Under Section 2(2) of the Legal Practitioner Act (LPA), people were entitled to apply to practice as Barrister and Solicitor in Nigeria, by applying to the Chief Justice (CJ) to be so authorized. That section of the law provides as follows:

"If an application under this subsection is made to the Chief Justice by or on behalf of any person appearing to him to be qualified to practice as an advocate in any country where the legal system is similar to that of Nigeria, and

The Chief Justice is of the opinion that it is expedient to permit that person to practice as a barrister for the purpose of proceedings described in the application,

the Chief Justice may by warrant under his hand, authorize that person, on payment to the Registrar, of such fee not exceeding fifty naira..., to practice as a barrister for the purpose of those proceedings."

The situation of the dearth of experienced and competent legal practitioners in Nigeria at the early stages of legal practice in the country, and this powers of the CJ to authorize anybody he considers qualified to appear in courts in Nigeria stirred up some controversies as to the recovery of cost of litigation with the legal fees of the counsel incorporated, especially where the Counsel is from other Common law jurisdictions such as Britain. It was held in this case of Rewane v. Okotie-Eboh that:

1. parties are at liberty to choose who will represent them in court cases, whether from within the country or overseas as long as such persons are qualified to practice in Nigeria;

2. costs follow the event;

3. a successful party is entitled to be awarded cost;

4. it is entirely within the discretion of the court to decide what cost to award depending on the particular circumstance of the particular case.

For other judicial authorities on the right of citizens/parties to court cases to decide their legal representation, see Nwambe v State (1995) 3NWLR (pt.384) p. 385;

For the particular issue of representation of an accused person by a legal practitioner of his choice S. 36(6) (c) of the CFRN, 1990 (as amended), and S. 352 of the C.P.A. see Peter Nemi v. The State (1994) NWLR (Pt. 366) 1; Josiah v. The State (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1) 125.

See particularly the case of Oladejo v. The State (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 419 where it was held that the State's failure to provide legal representation for a citizen charged with a capital offence in line with the provisions of S. 287(1)(a)(i)-(iii) of the C.P.L. and particularly Rule 5 of The Robbery and Firearms Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1975, was denying him fair trial.

Although by Section 8(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, a legal practitioner has the right to represent another and shall have the right of audience in all the courts of law sitting in Nigeria, this right can only be exercised whilst it is available and not when it is in abeyance i.e. whilst a legal practitioner is also a litigant before the court. In his role as a litigant, he is not appearing in court as a legal practitioner. He therefore cannot exercise the right of audience and the right to represent a co-defendant in an action.

The exclusive right of a legal practitioner to represent a litigant extends to all courts of law in Nigeria (including Customary or Area Courts) Section 36 (6) (d) 1999 Constitution as amended. Section 8 (1) Legal Practitioners Act. Of course, a Nigerian lawyer appears in court properly dressed in his wig and gown. But when he is appearing in any of the inferior courts -- for example Magistrates' and Customary Courts, he needs not so dress -- appearing dressed in a black (or somber) suit with tie or bib meets the requirement.

However, please note Rule 45 (2) (b) &(c) new RPC 2007 which provides:

A lawyer shall not wear the Barrister's or Senior Advocate's robe when conducting his own case as a party to a legal proceeding in court or giving evidence in a legal proceeding in Court. If he defends himself in a criminal charge, he must be in the dock to conduct his defence.

As provided in 292(2) CFRN 1999 as amended, ―Any person

who has held judicial office shall not on ceasing to be a judicial officer for any reason whatsoever thereafter appear or act as a legal practitioner before any court of law or tribunal in Nigeria.

By virtue of Section 318 (1) CFR 1999, Judicial Officers mean

a. Judges of the High Court,

b. Court of Appeal,

c. Supreme Court of Nigeria,

d. Grand Kadi, Kadi of Sharia Court of Appeal,

e. President or Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal.

f. Judges of National Industrial Court (NIC) in view of the Third Alteration Act 2010 which has elevated the NIC to the status of a superior court of record at par with the High Court.

See other restrictions on retired judicial officers and lawyers that have retired from public office or public employment as stated by Rules 6(1)(2)(3)(4) of the RPC which provides that:

(1) A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. (This provision is not limited to judicial officers as defined above).

(2) A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has advised on or dealt with while in such office or employment.

A lawyer acting in his capacity as a legal practitioner, legal officer or adviser of any Governmental department or Ministry or any corporation, shall not sign or file a legal document unless there is affixed on any such document a seal and stamp approved by the Nigerian Bar Association.

Legal documents include pleadings, affidavits, depositions, applications, instruments, agreements, deeds letters, memoranda, reports, legal opinions or any similar documents.

A document signed or filed without compliance means the document has not been properly signed or filed. The Supreme Court, per Ngwuta JSC, delivering the lead judgment in the instant referenced case held that a legal document signed and filed without the NBA stamp and seal as required by Rule 10(1) RPC 2007 is not proper in law. It renders it irregular or voidable. The document will become valid when counsel affixes the stamp and seal.

Same as in APC v. Yaki (supra). But additionally stated that where such legal document is not regularized by affixation of the stamp and seal before the court takes a decision such document will be rendered void. If such legal document is an originating process, the entire action will be liable to be struck out.

The position of the law with respect to a legal practitioner who paid for the Stamp and Seal but has not been given by the NBA is not yet settled. The decision of the court is still subject to interpretation by the Supreme Court.

Editor's Note: In practice, the way out in such instance is that the Counsel attaches his Receipt of Payment of Bar Dues and Stamp and Seal to the Court process he is filing. And same is taken to mean that the regularization of such processes flows from the saying that equity regards as done that which ought to have been done.

No attorney or counsel has right in discharge of his professional duties to involve his client by his advice in violation of the laws of the State, and when he does so, he becomes implicated in the client's guilt, if, when by following the advice, a crime against the laws of the State is committed. The fact that he acts in the capacity and under the privilege of counsel does not exonerate him from the well-founded legal principles which render all persons who advice and direct the commission of crime guilty of the crime committed by compliance with the advice.

where a testator instructed his lawyer to prepare certain conveyance with intent to evade payment of duty which the solicitor carried out. An order to the solicitor to produce the instructions cannot be resisted as privileged communication.

