevance as showing lustful disposition. The court held that this evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.

The court held that whereas evidence of evil disposition such as being a member of a notorious gang is under no circumstances regarded as relevant, evidence of reputation under circumstances to be discussed presently is regarded as relevant.

The court held that evidence of rumors before the publication of the libel that the plaintiff had committed the offences charged in it, and evidence of particular facts and circumstances tending to show the misconduct of the plaintiff as theatrical critic could not be admitted in reduction of damages.

The court held that evidence of the plaintiff's bad character in a divorce case based on adultery may be relevant to mitigation of damages.

The court held that evidence of the character of the woman seduced in an action for seduction may be relevant to mitigation of damages.

In this case, a witness for the appellant who was charged with the abetment of robbery called his bank manger as a witness. The manager gave evidence as follows: "I know the accused's financial background. He is financially sound. Since I have known the accused, I don't remember him getting involved in any trouble." It was held that trial magistrate was in error to have disregarded the evidence which was evidence of character within the meaning of Section 71 which is now Section 77 of the Evidence Act and admissible under Section 67, now Section 81 of the Evidence Act.

The court held in this case that it is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the commission of other crime does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury; and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defense which would otherwise be open to the accused.

The court stated that if one starts with the assumption that all evidence tending to show a disposition towards a particular crime must be excluded unless justified, then the justification of evidence of this kind is that it tends to rebut a defense otherwise open to the accused; but if one starts with the general proposition that all evidence that is logically probative is admissible unless excluded, then evidence of this kind does not have to seek a justification but is admissible irrespective of the issues raised by the defense.

The House of Lords in this case held that in exceptional cases, evidence that an accused has been guilty of other offences will be admissible if it shows that those offences share with the offence which is the subject of the charge common features of such an unusual nature and striking similarity that it would be an affront to common sense to assert that the similarity that it would be an affront to common sense to assert that the similarity was explicable on the basis of coincidence. In such a case, the judge has the discretion to admit the evidence if he is satisfied that its probative force in relation to an issue in the trial outweighs its prejudicial effect, and that there was no possibility of collaboration between the parties.

The court held that when the gist of an offence is fraud, intent is material and evidence of other similar acts is admissible to prove that intent.

The court held that in a charge of preparation for coining current silver coins, evidence of the previous uttering by the accused was admissible.

In this case, evidence that a medical practitioner had given injections of a mixture to a number of children suffering from yaws including the deceased and that other children had died as a result of the injections given to them by the medical practitioner, was held admissible to establish the fact of negligence of improper mixture by the medical practitioner.

In the case, evidence of other transactions similar to that which was the subject of the charge was admitted by the lower court, such evidence showing the accused only to be a dishonest man, having very little probative value. The court held on appeal that the evidence ought not to have been admitted.

In this case, a barber was sued for negligence of shaving a person with an unsterilized razor which resulted in ring worm infection. Evidence that other persons shaved by the barber had contracted the same infection was held admissible.

In an action in tort for damages caused by a domestic animal which is not by nature vicious or dangerous, evidence of past damages by the animal to the knowledge of its keeper is relevant. So, in order to prove that the defendant's dog killed certain sheep belonging to the plaintiff, the fact that the same dog earlier killed another sheep of the plaintiff was held admissible.

The court held that the words "tending to show" charge under Section 1 (f) of the English Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, which is Section 180(g) of the Evidence Act, 2011, means "make known to the jury." In this case, the appellant himself made it known to the jury that he had been in trouble with the police previously, the court held that the cross-examination allowed by the trial judge on the matter of his previous trouble with the police was admissible.

The court held that the meaning of charge under section 1 (f) of the English Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, which is Section 180(g) of the Evidence Act, 2011 means a charge in court.

The court held that convictions may be quashed as a result of the admission of irrelevant questions. However, it must be noted that the fact that a question put to the accused is irrelevant is, in itself, no reason for quashing a conviction.

In this case, a medical practitioner who was charged with manslaughter of a woman by means of illegal operation, put his character in issue by giving evidence that he had lived a clean and moral life. He was allowed to be asked whether a similar charge had be brought against him even though he was acquitted of the charge. It was held that the question and the answer was wrongly admitted.

The court held in this case that allegations that witnesses for the prosecution were acting out of malice in revenge or to shield themselves will amount to imputations under the provision of Section 180(d) (ii) of the Evidence Act.

The court held that it is an imputation on the character of a prosecution witness for the defense to allege that the witness has coerced or concocted a confession allegedly made by the accused.

The court held in this case that charges of faults or vices whether reputed or real which may not amount to offences provided they carry with them some stigma will not amount to imputation under the provision of Section 180(d) (ii) of the Evidence Act.

The court held in this case that it is unnecessary to show during cross examination that the witness has hostile intention against the co-accused where the witness has given evidence against a co-accused charged with the same offence as himself.

The court held in this case that a trial judge has no overriding discretion to allow questions put as to the character or previous conviction of a witness who gives evidence against a co-accused under Section 1 (j) (iii) of the English Criminal Act, which is in pari materia with Section 180(g) (iii) of the Evidence Act.

The court held in this case that cross examination under Section 1 (j) (iii) of the English Criminal Act, which is in pari materia with Section 180 (g) (iii) of the Evidence Act should not be allowed where a witness who testifies against a co-accused and the co-accused are not charged with the same offence.

The court held in this case that if oral evidence in a matter refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds the opinion on those grounds.

The court held that it is essential that the inspection of the locus in quo should be carried out by the trial judge and not by anyone else on his behalf.

The court held that places pointed out and everything else by witnesses at the locus in quo must be confirmed by evidence on oath in the court otherwise the court cannot act on such statements which are not part of the evidence in the case.

In the case, the court trying the case inspected the locus in quo to the close of the trial. Immediately after he returned to court, he made a record of the inspection including his observations of what he saw at the locus in quo and what witnesses said there. The court in holding the procedure to be wrong stated that the practice is that the court accompanied by the accused and his advocate together with the advocate for the crown and such witnesses for the prosecution and the defense as may be deemed material proceed to the locus. The witnesses there point out such places and things as are material to the case and distances are stepped off or otherwise arrived at. The court then reassembles and the persons who were used at the view are put into the witness box and, on oath, state what part they took in the recent visit to the locus and what they did. The defense as the case may be, are then given an opportunity of cross examining.

The court held that the purpose of a visit to a locus in quo is to clarify minor irregularities and contradictions and or uncertainties in the evidence as regards the physical conditions of the material thing and not to afford a party an opportunity to make an altogether a different case led in evidence.

The court held that the absence of a record of the inspection of a locus in quo is not necessarily fatal and that statements by the judge in a solemn judgment must be taken as a correct account of what occurred and therefore final.

In this case, after the close of the evidence, in an action for declaration of title of land, both counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant made an application for the trial judge to visit the locus in quo and the judge acceded to their request, and visited the locus in the presence of parties and their counsel. After the verdict, counsel on behalf of both parties addressed the court. The trial judge made no record of his observation and findings on the visit to the locus but made reference to his observations in his judgment and gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the trial judge to make notes of his visit to the locus in his record book was not necessarily fatal.

In this case, after the close of the case for the prosecution and the defense, counsel on both sides addressed the court and the trial court reserved judgment. Three days later, the judge went to the locus with the accused and witnesses. At the locus, some witnesses pointed out places and positions to the judge. After the visit, no further proceedings took place. On the next day of the adjournment, the judge gave judgment and convicted the accused person. The court held that inspection of the locus could be made after judgment has been reserved in the case. However, where inspection raises matters which are prejudicial to an accused person, he or his counsel has every right to put questions to the witnesses who have made statements and demonstrated to the judge at the scene of the crime.

The court held in this case that it is not in every case in which an error has been made in the conduct of an inspection that an appeal will be allowed, an appeal will only be allowed if the irregularity is capable of resulting in a misc

The Court of Appeal held in this case that by Section 128(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, no evidence may be given to contradict, alter, add to, or vary the contents of a document.

In this case, the plaintiffs sought to give evidence of an oral agreement which had been embodied in a written document, which was itself inadmissible in evidence. The court held that such evidence was inadmissible.

In the case, the plaintiff borrowed a sum of money from the defendant and agreed orally with the defendant that he should collect rents on certain of his property until the debt is satisfied. About two years later, the plaintiff signed a document acknowledging the debt, and purporting to mortgage the property to the defendant. The document was not registered under the Land Registration Act. The plaintiff sued the mortgagee of the plaintiff's property and payment over to him of any amount due on the taking of an account; he did not plead the document but based his action on the oral agreement about which he gave evidence. The defendant did not give evidence but contended that as the document described as a mortgage was an instrument affecting land, it was not admissible in evidence as it was registered and that the oral evidence of its contents were inadmissible and should be excluded. The Supreme Court held that the oral evidence was rightly admitted.

