The Honourable Court held in the above case that a power of attorney vesting power in an attorney to execute a deed must itself be by deed. See also Abina v Farhat (1938)14 NLR 17.

The Honourable Court held in the above case that a power of attorney vesting power in an attorney to execute a deed must itself be by deed. See also Powell v London Provincial Bank (1893) 2 Ch. 555.

It was held in the above case that a lease for less than three years with a right to renew for a further three years was only a demise of the property with an option to renew. As such, it was not required to be under seal. This was the same position as held in the case of Hand v Hall (1877) 2 Ex. D 355.

It was held in the above case that a lease for less than three years with a right to renew for a further three years was only a demise of the property with an option to renew. As such, it was not required to be under seal. See also Re Knight (1882) 21 Ch. DP. 442 at 458.

The rule propounded in this case is that an instrument which is void as an instrument of conveyance because it is not a deed may still operate in equity as an agreement for a conveyance. It will therefore, be as good as a conveyance for many purposes.

The formalities with regard to sealing are now minimal and any indication of an attempt of sealing will be accepted for the purpose of due execution. The position of the law as held in this case is to the effect that; where a party signs a document bearing a wax or wafer or other indication of a seal, with the intention of executing the document as a deed, is a sufficient adoption or recognition of the seal as amounting to due execution as a deed. (See also S. 159 Evidence Act 2011). The scenario played out in the case of First National Securities v Jones (1978) 2 WLR 475, where a mortgage deed was signed by the mortgagor. The signature of the mortgagor was a cross printed circle at the end of the deed and in that circle were printed the letters 'LS' (standing for the Latin phrase locus Sigilli' meaning a place of the seal). This mortgage was held to be sealed and therefore validly executed.

The formalities with regard to sealing are now minimal and any indication of an attempt of sealing will be accepted for the purpose of due execution. The position of the law as held in this case is to the effect that; where a party signs a document bearing a wax or wafer or other indication of a seal, with the intention of executing the document as a deed, is a sufficient adoption or recognition of the seal as amounting to due execution as a deed. (See also S. 159 Evidence Act 2011). The scenario played out in this case where a mortgage deed was signed by the mortgagor. The signature of the mortgagor was a cross printed circle at the end of the deed and in that circle were printed the letters -LS (standing for the Latin phrase locus Sigilli' meaning a place of the seal). This mortgage was held to be sealed and therefore validly executed. See also Stromdale and Ball v Burden (1952) Ch. 233.

Delivery as pertains to a deed with the phrase "I deliver this as my solemn act and deed" is no longer necessary. It is a well-settled principle of law as upheld in the above case that an act done by a party to evince an intention to be bound by the terms of the deed is a sufficient manner of executing the deed.

It is the position of the court in the above case that a deed is valid even if it has no date or it has a false or an impossible date. Also delivery of a deed in escrow is a delivery which takes place subject to a condition, which may be expressed or may be by implication. In the case of Dalfam (Nig.) Ltd v. Okaku Int. Ltd. (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 735) 203, it was held thus; where a vendor executes a conveyance in advance of completion and delivers it to his solicitor, he executes the deed subject to the implied condition that it is not to become effective until the purchaser has paid the purchase price to the vendor's solicitor.

It is the position of the court in the above case that a deed is valid even if it has no date or it has a false or an impossible date. Also delivery of a deed in escrow is a delivery which takes place subject to a condition, which may be expressed or may be by implication. In this case, the court held thus; where a vendor executes a conveyance in advance of completion and delivers it to his solicitor, he executes the deed subject to the implied condition that it is not to become effective until the purchaser has paid the purchase price to the vendor's solicitor.

In this case the court held that a deed in escrow does not mean that the party executing the deed can withdraw from the deed in the intervening period between execution and the date by which the other party must comply with the condition which will render delivery complete. Once a deed has been executed, even in escrow, it is too late for the executing party to escape from its effect, provided the other party fulfills the condition within a reasonable time, if any is not specifically provided.

The position of the law as upheld in this case is that the consent of the Governor is required in the execution of a deed where the deed makes a grant of state land as embedded in Section 22 Land Use Act 1978. Any failure to make provision for this in the Deed will constitute a material omission unless there is evidence that consent was in fact sought and obtained. State land here means any land in a place designated as an urban area. It does not extend to rural areas which the law authorizes the local government to grant consent.

In this case the court defined Recital as a concise statement of fact which gives the history or background of the vendor's acquired right, sought to be conveyed or sold. It is not every agreement that has a recital. A recital is a formal part of a deed or writing which explains the reasons for the transaction.

In clarifying the position of the law as regards the specific and general descriptions in parts of a deed, the court he in the above case that a specific description in the operative part of a deed is not controlled by the general description in the recital.

In this case the court held that recitals may also create estoppels in respect of statements in a deed. Parties will be estopped from showing the existence of a situation contrary to that stated in the recital, if the recital is clear and unambiguous. See also the case of District Bank v Webb (1958) 1 AII ER 126. By Section 155 Evidence Act, recitals contained in documents that are twenty years old or more at the date of the contract are presumed to be sufficient evidence of the facts stated in them.

In this case the court held that recitals may also create estoppels in respect of statements in a deed. Parties will be estopped from showing the existence of a situation contrary to that stated in the recital, if the recital is clear and unambiguous. See also the case of Cumberland Court (Brighton) v Taylor (1964) Ch. 29. By Section 155 Evidence Act, recitals contained in documents that are twenty years old or more at the date of the contract are presumed to be sufficient evidence of the facts stated in them.

A Power of Attorney is defined in this case as a formal instrument by which one person empowers or authorises another to act for him, or act in his stead for certain purposes. The court went further to point out that the person giving the power is called the donor, while the person to whom the power is given is called the donee. Only a person in law (i.e. someone who can sue and be sued) can be an attorney. See also the cases of National Bank of Nigeria Limited v Korban Brothers Nigeria Limited and Ors. (1976) 1 FNR 11 and Chime v Chime (2001)3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 527.

This case upholds the character of the law as regards a transaction between a donee of a power of attorney and a third party in that the law protects purchasers who deal with the donee of a power of attorney, irrespective of the death, lunacy, insanity, bankruptcy, etc. of the donor until the consideration is realised, or the time expires. A purchaser who relies on such power of attorney will not be affected by any of these disabilities. See S. 144 PCL, Ss. 8 & 9 CA 1882 and the case of Bashir Lababedi v. Odulana and Ors. (1973) CCHCJ 98.

The position of the law as upheld in this case is that the Court construes a power of attorney strictly. The donee of the power of attorney or his solicitor is duty-bound to peruse through the power of attorney carefully before execution thereof, to see that it, in fact, confers on him the necessary powers required to achieve the intended object, and that the power of attorney is drawn in a form which will cause no difficulty when dealing with third parties.

The court held in this case that the authority donated to an attorney through a power of attorney must be under seal when the attorney is authorized to execute a deed. See also Powell v. London and Provincial Bank (1893) 2 CH. 555 and Abina v Farhat (1938) 4 NLR 17

The court held in this case that the authority donated to an attorney through a power of attorney must be under seal when the attorney is authorized to execute a deed. See also Powell v. London and Provincial Bank (1893) 2 CH. 555 and Briggs v C.L.O.R.S.N. (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 59.

The court held in this case that the authority donated to an attorney through a power of attorney must be under seal when the attorney is authorized to execute a deed. See also Abina v Farhat (1938) 4 NLR 17 and Briggs v C.L.O.R.S.N. (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 59.

In the above case, the Supreme Court held that a Power of Attorney can transfer interest in land to a donee and that the consent of the governor is not needed for the transfer of title or alienation of rights between private individuals where there is no overriding public interest or conflict between the parties.

In this case, the court held that a power of Attorney cannot be used as an instrument of transfer of interest in land. Nonetheless, it could be a means by which a transfer could be carried out. As also held in the case of Ude v Nwara (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt.1077) 158 and codified in S. 141 (1) PCL, S. 56 (1) CA.

In this case, the court held that a power of Attorney cannot be used as an instrument of transfer of interest in land. Nonetheless, it could be a means by which a transfer could be carried out. As also held in the case of Ezeigwe v Awudu (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 158 and codified in S. 141 (1) PCL, S. 56 (1) CA.

A Power of Attorney is defined in this case as a formal instrument by which one person empowers or authorises another to act for him, or act in his stead for certain purposes. The court went further to point out that the person giving the power is called the donor, while the person to whom the power is given is called the donee. Only a person in law (i.e. someone who can sue and be sued) can be an attorney. See also the cases of National Bank of Nigeria Limited v Korban Brothers Nigeria Limited and Ors. (1976) 1 FNR 11 and Ude v. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638.

A Power of Attorney is defined in this case as a formal instrument by which one person empowers or authorises another to act for him, or act in his stead for certain purposes. The court went further to point out that the person giving the power is called the donor, while the person to whom the power is given is called the donee. Only a person in law (i.e. someone who can sue and be sued) can be an attorney. See also the cases of Ude v. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638 and Chime v Chime (2001)3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 527.

This case upholds the character of the law as regards a transaction between a donee of a power of attorney and a third party in that the law protects purchasers who deal with the donee of a power of attorney, irrespective of the death, lunacy, insanity, bankruptcy, etc. of the donor until the consideration is realised, or the time expires. A purchaser who relies on such power of attorney will not be affected by any of these disabilities. See S. 144 PCL, Ss. 8 & 9 CA 1882 and the case of UBA Limited v. Registrar of Titles (1973) 3 CCHCJ 152.

In this case, the court held that for a power of attorney to be presumed validly executed, the deed creating the power, if executed outside Nigeria must be witnessed by either a notary public or a judge, or magistrate. As provided for in S. 150 Evidence Act. Note: A notary public by the Law of Nations has credit everywhere; Hutcheon v Manington (1791) 30 ER 1327.

In this case, the court held that for a power of attorney to be presumed validly executed, the deed creating the power, if executed outside Nigeria must be witnessed by either a notary public or a judge, or magistrate. As provided for in S. 150 Evidence Act. See also Ayiwoh v Akorede (1951) 20 NLR 4. The court stated that a notary public by the Law of Nations has credit everywhere.

It is a settled principle of law as upheld by the court in the above case that a power of attorney attracts a fixed stamp duty of N50.00. It is registrable under the Land Instruments Registration Law of each state. The position of the law that non registration of an instrument renders it inadmissible in evidence like any other deed has changed. Nevertheless, non-registration of a power of attorney affect the admissibility of the document as held by the Supreme Court in Benjamin v Kalio (2018) ALL FWLR (Pt. 902) 1.

In this case the court held that a power of attorney is also a registrable instrument under the relevant Land Instruments Registration Laws of the various states. Stamping precedes registration and both are required when the power of attorney confers interest in land or landed property. Non-registration does not affect the admissibility of the document. The court further held that admissibility of such document in evidence before a court of law is no longer determined by the registration of lack of it under the States Laws, but by the principles of admissibility of documents under the Evidence Act, 2011.

The court in the above case is of the opinion that in modern practice, a Power of Attorney commences as follows: BY THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY given on the day of .... 2018. It is also correct to say; ―made/given on the .... day of ...2018. A power of attorney takes effect from the date stated on it.

The court held in this case that attestation, although not a strict requirement of a power of attorney, it is necessary that a power of attorney be attested to by a notary public, judge, magistrate for the presumption of due execution in order for s. 150 Evidence Act to be invoked. The section provides that a court shall presume that every document purporting to be a Power of Attorney and to have been executed before and, authenticated by a notary public or any court, judge, magistrate was so executed and authenticated.

In this case, the court held that a donee of a power of attorney cannot sue in his own name, but must sue in the name of the donor/principal. This case was actually conducted by one Mr. Anusionwu, who was the donee of the power of attorney given by Mr. Ude. The full title of this case reads as follows. Ude (by his attorney S. E. Anusionwu V. Nwara & Anor.)

The court held in this case that a power of attorney granted by a deed must be revoked by a deed. Furthermore, if the donor grants another power of attorney in respect of the same subject matter, it cannot be taken to be an implied revocation of the original one. The subsequent grant of a power of attorney is invalid.

In this case, the court held that a power of attorney can be invalidated if fraud, duress, undue influence, etc are established. Aside from this form of revocation/invalidation of a power of attorney, there are majorly three means of revocation of a power of attorney, to wit: Express revocation, implied revocation and revocation by operation of law.