Through Legal Advice: lawyers are expected to be careful in rendering legal advice to client. A lawyer may be liable in negligence where he proffers advice which turns out to be wrong if while acting on the advice something goes wrong. In this case Bello Raji v. X the Counsel misadvised his client which resulted in the action being caught up with statute of limitation.

Conducting Searches, preparing of legal documents and other related transactions require extreme caution. Where Counsel in doing any of these is found to have committed such clearly avoidable error, judging him by the normal standard of a lawyer, he may be held liable such as happened in the case of Midland Bank Trust Co. v. Kemp where a lawyer failed to insert an option of purchase granted to a second party.

In taking out Writs in Court Counsel need to employ all due diligence, study the subject matter, be certain what ingredients he needs to establish and plead his case accordingly. It so happened that a lawyer briefed to handle an election petition case, a matter that is known to be strictly time-bound, wasted so much time after being briefed that his case became dead on delivery because time had ran out on them. That is exactly what happened in this case of NBA v. Akintokun.

A lawyer owes his learned colleagues the duty of treating them with respect, fairness, consideration and dignity and shall not allow any ill -- feeling between his client and his opponent to influence his conduct and demeanour towards his learned colleagues or even their clients.

In this case it was held to be contempt of court for a solicitor to abuse and threaten an opposing counsel while on his way along the passages from the judge's chambers after an application therein.

Counsel should endeavor, as far as possible, to accommodate the convenience of fellow counsel when the interests of his client or the cause of justice will not be injured by so doing. It is particularly improper for counsel to criticize another or impugn his motives for taking a weak case or seeking an adjournment.

This relatively contemporary Nigerian case sends warning to the lawyer that he should at all times and in all cases, especially in a criminal trial cases where his client's life is at stake (Capital Offences) be totally committed and eagle-eyed vigilant. In this case, it was held that a Counsel in court in a capital trial has a very important and sacred duty to perform. He owes that duty to not only his client and the court but also to society at large. It is of the very essence of that duty that he should promptly take objection to every irregularity at the trial, be it an irregularity relating to procedure or to evidence called at the trial.

This relatively contemporary Nigerian case sends warning to the lawyer that he should at all times and in all cases, especially in a criminal trial cases where his client's life is at stake (Capital Offences) be totally committed and eagle-eyed vigilant. In this case, it was held that a Counsel in court in a capital trial has a very important and sacred duty to perform. He owes that duty to not only his client and the court but also to society at large. It is of the very essence of that duty that he should promptly take objection to every irregularity at the trial, be it an irregularity relating to procedure or to evidence called at the trial.

Any misconduct by a lawyer which would if committed before he was a lawyer would have been sufficient to prevent him from being admitted as a lawyer will be sufficient to warrant his being struck off the roll or suspended from practice.

This old U.S. case in which the decision by the Bar of Illinois to refuse admission to a conscientious objector to National service on the ground that he would be unable to subscribe to the oath to support the constitution of the State of Illinois was upheld by the Supreme Court serves to teach law students and practicing lawyers that the lawyer is expected to be above board, both in personal lawyer to lawyer, lawyer to colleagues and lawyer to nation relationships that the lawyer is expected to be a man of impeccable character, commitment and patriotism.

A lawyer has a special duty to uphold the law and promote the cause of justice because he occupies a quasi-official position. In the words of Justice Yales in. The court must have Ministers; the Attorneys are its Ministers - Rule 1 RPC 2007.

This case is used to remind students and practicing lawyers alike, of the immortal admonition of Lord Esher, concerning the need, indeed, duty, of lawyers not to allow their clients to use them for the revengeful plots against their enemies in litigation, when he said:

"If a solicitor were instructed by his client to take certain proceedings which could legally be taken but which would, to the knowledge of the solicitor, injure his antagonist unnecessarily, but the client nevertheless instructed him to go on in order to gratify his anger then, if the solicitor knew all these, he would be unfair and wrong if he took those proceedings, although he was acting on instruction in so doing."

So this case teaches that a lawyer should not to take, unreasonable or oppressive proceedings in order to gratify a malicious client. Legal Ethics P. 135. - Counsel should refrain from using abusive words even against his opponent. If he does, the court ought to stop him. ―Eloquential Cogniturans male decdendisubile (it is dog's eloquence to undertake the task of abusing one's opponent).

Subject to the rules of precedence all members of the Bar are equal. This principle involves the explanation that no member of the Bar irrespective of his rank or title shall regard himself as superior or inferior to any other member of the Bar. Denigration of other members of the profession may amount to infamous conduct.

A lawyer should adhere strictly to all express promises to and agreements with opposing counsel, whether oral or writing, and should adhere in good faith to all agreements implied by the circumstances or by local customs.

A lawyer should avoid all of such unethical conducts that have become known as Sharp practices. When a lawyer knows the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.

In the trial of a cause it is unethical to allude to the personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly client wrangling.

A lawyer should adhere strictly to all express promises to and agreements with opposing counsel, whether oral or writing, and should adhere in good faith to all agreements implied by the circumstances or by local customs.

A lawyer should avoid all of such unethical conducts that have become known as Sharp practices. When a lawyer knows the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.

In the trial of a cause it is unethical to allude to the personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly client wrangling.

A lawyer should adhere strictly to all express promises to and agreements with opposing counsel, whether oral or writing, and should adhere in good faith to all agreements implied by the circumstances or by local customs.

A lawyer should avoid all of such unethical conducts that have become known as Sharp practices. When a lawyer knows the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.

In the trial of a cause it is unethical to allude to the personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly client wrangling. Other judicial authorities on this matter of need for a lawyer to keep his promises are Ex P Hales (1970) 2KB 539; Re Hull Country Bank (1879) 13 Ch. 261.

A lawyer owes his learned colleagues the duty of treating them with respect, fairness, consideration and dignity and shall not allow any ill -- feeling between his client and his opponent to influence his conduct and demeanour towards his learned colleagues or even their clients.

In this case it was held to be contempt of court for a solicitor to abuse and threaten an opposing counsel while on his way along the passages from the judge's chambers after an application therein.

Counsel should endeavor, as far as possible, to accommodate the convenience of fellow counsel when the interests of his client or the cause of justice will not be injured by so doing. It is particularly improper for counsel to criticize another or impugn his motives for taking a weak case or seeking an adjournment.