In this case, the defendant agreed in writing to let a house with furniture to the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave evidence that, before the execution of a written agreement, the defendant had orally agreed to send into the house additional furniture. It was held that the evidence was inadmissible because, having reduced their agreement into writing, the plaintiff could not afterwards set up a term of the oral agreement which was not made part of the written agreement.

This case was an action by a mortgagee to recover some sum money under the mortgage deed. The defendants desired to adduce evidence to show that they never received the mortgage money of which they had acknowledged receipt in the mortgage deed and that repayment was contingent only on the borrowers making adequate profits, there being no clause to this effect in the mortgage deed. It was held that such evidence was inadmissible.

In this case, the appellant was convicted with some other accused persons in the Numan Federal Court of conspiring to defraud the Numan native authority. The appellant alleged that he was not in court during the whole course of the trial, and that one of the judges was also a witness in the case, and that, in fact, the judge had also been an accused person in the case. None of these allegations appeared on the record. The court held that the court is unwilling in an appeal, to look outside the record of proceedings in the trial court, but is empowered to do so under Section 131(1) (a) now Section 128(1) (a) of the Evidence Act.

The court held that a person who had signed a document could be allowed to prove that his signature was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation as to the nature of the document.

In this case, A agreed in writing to sell to B, goods which were to arrive Ex Peerless from Bombay. There were, in fact, two ships called Peerless, one sailed from Bombay in October and the other in December. Oral evidence was allowed to be led to show that A meant the October vessel whilst B meant the December vessel.

In this case, the question a signed a deed of contract as A's agent, or on his own and B's behalf. Oral evidence as to the statements made by at the time he signing the deed was held admissible.

The court held that evidence of want or failure of consideration may be admissible and where on the face of a written contract the consideration is past, evidence will be admissible to show that in fact the consideration is a present or future one.

In this case, a plaintiff and the defendant negotiated for the lease of a house by the latter to the former. The terms were arranged, but the plaintiff refused to hand over the counterpart that he had signed unless he received an assurance that the drains are in order. The defendant verbally represented that they were in good order, and the counterpart was thereupon handed to him. The lease contained no reference to drains. The drains were not in good order, and an action was brought to recover damages for breach of warranty. It was held that the representation made by the defendant as to the drains bring in good order was a warranty and that it was a separate collateral agreement about which oral evidence could be given, and for breach of which an action was maintainable.

The court held that if an agreement is one required by law to be in writing, then the parties are only free, either before or after a breach, to rescind it wholly by an oral agreement.

The court held that if an agreement is one required by law to be in writing, parties cannot amend or vary the agreement by oral agreement.

The court held in this case that, in commercial transactions, extrinsic evidence of custom and usage is admissible to annex incidents to written contracts, in matters with respect to which they are silent. The same rule has also been applied to contracts in other transactions of life, in which known usages have been established and prevailed; and this has been done upon the principle of presumption that; in such transactions, the parties did not mean to express in writing the whole of the contract by which they intended to be bound, but a contract with reference to those known usages.

The court held in this case that where a document does not contain all the necessary ingredients of a memorandum under the Statute of Frauds but expressly or by necessary implication, refers to some other document or transaction, parole evidence to connect it with that other document relating to it is admissible so as to enable the two documents to be read together to remedy the deficiency.

The court held in this case that a party who deals either personally or through agents in a particular type of transaction is bound by its reasonable usages even though he is ignorant of them.

In this case, a certain package was short-landed from one of the defendant's ships. The terms of the contract for the carriage of the goods were contained in the bill of lading upon which the plaintiffs sued. The plaintiffs sought to bring evidence of the custom of the port which would have extended the defendant's liability beyond the terms of the bill of lading. The court held such evidence inadmissible.

The court held in this case that evidence may be given to show the meaning of local and provisional expressions used in the peculiar sense. In this case evidence was allowed to show that according to usage 1,000 rabbits meant 1, 200 rabbits.

The court laid down the meaning of judicial notice in this case. The court stated that judicial notice is the cognizance taken by the court itself of certain matters which are so notorious or clearly established that evidence of their existence is deemed necessary.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the items judicial notice could be taken of are open-ended and not closed. Generally, these categories of items border on notorious facts such as the ordinary course of nature.

The court held in this case that by virtue of Section 122(1) and (2) (a) of the Evidence Act, 2011, no fact of which the court shall take judicial notice under the section needs to be proved. The court shall take judicial notice of all laws or enactments and any subsidiary legislation made under them having the force of law now or previously in force in any part of Nigeria. The provisions empowers the court to take judicial notice of all laws, enactment and other subsidiary legislation now or previously in force.

In this case, the court took judicial notice of the fact that two weeks is too short a period for human gestation, and that the normal period of gestation is about nine months. See also Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones (1951) AC 391

In this case, it was held that the court will take notice of the meaning of ordinary expressions in the English language.

In this case, it was held that a judge may take notice of the habit of the people. The court held that it is a matter of common knowledge of which the court has taken judicial notice that people commonly abuse each other as a prelude to a fight and call each other 'ole! elewon! which means thief! ex-convict! which abuse no one takes seriously as they are words of anger, and are nothing but vulgar abuse.

It was held in this case that the courts will take notice of its own proceedings and records and also their contents.

In this case, it was held that judicial notice could be taken of the fact that police officers receive proper pay and emoluments under the police act.

It was held in this case that a court will be entitled to take notice that goats, dogs, cats, camels are domestic animals and that young boys are naturally playful. See also McQuaker v. Goddard (1940) 1 KB 687, Clayton v. Hardwick Colliery Co. Ltd. (1915) 32 TLR 159.

In this case, it was held that the court would take judicial notice that the West African Pilot Newspaper is a national daily in the country and that it exercises immense influence on its readers everywhere.

In this case, the court took notice of the civil war.

In this case, it was held that when both parties have agreed about a particular matter in their pleadings such matter need not be proved and the court should accept such an agreed fact as established without further proof.

The court held that any party, may, by leave of the court, call upon any other party, by notice filed in court and served under order of the court to admit any document or fact, saving just exceptions, and on granting such leave, the court shall fix the terms and conditions, including the time within which the admissions are to be made.

The court held in this case that secondary evidence of a public document even when generated from the computers is admissible in evidence provided it satisfies the requirement of certification.

The Supreme Court held in this case that electronically generated documents are in the nature of secondary evidence and that where they are also public documents, they must be certified before being tendered in evidence.

The court held in this case that the question of admissibility of a document must be raised promptly as soon as the evidence is about to be given; in the case of a document, when it is tendered.

The court held in this case that the objection to admissibility of documentary evidence should be raised at the time when the document is tendered in evidence.

The court held that when an objection is taken as to the admissibility of any evidence, the question of admissibility should be decided by the court before the evidence is admitted or rejected.

It was held in this case that a court of appeal will not entertain question as to admissibility of evidence, unless the evidence has been formally tendered.

The court held in this case that it is only documents specifically referred to at the trial that should be entered as read in the judgment.

The court held that where a matter has been improperly received in evidence in the court below, even when no objection has been raised, it is the duty of the court of appeal to reject it and to decide the case on legal evidence.

In this case, it was held that a court is expected in all proceedings before it to admit and act only on evidence which is admissible in law and so if the court should inadvertently admit inadmissible evidence it has a duty generally not to act upon it.

It was held in this case that a trial court has power even to reject inadmissible evidence at the judgment stage.

The Supreme Court held in this case that if a court inadvertently admits inadmissible evidence, it is duty bound to expunge it from the record and refuse to act on it on its judgment.

In this case, the court held that if a document is rejected, it must nevertheless be marked as having been tendered and rejected and retained in the court's custody.

Even if the adverse party fails to raise his objection, the court may, and indeed in criminal cases, must, reject, such evidence on its own motion. Even if the court admits such admissible evidence, it is still the duty of the court not to act on it.

In the case, the court held that it is not within the competence of the parties to a case to admit by consent or otherwise a document which by law is inadmissible.

The court held that if a document is by error or otherwise admitted in evidence, then it is the duty of the trial court to expunge it in giving a judgment; and if the court of trial fails to do so, then an appeal court will reject such evidence and consider the case in the light only of the legally admitted evidence

It was held in this case that a plan not complying with Section 23(1) (b) of the Survey Act was inadmissible by consent or mistake of the parties.

The Court of Appeal held that it is not the law that once a document is received in evidence without objection by a party, then such a party is forever automatically stopped, even in the appellate court, from raising the issue of its admissibility. Thus, if a document is unlawfully received in evidence at the trial court, an appellate court has inherent jurisdiction to exclude and discountenance the document even though counsel at the trial did not object to its going into evidence.

In this case, the court held that if documentary evidence is admitted by consent of the parties or without objection, or used by adverse party, for the purposes of cross examination then the trial court can properly make use of it in arriving at a decision in the case.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a document which did not comply with Section 96(1) (b) now Section 89(1) (b) of the Evidence Act and which had been admitted without objection was legal evidence upon which the court could properly act.