In this case, the court held that although, an open contract is documented, the contents only reflect the parties, the price, and the property. Once it is signed by the party to be charged, it is sufficient memorandum of sale and thus enforceable. Section 4 Statute of Frauds. S. 5(2) Law Reform (Contracts) Act, S. 67(1) PCL, Paye v. Gaji & ors (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 450) 589.

In this case, the court held that it is the duty of the purchaser's solicitor to arrange for the registration of the document.

In this case, the court held that the examples of bad root of title are Leases, equitable mortgages, power of attorney and certificate of occupancy on deemed grant. See also Ude v. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 647.

In this case, the court held that the examples of bad root of title are Leases, equitable mortgages, power of attorney and certificate of occupancy on deemed grant. See also Ogunleye v Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 745.

The qualities and examples of a good root of title as opined by the court in this case are:-

(a) Sufficient description of property

(b) Discloses the entirety of the legal and equitable interest contracted to be alienated.

(c) Dispels all doubts about it authenticity

(d) Not subject to a greater interest.

Examples of good root of title are Conveyance, Legal Mortgage, Assent, Deed of Gift and (Registered Certificate), Court vesting order, Certificate of Occupancy on State land.

After an exchange of contract, the position of the vendor as held by the court in this case is that the vendor becomes the trustee of a qualified kind as he retains possession, collects rent and profits until completion of the sale. He also has a lien on the property for the balance of the purchase price.

In this case the court held that the position of the law as held in this case is that the position of the Purchaser after exchange of contract is that he acquires an equitable interest in the property.

In this case, the court observed that an open contract can take the form of several documents connected together. For the contract to be valid it should contain the parties, the price, and the property leased. Timmins v Moreland Street Pry. Co. Ltd. (1958) Ch. 110.

In this case, the court observed that an open contract can take the form of several documents connected together. For the contract to be valid it should contain the parties, the price, and the property leased. Pearce v Gardner (1897) 1 QB 688.

In this case, the court observed that an open contract can take the form of a written offer accepted whether orally or in writing. For the contract to be valid it should contain the parties, the price, and the property leased.

In this case, the court observed that an open contract can take the form of a rough draft of agreement. For the contract to be valid it should contain the parties, the price, and the property leased.

In this case, the court observed that an open contract can take the form of a receipt. For the contract to be valid it should contain the parties, the price, and the property leased. See also Yaya v Mogoga (1947) 12 WACA 132.

In this case, the court observed that an open contract can take the form of a receipt. For the contract to be valid it should contain the parties, the price, and the property leased. See also Auerbach v Nelson (1919) 2 Ch. 383.

In this case, the court held that the Land Use Act vests the ownership of all land comprised in the territory of a state in the Governor, and Section 5 empowers the person of the Governor to grant statutory rights of occupancy to any person for all purposes. Section 34(2) preserves the existing rights in developed land acquired prior to the date of enactment and under Section 34(3), the holder of the deemed right of occupancy thus preserved could also get a grant from the Governor in respect of the same land. In practice, where the holder of the deemed right applies for a grant, all he could get is a term of years certain and not a freehold or fee simple. But the individual can still make valid alienation subject to the restriction imposed by the Act. See also Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.190) 130.

In this case, the court held that although, an open contract is documented, the contents only reflect the parties, the price, and the property. Once it is signed by the party to be charged, it is sufficient memorandum of sale and thus enforceable. Section 4 Statute of Frauds. S. 5(2) Law Reform (Contracts) Act, S. 67(1) PCL, Gaji v Paye (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 823) 583.

In this case, the court held that sufficient acts of part performance is an exception to the provision of Statute of Fraud 1677 which prohibits the enforcement of the contract respecting lands that are not in writing. This statute will not apply where a party who part-performed in a lease contract. Such a party acquires an equity against the defendant which the court may enforce. Part performance is where a party alters his position on the faith of the contract. See S.5(3)(c) Law Reform (Contracts) Act, Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 AC 467, Aminu v Ogunyebi (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 457.

In this case, the court held that for a land title transfer by oral contracts to come under the exception, certain factors must exist. These factors are:-

1. It must be an alienation under customary law

2. Full purchase price of the property must have been paid

3. The sale must be in the presence of witnesses.

See also Mustapha v Mshelizah (2003) FWLR (Pt 183) 1. Odusoga v Rickets (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 511) 7, Kachalla v Banki (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 309) 1420. Adesanya v Aderonmu (2000) FWLR (Pt. 15) 2492, S. 5(3)(c) Law Reform (Contracts) Act.

In this case, the court held that an Oral contract is generally unenforceable and money paid as deposit is unrecoverable where purchaser defaults.

The court held in this case that once a contract has been exchanged and Governors consent is obtained, the property is at the risk of the purchaser. The exceptions to this rule are provided for in S. 72(1) PCL.

In this case, the court held that in the absence of express instructions to the contrary by the vendor, payment of a pre-contract deposit to an estate agent is at risk of the purchaser.

It is a well-settled position of the law as held in this case that when title is sound and the terms are clearly agreed on, a solicitor may safely act for both parties. However, if the title is not sound or the interests of the parties are likely to conflict, the parties must be advised to retain their respective solicitors. Note: It is not necessarily improper to act for both parties.

In this case, the court held that it would appear that the provision of section 5 LUA is not breached if the parties merely enter into an agreement to assign, sub-lease, mortgage or grant and take a licence; as a legal assignment, sub-lease, mortgage is needed for there to be a breach of the provision.

In this case, the court held that alienation by way of assignment (i.e. sale of the remainder of the term originally granted) sub-lease or mortgage without consent under these law passes no legal interest under the LUA (1978). Therefore, if the consent is refused, there is nothing the parties can do. See The Queen v The Minister of Land and Survey, Qudus v Military Governor of Lagos State (1973) CCHCJ/673.

In this case, the court held that alienation by way of assignment (i.e. sale of the remainder of the term originally granted) sub-lease or mortgage without consent under these law passes no legal interest under the LUA (1978). Therefore, if the consent is refused, there is nothing the parties can do. See The Queen v The Minister of Land and Survey Ex parte Bank of the North Limited (1963) NLR 581.

In this case, the court held that the Land Use Act vests the ownership of all land comprised in the territory of a state in the Governor, and Section 5 empowers the person of the Governor to grant statutory rights of occupancy to any person for all purposes. Section 34(2) preserves the existing rights in developed land acquired prior to the date of enactment and under Section 34(3), the holder of the deemed right of occupancy thus preserved could also get a grant from the Governor in respect of the same land. In practice, where the holder of the deemed right applies for a grant, all he could get is a term of years certain and not a freehold or fee simple. But the individual can still make valid alienation subject to the restriction imposed by the Act. See also Salami v Oke (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 63) 1.

In this case, the court held a license to be a mere permission or privilege given by the occupier of land to a person to do an act upon his property which otherwise will amount to trespass. A license does not create proprietary (ownership) rights.

The court in this case held that the remedies available to the tenant where the landlord refuses his request to sublet the apartment are:-

1. Tenant can seek declaration that the refusal is unreasonable.

2. Tenant may compel the landlord to give his consent in action for specific performance.

3. Tenant may ignore the landlord and sublet and thereafter apply to court for an order of an injunction restraining the landlord from harassing the sub- tenant.

4. Tenant may ask for damages.

Where the tenant is in beach of the covenant, the landlord is entitled to remedies: The landlord can only seek court order for re-entry & forfeiture of the lease. It is important to note that the landlord cannot resort to self-help. Akpina v. Balogun (unreported). Reason being that the tenant can sue the landlord for violation of his right where landlord uses self-help.

In this case, the court held that for refusal to the subletting of the apartment to be reasonable or not, the following should be considered:

1. Personality of the intended sub-tenant.

   The landlord is expected to be objective in his refusal. He may consider the sub-tenant's financial standing; is he a bankrupt or a notorious absconder.

2. The use or purpose for which the sub-tenant puts the premises

3. The nature of the property. The burden of proving that the reason of refusal is unsubstantiated lies on the tenant.

It is the position of the court in this case that where a tenant covenants not to assign, underlet, charge or part with possession of the apartment or any part without of the consent of landlord in writing first sought and obtained, such consent not to be reasonably withheld in the case of a responsible or respectable person. This is an ideal clause. It is used to ensure a balance of the competing interest of the parties. Once consent is given, it shall not be withdrawn.

In this case, the court held that rent in a lease is payable in arrears, except where expressly stated that rent is to be paid in advance. Once the parties have agreed to the sum to be paid as rent, neither party can unilaterally alter it.

Rent is the consideration paid by the lessee to the lessor for the use of the property. In this case, the court held that rent could be paid in money or money's worth. For instance, the lessee's rent in this case was equated with cleaning the parish church. In Pitcher v. Tovey (1692) 4 Med. 71 rent was paid with bottles of wine.

In this case, the court held that the payment of rent in a lease agreement should be expressly provided for in the terms of the agreement, because it is not one of the terms a court can imply from the conducts of the parties. Rent could be paid money or money's worth. It must be ascertainable. For instance, the court in this case held that rent was sufficiently paid with bottles of wine. In the case of Doe Ednega v. Renham (1845) 7 QB, 976, rent was equated with cleaning the parish church.

In this case, the court held that a rented premises can be used for any purpose which is legal though the usage may differ from the purpose it was earlier rented. Covenant of use provides the purpose which the lessee is to put the premises for either residential/agricultural or commercial use. In the above case the court held that building of a proprietary club was trading in line with the clause in the lease.

The court defined rent in this case to mean the consideration paid by the tenant for the use and enjoyment of the landlord's property. Rent may be money or money's worth. Rent where applicable must be certain or ascertainable. Rent is not mandatory in leases. The main feature of lease is lawful occupation by tenant whether he pays regular rent, subsidized rent or no rent at all is immaterial. Some situations where a lease may be created without payment of rent are-

I. Where a capital sum is paid (premium) so long as it is permissible

II. Where there is a right to live rent-free under a sale and a lease-back arrangement

III. Where there is only the understanding to perform and observe the covenants in a lease and

IV. The mere acceptance of the lease by the tenant

The Supreme Court set out the requirements of a valid lease as:

1. Words of demise.

2. Complete agreement leaving no ambiguity as to its purport

3. The identification of the parties to the agreement.

4. The premises must be clearly identified.

5. Commencement and the duration of the agreement.

In this case, the court defined an assignment as the grant of the remainder of the term in a lease.

In this case, the court held that parties must have the capacity to contract the lease agreement. The parties must either be natural persons or juristic persons to effectively contract the lease agreement.

The position of the court in this case is that the terms of a lease must be certain. The duration of the lease which is made up of the commencement date and the expiration date of the lease must be expressly stated. This is because the lease cannot tenure in perpetuity. In Bosah v. Oji (2002) LLJR-SC; Okechukwu v. Onuorah (2001) FWLR (Pt.33) 219, (2000)3SC 16; the terms in the lease were held ascertainable as they were dependent on future contingencies certain to take place. In this case, the tenure of the lease was held to be unascertainable and void when it was to tenure until the landlord requires the land for widening of the road. See also Bierel v. Carey.

The position of the court in this case is that the terms of a lease must be certain. The duration of the lease which is made up of the commencement date and the expiration date of the lease must be expressly stated. This is because the lease cannot tenure in perpetuity. The lease agreement executed by parties in this case had no date, it was declared invalid by the court.

Where the commencement of a lease is explicitly stated in the lease, no problem arises on its date of commencement. If the commencement date can also be reasonably inferred from the words used in the instrument creating the lease, the lease could be said to have a commencement date. In this case, the court held that the commencement date of a lease which was dependent upon the occurrence of a future contingency (for instance, the issuance of a certificate of occupancy) was valid and the lease became absolute and enforceable the moment the event in question occurred. See also Bosah v. Oji (2002) 6 NWLR part 762, 137.

Where the commencement of a lease is explicitly stated in the lease, no problem arises on its date of commencement. If the commencement date can also be reasonably inferred from the words used in the instrument creating the lease, the lease could be said to have a commencement date. In this case, the court held that the commencement date of a lease which was dependent upon the occurrence of a future contingency (issuance of a certificate of occupancy) was valid and the lease became absolute and enforceable the moment the event in question occurred. See also Okechukwu v. Onuorah (2001) FWLR part 33, 219.