A lawyer owes as a duty to his client and to the court to attend all sittings of court as pertains to that particular matter unless he had obtained leave of court to be absent, and same for lateness. And where counsel informs court of his absence or lateness, he must also inform the counsel to all the parties in the case. Rule 31(5) RPC; See the other case of Shemfe v. Police (1962) I ALL NLR 811.

A lawyer owes his learned colleagues the duty of treating them with respect, fairness, consideration and dignity and shall not allow any ill -- feeling between his client and his opponent to influence his conduct and demeanour towards his learned colleagues or even their clients.

In this case it was held to be contempt of court for a solicitor to abuse and threaten an opposing counsel while on his way along the passages from the judge's chambers after an application therein.

Counsel should endeavor, as far as possible, to accommodate the convenience of fellow counsel when the interests of his client or the cause of justice will not be injured by so doing. It is particularly improper for counsel to criticize another or impugn his motives for taking a weak case or seeking an adjournment.

In this case for instance, a Barrister permitted affidavits which contained matter amounting to chicanery to be used. On a motion to commit him for contempt of court, it was argued that all he had been guilty of was not having thrown up his brief. It was held that it was his duty to disclose to the Court that the affidavits were untrue and that his fault did not consist of not throwing up his brief but having made' himself a party to fraud whose aim was to delude the court.

All such other conducts that a lawyer should not engage in while handling the cases for client can be found under Rule 32 (2)(a-k) of the RPC.

It was stated in this case that a Counsel should understand and regard himself as an officer of the court and has a duty to uphold and observe the rule of law. The court is entitled to rely upon him for assistance in ascertaining the truth, veritalest justitiae mater. Counsel must make the fullest disclosure of evidence to the Court whether for or against his case and must not knowingly suppress a material fact. He must also not fail to cite a decided case that is against him although he is entitled to distinguish such case. He must not knowingly mislead the court. He must also not stand by and allow the court to be misled. see Rule 32 RPC 2007.

It was stated in this case that a Counsel should understand and regard himself as an officer of the court and has a duty to uphold and observe the rule of law. The court is entitled to rely upon him for assistance in ascertaining the truth, veritalest justitiae mater. Counsel must make the fullest disclosure of evidence to the Court whether for or against his case and must not knowingly suppress a material fact. He must also not fail to cite a decided case that is against him although he is entitled to distinguish such case. He must not knowingly mislead the court. He must also not stand by and allow the court to be misled. see Rule 32 RPC 2007.

This authority reminds Counsel not to take for granted that if you stay absent and write to ask for adjournment the Court is bound to accept your suggestion. That is why Counsel will need to always be fully prepared to go on with the case and not seek unnecessary adjournment thereby wasting the court's time. Court may refuse application for adjournment and proceed with the case.

This case illustrates that Counsel owes the court duty of respect and cooperation to act in a manner that enhances the smooth administration of justice-

The point at hand is demonstrated in the old case of R. v. Jordan (I888)36 W.R.797 where a legal practitioner interrupted a court during the course of judgement with the words "This is a most unjust remark." He was held to have committed contempt. The case of Atake v The A.G. Federation (I982) II SC. I53 further emphasises this point of duty of respect and honour which the lawyer owes to the court.

A lawyer must maintain a respectful attitude to the court in words and deed. A lawyer must always treat the court with respect, dignity, and honour. If he has a proper ground for complaint against a judicial officer, he shall make the complaint to the appropriate authorities.

Rule 31(2) RPC. See also Rule 35 of the RPC which enjoins lawyers before a judicial tribunal to accord it due respect, courtesy, and dignity.

This case teaches the how very important it is for a lawyer to maintain and act with decorum while in court. Counsel should rise when addressing or being addressed by the judge.

a. He should remain silent and attentive when the Judge is speaking

b. While the court is in session, he should not assume an undignified posture. See Discipline of Law pg. 8 where Lord Denning stated thus:

―Whatever the tribunal, you must give good impression. Your appearance means a lot. Dress neatly, not slovenly. Be well-groomed. Your voice must be pleasing, not harsh or discordant. Pitch it so that all can hear without strain. Pronounce your consonants. Do not slur your words. Speak not too fast but yet nor too slow

Counsel while in court must not engage in any banter, arguments or controversy with the opposing party. Rule 36(d). He is to channel his complaints to the courts.

It was held in this case that mere discourtesy to court, bad as it is, is not necessarily contempt of court.

Continuous and persistent absence of counsel from court without leave could be treated as interference with the course of justice and held to be contempt of court.

Absence of counsel on date of judgment is not necessarily contempt of court, however it is disrespectful for counsel to be absent on date of judgment.

A lawyer must not only attend all his court appointed sittings except when his absence or lateness is unavoidable, and he informs court and his other colleagues in the matter at the earliest opportunity, he also owes it to his client and to the court to do so punctually.

Just as a lawyer owes several duties to the Court, so also does the court have its responsibilities towards a lawyer. The court has the Constitutional obligation to grant fair hearing to both parties. Counsel must be allowed to conduct his case in the way he thinks best and the court should not interfere, as long as he is within allowed procedure.

The Court also owes Counsel the duty of respect, and entitlement of right of audience in court. It is not for the Court to decide which lawyer can appear in his court and which lawyer should not.

The court owes Counsel the right of respect and not to unduly interfere in Counsel's conduct of his case. Where the court flouts or denies Counsel these rights its judgment in the case may be set aside on appeal.

In a case where the court refused a reasonable request for adjournment and proceeded with the case without counsel, same was viewed as denial of fair hearing attracting the serious consequence of the decision reached being set aside on appeal.

So also would be the case where the court does not allow counsel to call his witnesses or to address it.

A Judge should be impartial and observe the rules of natural justice.

Unfortunately, the party that suffers when a judgment is set aside because of judge's attitude of antagonizing Counsel that leads to lack of fair hearing, is the litigant and not the judge.

Same as in State v. Oyenubi's case that emphasises that the judge should be impartial, observe the rules of natural justice in his handling of cases.

Judges should not forget that when they fail to observe the rules of fairness and impartiality and there follows a dishonouring and upturning of their judgments it is the parties, not the lawyers per se, that bear the brunt of their misconduct.