The court held that a document which did not comply with Section 21(1) of the Stamp Duties Law of Western Nigeria and which was admitted without objection was legal evidence upon which the court could act.

The court held that if evidence can be held to be inadmissible, it is not to be treated as inadmissible simply because there is a possible other interpretation which would render it inadmissible when the possible other interpretation had not been tested by questions from the party who could have objected to the admissibility of the evidence.

In this case, several documents were admitted before proper foundations for their reception in evidence were laid, but before the end of the case was reached, every one of the documents tendered in evidence had been adequately proved. The court held that no objection could be taken against them on appeal.

The court held that the wrongful exclusion of admissible evidence is not of itself a ground for the reversal of any decision if it appears to the Court of Appeal that had the evidence excluded been admitted, the decision would reasonably, nevertheless have been the same.

The court held that the wrongful exclusion of admissible evidence is not of itself a ground for the reversal of any decision if it appears to the Court of Appeal that had the evidence excluded been admitted, the decision would reasonably, nevertheless have been the same, however, the dominant question is the broad one of whether substantial justice has been done, whether looking at the pleadings as a whole, an taking into account what was properly proved, the conclusion arrived at by the trial court has been a just one.

In this case, the appellants were charged with murder. Each of them gave evidence in his defense and one of them introduced a fresh matter relating to customary law which if true, would have seriously discredited the evidence of the prosecution. The court then called a chief who had been sitting in court to testify to his knowledge of the customary law on the question thus raised. The Court of Appeal held that even if the evidence of the Chief was wrongly admitted, it would have been disposed to hold that no substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred since two eye witnesses, whose evidence the judge believed, testified to the actual murder of the deceased by the appellants.

In this case, although a judgment of a native court had been wrongly admitted, it was clear on the evidence that the trial judge did not regard the judgment as establishing the plaintiff's title to the land but had based his decision on a sound body of other evidence. The court held that the appeal must be dismissed.

In this case, the appellant was on trial with another person who was discharged during the prosecution of the case. When the case for the prosecution closed, the trial court called the discharged person and had counsel for the prosecution examine him and counsel for the defense cross-examine him. The court held that the procedure was irregular and that the evidence of the witness was inadmissible but that since no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred, the appeal was dismissed.

In the case, the appellant was charged with uttering a forged document and stealing the amount covered by the cheque. Exhibited in the case was a bank account book in which the account entry of the same cheque was to be found. Evidence was given that the entry had been partially erased. The trial judge, outside the court, and not during the course of the hearing, found out by himself what the erased words were by the use of a magnifying glass. It was held that the court was in error for examining the exhibits outside of court and for thus considering matters which had been brought out of examination of witnesses in open court or which should have been judicially noticed by the court, but that as there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice, the appeal could not be allowed on that ground.

In this case, a copy of a judgment which was not certified and therefore inadmissible was admitted. The Federal Supreme Court held that since the learned trial judge used it partly to discredit the traditional history given in the case and partly to re-affirm evidentiary value, it could not reasonably have affected the decision in the case, the court under Section 251 (1) of the Evidence Act would not reverse the judgment.

In this case, the deposition of a witness was wrongly admitted and in his judgment, the trial judge specifically accepted part of the statement contained in it as corroborative evidence of the testimony of a witness whose evidence the judge stated he would have hesitated to accept without corroboration. The appeal was allowed on the ground.

In this case, appellants were convicted of the murder of a boy whose dying declaration was wrongly admitted. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the grounds, inter alia, that they felt unable to say that had the inadmissible declaration been rejected, the lower court would inevitably have come to the same conclusion.

In this case, inspite of the wrongful admission of a dying declaration, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as there was sufficient other evidence to support the conviction.

It was held in this case that if the appeal court is satisfied that had an admissible evidence which had been rejected been in fact accepted, the verdict would certainly have been different, then the appeal would be allowed.

In this case, the plaintiffs claimed special damages being the value of their properties alleged wilfully damaged and looted by the defendants. The trial court refused to admit a certified copy of the criminal proceeding in which the defendants were convicted of riot during which the plaintiff's properties were damaged. The court held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the copy of the criminal proceedings and that the appeal would be allowed and the case sent back for re-trial.

In this case, the court enunciated the principles under which retrial can be ordered. The court held that before retrial can be ordered, the court must be satisfied that;

a. That there has been an error in law (including the observation of the law of evidence) or an irregularity in procedure of such a character that on the one hand the trial was not rendered a nullity and on the other hand, the court is unable to say that there has been no miscarriage of justice, and to invoke the proviso to Section 11(1) of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Act.

b. That, leaving aside the error or irregularity, the evidence taken as a whole discloses a substantial case against the appellant;

c. That there are no special circumstances as would render it oppressive to put the appellant on trial a second time.

d. That the offence or offences of which the appellant was convicted or the consequence to the appellant or any other person of the conviction or acquittal of the appellant, are not merely trivial; and

e. That to refuse an order for a retrial would occasion a greater miscarriage of justice than to grant it.

The court held in this case that all the circumstances as was stated in the case of Yesufu Abodunde & Ors. V. R (1959) 4 FSC 70 must co-exist before the Supreme Court would order a retrial which are;

a. That there has been an error in law (including the observation of the law of evidence) or an irregularity in procedure of such a character that on the one hand the trial was not rendered a nullity and on the other hand, the court is unable to say that there has been no miscarriage of justice, and to invoke the proviso to Section 11(1) of the Federal Supreme Court (Appeals) Act.

b. That, leaving aside the error or irregularity, the evidence taken as a whole discloses a substantial case against the appellant;

c. That there are no special circumstances as would render it oppressive to put the appellant on trial a second time.

d. That the offence or offences of which the appellant was convicted or the consequence to the appellant or any other person of the conviction or acquittal of the appellant, are not merely trivial; and

e. That to refuse an order for a retrial would occasion a greater miscarriage of justice than to grant it.

The court held in this case that a retrial will not be ordered simply for the purpose of enabling the prosecution to adduce, as against the appellant, evidence which must convict him when his success at the appeal is based on the absence of such evidence.

In this case, the appellant had been tried in the High court and convicted. He appealed to the Federal Supreme Court and his conviction was quashed because the High Court had admitted inadmissible evidence. A retrial was ordered. At the retrial before another judge of the High Court, the same inadmissible evidence was gain admitted. The court held that in view of the fact that the appellant had been in jeopardy twice and the prosecution had persisted in leading inadmissible evidence which could have no other effect but to prejudice the fair trial of the appellant, it would not be right to make the order for retrial in the present case. The appellant was accordingly discharged and acquitted.

In this case, the Court of Appeal held that a witness who has first-hand knowledge of what he testifies about has primacy. Any evidence which is not within a person's personal knowledge will not be accredited as competent.

The court held in this case in civil proceedings, young children who do not, in the opinion of the court, understand the nature of an oath are incompetent as witnesses.

In this case, the witness who was in court throughout the proceedings was held to be competent to give evidence in the proceedings but that the question of the weight to be attached to his evidence was a different matter altogether.

In this case, the question whether a person convicted of murder is a competent witness was decided. The court held that a person under the sentence of death was a competent witness.

The court held that an accomplice who is not charged with the offence along with the accused person was a competent witness for the prosecution.

The court held in this case that a witness who was not trial in the case but facing court trial in other cases on charges which were related to the charges for which the accused persons were being tried was a competent witness.

The court held in this case that the fact that in his judgment, the magistrate at the lower court said that after hearing the evidence of the child in the witness box, he came to the conclusion that she was mentally capable of understanding and giving an intelligent account of the case to his satisfaction, cannot justify the condition precedent nor cure the irregularity that there was nothing on the record to show that an investigation was first made in court to justify admitting the child's evidence on oath.

The court held in this case that the judge must record a note to the effect that in his opinion, the child is capable of understanding the nature of the oath before giving evidence.

The court held in this case that if a judge is of the opinion that a child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath, it is not necessary for him to carry out any preliminary investigation in that regard.

The court held in this case that if the sworn evidence of a child requires corroboration, then the unsworn evidence of another child, although admitted under Section 209(1) of the Evidence Act cannot provide the required corroboration.

In this case, the appellant was convicted by a magistrate of stealing a sum of money, the evidence against him was being that of a girl under seven years of age who said that she had been lured away from her home whilst the appellant proceeded to steal the money which had been locked up in a cupboard. The court held that the evidence of the child given on oath did not, as a matter of law, requires corroboration although it was not the practice to convict on such uncorroborated evidence except after weighing it with extreme care.

The court held that a conviction will not necessarily be quashed merely because the trial judge did not avert his mind to the fact that the evidence of a child given on oath was not corroborated.

The court held in this case that a court which is convicting on the evidence of a single adult witness also has to weigh the evidence with care.

In this case, the appellants and Z were charged with stealing. Z pleaded guilty and was convicted, but before he was sentenced he was called as witness for the prosecution. The court held in this case that an accused person, not being tried jointly with the appellants was a competent witness for the prosecution.