The position of the court in this case is that the terms of a lease must be certain. The duration of the lease which is made up of the commencement date and the expiration date of the lease must be expressly stated. This is because the lease cannot tenure in perpetuity. In Bosah v. Oji (2002) LLJR-SC; Okechukwu v. Onuorah (2001) FWLR (Pt.33) 219, (2000)3SC 16; the terms in the lease were held ascertainable as they were dependent on future contingencies certain to take place. For instance, a lease that will commence when the first daughter of the family gets married is uncertain, thus void. In Aminu v. Nzeribe (1989) LPELR-20249 (CA), a lease that had no date was declared invalid. A lease until the landlord requires the land for widening of the road was declared void. Prudential Assurance Co. v. London Residuary Body (1992) 2 AC, 286. A lease for as long as the company is trading was held void in Bierel v. Carey A lease for a future release is void unless definite time of commencement is inferred from it.

As held in this case by the court, a party alleging the existence of an oral agreement (lease) is duty bound to prove such an agreement to the hilt.

In this case, the court held that every trading company, unless prohibited by the memorandum or articles of association, has implied power to borrow money for the purposes of its business, and to give security for the loan by creating a mortgage or charge of its property. A mortgage of land by a company is by nomenclature a debenture as held in the case of Knightsbridge Estate Trust Ltd v Bryne (1940) AC 613.

It is the position of the law as held in this case that Leasing by way of mortgaging a property, by and by, is still a matter of a kind of contract between the two sides of the parties involved. While largely it has to conform with the provisions of the relevant laws, the parties have the choice, indeed, the right, to introduce their own agreed and accepted terms.

A mortgagor or mortgagee in possession is given right to grant certain leases as provided under S. 121 PCL or S. 18 CA 1881. It is the practice to restrict the granting of leases by a mortgagor by requiring the mortgagee's consent. For example, the mortgagor covenants with the mortgagee not to exercise the mortgagor's power of leasing given by the provisions of S. 131 PCL, S. 33 MPL or S. 8 CA 1881, except with the consent in writing of the mortgagee. Where the mortgagee wishes to retain a substantial degree of control over the security, he may, also consider the need for a provision, preventing the granting of licences.

The court was of the opinion in this case that sometimes, the mortgage deed contains an Attorney clause, by which the mortgagor expressly constitutes himself a tenant of the mortgagee at a nominal rent, the mortgagee is being given power to determine the tenancy so created at any time without notice. The clause is of little or no value and conveyancers should avoid its use. It is considered undesirable. See also Ss. 28 & 51 Land Use Act.

In this case, the court observed that as a remedy to the mortgagee where the mortgage instrument has not conferred an express power of sale on the mortgagee, the mortgagee could institute an action in court against the mortgagor to claim the principal sum advanced to the mortgagee and the interest that has accrued on it. It is imperative to note that a legal mortgage does not need to contain an express power of sale before such power of sale is exercised.

Other rights of a mortgagee are:-

a. Taking possession.

b. Appointment of a receiver.

c. Power of sale.

d. Foreclosure.

In this case, the court held that a legal mortgagee has the power to appoint a receiver where the mortgagor defaults to pay. A receiver is a person appointed as custodian of a person's or entity's property, finances, general assets, or business operations. See West African Breweries Ltd. v Savannah Ventures Ltd. (2002) 5 SCNJ 269; Section 131 PCL, Section 24 CA, Section 43 MPL.

Other rights of a mortgagee are:-

a. The right of action in court.

b. Taking possession.

c. Power of sale.

d. Foreclosure.

In this case, the court held that a legal mortgagee has the power to appoint a receiver where the mortgagor defaults to pay. A receiver is a person appointed as custodian of a person's or entity's property, finances, general assets, or business operations. See Awojugbagbe Light Ind v Chinukwe (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 390) 379; Section 131 PCL, Section 24 CA, Section 43 MPL.

Other rights of a mortgagee are:-

a. The right of action in court.

b. Taking possession.

c. Power of sale.

d. Foreclosure.

In this case, the court held that the mortgagee has the right to sell the mortgage property where the power of sale arises and become exerciseable. For a mortgagee to be able to exercise this right, some conditions must exist. These conditions are:- the mortgage agreement must be by deed, the mortgage money has become due and there is no contrary intention in the mortgage deed. See Taiwo v Adegboro & Anor (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 57, S 127 PCL, S. 21(3) CA, S. 39 MPL.

Other rights of a mortgagee are:-

a. The right of action in court.

b. Taking possession.

c. Appointment of a receiver.

d. Foreclosure.

In this case, the court held that the mortgagee has the right to sell the mortgage property where the power of sale arises and become exerciseable. For a mortgagee to be able to exercise this right, some conditions must exist. These conditions are:- the mortgage agreement must be by deed, the mortgage money has become due and there is no contrary intention in the mortgage deed. See Visioni v NBN (1975) 1 NMLR 8, S 127 PCL, S. 21(3) CA, S. 39 MPL.

Other rights of a mortgagee are:-

a. The right of action in court.

b. Taking possession.

c. Appointment of a receiver.

d. Foreclosure.

Upstamping is a situation where same mortgagor uses the same property earlier used as security to secure additional loan from the same mortgagee. Fresh stamping to reflect the new or additional consideration (loan) is required. As held in this case by the court, the subsequent legal mortgage over the same property by the same parties will not require the consent of the Governor.

A mortgage is the security offered for a loan or money. It is the conveyance or an assignment of land with a provision for redemption on repayment of the loan, the conveyance shall become void or the interest shall be re-conveyed. The complex arrangement of mortgage led an eminent English judge to observe that, "No one by light of nature ever understood an English Mortgage of Real Estate (Per Lord Macnaugten, Samuel v Jarrah (1904) AC 323 at 326. The borrower in legal parlance is the Mortgagor while the lender is the Mortgagee. See also Olowu v Miller Bros. Ltd. (1922) 13 NLR 110, Pharmatek Ind. Project Ltd. v Trade Bank Plc (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 495) 1678.

In this case, the court held that the registration of a deed of mortgage after stamping must be done in the lands registry of the state where the land is situate, in respect of dealing with land situated in any particular state.

The court held in this case that the sale may be by private treaty or through a licensed auctioneer or by tender. The mortgagee must take reasonable steps to obtain the proper market value and the sale must be a sale, e.g. the mortgagee may not sell to himself even indirectly. See also Eka-eteh v N.H. D.S. (1973) 6 SC 183.

The court held in this case that the sale may be by private treaty or through a licensed auctioneer or by tender. The mortgagee must take reasonable steps to obtain the proper market value and the sale must be a sale, e.g. the mortgagee may not sell to himself even indirectly. See also Williams v Wellingborough Council (1975) 1 WLR 1327.

In this case the court held that the mortgagee has a duty to deliver to the mortgagor the balance of the proceeds of sale of mortgaged property, after deducting the principal money, interest and expenses. If he fails to discharge this duty, the mortgagor may recover the balance by an action for money received.

In this case the court held that when a contract for sale is entered into, the power of sale is exercised and so long as the contract subsists, the equity of redemption is lost.

In this case, the court held that when the sale of a mortgage property is completed, the entire legal estate (term of years) vested in the mortgagor passes to the purchaser (See S. 126 PCL or s. 21 CA 1881).

In this case the court held that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, a mortgagor has the right to sell the legal title to the mortgaged property, but the purchaser will take subject to the right of the mortgagee. See Barclays Bank v Ashiru (1978) 1 LRN 266 at 275.

In this case the court held that the mortgagee, where the mortgage is by deed, has statutory power to insure against fire at any time after the date of the mortgage, and any premium paid becomes a charge on the property and bears interest at the same rate with the principal debt. The statutory provision governing insurance (e.g. s. 130 Property and Conveyancing Law 1959, s. 23 CA (1881) is not entirely satisfactory. Therefore, a mortgagee should consider the alternative of taking out a policy in his own name and that of the mortgagor to the full value of the property and requiring the mortgagor to pay the premium. And if not so paid, but paid by the mortgagee, the amount so paid to be charged on the property.

A mortgage is the security offered for a loan or money. It is the conveyance or an assignment of land with a provision for redemption on repayment of the loan, the conveyance shall become void or the interest shall be re-conveyed. The complex arrangement of mortgage led an eminent English judge to observe that, "No one by light of nature ever understood an English Mortgage of Real Estate (Per Lord Macnaugten, Samuel v Jarrah (1904) AC 323 at 326. The borrower in legal parlance is the Mortgagor while the lender is the Mortgagee. See also Suberu v A.I.S.L. Limited (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 590, Pharmatek Ind. Project Ltd. v Trade Bank Plc (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 495) 1678.

In this case, the court held that a Solicitor involved in a mortgage agreement is duty-bound to advice his client where the purpose of the loan advanced to him is for the purpose of purchasing a property.

The mortgagor has two types of rights, one legal and the other equitable. There is his legal right to redeem on a specified date and there is also his equitable right, exercisable anytime thereafter. The date is important. Until the legal date for redemption passes (legal due date), the power of sale has not arisen. A purchaser is concerned to see that the power of sale has arisen, he is not concerned to see whether or not it has become exercisable. See Administrator General v. Cardoso (1973) ALL NLR 816. In this case, the court was of the opinion that it is not advisable to fix a very long date for repayment of a mortgage

The fixing of a date for repayment in a mortgage transaction does not generally mean that the parties intend that actual payment is to be made on the named date but only that the mortgagee may call for payment on or at any time after that date if so minded, but not before. The date fixed is usually six months from the date of the loan or deed, but may be at the end of three months or any other period or the loan may be made repayable upon demand. As a general rule, the mortgagor may not repay prior to the date fixed for repayment as held in the case of Ogiorio v. Igbinovia (1998) 13 NWLR, part 582, p. 426, at p. 438. In this case, the court was of the opinion that it is not advisable to fix a very long date for repayment in the future. See also Twentienth Century Banking Corporation v. Wilkinson (1977) 1 Ch. 99.

In this case, the court held that the ownership title of the mortgagor is a determinant factor to the validity of the mortgage agreement. A party cannot mortgage a property that doesn't belong to him.

In this case, the court observed that the proper documentation and execution of the mortgage agreement is a determinant factor to its validity. This is a sine qua non to the validity of a mortgage agreement, therefore parties are advised to make sure the mortgage agreement is properly documented and executed.

In this case, the court held that where a legal mortgage is created, the consent of the governor of the state where the land is situated must be first sought and obtained. Where the land is subject to a customary right of occupancy, the consent of the appropriate local government is required so long as the transfer is not one subject to the Sheriffs and Civil process law. See Awojugbabe Light Industries Ltd. v. Chinukwe (1993)1 NWLR (Pt. 270) 485.

In this case, the court held that the mortgagee's solicitor is responsible for preparing the mortgage deed if he is satisfied with the title offered. The solicitor needs to make a careful enquiry at the Lands Registry. A mortgage of leasehold (including certificate of occupancy) is done by assignment of the unexpired residue of the term of the lease or by granting a sub- lease to the mortgage out of the whole term at least one day shorter than the term subject to a provision for re-assignment or cesser.

The court held in this case that a charge differs from a legal mortgage and an equitable mortgage in respect of the remedies it confers. The charge is not an agreement to give a legal mortgage, but a security by which the mortgagee has a lien on the property. The mortgagee's lien can be enforced by a court order for sale of the property and the proceeds of sale could be used to discharge the lien.

In this case, the court held that one of the ways in which equitable mortgage is created is by mere deposit of title deeds with a clear intention that the deeds should be used or retained as security for the loan. See also Olofintuyi v Barclays Bank DCO (1965) NMLR 142; Okuneye v FBN Plc (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 749. Other ways are:

a) By an agreement to create legal mortgage.

b) By deposit of title deed accompanied by an agreement to execute a legal mortgage.

c) Mortgage of an equitable interest

d) A defective legal mortgage; and

e) By mere equitable charge of the mortgagor's property.

In Lagos State the ways equitable mortgage is created are as follows: see s. 18 MPL

a) By deposit of title deeds accompanied by an agreement to create a legal mortgage in favour of the mortgagee;

b) A charge accompanied by agreement to create a legal mortgage; and

c) By assignment of an equitable interest

In this case, the court held that one of the ways in which equitable mortgages is created is by mere deposit of title deeds with a clear intention that the deeds should be used or retained as security for the loan. See also British and French Bank Ltd v. S.O. Akande (1961) All NLR 849; Okuneye v FBN Plc (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 749. Other ways are:

a) By an agreement to create legal mortgage.

b) By deposit of title deed accompanied by an agreement to execute a legal mortgage.

c) Mortgage of an equitable interest

d) A defective legal mortgage; and

e) By mere equitable charge of the mortgagor's property.