In all of these, that is, the judge doing his duty of being respectful to Counsel, allowing Counsel to do his case as he thinks best, be fair and impartial in handling the matter, the judge is also not to sit unconcerned and watch Counsel's incompetence cause injustice to occur. The judge's duty is first foremost, seeing that real justice is dispensed to all parties before him, to the institution the Court represents and to the society at large.

Contempt of court is an offence of a criminal nature, and so, to prove it, the prosecution is required to do so only after attaining the Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt standard. The ingredients of the particular contemptuous acts must be proved and established beyond reasonable doubt. See also the case of Awobokun v. Adeyemi (1968) NMLR Page 289.

Talking about comments and remarks, it needs to be said that it is not every statement about a judge which he is not happy about that would amount to contemptuous comment. In this case of the comment that was to that the Judge acted un-judiciously was held not to be contemptuous.

This old case presses home the fact that mere statement or remark that appears to diminish or demean the court can be all it takes to entrap the commentator in a contempt charge. In this particular case, all that the convict said of a statement made by the court was "This is a most unjust remark" which held to be demeaning and lowering of the esteem and regard of that court in its administration of justice.

It was also a mere remark about the manner the Court handled a case in the contempt charges in R V. Stafford County Judge; Atake V. The AG. Fed. (1982) 11 SC. 153.

As stated earlier, contempt of court is an offence punishable by some term of imprisonment. Section 133 of the Criminal Code provides for Three (3) Months' Imprisonment for a convicted Contemnor. But in Afe Babalola V. FEDECO & ANR. AK/ML/77 of 21/2/78 @ 17 -- 23 it is stated that the Halsbury's Law teaches that punishment for civil contempt is Six (6) Months. While in Ikabala V. Ojosipe Suit No. LD/967/71 of 30/3/72 instructs that the punishment for contempt can be in the indefinite form of ordering that the Contemnor be kept in detention until such a time as he is able to show that he has purge himself of the contemptuous state of mind.

This case instructs that even as it has been said that the offence of Contempt of Court is a serious one, actually a criminal offence, yet it will not be easily taken that one has committed a contemptuous act without it being well established that both elements of actus reus and mens rea are present. To that extent, an act which was not done intentionally, not with the mind of slighting or demeaning the court, which as provocative as it may be, the Counsel realizes his mistake on time and renders a sincere and credible apology, would not be taken and punished as contemptuous.

This State v. Ekundayo case also is an authority supporting the fact that a Judge may commit another Judge to prison for contempt where the latter is seen and established to have acted or said a thing that is contemptuous of his Brother Judge.

This case justifies sever punishment for the offence of contempt of court. The offence of Contempt of Court is a serious one, being a challenge to the authority and sanctity of the court and the entire judicial process, which itself is the thread that nits the entire society and the justice system together, ensuring that order and not anarchy, rules. Anything that is done to distract from this bulwark that the justice system serves as must be seriously frowned at and punished in a way to serve as deterrent to others.

When a contempt is not committed in the face of the court, a judge who has been personally attacked should not, as much as can be possibly arranged, should not hear the case.

If a trial court wishes to deal with a case of contempt in the face of the court summarily, he should put the accused not in the witness box but into the dock and ask him to show cause. He should not be compulsorily put into the witness box as that offends section 36(11) of the 1999 constitution which reads ―No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial. See Deduwa v. The State (1975) I ALL NLR Pages 1 - 17, Agbachom v. The State (1970) I ALL N.L.R. Page 69. Note also the proviso to Section 160 of the Evidence Act which buttresses Section 36(11) of the 1999 Constitution.

Natural justice demands that before anyone is committed for contempt, he must be informed of the details of the contempt and must be given an opportunity to make an answer and defence- See Re: Olu Onagoruwa FCA/E 117/79 delivered on 5/2/80.

No person shall be punished for contempt of court which is a criminal offence unless the specific offence charged against him is distinctly stated and an opportunity of answering it is given to him. See Obiekwe Aniweta v. The State (Supra). A court can deal summarily with cases of contempt in the face of the court and by the very judicial officer in whose presence the offence was committed.

In cases of contempt committed in the face of the court, the court has two options: firstly, there may be cases where the offence should be dealt with summarily but such hearing must be conducted in accordance with the cardinal principle of fair hearing and the case must be one in which the facts surrounding the alleged contempt are so notorious as to be virtually incontestable.

Secondly in most cases, the proper procedure of apprehension or arrest, charge, prosecution etc, must be followed: *see also the cases of Oku v. The State (1970) I ALL N.L.R. P. 60. Maharaj v. A.G. Trinidad & Tobago (1977) I ALL NLR 411.

It is true that whatever the nature of Contempt of Court charge is -- criminal or civil -- contempt of Court is, by the nature of the punishment to be administered, criminal charge. So, even where it is said to be a civil contempt arising from a breach of an order of injunction, it must nonetheless, be proved beyond all reasonable doubt as in a criminal proceeding.

The word "Contempt" is defined in Collins English Dictionary as the attitude or feeling of a person towards a person or thing that he considers worthless or despicable; scorn. - Willful disregard of or disrespect for the authority of a court of law or legislative body.

In this particular case, IDIGBE JSC has this to say on the definition of contempt of court.

"It is indeed difficult to give exact definition of contempt of court and this is because it is so manifold in aspects but generally it may be described as any conduct which tend to bring into disrespect, scorn or disrepute the authority and administration of the law or which tends to interfere with and or prejudice litigants and/or their witnesses in the course of litigation"

Contempt could either be in the face of the court (in facie curiae) or outside the court (ex facie curiae). Contempt in facie curiae has no closed category and examples of such instance are many. But broadly it is word spoken or act done within the precincts of the court which obstructs or interferes with due administration of justice or is calculated to do so. Contempt ex-facie curiae may be described as words spoken or otherwise published or act done outside court which are intended or likely to interfere with or obstruct the fair administration of justice

A fair and civil criticism made against a court, may not amount to contempt. Reviews and critiques of judgments and Rulings are part of developing the law and its administration.

Every private communication to a Judge for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a pending matter and whether or not accompanied by the offer of a bribe or by personal abuse is a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the cause of justice:

Communicating with a judge over a matter being handled by him behind the back of the opposing Counsel or parties is contemptuous.