In this case the court held that the failure of the court to warn the defendant that he is not bound to give evidence may be fatal to a conviction if the conviction cannot be sustained after discountenancing his evidence.

The court held in this case that the presumption that every marriage in Nigeria is a monogamous marriage will not be rebutted by the mere fact that the witness was sworn on the Qur'an or from the religious belief accepted by her.

In this case, the court held that if the evidence of a wife will incriminate her husband in the case that they are jointly charged, then she has to be called on the application of her husband before she can give evidence for the prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held in this case that the statutory provisions sanctioning discrimination against customary and Islamic marriages are not unconstitutional.

The court held in this case that in all civil proceedings, the parties to the suit and their spouse are competent witnesses not only for themselves but also competent witnesses for the opposing party.

In this case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants to set aside the sale and conveyance of a piece of family land by some members of the family. At the trial, two of the plaintiffs gave evidence. When the defense opened its case, counsel for the first defendant applied to call the plaintiff who had not given evidence. No objection was raised by counsel for the plaintiffs; nevertheless, the trial judge ruled that the plaintiff was not a competent witness for the defense. The court held that the trial court was in error as there was nothing in Section 157, now Section 178 of the Evidence Act to indicate that a party in a civil suit is only competent to give evidence upon his own application as is the case under Section 159, now section 180, proviso (a) of the Evidence Act, with a person charged with an offence, and although it is rare for counsel to take the risk of calling on opposing party, there is no doubt the judge was wrong in ruling that the plaintiff was a competent witness for the defense. The fact that no subpoena had been issued was immaterial to the question of competence.

The court held in this case that counsel is not free to give evidence in the case in which he is appearing, first, because every litigant must feel safe when making disclosures to his counsel, and secondly, counsel must remain detached and impersonal in his attitude to the case so that his judgment of it will not be beclouded by personal feelings.

The court held in this case that counsel cannot give material evidence on behalf of his client so as to identify himself with his client's case.

The court held in this case that it is irregular for counsel to swear to affidavits in the course of the proceedings in a case in which he is appearing if the facts deposed to are material to the determination of the facts in issue between the parties.

The court held in this case that there is little need for counsel to swear an affidavit even where the facts to be deposed to are formal facts required to be established to support a purely formal ex parte application where there is no possibility of those facts being disputed, as some member of his staff, like the litigation secretary, could easily depose to the same facts as a matter of information and belief and due heed should be paid to sections 115 and 116 of the Evidence Act.

The court held in this case that it is clear principle of practice that the duty of counsel to his client and the court prevents him from associating himself with his client's case.

The court held in this case that where counsel knows that he is likely to give evidence in a case or who finds himself in the position where he is the only person with the necessary knowledge to swear are likely to be in dispute should withdraw from the case

In this case, the court held that the rule that counsel should withdraw from a case where he knows he is likely to testify must be held applicable so as to bar counsel practicing in the same chambers from giving evidence in a case in which their chambers have been consulted and in which one counsel from their chambers is appearing.

In this case, the police officer who had taken part in the investigation of the case was conducting the prosecution on behalf of the police. Objection was taken against his appearance as he was a potential witness. This objection was overruled because as the court said, there was nothing in Section 159, now Section 180 of the Evidence Act against the procedure, but no reference was made to the practice of the courts with respect to legal practitioners.

In this case, during the preliminary investigation before the magistrate, a police officer, who was conducting the preliminary investigation on behalf of the prosecution, at one stage entered the witness box and gave evidence for the prosecution. At the trial before the High Court, he was called as a witness for the Crown. It was submitted on behalf of the defense that in these circumstances, the proceedings in the magistrate's court and in the High court were irregular and that therefore the trial was a nullity. The court held that the proceedings before the High court were regular, the police officer not being the prosecutor and that, therefore, there was nothing improper in calling him as a witness.

The court held in this case that where the possibility exists that a magistrate might be required to give evidence, he should decline the case.

The court held in this case that the character of a document is not the only decisive factor as to whether it relates to the affairs of State, but the possible consequences of the publication to the state where a document is sought to be produced in court in support of a case.

It was held in this case that although the court may restrain the publication of cabinet proceedings and papers because of the possible consequences of such publication on the state, after the lapse of a period, such publication may become permissible if serious adverse consequences are no longer anticipated.

The court held that the certificate contemplated under Section 36(13) of the Evidence Act must be signed by the appropriate Minister or Commissioner personally, and not by any other person.

The court held in this case that a legal practitioner must not disclose any advice he may have given to his client in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such. The fact that the legal practitioner is in full-time employment of the client and he is on monthly salary is immaterial.

The court held in this case that every client is entitled to feel safe when making disclosures to his solicitor or counsel, and there are cases establishing firmly that counsel cannot be called to give evidence which would infringe the client's privilege of secrecy.

The court held in this case that in the overall interest of the administration of justice however, privilege must give way where there is a legal obligation arising either from a statutory provision or from an order of a judge.

The court held in this case that where a document was communicated to a person voluntarily, in confidence and for a limited and restricted purpose, he cannot be compelled to divulge the document or a copy of it.

The court held in this case that where a document is communicated to a person voluntarily, he cannot be compelled to divulge the document except for the purpose for which it was communicated unless the court in its discretion orders him to do so, which it will do if it is in the public interest.

The court held in this case that the law would not permit any person, including legal practitioners, to screen from the court information which if disclosed to the court would perhaps enable a person accused of a crime to establish his innocence or to resist an allegation made against him by the state.

The general principle is that no witness is bound to answer any question if his answer, in the opinion of the court, will have a tendency to expose the witness or the witness's spouse to any criminal charge, or any penalty or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred or sued for.

The court held in this case that the privilege against self-incrimination does not amount to incompetency but only relates to the answering of individual questions.

In this case, a witness who had been granted a pardon was compelled to answer a question with reference to the subject matter even though strictly speaking he might still be impeached for the offence.

The court held in this case that anything that a person is wrongly compelled to say after he has claimed his privilege will be treated as having been said involuntarily with the result that it will be inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings brought against him.

The court held that once the first of a series of letters is headed "without prejudice" the whole series will be privileged.

The court held that merely heading a document "without prejudice" does not carry along with it privilege unless the document relates to negotiations towards the settlement of an issue which has arisen or is likely to arise between the parties.

In this case, the second defendant signed a document undertaking to guarantee the fidelity of the first defendant to the plaintiffs in whose employment the first defendant was. On top of it he wrote the words "without prejudice." On being sued under the document, the second defendant pleaded that the document could not be received against him because of the words "without prejudice." The court held that the phrase must be ignored as it could have no meaning at all when attached to such a document.

In this case, it was held that the discussions which took place in the meetings for the purposes of reconciliation between a husband and his wife with a probation officer were privileged, but since the parties themselves gave evidence of them they must be taken as having waived their privilege.

The court held that the statements made without prejudice cover cases of negotiations between a husband and his wife before a clergy man who was a friend of the family.

The court held in this case that privilege would not attach to negotiations before a solicitor. However this position was doubted in the latter case of Mole v. Mole and the better view is that privilege must extend to such negotiations.

The court held in this case that both parties to a dispute may agree to waive the privilege in statements made without prejudice.

The Supreme Court held in this case that corroboration is that additional evidence that strengthens, makes certain or confirms another piece of evidence that connects or links the defendant to the offence he is charged with.

The Supreme Court in defining corroboration stated that it is evidence which shows or tends to show that the story of the accomplice that the accused committed the crime is true, not merely that the crime has been committed, but that it was committed by the accused.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the purpose of corroboration is to confirm and support a piece of evidence given that is credible an admissible.

The court held in this case that the evidence that is required or regarded as corroboration is clearly not a repetition of the evidence to be corroborated, otherwise there would be no need for the original evidence.

The court held that the corroborative evidence may be oral, documentary or real. It need not be direct but may even be purely circumstantial.

The court held in this case that where corroboration of one witness's testimony is required by law, the evidence of another witness which itself requires corroboration cannot, as a general rule, effectively corroborate the evidence of the first witness.

The court held that in criminal cases corroboration of evidence against an accused may be found in his conduct and behavior before or at the trial.

The court held in this case that in determining whether silence by an accused person in the face of allegations against him may be sufficient corroboration of the allegations, the question to be considered is whether by his silence, the accused was accepting the allegations made against him as true; if he was, his silence could be treated as corroboration, if he was not, it is no corroboration.

The court held in this case that under the constitution, an accused person has the positive right to remain silent or avoid answering any question in such circumstances until after consultation with a legal practitioner or any person of his own choice.

The court held that where an accusation is made before any legal process has been set in motion and the accusation contains full particulars of the offence, failure by the accused to reply may be registered as corroboration.

The court held in this case that for evidence to amount to corroboration in a criminal case, it must be independent and confirm in some material particular, not only that the offence has been committed but also definitely associate the prisoner with the offence.