In Lagos State the ways equitable mortgage is created are as follows: see s. 18 MPL

a) By deposit of title deeds accompanied by an agreement to create a legal mortgage in favour of the mortgagee;

b) A charge accompanied by agreement to create a legal mortgage; and

c) By assignment of an equitable interest

In this case, the court held that one of the ways in which equitable mortgages is created is by mere deposit of title deeds with a clear intention that the deeds should be used or retained as security for the loan. See also British and French Bank Ltd v. S.O. Akande (1961) All NLR 849; Okuneye v FBN Plc (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 749. Other ways are:

a) By an agreement to create legal mortgage.

b) By deposit of title deed accompanied by an agreement to execute a legal mortgage.

c) Mortgage of an equitable interest

d) A defective legal mortgage; and

e) By mere equitable charge of the mortgagor's property.

In Lagos State the ways equitable mortgage is created are as follows: see s. 18 MPL

a) By deposit of title deeds accompanied by an agreement to create a legal mortgage in favour of the mortgagee;

b) A charge accompanied by agreement to create a legal mortgage; and

c) By assignment of an equitable interest

In this case the court held that where an equitable mortgage has been created in favour of a mortgagee and consent has been obtained, further consent is not required to a legal mortgage replacing the equitable mortgage (s. 22 Land Use Act, 1978). However, the Act does not require consent to a loan agreement, nor does it make unlawful for a loan transaction to be effected without first obtaining the Governor's consent. But a prior consent of the Governor is required for the creation and registration of a legal mortgage or a charge by deed. The actual alienation by mortgage must have the consent of the Governor. See also the case of Awojugbagbe v Chinukwe (1995) 4 SCNJ 162.

In this case the court held that a clause useful to insert in the mortgage is a penal clause, whereby the rate of interest payable by them or mortgagor is increased if there is delay in payment. This, of course, cannot be done directly, for if the covenant provides for interest at the rate of 14% but that if it is not paid punctually on the date fixed for payment, then it is to be 15%, the court will interpret it as a penalty and thus will not enforce it. Rather, it should be couched that the rate of interest shall be 15% per annum, but where the mortgagor pays punctually the rate of 14% will be accepted. See also Twentieth Century Banking Corp. v Wilkinson (1977) 1 Ch. 99; s. 123 PCL, s. 19 CA, s. 35 MPL.

In this case the court held that when providing for redemption of the mortgage, it should be recalled that the right to redeem cannot be clogged except in the case of company debenture (See s. 171 Companies and Allied Matters Act). A mortgage cannot be made totally irredeemable, and if the right to redeem is for a term certain, the term must not be unduly long, even if there is a corresponding provision preventing the mortgagee from calling in his money. Each case depends on its facts. In this case, the court held a term of 10 years as not being unfair.

In this case the court held that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, a mortgagor has the right to sell the legal title to the mortgaged property, but the purchaser will take subject to the right of the mortgagee. See Olofuntuyi v Barclays Bank D.C.O. Ltd (1965) NMLR 142.

Section 135 PCL Provides that a mortgage may be discharged by a receipt under hand endorsed or written at the foot or annexed to the mortgage deed. The receipt must state the name of the persons who pay the money, it must be executed by the chargee or the person in whom the mortgage is vested. The receipt operates as transfer where the money is paid by person not entitled to equity of redemption.

Alternatively, the discharge can be effected by a separate deed e.g. a reassignment, surrender, release of transfers (S. 135(4). If the property is being sold to a purchaser whose money is to be used to repay a subsisting mortgage, it is better to make the mortgagee a party to the conveyance and insert a clause to the effect that he has agreed to release the property conveyed, as indicated in the precedent. In addition to the above, a mortgage can be discharged by the court. See S. 75 Property and Conveyancing Law 1959, Queen v The Minister of Land and Survey, Ex parte Bank of the North Ltd (1963) NNLR 58.

In this case, the court held that the burden of proof lies on the PROPOUNDER of the Will though it may shift to the CHALLENGER where the propounder discharges the burden. One of the ways to prove the validity of a Will is usually by: Positive affirmative evidence: Oral and Documentary evidence is admissible in proof of the validity of a Will. These oral and documentary evidence may come in the form of:

i. Statements at the time of instruction & execution

ii. Witnesses (light weight/ unless corroborated)

iii. Evidence of conduct before & after making the Will.

iv. Evidence of general habits and course of life of the testator

v. Medical evidence by a doctor who have attended to the testator in the past (must be credible).

In this case, the court held that the testator's wishes are paramount. That the solicitor should receive instructions directly from the testator. However, where instructions are given to an intermediary, i.e. a third party who repeats them to the solicitor, the solicitor should insist on seeing the testator personally and going through the Will with him.

Any person of sound mind and memory (and of statutory age) can make a Will -- Section 3 of the Wills Act 1837. In this case, the court held one of the exceptions to the above general principle as Customary Law- Islamic Rules of Inheritance. See Section 3(1)(b) of the Wills Law of Oyo State, 1990 see also the case of Adesubokun v. Yunusa (1971) 1 All NLR 225.

Any person of sound mind and memory (and of statutory age) can make a Will -- Section 3 of the Wills Act 1837. In this case, the court held one of the exceptions to the above general principle as Customary Law- Islamic Rules of Inheritance. See Section 3(1)(b) of the Wills Law of Oyo State, 1990 see also the case of Ajibaiye v. Ajibaiye (2007) ALL FWLR pt. 359, 1321.

In this case, the court held that the rule that a marriage involving the testator of a Will shall revoke any Will previously made by the testator will not apply where the will was made in contemplation of that marriage. For this exception to apply:

The Will must be expressed to be made in contemplation of a particular marriage.

The testator must have married the person expressed in the Will.

The names of the parties to the contemplated marriage must be clearly stated in the Will.

The law as settled in this case is that Wills made before the celebration of marriage under the Marriage Act by parties already married under customary law as one of the exceptions to the revocation of a Will by the operation of law. Such issue can be cured by revival and republication of the Will through these means:-

1. By Re- Execution

2. By Codicil duly executed, stating intention to revive. Effective date is the date of revival . Section 22 Act; Section 15 Lagos

In this case, the court observed that the act and the intention as regards the revocation of a will must be contemporaneous. There can be no subsequent ratification or confirmation of the act which was done without intention.

In this case, the court held that the act of revocation must have been carried out with the intention to revoke, otherwise the revocation would be invalid (animus revocandi). Such intention must be complete. The act and the intention must be contemporaneous. In the case of Gill v. Gill (1909) P. 157, the court held that there can be no subsequent ratification or confirmation of the act which was done without intention.

In this case, the court held that a revocation by destruction can be done personally by the testator or by another person but the act must be done in the presence of the testator and at his request and direction otherwise it would not be a valid revocation. The court further held that the destruction of a Will by a third party after the testator's death on the instructions of the testator in his lifetime was an ineffectual revocation and did not comply with the law.

In this case, the court held that a revocation by destruction can be done personally by the testator or by another person but the act must be done in the presence of the testator and at his request and direction otherwise it would not be a valid revocation. In the case of THE GOODS OF BACON (1859) 23 J. P. 712, the court held that the destruction of a Will by a third party after the testator's death on the instructions of the testator in his lifetime was an ineffectual revocation and did not comply with the law.

A partial destruction e.g. by tearing off some pages of the Will would only revoke the part torn off and not the entire Will. In this case, the court held that where an essential part of a will is destroyed which renders meaningless the remaining part, the entire will is deemed revoked. Mutilation, burning, tearing beyond recognition, cutting or scratching out the signature (obliteration) of the testator or witnesses are sufficient acts of destruction and would revoke a Will.

In this case, the court held that there must be sufficient destruction of the Will coupled with an intention to revoke (by the act of destruction). Destruction by burning, tearing or otherwise destroying has been held to mean complete destruction and not merely squeezing, drawing lines on the Will by the use of pen or biros, or any other form of symbolic destruction as the words. Otherwise destruction of a will is usually construed ejusdem generis. See also Cheese v. Lovejoy (1858) 2 PD 251.

In this case, the court held that there must be sufficient destruction of the Will coupled with an intention to revoke (by the act of destruction). Destruction by burning, tearing or otherwise destroying has been held to mean complete destruction and not merely squeezing, drawing lines on the Will by the use of pen or biros, or any other form of symbolic destruction as the words. Otherwise destruction of a will is usually construed ejusdem generis. The scenario that played out in the above case is that the testator drew his pen through the lines of various parts of his Will and even wrote on the back of it "This is revoked" and threw it among the heap of waste papers in his sitting room. It was held that the Will was not revoked; See also Stephen v. Taprell 163 E.R.473.

In this case, the court observed that the rule that a subsequent Will or Codicil revokes that former one is not a general rule. It is not every inconsistent Will that revokes the previous Will. The court considers the facts of each case before reaching a reasonable conclusion.

In this case, the court observed that a later Will may by implication revoke an earlier Will if it covers practically the same grounds as the earlier one; or, where the later Will disposed the same properties to either different beneficiaries or in a manner materially inconsistent with the former Will. The testator in a Will made in 1838 appointed executors one of whom he gave his residuary estate. In 1839, the testator made a second Will containing no revocation clause by which he disposed all his property to his wife but appointed no executor. The court held that the second Will had impliedly revoked the first Will. However it is not a general rule that every inconsistent Will revokes the previous Will -- See Biddles v. Biddles 163 E.R. 790.

Revocation may be express i.e. inserting an appropriate revocation clause in the later Will. For example: 'I revoke all former testamentary dispositions made by me". In this case, the court held that this clause revokes a previous Will except it can be shown that the clause was inserted by mistake and without the testator's approval; or that the two Wills relate to different properties of the testator.

In this case, the court laid down the degree of mental capacity (TEST). According to this case for the testator to be seen as mentally stable to make the Will, the testator must:

1. Understand the nature of the act of making a will and its legal effects

2. Know the extent of his property which he wants to dispose

3. Have a recollection of the object s of his bounty

4. Know the manner of distribution

In this case, it was contended that the testator lacked testamentary capacity because he had a long history of mental disease and suffered from delusion. The court held that the testator was neither afflicted by mental disease nor delusion when he made his will. He found that the testator knew that he was engaged in a testamentary act, that he knew the extent of his property and that he knew the object of his bounty. Thus the testator was held to have a sound disposing mind and memory. Consequently, the Will was declared valid by the court. Where a testator who suffers from delusion is mentally stable at the time he makes the Will, the Will is valid. The existence of a delusion, compatible with the retention of the general powers and faculties of the mind, will not be sufficient to overthrow the Will, unless it were such as calculated to influence the testator making the Will. See also Johnson v. Maja (1951) 13 WACA 290; Adebajo v. Adebajo (1973) 3 ECSLR pt. ipg. 544; Okelola v. Boyle (1998) 2 NWLR pt. 539 at 533.

In this case, the court held that the burden of proof lies on the PROPOUNDER of the Will though it may shift to the CHALLENGER where the propounder discharges the burden. One of the ways to prove the validity of a Will is usually by: Proof of Due Execution: Section 168 (1) Evidence Act (Presumption of due execution) Omnia prae sumuntur rita esse acta (everything is presumed okay which looks okay) For this presumption to be invoked, the will; Must be regular on its face and have proper attestation clause.

In this case, the court held that where there is no proper attestation clause or the judge has any doubt as to the due execution of a will or where the testator is an illiterate, or a blind person, the proof of validity is by the use of AFFIDAVIT (sets out the manner in which the will was read or interpreted to the testator and the manner in which he signified that he understood & approved of its content) . In this case, testator was deaf, dumb & an illiterate. See Order. 58 Rule. 5 & 10 of Lagos State Cp Rules, 2012.

In this case, the court held that the beneficiary of a will or spouse to the demised testator cannot be witnesses to a will. See S.15 Wills Act. The exceptions to this rule are:-

a. Section 8 Wills Law Lagos state enables a witness who is also a beneficiary to retain the gift where there are other witnesses to prove due execution if the signature of the witness-beneficiary is disregarded.

b. Provision for debt settlement

c. Marriage of the spouse/witness & the beneficiary took place after the making of the will

d. Where another will of codicil confirms the gift (the latter not being attested by the beneficiary or spouse)

e. Where the Will is a Privileged will

In this case, the court held that for a testator to make a valid Will, he must possess ANIMUS TESTANDI (an intention to make a will) know & approve of the content. The intention must not have been dislodged by old age.