This case teaches that while it is not easy to precisely list what exact conducts can amount to contempt of court, nevertheless, the following acts or conduct have been held to constitute contempt of court:

1. language or behaviour which is outrageous or scandalous or which is deliberately insulting to the court;

2. comments whether oral or written scandalizing the court are contemptuous,

3. publication in a newspaper or article containing scurrilous personal abuse of a Judge, with reference to his conduct as a Judge in a judicial proceeding which has terminated is a contempt of court.

Allegations of partiality made against the Judge which are probably the most common way in which the court has been held to be scandalized, are treated very seriously as contempt because they tend to undermine confidence in the basic function of a Judge. An article or publication in a newspaper that scandalizes or is calculated to bring the court into disrepute amounts to contempt.

Any publication in a newspaper misrepresenting proceedings of a court is contempt under section 133 (4) of the Criminal Code.

Civil Contempt of court is contempt in procedure consisting of disobedience to the judgments, orders or other process of court and involving a private injury.

Criminal contempt consists of words or acts which obstruct or tend to obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice. It was the view of Ravel 1917 that to allege that a judge is partial is criminal contempt of court punishable with a term of imprisonment. In the opinion of a Stafford County judge, in 1888-57 LTQB 483, JORDAN 36 WR 289, that it is a criminal contempt of court to say, of the judgment of a judge "That is a most unjust remark" is criminally contemptuous of the court.

In this case the court said,

"The purpose of the discipline enforced by the court in the case of contempt is the need to project the dignity of the court to the person of the Judge and to prevent undue interference with the administration of Justice but not to bolster up the power and dignity of the Judge as an individual. The importance of this is that of all the places where 1aw and order is maintained, it is in the courts the course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of the society. To maintain law and order, judges have and must have power at once to deal with those who offend against it".

Also in this case the Court defined contempt of court more from the angle of interference with the aim of unfairly skewing the outcome of the adjudication as follows

"The essence of contempt is action or inaction amounting to an interference with or obstruction or having a tendency to interfere with or obstruct due administration of justice".

Unethical practices and Corruption do so very often crop up in the entire long chain of activities that qualify to be regarded as activities and processes in the Nigerian Legal System - from the Police Officers, the Court Officials, the Judicial Officers (including Judges, Registrars, Clerks of Court, etc.) to the External Forces that bring so much pressure upon these players in the entire world of Justice system. He said pressures come in various forms and guise.

The CJN Elias spotted and warned Police against the corruption and perversion of Police Officers being used by some evil minded vengeful persons who plot and work to use as Agents of Vendetta against their enemies.

This old case has a definition of what is an Infamous Conduct that has been generally accepted and relied upon for years. Defining a phrase inserted in the Medical & Dental Practitioners Act, the Queen's Bench Court stated that it means:

"Where a medical man in the pursuit of his profession has done something with regard to which it would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency"

This definition was adopted and applied in the Legal practitioner breach of his Law Society's Rules for practitioners in the cases of Solicitor Ex Parte Law Society (1912) 1 KB 301 @ 311, and Grahame V. Attorney General of Fuji (1936) ALL ER 992 @ 1000.

In this case, it was held that a Counsel who willfully acted without the authorization of his Client committed an Infamous and Dishonourable act.

A Solicitor who, on his Client's instruction, concealed a Will, was held to have committed a dishonourable and unethical act.

In this case Infamous conduct was defined to be one of serious infraction of the acceptable standard of behavior or ethics of the profession.

Infamous conduct in a professional respect was defined to be "an act or omission, which in the opinion of the disciplinary committee is such that will bring the profession into disrepute"

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is not a good 'legal' definition. It is wrong to leave the wisdom of what is or is not infamous conduct entirely in the hands of the very deciding committee - if it stands with and ends with that same disciplinary committee, it means that there will not be any valid ground to appeal the decision of the disciplinary committee, because infamous conduct is what the disciplinary committee says is infamous conduct. It breaches fair hearing rules.

It is also worthy of mention that what may constitute infamous conduct may depend upon the norms of each profession and the facts upon which each case is to be considered. A particular conduct may be so very dishonourable in one profession than it may be in another -- what may be a serious infraction of the lawyers' ethical rules of conduct (trust) may not be that serious in the medical profession where commitment to saving life is of utmost importance. If a medical doctor information with another professional without your authorization but for the purpose of saving your life, he would not be held to have breached the principle of Confidentiality as would be the case if a Legal Practitioner was the one did so.

This point of matching the particular facts with the nature of each profession was well highlighted in the case of Onitiri v Fadipe* Charge No *LPDC/IP/82 where misappropriation of client'

This case teaches that where the facts constituting infamous conduct also constitute a criminal offence, it may not be allowed to institute professional disciplinary procedure against the offender unless criminal prosecution has been brought against him.

Other judicial authorities supporting this rule are Garba v University of Maiduguri (1986)1 NWLR (Pt 18) 550, and Akintemi & Ors. v Prof. Onwumechili (1985) 1 NSCC 46.

Where an infamous act was not committed in a professional respect it would not come within the provision of S. 11(1) (a) LPA, but it may come within s. 11(2) Legal Practitioners Act as conduct incompatible with the status of a legal practitioner, in which case the Legal Practitioner would be likely to still come under sanctions in his capacity as a Legal Practitioner.

It was so help and applied in the English case of Thomas James Wallace 1886 16 ER 26.

This old English case teaches that where a person who had been convicted in a criminal trial of an offence which also constituted infamous conduct in a professional respect and who gets that conviction reversed on appeal, purely on technical grounds (that is, a reversal that amounts to Discharged without Acquittal), could still be proceeded against professionally for infamous conduct in a professional respect.

While there is no precise list of offences for this category of criminal acts, offences involving securing enrollment as a Legal Practitioner by fraud, financial dishonesty, and those that endanger the welfare and morality of human beings and society such as possession and distribution of hard drugs like cocaine, making business of prostitution, human (child) trafficking and the likes, have always been regarded as incompatible with the status of a legal practitioner. R v. Abuah 1962 1 ALL NLR 279 also affirms position of the law of Legal Practitioners' Ethics.

Quite conveniently for the political powers that be, such political offences as treason, treasonable felony, sedition, marriage and such other cases are considered to be those types of offences that are not incompatible with the status of a Legal Practitioners (LP).