In this case, the appellants and others were charged with conspiracy to commit felony, breaking into the building and committing felony therein, stealing and receiving stolen property. The evidence against them needed corroboration. The trial judge found such corroboration in respect of one of the appellants in the evidence that that appellant visited a self-confessed accomplice in the offences immediately before the breaking. It was held on appeal that this might be suspicious circumstances but could not by any twist of imagination connect the appellant and the actual breaking.

The material point in dispute was whether the appellants jointly robbed the complainant in a train. It was held that evidence which only went to show that the appellants were on the train, a point they did not even deny, could no amount to corroboration of the actual act of brigandage.

In this case, the body of the deceased was found about a quarter of a mile from the house of the accused. it had a number of severe wounds and the accused said in a statement under caution after being arrested and charged with murder, that the deceased broke into his house during the night and stole meat, pieces of meat which were found in the deceased's pocket, that he chased the deceased, who was unarmed and cut him with his machete which he showed to the police to whom he also showed damages done to his house by the deceased. It was held by the court that the facts averred in these retracted statements which were all found to be true were circumstantial corroboration of that statement and this coupled with the judge's acceptance of it, provided ample evidence of guilt.

In the case, the appellant was convicted of murder. The witness upon whose testimony the conviction was based was an eleven year old girl, daughter of the deceased. She gave a detailed account of how her father was killed by the appellant. In view of the age of the witness, corroboration of her testimony was necessary. This corroboration was found in another piece of evidence to the effect that the appellant was found to be wearing trousers, part of the clothes which the girl said he was wearing on the date of the killing and on which on examination were found to be stained with human blood and that the appellant offered no explanation of how the human blood got there.

In this case, the case against the appellant was that he raped a girl under the age of fourteen years. The girl gave evidence of how she was ravished by the appellant. Because of the nature of the offence and as the girl gave unsworn evidence, corroboration of the evidence was mandatory. When police investigation into the case started, both the girl and the appellant were examined by a medical officer. The doctor's evidence confirmed that the girl was raped. He also testified that the girl was infected with gonorrhea at most three days before the medical examination. The doctor's evidence also had it that the appellant was suffering from the same type of venereal disease as was found in the girl. There was also evidence that both the girl and the appellant had stayed in the same house for about one year and indeed were so staying when the incident happened. It was held by the Supreme Court that in the particular circumstances of the case, the presence of venereal infection in the girl and the appellant was corroborative of her evidence that it was the appellant who had raped her.

The court held in this case that for a photograph of accused persons pointing at the scene of crime to be of any corroborative value, it is necessary for the persons who posed for it to have led the police to the alleged scene of the crime independently of each other.

In this case, it was held that whether any particular evidence can be corroboration is for the judge to decide, the jury decides the weight to be attached to it.

The court held in this case that in criminal cases, the rule as to corroboration applies only to witnesses for the prosecution.

The court held in this case that the only witnesses who are to be treated as accomplices are:

a. Participants in the actual crime charged.

b. Receivers of property which the accused is charged with stealing;

c. Participants in other crimes alleged to have been committed by the accused where evidence of such other crimes is admissible to prove intent or to negative the accident

In this case, on the order of the appellant, a senior police officer in charge of a detachment of the mobile police force, a market and other places were raided, goods therein were looted and a number of persons beaten up by the appellant. He was eventually charged with and convicted for robbery, stealing and assault. In his trial, some of the subordinate officers who took part in this scandalous activities on his order testified for the prosecution. On appeal, it was argued that these witnesses who were acting and obeying the instructions of their boss should be regarded and treated as accomplices. The Supreme Court in rejecting the argument held that the witnesses sought by the appellant to be treated as accomplices were indeed engaged with the appellant on the act or omission grounding the charges before the court though with different intents. While the appellant's intent was to misappropriate the goods, his subordinate officers were merely carrying out his orders.

The court held in this case that a witness may rank as an accomplice on the ground that he assisted the culprit to escape punishment and was an accessory after the fact in that way.

The court held in this case that a person who lacks the capacity for criminal responsibility cannot be an accomplice.

The court held in this case that the giver of a bribe may be a victim or an accomplice according to the circumstances of the case.

It was held in this case that the court will not take into account the number of witnesses who have given evidence for each side as a relevant factor in deciding which side of evidence should succeed. What is of primary importance is the quality not the quantity of evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that a single credible witness can establish a case beyond reasonable doubt if the witness is believed, given all the circumstances of the case. One credible witness accepted and believed by the court, is sufficient to justify a conviction except where such a witness is an accomplice in which case his testimony would require corroboration.

The court held that the proper approach is not for the court to say 'I may convict if I warn myself it is unsafe to convict' but to say 'it is unsafe to convict on uncorroborated accomplice evidence; can it be safe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of this accomplice?; and the trial court must convict unless it sees clearly that it can safely do so in the particular case.

The court held that it is generally unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, first, because he may invent an offence and accuse someone of committing it first, and secondly, he may falsely accuse someone else of an offence that had been committed.

The court held in this case that a witness is only an accomplice if he is a person who might on the evidence be convicted of the offence with which the accused is charged.

The Supreme Court held that persons are accomplices who are participes criminis in respect of the actual crime charged whether as principals or accessories before or after the fact in the case of felonies or misdemeanors.

In this case, the first accused informed a police officer that he and others planned to break into an office strong room and steal therein. He offered to give a share of the booty to the police officer if he arranged for the police not to disturb them. The police officer said it was alright but went and reported to a senior police officer who arranged for the thieves to be caught. At the trial, it was argued for the accused persons that since the police witnesses failed to carry out their duty to prevent the commission of an offence under Section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Act, they had thereby become accomplices. The court held that putting the argument at its highest, the police could only be convicted of perversely and without lawful excuse omitting to perform a statutory duty contrary to Section 198 of the Criminal Code, they could not be convicted of aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring the offences charged in the present information. They are therefore not accomplices.

The court held in this case that detection by deception is a form of police procedure to be directed and used sparingly and with circumspection; but as a method, it is as old as the constable in plain clothes and, regrettable though the fact may be, the day has not yet come when it would be safe to say that the law and order could always be enforced and the public safety protected without occasional resort to it.

The court held in this case that when the term "agent provocateur" is used in the sense of police officers and their aides who positively incite or provoke and then join in the commission of a crime, it is safe to say that evidence given by such officer must be suspect. Such evidence cannot be sufficient to found a conviction unless it is corroborated.

The court held in this case that the evidence of an agent provocateur must be corroborated in some material particular by independent evidence tending to show that both the alleged crime was committed and that the accused participated in it.

The court held in this case that where an accused person has manifested a clear intention to commit an offence and the police facilitate the commission of the offence by the accused in order that the accused may be caught, the police officers and their aides cannot, and should not be regarded as agent provocateurs, whose evidence requires corroboration.

In this case, the accused person, a police corporal, had threatened to arrest two native court messengers and a councillor for illegally investigating a case of attempted murder. They went and told a village chief who summoned a meeting in which the accused said that if he was not to arrest the messenger and the councillor, he must be given sixty pounds. The chief suggested fifty pound which as agreed and given to the accused. He was charged with demanding money with menaces contrary to Section 406 of the Criminal Code. The court held that the chief and another witness who took part in the negotiations were accomplices.

In this case, the Federal Supreme Court held that a person who had acted as an intermediary in the asking and receiving of a bribe was an accomplice.

The court held in this case that a person who had acted as an intermediary in the asking and receiving of a bribe was an accomplice of the giver as well as an accomplice of the receiver.

The court held in this case that a tainted witness is a witness who may not, in the strict sense, be an accomplice but who, in giving his evidence, is established to have some purpose of his own to serve and in respect of whom it is desirable that warning, as to the corroboration of evidence, may appropriately be given.

A witness is not tainted witness merely by the fact of his biological relationship or any other relationship or any other relationship with the complainant, victim or accused person. For a witness to be regarded as a tainted witness, he must be shown to have some other purpose than the pursuit of justice and the truth of the fact in issue.

The court held in this case that in the case where a person may be regarded as having some purpose of his to serve, the warning against uncorroborated evidence should be given.

The court held that two witnesses for the crown in a murder case who were charged on a separate charge with the murder of the deceased were clearly interested persons who might have some purpose of their own to serve. The Supreme Court was of the view that the evidence of the witnesses ought to be regarded with considerable caution, and the trial court should have been wary in reaching a verdict of guilty on the uncorroborated evidence of such witnesses.

The court held in this case that the mere presence of a person at the commission of an offence does not make one an accomplice to the offence.

The evidence against the appellants was that of two witnesses who hearing shouts in the night, went to the scene and saw the three appellants killing the deceased. The Federal Supreme Court held that the witnesses could not be regarded as accomplices.