In this case, the court held that where a testator gives instruction with a sound disposing mind directly to a solicitor or notary public but before execution losses mental capacity, the will is still valid if executed with knowledge. See also Parker vs. Felgate (1883) 7- 9 P.D 171. It is important to Note this rule will not apply where the instructions were given to lay intermediary by the testator except the test laid down in Battan Singh v. Armichand (1948) I A.E.R 152 is upheld.

In this case, the court held that where a testator gives instruction with a sound disposing mind directly to a solicitor or notary public but before execution losses mental capacity, the will is still valid if executed with knowledge. See also Perera v. Perera (1901) A.C. 354. It is important to Note this rule will not apply where the instructions were given to lay intermediary by the testator except the test laid down in Battan Singh v. Armichand (1948) I A.E.R 152 is upheld.

It is a question of fact whether the delusion affects the disposition and even where the delusion affects the subject matter of the disposition, it does not necessarily inform the conclusion that the delusion invalidates the will. See the case of smith v. Tebitt (1867) L.R.I.P.D. 398. In this case, the court observed that probate to a will and codicil may be granted by a court with the deletion of a clause in the codicil which has been affected by the delusion. See also The Estate of Bohrmann (1938) I All E.R.271.

It is a question of fact whether the delusion affects the disposition and even where the delusion affects the subject matter of the disposition, it does not necessarily inform the conclusion that the delusion invalidates the will. See the case of smith v. Tebitt (1867) L.R.I.P.D. 398. In this case, the court observed that probate to a will and codicil may be granted by a court with the deletion of a clause in the codicil which has been affected by the delusion. See also Amu v. Amu (2000) 7 NWLR Pt.663 at 164.

In this case, the court held that it is a question of fact whether the delusion affects the disposition and even where the delusion affects the subject matter of the disposition, it does not necessarily inform the conclusion that the delusion invalidates the will. The court may grant probate to a will and codicil with the deletion of a clause in the codicil which has been affected by the delusion. See the Estate of Bohrmann (1938) I All E.R.271; Amu v. Amu (2000) 7 NWLR Pt.663 at 164.

Person suffering from delusions can create a valid will where Testator satisfies the test in BANKS VS. GOODFELLOW (supra). In this case, the testator suffered from a delusion that his son was not really his son. It was held that he was incapable of making a will. In this case the court held that for a Will to be declared invalid on the ground of delusion, such delusion must influence the disposition of the testator. In Battan singh v. Armichand (1948) I A.E.R 152, the testator had made an earlier will leaving all his estate to his nephew. The testator suffered from tuberculosis and had delusions that he had no relation anywhere in the world, while in fact he had four nephews. In a subsequent will, he left his property to the respondent. The appellant brought an action on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity. The court found that the delusion had robbed the testator of a disposing mind and memory for the subsequent will and consequently, declared it invalid

Person suffering from delusions can create a valid will where Testator satisfies the test in BANKS VS. GOODFELLOW (supra). In this case the court held that for a Will to be declared invalid on the ground of delusion, such delusion must influence the disposition of the testator. In this case, the testator had made an earlier will leaving all his estate to his nephew. The testator suffered from tuberculosis and had delusions that he had no relation anywhere in the world, while in fact he had four nephews. In a subsequent will, he left his property to the respondent. The appellant brought an action on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity. The court found that the delusion had robbed the testator of a disposing mind and memory for the subsequent will and consequently, declared it invalid. In Re Ford Estate, Royal Trust Co. v. Ford (1970) 72 W.W.R. 646, the testator suffered from a delusion that his son was not really his son. It was held that he was incapable of making a will.

In this case, the court held that where a testator who suffers from delusion is mentally stable at the time he makes the Will, the Will is valid. The existence of a delusion, compatible with the retention of the general powers and faculties of the mind, will not be sufficient to overthrow the Will, unless it were such as calculated to influence the testator making the Will. See also Banks V. Good Fellow (1870) L.R 5 Q.B.549; Johnson v. Maja (1951) 13 WACA 290; Adebajo v. Adebajo (1973) 3 ECSLR pt. ipg. 544.

In this case, the court held that where a testator who suffers from delusion is mentally stable at the time he makes the Will, the Will is valid. The existence of a delusion, compatible with the retention of the general powers and faculties of the mind, will not be sufficient to overthrow the Will, unless it were such as calculated to influence the testator making the Will. See also Banks V. Good Fellow (1870) L.R 5 Q.B.549; Johnson v. Maja (1951) 13 WACA 290; Okelola v. Boyle (1998) 2 NWLR pt. 539 at 533.

In this case, the court held that where a testator who suffers from delusion is mentally stable at the time he makes the Will, the Will is valid. The existence of a delusion, compatible with the retention of the general powers and faculties of the mind, will not be sufficient to overthrow the Will, unless it were such as calculated to influence the testator making the Will. See also Banks V. Good Fellow (1870) L.R 5 Q.B.549; Adebajo v. Adebajo (1973) 3 ECSLR pt. ipg. 544; Okelola v. Boyle (1998) 2 NWLR pt. 539 at 533.

In this case, the court held that the Executors must ascertain the beneficiaries that are entitled under the Will and distribute the estate in accordance with the wishes of the Testator as expressed in his Will. Where they fail to conduct adequate search, they might be liable to a beneficiary that suffers loss as a result of their negligence. Executors must distribute the assets in the estate of the Testator according to the tenor of the will or in accordance with the relevant customary rules. Where the Administrator is granted Letters of Administration over personalty, whether or not it includes realty depends on the provision of the applicable Administration of Estate Law. See also Ugu v. Tabi (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 513) 368.

In this case, the court held that generally, an Executor or administrator has no power to go into business; this is only possible where there is a distinct and positive authority or direction to that effect given in the will. And where the Testator has stated the part of the estate to be put into business, the Personal Representatives must only to use that part. See also Re White (1958) Ch. 762.

In this case, the court observed that under the Administration of Estate Law, the Administrator has power to go into business with the estate of the deceased with a view to proper realization of the deceased's estate before its distribution/disposition. Note that the Personal Representatives may go on with the business as a going concern. Where the deceased had entered into a contract before his death, the Personal Representatives can continue with the contract. See Marshal v. Broadhurst (1831) 1 Cr & J 403.

In this case, the court observed that under the Administration of Estate Law, the Administrator has power to go into business with the estate of the deceased with a view to proper realization of the deceased's estate before its distribution/disposition. Note that the Personal Representatives may go on with the business as a going concern. See Dowse v. Gorton (1891) AC 190. Where the deceased had entered into a contract before his death, the Personal Representatives can continue with the contract.

In this case, the court held that Personal Representatives have the power to invest the assets in the estate of the deceased. This power may be as contained in the will, if any, or as authorized under the Trustees Investment Act. The Testator can give extensive powers to invest in any kind of business. In the absence of such authority in the will, the Personal Representatives can only invest in area as stipulated in the Trustees Investment Act. Investment may include the purchase of property for the sake of the income produced and for possible capital appreciation. But it does not extend to the power to purchase property for the occupation of beneficiaries. Re Power (1947) Ch 572. See Section 37 (3), AEL, Lagos.

It was settled in this case that Personal Representatives have power to either sue or maintain any subsisting action for or on behalf of the estate of the deceased. Personal Representatives shall not maintain any action except the cause of action was either pending at the date of the death of the deceased or the cause of action arose at lease within three years before the death, and the proceedings must have been undertaken at least six months after the Personal Representatives have taken up representation. But cause of action that has to do with defamation, seduction, inducing one's spouse to leave or remain apart, will not survive the deceased person.

Thus Representatives of a deceased person can sue and be sued on behalf of the estate; all causes of action subsisting against or vested in the estate of the deceased shall survive against or for the benefit of the estate. The common law maxim, action personalis morltur cum persona (a personal right of action dies with the person) does not apply. But causes of action relating to defamation, seduction, inducing one's spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to claims for damages on grounds of adultery shall not survive the deceased. See Section 15 of the Administration of Estates Law, Lagos.

In this case, the court held that Personal Representatives can take proceedings that are preservatory; where there is threat to assets in the estate, they can take pre-emptive steps to avoid damage to the assets even before the grant of probate or administration. It must be noted that where the intestate died a Bini man, no action can be maintained in respect of his estate until after the second burial. See also the cases of Idehen v. Idehen (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 198) 382; Obaro v. Probate Registrar (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 762) 56. See also page 436. Sasegbon's Laws of Nigeria, vol. 1.

In this case, the court held that Personal Representatives can take proceedings that are preservatory; where there is threat to assets in the estate, they can take pre-emptive steps to avoid damage to the assets even before the grant of probate or administration. It must be noted that where the intestate died a Bini man, no action can be maintained in respect of his estate until after the second burial. See also the cases of Ovensiri v. Osagiede (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt. 572) 1; Obaro v. Probate Registrar (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 762) 56. See also page 436. Sasegbon's Laws of Nigeria, vol. 1.

In this case the court held that the Personal Representatives can only validly maintain action as representatives of the estate after securing grant. Any action commenced in that capacity before the grant of administration will be incurably defective and liable to be struck out. See also Mallam v. Mairiga (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 189) 114.

In this case the court held that the Personal Representatives can only validly maintain action as representatives of the estate after securing grant. Any action commenced in that capacity before the grant of administration will be incurably defective and liable to be struck out. But where the action is commenced as next of kin of the deceased or in any other capacity that does not portray the claimant as Administrator of the estate, and the claimant subsequently secures grant of administration of the estate, the writ can be amended to reflect the new status of the claimant as Administrator of the estate. This is what is known as doctrine of relation back.

The fact that the grant of administration was not made at the commencement of the action would not affect the proceedings, provided the action was not commenced as an Administrator. This is what is known as doctrine of relation back. The subsequent grant of administration would be deemed as effective from the date of commencement of the action. The plaintiff in this case commenced the action as the deceased's next of kin and after hearing had started, a grant of letters of administration was made to the Plaintiff, she later applied for amendment to sue as Adminstratix of the estate of the deceased. This was granted and judgment obtained in that capacity. On appeal, it was argued that the suit be dismissed as it was commenced, by virtue of the amendment, in a capacity that was non-existent at the commencement of the action. The court held that this must be distinguished from instances where the Plaintiff commences the action as administrator of the estate prior to the grant of administration. See Bowler v. Mowlen (1954) 1 WLR 1445.

In this case the court held that the Personal Representatives can only validly maintain action as representatives of the estate after securing grant. Any action commenced in that capacity before the grant of administration will be incurably defective and liable to be struck out. But where the action is commenced as next of kin of the deceased or in any other capacity that does not portray the claimant as Administrator of the estate, and the claimant subsequently secures grant of administration of the estate, the writ can be amended to reflect the new status of the claimant as Administrator of the estate. This is what is known as doctrine of relation back.

The fact that the grant of administration was not made at the commencement of the action would not affect the proceedings, provided the action was not commenced as an Administrator. This is what is known as doctrine of relation back. The subsequent grant of administration would be deemed as effective from the date of commencement of the action. The plaintiff in the case of Kafine Jeddo v. Imiko (1972) LLJR-SC commenced the action as the deceased's next of kin and after hearing had started, a grant of letters of administration was made to the Plaintiff, she later applied for amendment to sue as Adminstratix of the estate of the deceased. This was granted and judgment obtained in that capacity. On appeal, it was argued that the suit be dismissed as it was commenced, by virtue of the amendment, in a capacity that was non-existent at the commencement of the action. The court held that this must be distinguished from instances where the Plaintiff commences the action as administrator of the estate prior to the grant of administration.

In this case, the court held that the Executor or Administrator has a duty to ascertain the nature and value of the estate, to gather in all the items or property constituting the estate. He might be required to do this on oath -- see section 14 AEL, Lagos. When the Personal Representative is an Executor, he needs not wait for the grant of probate to take steps to preserve the estate. In Ogbe & or v. Ogbe (unreported) in the High Court of the Midwest, Benin Judicial Division per Irikefe J in suit No:8/3/1969, the Executors of the will of the deceased, took out a writ seeking an order of injunction to restrain the widow of the deceased from further meddling with the estate. The contention of the widow that the Executors had no locus to bring the action until they were granted probate was rejected by the court.