It is important that it be pointed that it is not necessarily the seriousness of the offence that is material but whether a person who commits the offence should remain a member of a learned profession.

In this case of Re Weare case it was not only so established that morality of the conduct matters, but also that it does need to established that the reprehensible conduct was committed in a professional regards, but that even if it has nothing to do with the LP in his professional life, it will still not be permitted that a lawyer would be allowed to get involved in such 'dirty' business such as being entrepreneurially involved in brothel matters and continue to practice and move around parading himself/herself as a learned gentleman. It smears not only him/her but collaterally, the rest of his/her colleagues.

It was in the same line of reasoning that in the case of Re Valance a lawyer who conspired with and assisted a prisoner to escape the prison and ran to another country was held to have committed not only a criminal act but also one which is incompatible with his status as LP whose name ought to, and was indeed, struck off the Roll.

This case teaches the LP to avoid failing into the dated style of over using certain clichés or repeating of same thing by the use of other words that mean the same thing, for example, grant, sell, alienate, convey, transfer, all saying the same thing, when the one simple word "grant" would do.

It is also no more fashionable to use the word 'Such' 'the said...', 'whereas' as a way of repeating same subject or repeatedly, just for the purpose of mentioning same subject or a noun that one has earlier mentioned in documents or write-ups.

Using a word that should speak of Mandatoriness, Obligation or Compulsion ('must', 'shall') where what is required is Direction, Guidance or **Suggestion ('**will', 'may') vice versa, can lead to wrong drafting that might, in same particular instances, cost your client so much.

These cases teach that the words **'BOTH' 'AND' 'EITHER', 'OR' should be carefully and properly used for their Conjunctive or Disjunctive effects.

Sometimes, using them together, for example, 'Both/And' thus:

"Both Ada and Hassan were appointed to represent us in the meeting" does the Conjunctive job more clearly,

Just as

'Either/Or' used thus:

Either Ada or Hassan may attend the meeting on our behalf" brings out the disjunctive intention very well.

And / Or may, in certain situations, be used together to effect saving of words but must be avoided if it creates ambiguity, e.g. dogs and / or horses.

Refer to the Handbook to see the several rules and style of drafting that make for simplicity, clarity, completeness and richness of legal documents which include:

1. Avoiding intricate and archaic words, phrases, clichés, legalese and expressions that create ambiguity;

2. Careful use of pronouns, inconsistency in nomenclature;

3. Misuse of 'Must', 'Will', 'May' and 'Shall';

4. Criticality of Punctuation -- considering that, as provided in Section 3 of the Interpretation Act, punctuation forms part of enactments, instruments and all other documents to be given legal meaning;

5. Use of descriptive words for Definitions, provision of Interpretation schedule/section, Brackets, Enumeration of some important particulars so as to exclude what is not included (ejusdem generis Rule);

6. Paying serious attention to how date and time is indicated -- for example, "From 2nd June -- 10th June means that the 2nd of June is excluded while 10th of June is included, Time computation here starts from 3rd of June. See Stewart v. Chapman (1951) 1 K.B. 796, Cartwright v. Maccormack (1963) W.L.R. 18.

7. Making sure to such expressions to represent and convey exactly what you have in mind: Example -- At the expiration of this has been held to mean

At or after the expiration of the stated period. It will not be accepted 'after a reasonable time of the stated period. See In the Goods of Ruddy (1972) L.R. 2 P and D 330.

About Time and Period, you may want to check under WORDS & PHRASES of the Index of NWLR or ALL FWLR to see the exact legal meaning of such words and phrases as'Day', 'Clear Day', 'Month', 'Calendar Month', 'Year' etc.

THE LPAC: Section 10 of the LPA created the Legal Practitioners' Disciplinary Committee (LPDC), while the Legal Practitioners' Appeal Committee (APP. Comm) is also established under Section 12 of the LPA to hear and decide the appeals of persons who are not dissatisfied with the decisions of the LPDC.

THE SC: Appeals go from the App Comm. to the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court also has, under Section 13(1) of the LPA, its own original jurisdiction of acting to impose discipline where it sees need to do so.

THE CJN: Under Section 13(2) of the LPA the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) has his own personal disciplinary powers to exercise, but not without first affording the LP involved an opportunity to raise and argue his defence to the charge of professional misconduct, or infamous conduct.

QUERRY: DOES THE SC HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPEALS OVER DIRECTIONS OF THE LPDC?

In this case of Aladejobi v. NBA it was unsuccessfully argued that Appeals lie from the decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee to the Supreme Court by virtue of section 12 (7) of the LPA 2004 as amended.

In this case the debate of whether the Supreme Court should hear appeals from the LPDC straight to it, bypassing the Appeal Committee (LPAC) was a heated one.

The SC reviewed the relevant sections of the LPA thus:

"11(7) The person to whom such a direction relates, may at any time within 28 days from the date of service on him of the notice of the direction, appeal against the direction to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers established under section 12 of the Act; and the Disciplinary Committee may appear as the respondent to the appeal and, for the purpose of enabling directions to be given as to costs of the appeal and of proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee, shall be deemed to be a party thereto whether or not it appears on the hearing of the appeal.

12(1) There shall be a committee to be known as the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers (in this Act referred to as 'the Appeal Committee') which shall be charged with the duty of hearing appeals from any direction given by the Disciplinary Committee."

And Held:

It should be noted here that the word shall is employed in section 12(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1990 as amended. The purport of same is not farfetched. The word shall as employed in the law denotes obligation or a command and gives no room for discretion. It imposes a duty. A peremptory mandate is enjoined. See: Bamaiyi v. Attorney-General, Federation & Ors. (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 727) 466 at 497.

From a clear reading of the above reproduced section 12(1) of the Act, it is basic that there must be in place the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers which is charged with the duty of hearing appeals from any direction given by the Disciplinary Committee. It is clear to me that the appellant herein cannot appeal direct to this court against the direction handed out on 22nd February, 2011 by the Disciplinary Committee without first appealing to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers.

It hardly needs any gainsaying that the appeal of the appellant direct in this court without going through the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers is incompetent. This court has no jurisdiction to entertain same.

Furthermore, it is the law that where a statute prescribes a legal line of action for initiating court process, all remedies in the statute should be duly followed to the letter.