The court held in this case that the appellants were members of a society whose declared purpose, as announced earlier by the first appellant, was to try thieves in the first appellant's house where the thief would be asked to pay money, and if he failed to pay, would be killed. The appellants were convicted of the murder of one man who was alleged to have been killed in pursuance of this illegal purpose. The case for the crown depended entirely upon the evidence of one witness who was a member of the society when the crime was committed and was still a member at the time of the trial of the appellants. He was not present during the actual killing and took no part in it but stood outside the house and watched through the door. On the day following the murder, he was made to pay five pounds for his failing to help in the killing. The court held that he was not an accomplice and that his evidence did not require corroboration.

In the case, A, an American saxophone player, was allowed to land in England only on the condition that he would not take up an appointment there. A, in breach of this condition, played at a concert, thus committing an offence. W, who knew about A's condition of entry into England, nevertheless paid for a ticket to watch the concert. He attended the concert and later published a laudatory report of t in the jazz illustrated, a magazine of which he was the editor. The court held that W was an accomplice to A's offence on the ground that his payment to go there was an encouragement.

In this case, in consideration of a loan of a sum of money advance to him by the accused, D handed over to the accused his son, M to remain with him as a pawn until the money was repaid. On a charge of slave-dealing, contrary to the criminal code, it was held that M was a victim and could not be regarded as an accomplice.

In this case, the West African Court of Appeal pointed out that it is quite untenable in argument that those who met the monetary demands of the appellant were accomplices to the demand. Nor, in meeting the demand, could they be regarded otherwise than as victims of the appellant's rapacity.

In this case, the first appellant was employed as forest guard charged with the duty of inspecting farms in order to check contraventions of the forestry laws. As he was new to the area, the second and third accused persons were instructed to act as his guides. They went from village to village demanding and receiving money so that they might not arrest the villagers for offences against the forestry laws. The court held that in the present case the witnesses for the crown were victims, not accomplices.

In this case, the court held that on a charge of obtaining a bribe, a person who has voluntarily acceded to a request for money in order to obtain a preference not otherwise open to him cannot be regarded as a victim in giving what he must have known was a bribe for that purpose.

In this case, the four appellants and one Ejembi were charged with murder. A nolle prosequi was entered in respect of Ejembi, who then gave evidence for the prosecution. On the evidence, he was clearly an accomplice. The first appellant gave evidence in his own defense and in so doing incriminated the other appellants. The court held that whereas the evidence of Ejembi required corroboration that of the first appellant did not.

In this case, the appellant and another person were charged jointly with stealing, forgery and uttering a forged document. The other person in his defense gave evidence which incriminated the present appellant, who was convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of the accused. The court held that evidence needed no corroboration.

In this case, the court held that the evidence of an accused person which incriminates a co-accused person requires no corroboration, neither does it requires, as a matter of practice, that a direction should be given to the jury as to warn it of the dangers of convicting the accused on such uncorroborated evidence, but the court is free to do so.

The Supreme Court pointed out in this case that it is prudent for the trial judge to remind the jury or himself of the need for caution in regard to any witness, including a defendant who has an interest to serve. Subsection (2) of Section 177 now Section 199 of the Evidence Act does not debar the judge from treating a defendant's evidence as the facts of the case may require. There is no hard and fast rule, but the judge is expected to act with good sense, and the appellate court may think that his lack of caution led to a substantial miscarriage of justice in a given case.

The court held in this case that a conviction could be had on the uncorroborated sworn testimony of a child.

A person shall not be liable to be convicted of an offence unless such evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence in support therefore implicating a defendant. The court held that such material evidence must come from an independent source and must not be evidence which itself requires to be corroborated.

The court held that the evidence of one single witness can provide the corroboration required to convict an accused.

In this case, the court held a girl of ten, after the normal examination, to be incapable of understanding the nature of the oath, and was allowed to give evidence not on oath as she was found to be sufficiently intelligent to understand the duty of speaking the truth. In this case, it was held that the admission of the offence of unlawful carnal knowledge of the girl by the accused to the father of the girl provided the required corroboration.

The court held in this case that an unsworn testimony of another child cannot provide the corroboration required for the unsworn testimony of a child which itself requires corroboration. This decision was however overruled by the court in subsequent decision such as that in the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Hester (1972) 3 WLR 910 where the court held that the sworn evidence of another child can provide the required corroboration necessary where the sworn evidence of a child requires corroboration. Accordingly, evidence that needs to be corroborated could be corroborated by evidence which itself needs to be corroborated so that each of two witnesses might corroborate each other.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that a witness must be able to testify to an overt act in its entirety but it is sufficient if a number of witnesses give evidence of snippets which add up to proof of an overt act.

The court held in this case that if the sworn evidence of a child requires corroboration, then the sworn evidence of another child admitted under Section 183 (2) of the Evidence Act can provide the required corroboration. This decision overruled the previous decision to the contrary such as was the decision in R v. Manser (1934) 25 Cr. App.R. 18 that an unsworn testimony of another child cannot provide the corroboration required for the unsworn testimony of a child which itself requires corroboration.

In this case, the court held that corroboration is required not merely as to the making of an alleged false statement but also as to the falsity of it where perjury is alleged as Section 119 of the Criminal Code provides that a person cannot be convicted of committing the offence of perjury or of counselling or procuring the commission of it upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness.

In this case, the appellant was charged with indecent assault. The court held that it is not the rule of law that in sexual offences, an accused person should not be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of a prosecutrix, but the proper direction is that it is not safe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix, but that the jury may, after paying attention to the warning, nevertheless convict if they are satisfied of the truth of the evidence.

The court held in this case that the defendant's constant references to the plaintiff as his fiancée sometime before the alleged engagement was sufficient corroboration.

In this case, the plaintiff gave evidence that the defendant promised to marry her. a witness called by her deposed to the fact that she had heard her say to him, "you always promised to marry me, and you don't keep your word," and that the defendant made no reply to that apart from giving the plaintiff money and asking her to go away. The court held that the defendant's silence amounted to an admission of the promise and that, therefore, the evidence of the witness could be treated as material evidence in support for the purpose of the provision.

In this case, the court stated that a court will not necessarily refrain from pronouncing a decree dissolving a marriage simply because the evidence is uncorroborated.

It was stated in this case that the court would hesitate before granting a divorce on the sole and unsupported testimony of a petitioner.

The court held in this case that in the case of cruelty, it is the practice of the court to require corroboration, and not a rule of law; and it has never been decided that the court is not entitled in a proper case, where it is not in doubt where the truth lies, to act upon the uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.

In the case, the petition for divorce was based on the alleged adultery of the respondent with the co-respondent, the court held that the failure of the respondent to enter an appearance or file an answer to the petition was ample corroboration of the fact alleged by the petitioner that she had confessed to the adultery to the petitioner.

The court held in this case that in most cases where the question of corroboration arises, the question is "Is there independent testimony which affects the accused by tending to connect him with the crime? But it is also essential that there should be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, which confirms the evidence given by the accomplice that the crime had been committed. It is of course not necessary that there should be confirmation by independent evidence of everything the accomplice says, but only some independent evidence connecting the accused with the crime.

The court held that order that evidence may amount to corroboration, it must be extraneous to the witness who is to be corroborated.

The court held in this case that it is a well-recognized principle that the evidence of one requiring corroboration cannot serve as corroboration to the evidence of another requiring corroboration.

The court held in this case that the unsworn testimony by a child cannot serve as corroboration to the testimony of another unsworn child.

In this case, the court held that one accomplice cannot corroborate another accomplice.

In this case, the accused was charged with stealing mineral concentrate. The Magistrate after warning himself that one witness was an accomplice, proceeded to treat the fact that there was marked similarity between the mineral pointed out by the witness as having been stolen from the workings and a sample taken therefrom as corroboration of the witness's evidence. The court held that although this evidence might show that a theft of the mineral in question had been committed, it did not amount to corroboration as it did not implicate the appellant in the actual theft.

In the case, the principal evidence against one of the accused persons who were charged with robbery was that of an accomplice. The trial judge found corroboration in the evidence of another witness whose evidence only showed that the accused had been associating with some of the other accused persons for some time before the robbery. The court held that this was not sufficient corroboration as it did not tend to connect him with the offences charged.

The court held in a charge of receiving stolen property that other instances of receiving by the accused person could not furnish corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice.

The court held that in considering whether evidence is corroborative, one must take it as a whole; it will not do to say , take this item for instance, it is not corroboration; take this other item, and so forth; one must take all the little items together and consider whether they all add up to corroborate as a whole.

In the case, the accused was charged with high way robbery. The police, suspecting a number of persons including the accused of being involved in the robbery, conducted an identification parade. The judge having held that the evidence of the parade as showing the implication of the accused in the offence was weak, decided that corroboration was necessary. The Supreme Court held that each of the items of evidence was found by the trial court might raise suspicion, together they made the suspicion strong, but that their union together could nevertheless not give them a quality, the quality of being corroborative evidence in the true sense, which none of them had.

The court held in this case that corroboration can take different forms apart from the usual form of testimony by another witness. It may be deduced from the conduct of the accused.