In this case, the court held that where the Testator imposes duties or functions to be performed on a named person in the will without any express declaration of appointment of that person as Executor, such a person will be held as been appointed an executor by implication. It is otherwise known as Executor according to the tenor of the will. It is not advisable to appoint Executors by implication as it may be open to conflicting interpretations as to whether the words show an intention that the person performs the functions of an Executor. The mere stipulation of a person as sole beneficiary of the estate does not amount to appointment of such person as Executor of the will. The Executor must have been empowered in the will to carry out the usual duties of an Executor. In the the above case, where the Testator merely said: "All else to be sold and proceeds after debts etc. Barclays Bank would do this, to Emily Thompson"; it was held to be an implied appointment of Barclays Bank as Executor according to the tenor of the will. See also The Goods of Cooks (1902) P. 115. See Order 62 Rule 22 (c) High Court of Lagos Civil Procedure Rules, 2019.

In this case, the court held that the Executors must ascertain the beneficiaries that are entitled under the Will and distribute the estate in accordance with the wishes of the Testator as expressed in his Will. Where they fail to conduct adequate search, they might be liable to a beneficiary that suffers loss as a result of their negligence. Executors must distribute the assets in the estate of the Testator according to the tenor of the will or in accordance with the relevant customary rules. Where the Administrator is granted Letters of Administration over personalty, whether or not it includes realty depends on the provision of the applicable Administration of Estate Law. See also Shobogun v. Sanni (1974) ALL NLR 816.

In this case, the court held that both real and personal assets comprised in the estate of the deceased are vested in the Personal Representatives. Title to assets in the estate, especially in the case of realty would only pass where the Executor grants assent to the beneficiaries thereof. See Section 3 of the Administration of Estates Law, Lagos. Once an assent is issued, the Executor is divest of the legal estate in such property. The assent vests the legal estate in the beneficiary. See also Cappa Ltd v. Pereira (1966) 1 All NLR 57.

In this case, the court held that the prerequisite conditions for the validity of an assent is that, it must be in writing, signed by the Executors, and must contain the names of the beneficiary. The assent must be signed by all Executors that proved the Will.

In this case, the court held that the personal representative cannot refuse to execute an assent without a good cause. He is liable to be compelled to give the assent. See also Unoka v. Agili (2007) NWLR (Pt. 1044) 122. Nonetheless in Odusoga v. Ricket (197) 7 NWLR (pt. 511) 17, the court held that a beneficiary has no right to sue for the protection of the assets in the estate of a Testator; that the real estate or chattels-real vest in the Executors who are the representative of the Testator and heir at law to the estate of the Testator.

In this case, the court held that the personal representative cannot refuse to execute an assent without a good cause. He is liable to be compelled to give the assent. See also Martin v. Wilson (1913) 1 IRR 470. Nonetheless in Odusoga v. Ricket (197) 7 NWLR (pt. 511) 17, the court held that a beneficiary has no right to sue for the protection of the assets in the estate of a Testator; that the real estate or chattels-real vest in the Executors who are the representative of the Testator and heir at law to the estate of the Testator.

In this case, the court held that a beneficiary has no right to sue for the protection of the assets in the estate of a Testator; that the real estate or chattels-real vest in the Executors who are the representative of the Testator and heir at law to the estate of the Testator.

It is trite that one cannot place something on nothing and expect it to stand. No right can arise from a base action. If the premise of the grant is fraud or falsehood, then there is no valid grant in law. Such a grant is liable to be revoked. Thus where an applicant for Letters of Administration lies about his relationship with the deceased; or a false will is presented to be admitted to probate or where an applicant falsely swore that another person interested in the estate of the deceased has been cited and has refused or neglected to answer or respond to the citation, any grant made to such applicant is void and of no legal effect; it therefore liable to revocation.

A grant would be revoked where it has been obtained upon a false suggestion, whether made fraudulently or in ignorance, where the false suggestion obscures a defect in the title of the grant. But where the falsehood did not have a decisive effect on the court in making the grant, the court may not exercise the power to revoke the grant. See also, Ephraim v. Asuquo (1923) 4 NLR 98 Thus in this case, the widow of the deceased who was entitled to a grant falsely declared that she was the mother of the deceased's only two surviving sons. The court did not revoke the grant, partly on the basis that it was not one of the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, and again that she would have still been entitled without the false declaration.

It is trite that one cannot place something on nothing and expect it to stand. No right can arise from a base action. If the premise of the grant is fraud or falsehood, then there is no valid grant in law. Such a grant is liable to be revoked. Thus where an applicant for Letters of Administration lies about his relationship with the deceased; or a false will is presented to be admitted to probate or where an applicant falsely swore that another person interested in the estate of the deceased has been cited and has refused or neglected to answer or respond to the citation, any grant made to such applicant is void and of no legal effect; it therefore liable to revocation.

A grant would be revoked where it has been obtained upon a false suggestion, whether made fraudulently or in ignorance, where the false suggestion obscures a defect in the title of the grant. But where the falsehood did not have a decisive effect on the court in making the grant, the court may not exercise the power to revoke the grant. Thus, here, the widow of the deceased who was entitled to a grant falsely declared that she was the mother of the deceased's only two surviving sons. The court did not revoke the grant, partly on the basis that it was not one of the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, and again that she would have still been entitled without the false declaration.

In this case a caveat was entered against the grant of probate by a beneficiary. Other beneficiaries took out a writ against the caveator and the caveat was discharged; judgment was entered against the caveator. Being dissatisfied with the judgment, he appealed against the judgment. Whilst the appeal was pending, the Probate Registrar granted probate in favour of the other beneficiaries in whose favour the trial court gave his judgment. The Court of Appeal held that the grant of the probate was irregular as it was issued and intended to overreach the appeal.

In this case, the court held that the procedure for Revocation of a Grant is by any of the following ways:

a) Through the Registry;

b) Through the Court by Summons (originating summons)

c) By way of a Writ of Summons; See also Lindsel v. Phillips (1885) 30 Chd 291; Ijeni v. Ijeni (1977) 9 CCHCJ/2175 at 2182, National Bank v. Lady (1978) 9 & 10 SC 59.

In this case, the court held that a purchaser for value is entitled to infer with the authority of the Executors in relation to the deceased personal estate, unless fraud or misapplication of the fund is evident on the face of the transaction or the property is grossly undervalued or he is in collusion with Executors to defraud the estate, in which case he will not be entitled to statutory or equitable protection. But where he purchases equitable interest from the Executors or Personal Representatives, then on the premise that where the equities are equal, the first in time prevails, the equity of the beneficiaries will be accorded priority. See also Re Morgan (1881) 18 Ch. 93.

In this case, the court held that where the Testator imposes duties or functions to be performed on a named person in the will without any express declaration of appointment of that person as Executor, such a person will be held as been appointed an executor by implication. It is otherwise known as Executor according to the tenor of the will. It is not advisable to appoint Executors by implication as it may be open to conflicting interpretations as to whether the words show an intention that the person performs the functions of an Executor. The mere stipulation of a person as sole beneficiary of the estate does not amount to appointment of such person as Executor of the will. The Executor must have been empowered in the will to carry out the usual duties of an Executor. In the above case, where the testatrix desired John Goodluck to pay all her just debts, the court held that it was an implied appointment to John Co. as the Executor of the Testatrix's will. See also The Estate of Fawcett (1941) P 85. See Order 62 Rule 22 (c) High Court of Lagos Civil Procedure Rules, 2019.

In this case, the court held that where an infant or person of unsound mind is appointed as an executor of a Will, the court may appoint another Administrator with the Will annexed upon application by the guardian to the infant or any other person interested in the estate. See S. 29 AEL, Lagos; Section 27 AEL Abuja. Probate may be appointed to such guardian alone or jointly with another person as appointed by the court. The grant is made pending when the minor attains majority, the grant can be recalled or cancelled and a fresh grant made to the minor, now adult. Pending the fresh grant to the minor, the Administrator has all the powers of an Administrator. See also Re Cope (1880) 16 CH. D 49.

In this case, the court held that where an infant or person of unsound mind is appointed as an executor of a Will, the court may appoint another Administrator with the Will annexed upon application by the guardian to the infant or any other person interested in the estate. See S. 29 AEL, Lagos; Section 27 AEL Abuja. Probate may be appointed to such guardian alone or jointly with another person as appointed by the court. The grant is made pending when the minor attains majority, the grant can be recalled or cancelled and a fresh grant made to the minor, now adult. Pending the fresh grant to the minor, the Administrator has all the powers of an Administrator. See also Administrator-General v. Coker (1948) 16 NLR II.

In this case, the court held that although the power of an Executor can be exercised by a sole Executor, where a minor has beneficial interest in the estate in such a situation, the court may appoint an individual representative unless the sole Executor is a Trust Corporation. See Section 24 AEL Lagos.

In this case, the court held that where a minor is made Executor alongside other adults, probate shall be granted to the adults with power reserved for the minor to apply for double probate when he attains majority.

In this case, the court held that executors are not entitled to remuneration; their services are rendered gratuitously. But an Executor may claim remuneration in any of the following circumstances:

1. Where the court makes an order to that effect. The value of the estate determines the amount of remuneration. But in Abuja, remuneration shall not exceed N10,000.00 unless the court otherwise directs where the Executors satisfy the court of the exceptional circumstances to warrant additional fees.

2. Under the rule in Cradock v. Piper 41 ER 1422 -- an Executor or administrator is entitled to his out of pocket expenses in the course of his administration of the estate.

3. Where there is a charging clause -- a Charging Clause is a declaration by a Testator in the Will allowing or permitting Executors to charge their usual professional fees for services rendered in the administration of the estate.

The rule that where an Executor who is a beneficiary under a Will witnesses the Will, he may lose any gift to him under the will, it seems, does not affect his professional fees to which he is entitled by virtue of the charging clause in the Will. See Re Royce (1957) Ch 626. But see Re Pooley (1889) 40 Ch D 1 where it was held that an Executor who is also an attesting witness to a will is not entitled to rely on a charging clause in the Will as the same has failed by virtue of section 15, Wills Act, 1837.

In this case, the court held that an Executor may renounce his appointment; this must however be by a positive act, not by a passive one. He may be required to fill some Forms for renunciation or depose to an affidavit of renunciation. He must renounce his administration of the entire estate and not part of it. See Order 62 R 24 Lagos State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019, Order 64 R 42 High Court of the FCT (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2018.

Where a sole Executor appointed in a Will survives the Testator but either;

a. Dies without taking out probate, or

b. Is cited but refuses to take probate, or

c. Renounces probate.

His right in respect of the Executorships shall wholly cease and the representation to the administration of the estate shall devolve as it no Executor had been appointed -- S. 6 AEL.

In this case, the court held that an executor de son tort is a person who is not an Executor or personal representative in the real sense of the word but who has intermeddled or dealt with the estate without authority and has thereby incurred liability to be treated as personal representative. Though the word 'tort' implies some wrongdoing, the acts constituting a person to be Executor de son tort need not be wrongful. Any person who intermeddles with the estate could be regarded as Executor de son tort. As Executor who had been appointed in the will but refuses to prove the will or take probate may be regarded as Executor de son tort, so also is an Administrator who takes the property in the estate prior to the grant of letters of Administration. But note that an Executor or administrator who has intermeddled with the estate but who later applies for and obtains probate or letters of administration ceases to be Executor de son tort. See Order 62 Rule 18 High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019, FCT, Lagos.

In this case, the court observed that it is the nature of the acts constituting the intermeddling and not the objective or financial implications of the act that makes a person an Executor de son tort. It is therefore not all acts that necessarily makes an unauthorized person an Executor de son tort. The act of arranging for the funeral of the Testator was held not to be an act that can make a person an Executor de son tort. But collecting assets in the estate and paying debts may constitute a person an Executor de son tort. See Re Stevens (1898) 1Ch. 162.

In this case, the court observed that it is the nature of the acts constituting the intermeddling and not the objective or financial implications of the act that makes a person an Executor de son tort. In this case, the act of collecting assets in the estate and paying debts was held to constitute a person an Executor de son tort. It is therefore not all acts that necessarily makes an unauthorized person an Executor de son tort. In the case of Adeniyi Jones v. Martins (1943) 9 WACA 100, the act of arranging for the funeral of the Testator was held not to be an act that can make a person an Executor de son tort.