Refer to the case of Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen (supra) at page 25. The law provides that the appellant should appeal to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers. He must exhaust all the remedies by filling his appeal at the Appeal Committee from where he may have a lee-way to imbue this court with jurisdiction.

Perhaps, it should be further stated that the failure of the appellant to file his appeal before the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers against the direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee before filing appeal in this court engenders incompetence which cannot be cured. This is because the condition precedent to confer jurisdiction on this court has not been fulfilled. See: Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra) at page 594.

In a similar scenario in the case of Ibori v. Agbi (supra) at page 742, this court frowned at parties who tried to frog jump the Court of Appeal by appealing direct to this court from the decision of the High Court. This court will not usurp the function of the Court of Appeal as to do so will amount to a violation of the Constitution and will be null and void.

On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that from the decision of this court in Okike v. LPDC (supra) appeal from the direction of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee lies directly to this court. I dare say it that issue of jurisdiction of this court was not remotely raised therein. The applicable sections of the law were not considered and pronounced upon in the lead judgment therein. With due diffidence, the opinion was given per incuriam and cannot stand the test of time in the face of the applicable law earlier on discussed in this judgment.

Senior counsel to the appellant had axe to grind with his surmised composition of the Appeal Committee as enjoined by subsection 2 of section 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act, whereby two members of the Association are part, renders the provision unconstitutional or null and void. He contended that such offends the principles of natural justice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause.

To my mind, this line of tactics employed by the appellant appears precipitate; in the main. The law provides for the establishment of an Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers. The appellant will have his day to challenge the composition of the Appeal Committee when he gets there as dictated by the law. For now, he should keep his gun powder dry.

This case instructs on how to take advantage of the provisions of Section 14 of the LPA any person found liable and punished in criminal prosecution, and also by the LPDC but who later gets the guilty decision and punishment reversed on appeal and who wants to have his professional status restored is to apply to the very body that imposed the professional disciplinary body that slammed the punishment on him -- the LPDC.

But where the decision being challenged was made by the Supreme Court any appeal for reversal of decision, including one of restoration of name to the Roll, then he would need to make his Appeal to same Supreme Court.

In considering whether a name which was struck off should be restored or that a suspension be cancelled, the following factors are considered.

i. The gravity of the offence or offences necessitating the striking off of the applicant's name in the first place.

ii. Whether there is sufficient evidence of genuine remorse shown by the applicant in the period between the striking off of his name and the submission of the application.

iii. Whether in all the circumstances of the case the court is satisfied that the applicant has in the intervening years become a fit and proper person to be reintegrated as a member of the legal profession.

These cases teach about the importance of the Long Title, which actually forms part of the enactment. It comes at the beginning of the enactment. It indicates the general purpose of the legislation; contains the essence of the enactment. It can be used in the interpretation of the legislation and ascertaining the scope of the Legislation.

Note how this omnibus phrase "...and for connected purposes" or words having the same effect are used to sweep in all related matters under the one legislation.

Where the law is to amend or repeal earlier legislation, the long title must reflect that.

Preambles serve the purpose of explaining the Object of or the reason for the enactment. It may, in a situation of the operative words of the legislation being complex and ambiguous, be considered in interpretation or construction of the legislation

It is sometimes considered necessary where the particular legislation is one of International purpose or it is of a ceremonial in character and intended to mark some noteworthy even.

The commencement of an Act is not the same thing as the passing of the Act. An Act commences when it comes into force. An Act is passed when it is assented to by the President. It then technically becomes part of the country's body of laws.

There are basically four different ways the commencement date can be determined. They are:

1. The legislation may make no specific provision; in which case, it will commence on the day it is assented to by the president or the day it is published.

2. It may specify a date for the commencement; it could be drafted thus:―Commencement [23rd November, 2015] or ―This Act comes into force on 23 November 2015.

3. It may empower some named person or persons to specify the commencement date: ―This Act comes into force on such day as the Minister appoints by notice in the Gazette.

4. It may provide for the Act to commence upon the occurrence of a stipulated event.

• This Act comes into force on the day the Supreme Court declares a governor invalidly elected.

Note that Enactment formulas will differ and depend on whether we are talking of National Assembly or State House of Assembly.

This case teaches that the purpose of a short title is to identify, describe and cite the law. It described short title as:

―a statutory nickname to obviate the necessity of always referring to the Act under its full and descriptive title.

This case teaches that, in the absence of special provisions to the contrary, a legislation, until repealed, spent or otherwise amended, is of perpetual duration.

In instances where there is a stated duration, it may look something like this:

―This Act shall continue in force until the 31st day of July 1970, and shall then expire, unless parliament, by affirmative resolutions by both Houses, otherwise determines

Marginal Notes are sometimes referred to as statutory signpost - they indicate what to find in the section to which they are annexed. They are contained in the margin of each section.

In some jurisdictions marginal notes are referred to as ―section notes, in some, ―head notes or ―shoulder headings. They correspond to the arrangement of sections of the legislation.

Legislation is repealed when its operation is brought to an end by the legislature. The repeal of a law may be express or by implication.

This case shows that the repeal of a law does not cancel out what had earlier been done under and by its provisions. See Section 6 Interpretation Act, 1964.

Explanatory notes while meant to aid understanding of the enactment does not form part of a law.

A schedule is a way by which matters of technical and detailed nature that naturally belong to an enacting section of a law is arranged to stand differently but still as part of the law, usually at the end of the enactment. This is done to avoid clumsiness and distraction when reading the law. Schedules also ease comprehension of such provision. A schedule forms part of the law where they are referred to in the enacting section.

This is called incorporation by reference. They also refer to the section which enacts them. This is cross referencing.

A hostile witness is a witness who is biased against the party who called him, even in the eyes and opinion of the Court. He is unwilling to testify to the truth. He is a witness who supports the other party or has been compromised.

He acts and is seen by the Court to bear hostile animus towards the party calling him and is unwilling to testify or tell the truth.

Party calling witness is deemed to be holding out such witness as witness of truth. Therefore, as a general rule, a party calling a witness cannot discredit him by general evidence of bad character except where the court declares him hostile. S. 230 E.A.