In the case, the accused was an Inspector of Police. On the report of an accident, he gave instructions that the driver of one of the vehicles and its owner be prosecuted. The summons were served. Before they were due to appear in court, both the driver and the owner sent another person to beg the accused on their behalf. It was alleged that the accused demanded money through the intermediary which money was paid to the accused through the same person. on the day following this alleged payment, the accused took the summons from the driver and the owner of the lorry, tore them, wrote on the police case file that the file be put away without giving any reasons. The court held on the facts that the conduct of the accused in reversing his instruction corroborated the evidence of the accomplices, that is, the intermediary and the givers of the bribe.

In this case where a co-accused gave evidence implicating an accused in the forgery of a document purporting to have been executed by thumb-print of an illiterate, a false verification of that document executed by the accused was held to amount to corroboration of the co-accused's evidence. A document written by an accused may be sufficient corroboration.

In this case, the accused was charged with indecent assault against a girl of ten years of age. The court held that the admission of the offence by the accused to the father of the girl was sufficient corroboration.

In this case, the accused persons who were charged with murder, after making statements to the police escorted the police to the spot where the body of the deceased was found. The court held that the finding of the body is corroboration of the confession contained in the statements.

The court held in this case that the finding of the body is corroboration of the confession contained in the statements.

In the case, the accused persons were charged with offering a bribe to an Assistant Superintendent of Police. During the interview at which the bribe was offered, a tape recorder, which had been hidden in the room, recorded the interview. The court held that the tape recording was admissible and provided corroboration of the evidence of the Assistant Superintendent of Police.

The court held in this case that the silence of a party will render a statement made in his presence or sent to him by letter, evidence against him if the circumstance of the case were such as to indicate that he should have made a reply.

The court held in this case that in a criminal case, the non-denial of an incriminating statement made in the presence of an accused person may or may not amount to corroboration depending on the circumstances even if any were required in the case.

In this case, two witnesses for the accused gave evidence before the accused gave his own evidence. The court held that while there is no statutory rule to prohibit the practice, it is however desirable that the English practice should be followed, under which if an accused person intends both to give evidence himself and to call witnesses as to fact, his evidence normally taken before that of his witness.

The court held in this case that the duty of deciding what witnesses shall be called and in what order they should be called is solely a matter for counsel.

It was held in this case that if the trial court prevents counsel from exercising the right of conducting a case as he thinks fit, any decision subsequently arrived at may, in a proper case, be vitiated.

In this case, the court held that if an accused person elects to give evidence, then he should do so before he has heard the evidence-in-chief and the cross examination of the witnesses he is going to call.

The court held in this case that in criminal cases, if the accused wants to testify and to call witnesses, his evidence should first be taken before that of his witnesses.

It was held in this case that there is always a discretion in the court to permit the calling of formal witnesses and witnesses whose evidence is not controversial before the accused gives evidence.

In the case, after hearing evidence on both sides, the trial judge went to inspect the land in the presence of the parties. Both parties at the time of the inspection made some admissions that part of their evidence in court had been false. In dismissing the claim of the plaintiffs, the court referred to an account of the inspection and the said admissions. It was argued on appeal that the trial judge was wrong in acting on the admissions that they were not made on oath. It was held that the statements were mush oral admissions by a party in court as if they had been made in a court room. They amounted to matters before the court which the trial judge could take into consideration without the observance of Section 179, now Section 205 of the Evidence Act.

The West African Court of Appeal held in this case that there is no rule in Nigeria, either statutory or at common law, requiring that an interpreter should be sworn, and that, while it is a most salutary rule of practice that interpreters should invariably be sworn, the fact that the interpreter has not been sworn is not in itself an illegality involving the quashing of the conviction. It would be otherwise were the court of trial not satisfied that the interpretation was in fact accurate.

In this case, after suffering an attack which ultimately caused his death, the deceased told the first person who found him injured that he was going to die, that he had been beaten, and that one Momo had instigated the beating. The evidence as to deceased's statement of impending death was extracted by a leading question. No objection to the form of question was taken until the question had been put and answered. The court held that the trial judge rightly exercised his discretion in allowing the question to be put in the particular circumstances, and, in those circumstances, in admitting the answer in evidence and that the appeal could not be allowed on that score.

The Supreme Court held in this case that a witness is considered hostile under Section 206, now Section 230 of the Evidence Act when in the opinion of the court, he bears a hostile animus to the party calling him and does not give his evidence fairly with the desire to tell the truth to the court.

The court held in this case that cross examination is the noble art which constitutes a lethal weapon in the hands of the adversary to enable him effect the demolition of the case of the opposing party. Cross examination, if rightly employed, is a potent tool for perforating falsehood. Cross examination occupies an Olympian position in the adjectival law. It is the template with which to assess the truth in evidence-in-chief of witnesses. The veracity of a witness under examination-in-chief is tested by the evidence elicited from him in the furnace of cross examination. The law views evidence procured from the heat of cross examination as more reliable and compelling than the ones that flow from examination-in-chief.

The court held in this case that the cross examination is a lethal weapon in the hands of the adversary to enable him effect the demolition of the case of the opposing party. See also Oforlette v. State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt. 681) 415.

The Supreme Court held in this case that the general aim of cross-examination is to enable the adverse party to demolish or weaken the case of the party being cross-examining party the opportunity of stating or presenting its case through the witness of its opponent. See also Iwuoha v. Okoroike (1996) 2 NWLR (pt. 429) 231.

The court held in this case that in any case, if a witness is not cross examined, an admission of the truth of his evidence by the opposite party is implied.

The Supreme Court held in this case that to deprive an accused person of the opportunity to cross examine a witness amounts to gross violation of his constitutional right to fair hearing.

The court held in this case that where a witness dies after the examination in chief but before cross examination, the evidence in chief is still legal but the weight to be attached to such evidence depends on the circumstances of each case.

The court held in this case that if inadmissible evidence is brought out by the defense during the cross examination of witnesses for the plaintiff, the same defense cannot be allowed to object to it later in the proceedings or on appeal.

It was stated in this case that when questions are irrelevant to the issue on the record, another witness cannot be called to contradict the answer the witness gives. No witness can be prepared to support his character as to particular facts, and such collateral inquiries would lead to endless confusion.

In this case, in an information under the revenue laws, a witness, who had given material evidence as to the fact in issue, was asked on cross examination whether he had not said that the officers of the crown offered him a bribe to give that evidence. He denied that he had ever said so. It was held that the answer was final and that evidence was inadmissible to show that he had made such a statement.

The court held in this case that the answer of a prosecutrix in a charge of rape who denies under cross examination an allegation that she had voluntarily intercourse with other men is final.

The court held that where the question whether a prosecutrix in a charge of rape had had voluntary intercourse with the accused on previous occasions is relevant and her denial to it can be contradicted by other evidence.

The court held that under proviso (b) to Section 229 of the Evidence Act, evidence in rebuttal of a denial by the witness that he is a relation of one of the parties to the suit, or that he has quarreled with one of them is admissible.

In an action against the maker of a promissory note, one of the subscribing witnesses was asked if she did not constantly sleep with her master, the plaintiff. She denied this and it was held that the defendant could be allowed to call another witness to prove that she did so and that this was not collateral to the issue.

The court held in this case that a witness may be cross examined as to any previous statement made by him in writing or a deposition made by him reduced into writing by someone else.

The court held that a witness can be cross examined as to any previous statement made by him. However, such statement can only be used to impeach the credit of the witness and cannot be treated as evidence in the latter case.

The court held in this case that in a criminal trial, the defense may request for the production of a previous statement made by an accused and it is not necessary to allege the existence of any discrepancy between such a statement and the evidence being given in the court by the witness before such request is made.

The court held in this case that the attention of an accused must first be called to the parts of a previous statement which is sought to be used to contradict his statement in the witness box. This foundation must first be laid before the statement can be admitted.

The court held in this case that when a witness is shown to have made previous statements inconsistent with the evidence given by him at the trial, the jury should not merely be directed that his evidence at the trial should be regarded as unreliable, but also that the previous statements, whether sworn or unsworn, do not constitute evidence upon which they can act, and, in a non-jury case, the court should direct itself likewise.

It was held in this case that the court should be slow to act on the evidence of a witness shown to have made previous statements inconsistent with the evidence given by him at the trial unless reason for the inconsistency is satisfactorily accounted for.

The court went further to hold that where explanation satisfactory to the trial court is given for inconsistency in a witness' evidence and the inconsistency is not substantial, the court may however accept the other portions of the evidence given by the witness at the trial. In such a case, the inconsistency may not discredit the entire testimony.

The court held in this case that in criminal trials, the prosecution should on request to the effect, give to the defense statements made to the police by the witness called by the prosecution for the purpose of contradicting their evidence with such statements if necessary.

The court held in this case that where a deposition at a preliminary investigation is to be put in evidence for the purpose of contradicting a witness, this can be done by producing the original or certified true copy of it.