In this case, the court held that a beneficiary who has intermeddled with the estate of a deceased can also be an Executor de son tort. This is because the assets in the estate remain vested in the Personal Representatives until they are distributed according to the tenor of the Will or in the absence of a valid will, in accordance with the applicable intestate rule of succession. See also the case of Yunusa v. Dada (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 657.

In this case, the court held that an Executor de son tort is liable to creditors of the estate even for debts incurred by the deceased. Other liabilities of an executor de son tort are:

1. Liable for any Loss Suffered by the Estate- An Executor de son tort is liable to refund any loss suffered by the estate as a result of his intermeddling with the estate.

2. Liability to Pay for Services Rendered to the Estate during the Period of Intermeddling or in the Lifetime of the Deceased -- The Executor de son tort is liable to bear the cost of services rendered by a third party to the estate during the period he intermeddled with the estate. Having made the representation of acting on behalf of the estate, he would be liable to anybody who, relying on that representation, acted on behalf of the estate. See Adebiyi Jones v. Marthins (supra).

3. Liability for Personal Expenses -- Where an Executor de son tort incurs any expenses in the course of intermeddling with the estate, he would be personally liable to the creditor. He is not an agent of the estate, and is therefore not entitled to any indemnity from the estate. See Ricket v. Bank of West Africa (1959) NRNLR 125; Udo v. Williams (1997) 1 NWLR (pt 483) 548.

4. Liability to Pay Fine -- An Executor de son tort is liable to pay fine for intermeddling with the estate of the deceased. The amount of the fine would depend on the applicable High Court Rules. In Lagos, it shall not be less than N50.000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira): Order 57 Rule 17, High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2012. In Abuja, it shall not exceed N5,00.00 (five thousand Naira) Order 48 Rule 5 Abuja High Court Rules, 2004.

5. Liability for Inheritance Tax -- The Executor de son tort is liable to pa inheritance tax on anything he has intermeddled with. See New York Breweries Company Ltd v. AG (1899) AC 62.

6. Liability for Citation -- An Executor who is entitled to probate who intermeddles with the estate prior to grant of probate can be cited to prove the Will or be compelled to take probate. In the Estate of Biggs (1966) Please note that generally, until probate is granted, the Executor or Administrator who interferes with the estate of the deceased person without applying for probate within three months of his death, is an inter --meddler or after the termination of any suit for or dispute in respect of probate or administration, he shall in addition to any other liability, be liable to such fine not less than N50,000.00 as the Judge deems fit to impose.

In this case, the court held that a beneficiary who has intermeddled with the estate of a deceased can also be an Executor de son tort. This is because the assets in the estate remain vested in the Personal Representatives until they are distributed according to the tenor of the Will or in the absence of a valid will, in accordance with the applicable intestate rule of succession. See also the case of Adebiyi v. Adebiyi (2000) 1 LHCH (Pt. 6) 46.

In this case, the court held that a purchaser for value is entitled to infer with the authority of the Executors in relation to the deceased personal estate, unless fraud or misapplication of the fund is evident on the face of the transaction or the property is grossly undervalued or he is in collusion with Executors to defraud the estate, in which case he will not be entitled to statutory or equitable protection. But where he purchases equitable interest from the Executors or Personal Representatives, then on the premise that where the equities are equal, the first in time prevails, the equity of the beneficiaries will be accorded priority. See also Re Venn & Furze's Contact (1894) 2 Ch. 101.

In this case, the court observed that prior to the appropriation of assets of a testator, the Personal Representatives can authorise professional valuers to undertake a valuation of the asset to be appropriated. The court held that the Personal Representatives cannot appropriate to themselves assets in the estate unless such asset had been valued by an independent or professional valuer. In appropriating the assets in the estate, Personal Representatives must have regard to the interest of the persons beneficiary entitled under the will or in intestacy and in such circumstances appropriate consents must be obtained.

In this case, the court held that Personal Representatives can appropriate any part of the assets in the estate towards the satisfaction of a legacy or any other interest in the estate of the deceased. But if an asset exceeds the value of the beneficiary's legacy or other interest in the asset, it cannot be appropriated. See also Section 44 (1), (5) & (7) AEL, Lagos.

In this case, the court held that where the property of the testator which is to be mortgaged or sold is a realty, no Executor or Administrator has power to sell without the concurrence of all other Executors or Administrators (where they are more than one), unless the other named Executors have renounced probate or have refused to prove the will. See also the case of Ojomo v. Ibrahim (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 415. See also Section 4 (2) AEL, Lagos

The exceptions to the above is that conveyance of realty can only be validly made without the concurrence of all the representatives:

a. Where there is an order of court permitting or authorizing such conveyance; or

b. Where the other Representatives left out of the conveyance are Executors yet to be granted probate, or who have renounced probate or have refused to prove the Will.

In this case, the court held that the personal representatives can exercise the power to mortgage the assets in the estate in order to raise money to pay the portions or quantum of interest of a surviving spouse or any other beneficiary, or to redeem a life interest of a surviving spouse. Where there are more than one Executor or administrator, any of them can sell personally. Power to sell personally is joint and several. But in the case of realty, no Executor or Administrator has power to sell without the concurrence of all other Executors or Administrators (where they are more than one), unless the other named Executors have renounced probate or have refused to prove the will. See the cases of Erewa v. Idehen (1971) All NLR 195; Ojomo v. Ibrahim (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 415. See also Section 4 (2) AEL, Lagos

The exceptions to the above is that conveyance of realty can only be validly made without the concurrence of all the representatives:

a. Where there is an order of court permitting or authorizing such conveyance; or

b. Where the other Representatives left out of the conveyance are Executors yet to be granted probate, or who have renounced probate or have refused to prove the Will.

In this case, the court held that an assent need not be by Deed to pass the legal interest in the property. See Section. 40 (4) AEL, Lagos. The key conditions is that the assent:

1. Must be in writing

2. Signed by all Personal Representatives

3. Property must be certain -- contain proper description of the property

4. Properly identify the beneficiary

The Administration of Estates Law empowers a personal representative to assent to the vesting of a legal estate which devolved upon the personal representative, in the beneficiary or any person who may be entitled by devise, bequest, devolution, appropriation or otherwise. This power is confined only to estate which devolved upon the personal representative: See Section 40 (1) AEL Lagos. In this case, the court held that since an assent is by statute a conveyance, where it is executed under seal, it is capable of vesting a legal estate in the ultimate beneficiary in any event.

In this case, the court held that the Executor de son tort is liable to pa inheritance tax on anything he has intermeddled with. See also Ricket v. Bank of West Africa (1959) NRNLR 125. Other liabilities of an executor de son tort are:

1. Liable for any Loss Suffered by the Estate- An Executor de son tort is liable to refund any loss suffered by the estate as a result of his intermeddling with the estate.

2. Liability to Pay for Services Rendered to the Estate during the Period of Intermeddling or in the Lifetime of the Deceased -- The Executor de son tort is liable to bear the cost of services rendered by a third party to the estate during the period he intermeddled with the estate. Having made the representation of acting on behalf of the estate, he would be liable to anybody who, relying on that representation, acted on behalf of the estate. See Adebiyi Jones v. Marthins (supra).

3. Liability to Creditors --An Executor de son tort is liable to creditors of the estate even for debts incurred by the deceased. See Wokocha v. Esiaba (1975) ECSLR 96.

4. Liability to Pay Fine -- An Executor de son tort is liable to pay fine for intermeddling with the estate of the deceased. The amount of the fine would depend on the applicable High Court Rules. In Lagos, it shall not be less than N50.000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira): Order 57 Rule 17, High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2012. In Abuja, it shall not exceed N5,00.00 (five thousand Naira) Order 48 Rule 5 Abuja High Court Rules, 2004.

5. Liability for Personal Expenses -- Where an Executor de son tort incurs any expenses in the course of intermeddling with the estate, he would be personally liable to the creditor. He is not an agent of the estate, and is therefore not entitled to any indemnity from the estate. See Ricket v. Bank of West Africa (1959) NRNLR 125; Udo v. Williams (1997) 1 NWLR (pt 483) 548.

6. Liability for Citation -- An Executor who is entitled to probate who intermeddles with the estate prior to grant of probate can be cited to prove the Will or be compelled to take probate. In In the Estate of Biggs (1966) Please note that generally, until probate is granted, the Executor or Administrator who interferes with the estate of the deceased person without applying for probate within three months of his death, is an inter --meddler or after the termination of any suit for or dispute in respect of probate or administration, he shall in addition to any other liability, be liable to such fine not less than N50,000.00 as the Judge deems fit to impose.

In this case, the court held that where an Executor de son tort incurs any expenses in the course of intermeddling with the estate, he would be personally liable to the creditor. He is not an agent of the estate, and is therefore not entitled to any indemnity from the estate. See also Udo v. Williams (1997) 1 NWLR (pt 483) 548. Other liabilities of an executor de son tort are:

1. Liable for any Loss Suffered by the Estate- An Executor de son tort is liable to refund any loss suffered by the estate as a result of his intermeddling with the estate.

2. Liability to Pay for Services Rendered to the Estate during the Period of Intermeddling or in the Lifetime of the Deceased -- The Executor de son tort is liable to bear the cost of services rendered by a third party to the estate during the period he intermeddled with the estate. Having made the representation of acting on behalf of the estate, he would be liable to anybody who, relying on that representation, acted on behalf of the estate. See Adebiyi Jones v. Marthins (supra).

3. Liability to Creditors --An Executor de son tort is liable to creditors of the estate even for debts incurred by the deceased. See Wokocha v. Esiaba (1975) ECSLR 96.

4. Liability to Pay Fine -- An Executor de son tort is liable to pay fine for intermeddling with the estate of the deceased. The amount of the fine would depend on the applicable High Court Rules. In Lagos, it shall not be less than N50.000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira): Order 57 Rule 17, High Court of Lagos (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2012. In Abuja, it shall not exceed N5,00.00 (five thousand Naira) Order 48 Rule 5 Abuja High Court Rules, 2004.

5. Liability for Inheritance Tax -- The Executor de son tort is liable to pa inheritance tax on anything he has intermeddled with. See New York Breweries Company Ltd v. AG (1899) AC 62.

6. Liability for Citation -- An Executor who is entitled to probate who intermeddles with the estate prior to grant of probate can be cited to prove the Will or be compelled to take probate. In In the Estate of Biggs (1966) Please note that generally, until probate is granted, the Executor or Administrator who interferes with the estate of the deceased person without applying for probate within three months of his death, is an inter --meddler or after the termination of any suit for or dispute in respect of probate or administration, he shall in addition to any other liability, be liable to such fine not less than N50,000.00 as the Judge deems fit to impose.

In this case, the court held that where the Personal Representatives files the final accounts upon the completion of the administration of the estate, and the court is satisfied as to the contents of the accounts, the Personal Representatives, would be discharged from the administration bonds entered at the time of application for grant. Generally, the Personal Representatives, the bondman or guarantor remains liable until the due administration of the estate. If there is any failure on the part of the Personal Representatives to pay appropriate fees, or file appropriate accounts, the bondman or guarantor may be made liable to forfeit the bond or pay for the inaction of the Personal Representatives. In the above case, the Personal Representatives failed to pay additional court fees in respect of money received as proceeds of sale of real property of the estate by the Personal Representatives, the court ordered the fees to be paid by the bonds man. Where the bondman or guarantor forfeits any bond or pays anything as a result of the action or inaction of the Personal Representatives, they are entitled to indemnity from the Personal Representatives the liability of the Personal Representatives or the bonds man ceases; they are accordingly exempted from liability for any loss that may arise subsequently. But please not that a Personal Representative can only be discharged from the administration bond by the court at the completion of the administration. That is, after the satisfaction of all legitimate claims on the estate, and the distribution of the residue of the estate, the Personal Representatives must file in court an account of how the administration was conducted. In case of the Administrator-General, the account must indicate that appropriate stamp duty has been duly paid and must be certified by the Judge

An Executor becomes functus officio, after clearing the estate by payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and there being no legacies in the ordinary sense, he has done his duty and he assumes the status of a Trustee. See Nixon v. Smith (1902) 1 Ch. 176. Similarly, as held in this case, an administrator who has paid all expenses and debts and cleared the intestate's estate stands in the same position towards the nest of kin as that which an Executor who has cleared the estate stands in towards the residuary legatees. He ceases to be an administrator and becomes a trustee.