A party that sees a Witness called by him deliberately acting against his interest will have to apply to the Court to declare him a hostile witness. Upon oral application by the party and court satisfying itself, it can declare a witness hostile. S. 230 E. A. -- the witness may then be cross-examined.

In this case, which is decision on a dispute as to whether the respondent fulfilled the conditions precedent for the renewal of a lease. At the pre- trial conference, the pre-trial judge, with the consent of the parties referred the following questions to the Multi- Door Court House. It was held by the court per John Inyang Okoro JCA that:

"As was rightly pointed out in his brief by the learned senior counsel, the practice of referring by the judge of issues, inquiries and accounts to an official Referee for Inquiry and report back is not new. For example, it was part of the PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ENGLAND (1964 Edition) under order 33 thereof. See Graham v. Skipper 29 Ch.D; 566. Similar provisions have been in force in Nigeria since colonial days and an example is ORDER XLIII of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules at pp.71- 72 of volume X of the Revised Law of Nigeria 1948 Edition. As was said earlier, this practice is not entirely new to our laws and procedure. Thus Order 27 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004 provides for ISSUES, INQUIRIES, ACCOUNTS AND REFERENCES

TO REFEREES. Rule 2 of the said order provides:- ―IN any legal proceedings, the judge may at any time order the whole cause or matter or any question or issue of facts arising therein, to be tried before an official Referee or Officer of the Court, notwithstanding that it may appear that there is a special or other relief sought or some special issue to be tried, as to which it may be proper that the cause or matter should proceed in the ordinary manner"

Arbitration is a form of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding on the parties who agreed and incorporated it into their Agreement or Contract.

This is an appeal against the ruling of the Yobe State High Court delivered on 12th July, 2010 in Motion No. YBS/DT/82M/2009, seeking inter alia the appointment of an

arbitrator for the respondents. Therein, Uzo. I. Ndukwe- Anyanwu, JCA, opined inter-alia:

―An arbitration clause is a clause inserted in a contract providing for compulsory arbitration in case of dispute as to rights and liabilities under such contract. The purpose of that clause is to avoid having to litigate disputes that might arise.

The Rule is that the arbitration clause and the contract which incorporated it are two distinct contracts. The arbitration clause contains the parties agreement to resolve present and future disputes by arbitration. The contract which incorporates the arbitration clause by reference is the underlying contract. An arbitration agreement within a contract is thus separate from the contract. Consequently, where the underlying contract is void for illegality, the arbitration clause could still survive as the illegality of the underlying contract would not impeach the arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement and the underlying contract need not arise and fall together.

It is trite that an arbitration agreement is not terminated by a breach of the underlying contract. It is only where a contract is void ab initio because one of the parties is a minor, then this ground would also affect the arbitration clause. It is not every dispute or difference that can be referred to arbitration. Disputes that can be referred must be justiciable issues which can be tried as civil matters. These should include all matters in dispute about any real or personal property, disputes as to whether a contract has been breached by either party thereto, or whether one or both parties have been discharged from performance thereof.

By virtue of section 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1988, an arbitration agreement shall be irrevocable except by agreement of the parties, or by leave of court, or a judge. However, the right to go for arbitration is a personal right. It is not a constitutional right. Therefore, it can be waived by either of the parties to the agreement expressly or by contract.

In this case, Uwaifo JCA, listed conditions for a resort to arbitration. These are:

(a) That there is an agreement between the parties thereto or a statutory provision which compels arbitration in such matters.

(b) That the parties before the court are parties to the agreement or the transaction which compels arbitration;

(c) That the arbitration sought is within the contemplation of the arbitration agreement or circumstances calling it;

(d) That there is no sufficient reason why reference to arbitration should not be made; and

(e) That the application for stay of proceedings pending arbitration was made in time as envisaged under section 5 of the Arbitration Act.

Check up on other methods of Out-of-Court settlement of disputes such as Mediation, Conciliation and Negotiation in the Handbook.

Remuneration for professional fees of lawyers is provided for under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 2007. A Legal Practitioner is entitled to be adequately remunerated for his services. He is also not expected, or allowed to charge his clients excessive fees, or receive illegal rewards.

The relevant provisions on this are to be found under Section 15 and 16 of the Legal Practitioners' Act (LPA), and Rules 48 -- 54 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), Legal Practitioners (Remuneration for Legal Documentation and other Land Matters) Order, 1991.

The facts of this case is that, the Respondent, a legal practitioner, filed an action at the High Court, Enugu, wherein he claimed the sum of N12.5 Million naira representing his professional fees and consultancy fees for securing the financing of a proposed Enugu International Market Project for the 1st Appellant.

It was held per Augie JCA at pp.24-25 Par. A-B, that: - A legal practitioner has a right to be remunerated for his services, he can either be paid in advance upon named fees or rely on the terms of any agreement reached for his fees.

However, if he has not received his fees and no agreement was reached as to what they would be, he must submit his bill of charges. All the relevant authorities say that reasonable remuneration must be given for the actual work or service rendered by a claimant on quantum meruit, which is Latin for 'as much as he deserved'.

In effect, when the bill of charges or fees (as they are called) are properly brought by the legal practitioner in compliance with the provision of the LPA, the court will normally give judgment for the amount of fees so claimed.

unless there are other factors preventing it from doing so, such as the absence or non-existence of any agreement for the payment of the fees by the client or an attempt by the legal practitioner to illegally enrich himself at the expense of his client (by way of Champarty). See Oyo v. Merchantile Bank (Nig.) Ltd (supra).

In this case, Adamu, JCA added as follows- ―In some cases, even where charges or fees were not agreed upon or fixed by contract between the parties, the court can award a reasonable fee or remuneration to the legal practitioner for his services actually rendered by him at the request or instruction of his client on the basis of quantum meruit or quasi-contract.

Section 16 (2) of the Legal Practitioner Act, makes it that before the legal practitioner can start demanding for the payment of his professional fee through the Court action certain conditions would have been met.

The provision of section 16 of the Legal Practitioner Act 1975 enjoined a Legal Practitioner to issue and deliver to the Client a Bill of Charges containing the particulars of how the total sum was arrived at, and wait until after One month after the delivery to the Client the said Bill of Charges.

Except the Bill of Charges appear unreasonable with regard to the services rendered or for any illegality or unfair practice, the payment of the fee will be ordered.