The court held in this case that the evidence given by a witness and reduced into writing in the chief Magistrate Court of Biafra cannot be used to contradict that witness in a subsequent proceeding as that court never existed in or was constituted by law and its proceedings as well as the evidence are null and void.

The court held in this case that the mere fact that a witness has made several statements to the police is however not a ground per se for discrediting him although such statements may be used in accordance with the Evidence Act to discredit him. The court went further to hold that if the several statements are contradictory and inconsistent in material particulars with one another and with the evidence of the maker that may be a ground for discrediting him as a witness. On the other hand, if the several statements are in substance consistent with one another and with the evidence of the maker that may favorably affect his credibility as a witness.

The court held that when a previous statement made by an accused sought to be used to contradict his statement in the witness box is proved, it will be wrong for a trial judge to refuse to admit the statement in evidence.

The court held that a previous statement of an accused, which is sought to be used to contradict is evidence in the witness box, which is proved and admitted is not proof of the facts contained in it; its purpose is only to impugn the testimony of the witness.

It was held in this case that the court which exists to do justice should make available to an accused whatever may appear necessary to enable him to put forward any defense that may be open to him.

The court held in this case that once a witness has been cross examined on a previous testimony which contradicts his testimony in the witness box, the statement must be admitted in evidence.

It was held in this case that after the production of the previous statement of an accused, the court may make use of it for purposes of the trial as it thinks fit, but it cannot choose between the written statement and the evidence of the witness in court.

The court held in this case that where a witness' credit has been impeached under cross-examination, a chance of attempting to restore his credit is afforded by the re-examination.

The court held in this case that although failure to allow re-examination may not necessarily be fatal to a case, yet circumstance may occur, particularly in a criminal case, where it may lead to the reversal of a verdict.

The court held that as a rule in civil cases, a judge cannot call a witness on his own motion.

The court held in this case that a judge should never, without the consent of both parties, call a witness on his own volition.

The court held in this case that it is not merely irregular but also beyond the power of a judge to call witness for one party in the absence of the absence of the party and his counsel. In this case, at the adjourned hearing of a divorce petition, the husband and his counsel were absent, but nonetheless, the trial judge, himself, called the witnesses for the husband who were in court and took their evidence. An appeal against the judgment was allowed on this ground as the Supreme Court held that the trial judge had no power to call the witnesses in the circumstances.

It was held in this case that for the exercise of the power of the court under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act, now Section 256 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, to call as a witness any person not called by either the prosecution or the defense or to recall and re-examine a witness already examined at any stage of the trial, inquiry or other proceedings, if the evidence of such a person or witness appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case, consent of the party is not necessary.

The court held in this case that it is wrong for the court to call a witness after the parties have closed their cases in order to strengthen the case against the accused.

It was held in this case that a court indisputably has discretion to recall a witness in the interest of justice in order to explain or confirm a point on which evidence had been given but which requires some elucidation.

It was held in this case that a court may call a witness on his own motion where the interest of justice compels such an action.

The court held in this case that where a presiding judge calls a witness under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act, now Section 256 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, neither the prosecution nor the defense is entitled to examine or cross examine him without the leave of the judge.

It was held that the court cannot make use of the provision of Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act, now Section 256 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act to clear any doubts he may have about the guilt of an accused person.

The court held in this case that the power under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act, now Section 256 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act should be confined to evidence and rebuttal of matters raised by the defense for the first time.

It was held that in the exercise of the power under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act, now Section 256 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, the judge, as an umpire, is not expected to descend into the arena.

It was held in this case that a court of appeal may not interfere where a trial judge has exercised his discretion to call a witness at the end of the case for the prosecution but before the defense opens in order to remedy an obvious omission in the case of the prosecution.

In this case, the appellants were charged with murder. They each gave evidence and during the evidence of one of them, he introduced a fresh matter relating to customary law in cases of suspected witchcraft, which, if true, would have seriously discredited the evidence of the prosecution. The trial judge then called a chief who had been sitting in court to testify to his knowledge of customary law on the question thus raised. The court held that the judge was correct in so doing as the matter of customary law arose ex improvise.

In this case, it was held that the power of the court to call or recall a witness is not limited to clearing something which has arisen ex improvise and which no human ingenuity could have foreseen; and that it is the duty of the court to re-call and re-examine any person at any stage of a trial if his further evidence appears to be essential to a just decision in the case.

In this case, the Supreme Court stated that nevertheless it is the traditional function of the jury to decide cases on the evidence brought out before them by the contesting parties and that in the exercise of the discretion to decide what questions are proper, the judge should discourage a jury from asking questions other than those designed to clarify answers given to questions asked by one of the parties.

The court held in this case that in a criminal trial, it is not competent for the prosecution which called the witnesses to pick and choose between them, and cannot urge the court to accept the testimony of the one witness in preference for the evidence of the other except where on the facts, the court in its discretion is able to treat the other as an hostile witness.

The court held in this case that when a witness is shown to have made a previous statement inconsistent with his evidence and no cogent reasons are given for the inconsistency, the court should regard his evidence as unreliable.

The court held that although the production of a previous extra-judicial contradicting statement may destroy or nullify what a witness has said in court, yet it is not evidence of the truth of the facts contained in the extra-judicial statement unless the witness admits that he has tried to mislead the court and then swears to the truth of the facts contained in his previous statement and even where this is done, the court may deem it safer to reject the evidence altogether.

The court held in this case that the reason why a witness is allowed to refresh his memory is so that he should suffer from a mistake due to lapse of memory.

The court held in this case that there is nothing wrong in the practice of showing to a witness a statement made by that witness at some time before the witness goes into the witness box to give evidence, but it is desirable that the defense are informed of what has been done as it may be relevant to the weight which can properly be attached to the evidence of the witness.

In this case, the trial judge allowed a witness to refresh his memory by the reading to him of his deposition at the preliminary investigation, which deposition was taken some five weeks after the incidents to which the witness deposed. The Federal Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in allowing the witness to make use of the deposition to refresh his memory in these circumstances.

The court held in this case that as the document sought to be used to refresh a witness; memory must have been written by the witness or read by him, an illiterate who can do neither of these things cannot refresh his memory by having the entries in a log book and made at his dictation, read to him.

The court held in this case that a document made with the view to giving evidence thereof, such as proof of evidence, cannot be used for refreshing memory.

The court held in this case that a document inadmissible in evidence such as an invalid lease can be used in refreshing memory because such document has no further value in the trial than assisting the witness' recollection.

The court held in this case that a document inadmissible in evidence such as an unstamped writing can be used in refreshing memory because such document has no further value in the trial than assisting the witness' recollection.

The court held in this case that it is wrong to permit a witness to refresh his memory from a document which he had made two months after the occurrence of the matters recorded therein.

The court held in this case that any document which has been used by a witness to refresh his memory must be produced and shown to the adverse party if he requires it and the adverse party is at liberty to cross examine the witness on it and to tender it if he so wishes; but such a document cannot be tendered in examination in chief.

In this case, a person who was called by the respondent to produce the record of the previous proceedings, which record was required in the suit, went to the witness box and tendered the record on oath. The trial magistrate refused the appellant the right to cross examine him on the ground that he was called merely to produce a document. The court in holding the trial magistrate was in error stated that it is to be observed that Section 192, now Section 219 of the Evidence Act speaks of a person summoned and not of a witness. It follows that the person who put in a certified copy of the Native court proceedings, upon being sworn, became witness for all purposes and was therefore liable to cross examination.

In this case the court held that the rule regarding exclusion of evidence on grounds of public policy is absolute. However, this decision was overruled by the court in Conway v. Rimmer (1968) 1 ALL ER 874.

In this case, the court held that a claim to privilege is not conclusive where it is shown;

a. Not to have been taken in good faith, or

b. To have been activated by some irrelevant or improper consideration

c. To have been founded on a false promise.

The court held in this case that for a court to come to a decision in a case where privilege is claimed, it has a right to inspect the document where the claim is not properly formulated or is of doubtful validity.

The court held in this case that the provision of Section 219(2) of the old Evidence Act was void to the extent that it was inconsistent with the provision for Section 22(1) of the 1963 Constitution in that, a litigant, part of whose evidence a minister has an absolute discretion to prevent the court from hearing, cannot be held to have had fair hearing.

The Supreme Court held in this case that if in a criminal case, privilege is claimed and accepted, the court may as well hold that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

It is the light of the above that the modification introduced to Section 243 of the Evidence Act 2011 vide subsection 3 thereof, can be properly understood and appreciated.

It was held in this case that when a party, during a court proceeding, calls for a document which he has given the other party notice to produce, and the document is produced and inspected by the party calling for its production, then he is bound to tender it in evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so.

The court in this case that where the nature of evidence in a case has been disclosed in the pleadings, it will be injustice to allow the plaintiffs to adduce evidence at the close of the defendant's case.