In this case the court held that an Executor becomes functus officio, after clearing the estate by payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and there being no legacies in the ordinary sense, he has done his duty and he assumes the status of a Trustee. Similarly, an administrator who has paid all expenses and debts and cleared the intestate's estate stands in the same position towards the nest of kin as that which an Executor who has cleared the estate stand s in towards the residuary legatees. He ceases to be an administrator and becomes a trustee. See Ponder v. Ponder (1921) 2 Ch. 59.

It must be pointed out that a Trustee and a Personal Representative have a common responsibility and duties. The same person can, therefore, act in the dual capacity. Section 37 AEL, Lagos; Renner v. Renner (1961) ALL NLR, 244; Adeniji v. The Probate Registrar (1966) NMLR 125. In this case, the court held that where the person named as Executor and Trustee in a Will proves the Will, he is deemed to have accepted the trusts of the Will in respect of both personal property and real property.

It must be pointed out that a Trustee and a Personal Representative have a common responsibility and duties. In this case, the court held that the same person can, therefore, act in the dual capacity. Section 37 AEL, Lagos; Renner v. Renner (1961) ALL NLR, 244. Where the person named as Executor and Trustee in a Will proves the Will, he is deemed to have accepted the trusts of the Will in respect of both personal property and real property. Public Trustee v. Sharman (1942) Ch. 311; (1942) 2 All ER 74.

It must be pointed out that a Trustee and a Personal Representative have a common responsibility and duties. In this case, the court held that the same person can, therefore, act in the dual capacity. Section 37 AEL, Lagos; Adeniji v. The Probate Registrar (1966) NMLR 125. Where the person named as Executor and Trustee in a Will proves the Will, he is deemed to have accepted the trusts of the Will in respect of both personal property and real property. Public Trustee v. Sharman (1942) Ch. 311; (1942) 2 All ER 74.

The law is also clear that where a Personal Representative of a deceased person including an Executor de son tort wastes or converts to his own use any part of the real or personal estate of the deceased, dies, his Personal Representative shall to the extent of the available assets of the defaulter be liable and chargeable in respect of such waste or conversion in the same manner as the defaulter would have been if living. See Section 14 AEL, Lagos.

In this case, it was held by the court that a Personal Representative standing in a fiduciary position unless expressly authorised to do so, is not allowed to make a profit by the trust either directly or indirectly. He is accountable for any profit made out of the trust. Regal v. Gulliver (1942) 1 All ER 378 at 391. He must not in any way make use of the trust property or his position for his own interest or private advantage. He should not buy the trust property from himself or for himself or from his co-trustee. He cannot occupy the two positions of vendor and purchaser at the same time. The court further held that any such purchase is voidable at the instance of any beneficiary, however fair the transaction may be and however full a disclosure of all material facts may have been made to the beneficiaries especially where the price is unreasonably low.

In this case, it was held by the court that a Personal Representative standing in a fiduciary position unless expressly authorised to do so, is not allowed to make a profit by the trust either directly or indirectly. Marques v. Edamatie (1950) 19 NLR 75. The court further held that he is accountable for any profit made out of the trust. He must not in any way make use of the trust property or his position for his own interest or private advantage. He should not buy the trust property from himself or for himself or from his co-trustee. He cannot occupy the two positions of vendor and purchaser at the same time. Any such purchase is voidable at the instance of any beneficiary, however fair the transaction may be and however full a disclosure of all material facts may have been made to the beneficiaries especially where the price is unreasonably low. Wright v. Morgan (1920) AC 788.

In this case, it was held by the court that a Personal Representative standing in a fiduciary position unless expressly authorised to do so, is not allowed to make a profit by the trust either directly or indirectly. He is accountable for any profit made out of the trust. Regal v. Gulliver (1942) 1 All ER 378 at 391. He must not in any way make use of the trust property or his position for his own interest or private advantage. He should not buy the trust property from himself or for himself or from his co-trustee. He cannot occupy the two positions of vendor and purchaser at the same time. Any such purchase is voidable at the instance of any beneficiary, however fair the transaction may be and however full a disclosure of all material facts may have been made to the beneficiaries especially where the price is unreasonably low. Wright v. Morgan (1920) AC 788.

In this case, it was held that where accounts are ordered by the Court or called for, the Personal Representative is bound not only to bring in accounts of his receipts but to discharge himself as regards those receipts and show what he has done with the money received; and in taking the account, disbursements made by him in breach of his fiduciary duties will be disallowed. In other words, he may be compelled to account for what he has received of the Testator's or Intestate's estate as well as for what he might have received without wilful neglect and default. Where he has made unauthorised and risky investments or paid out money to a wrong person from the estate even if in good faith or by mistake, he is to be treated as having the sum in hand and must replace the capital with interest AG v. Kohler (1861) HL CaS. 654; Powell v. Hulkes (1886) 33 Ch. D 562. Such sum attracts simple interest. Re Barclay (1899) 1 Ch. 674. It is no defence that he has acted on legal advice. National Trustee Company of Australia v. General Finance (1905) AC 373.

In this case, the court held that every Personal Representative must keep accurate accounts and be ready to render such accounts whenever called upon so to do or as prescribed by law. Sawyer v. Goddard (1895) 1 Ch. 574. The accounts shall include an inventory of all assets in the estate, an account of all monies received on behalf of the estate, purchases made, out of pocket expenses, and other necessary account of the administration, the vouchers in the hands of the Executor or Administrator relating to the administration of the estate, and a verifying affidavit.

As held by the court in this case, the law requires every Executor or Administrator to file in Court an account of his administration every 12 months (In Lagos State, Rivers State), see Order 61 R 16 Lagos, from the date of the grant or the appointment until the completion of the administration. Sawyer v. Goddard (1895) 1 Ch. 574; S. 14 AEL Lagos. In other States, accounts are to be filed whenever a personal representative is called upon so to do by the Court. See Order 62 R 41 Abuja. Any such Executor or Administrator who fails within the prescribed period to file his accounts shall in Lagos and Rivers States be liable to a penalty of N100.00 (One Hundred Naira) for every day of default. Every such fine shall on non-payment be enforceable by distress, and failing sufficient distress, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months. See Order 61 R 16(2) Lagos, Order 62 R 41(2) Abuja.

As held by the court in this case, the law requires every Executor or Administrator to file in Court an account of his administration every 12 months (In Lagos State, Rivers State), see Order 61 R 16 Lagos, from the date of the grant or the appointment until the completion of the administration. Cooper v. Skinner (1904) 1 Ch. 189; S. 14 AEL Lagos. In other States, accounts are to be filed whenever a personal representative is called upon so to do by the Court. See Order 62 R 41 Abuja. Any such Executor or Administrator who fails within the prescribed period to file his accounts shall in Lagos and Rivers States be liable to a penalty of N100.00 (One Hundred Naira) for every day of default. Every such fine shall on non-payment be enforceable by distress, and failing sufficient distress, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months. See Order 61 R 16(2) Lagos, Order 62 R 41(2) Abuja. The court further held that every Personal Representative must keep accurate accounts and be ready to render such accounts whenever called upon so to do or as prescribed by law. Thompson v. Dunn (1870) 5 Ch App 573. The accounts shall include an inventory of all assets in the estate, an account of all monies received on behalf of the estate, purchases made, out of pocket expenses, and other necessary account of the administration, the vouchers in the hands of the Executor or Administrator relating to the administration of the estate, and a verifying affidavit.

In this case, the court held that where the original grant is made to two or more persons, all the grantees must join in the application for resealing. The resealing would not be made where there is no agreement among the Personal Representatives unless the court makes an order excluding any of the Personal Representatives. The facts of this case goes thus; the parties were Administrators of the estate of Joseph Asaboro, who died intestate. Letters of administration were granted to the parties by the Western Region High Court. It was later discovered that the deceased had several pieces of property in Lagos. As the High Court of Western Region had no jurisdiction over the property in Lagos, the deceased's property in Lagos was un-administered for four and a half years. The Plaintiffs applied for resealing which was without the participation of the defendant who was the widow of the deceased but now remarried. The court found the attitude of the defendant inimical to the due and proper administration of the estate, even though she was entitled to partake in applying for re- sealing; the court therefore ordered her to be excluded and gave further order that the grant be resealed in the names of the plaintiffs only.

In this case, it was held that where the Testator or intestate has property outside the state where grant of probate or of administration made, the grant shall be resealed. See Section 2 Probate (re-sealing) Act. Re-sealing enables a grant made in one State or Country to be effective within another State or Country. The Personal Representatives of the deceased have no power over the property of the deceased outside the State where grant is made. They also lack locus to institute action in respect of such property that are outside the State where the grant is made. The resealing is made in respect of the property of the deceased found outside the State or Country where the original grant was made. It is regulated by the various High Court Laws and Rules. The resealing shall be made in that other State where the property exists or is situate.

In this case, the court held that where it is discovered that a deceased person once traded under or operated an account in a bank in a name and style different from those originally noted on the grant and which in effect means that unless the grant is amended by the addition thereon of the new description, the grantee may be unable to deal with the property held by the deceased under such names. Other instances in which a grant may be returned to the Registry for amendment are as follows:

1. Any grant which is inaccurately issued or subsequently discovered to be defective due to a mistake of the Registry for correction within 14 days of issue, provided it has not been entered up in the prescribed Record Book for entry of grants.

2. Where the surname of the Deceased person has been wrongly spelt on a grant. See Otun v. Otun (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 893) 381 at 399 -- 400.

3. Where malaprogism, i.e., similarity in the pronouncement of one of the names of a deceased person and another name, affects his true name and has encouraged the deceased being popularly addressed by such similar name elsewhere (e.g. ―Sulemonu and ―Sulaimon, ―Tina and ―Tina,Sunmonu and Simeon) See In the Estate of Sunmonu Olanrewaju PHC.5621 Lagos (unreported)

4. Where after a grant has been extracted it is discovered that the deceased died possessed of certain property in another name other than the one on the grant (e.g.) a change name as a result of religious conversion). In the Estate of Comfort AkidePHC.6902 Lagos (unreported)

5. Application for an amendment of a grant must be made with the consent of the grantees (except in special circumstances) by way of Sworn Affidavit titled ―Affidavit to Lead Amendment of a Grant and supported by relevant documents as the Registrar may require. The Registrar will allow the amendment sought where he is satisfied that the facts deposed to in the affidavit have sufficiently established the following:

a. The nature of the error discovered in the grant; or

b. The necessity for any alteration or addition to the contents of the grant; or

c. The nature of the amendment sought.

In this case, it was held that once a grant is revoked, the Executor/Administrator loses the capacity to deal with the assets in the estate of the deceased. But revocation does not operate retroactively; whatever the Executor or Administrator has done before the revocation and by virtue of the grant, would remain valid. The revocation of the grant has the following effects:

1. All transfers of interest in property made by a person to whom grant of probate or administration was made shall not be affected by subsequent revocation of the grant.

2. The title of such a purchaser or recipient of the property from the grantee of probate or administration remains valid even if the grant is subsequently revoked.

3. Persons who make payments or disposition of goods to grantee of probate or administration before revocation remains indemnified. See Section 17 (1) AEL, Lagos.

4. The person can still be indemnified from the estate of the deceased to the extent of the amount paid out to the grantee of the administration or probate; Section 41 (1) AEL, Lagos.

Probate practice comprise of the procedure for the grant of probate and letters of administration both in contentions and non-contentions cases. In this case, the court held that until probate or letters of administration is granted, the executor or administrator who interferes with the state of the deceased person is inter-meddler.

In this case the court held that probate action can be commenced by writ of summons. Either the applicant for probate or caveator can file normal court proceedings by way of writs of summons. At the conclusion of the probate action, the probate registrar may or may not grant probate depending on the outcome of the action. If the court pronounces in favour of the Will, the registrar would grant probate.

In this case the court held that pending the conclusion of the dispute on the will, the court may grant temporary administration pendent lite to preserve the estate. It is at the discretion of the court to either grant or refuse grant of temporary administration.

Under the Administration Estates Law (AEL) the following persons are entitled to grant of letter of Administration in order of priority:

a. Surviving spouse or spouses of the deceased person

b. Children of the deceased or issues of such children that predeceased intestate

c. Parents of the deceased

d. Brothers and sisters of the deceased of full blood and their surviving children as held in the above case.

e Brother and sisters of the deceased of half-blood and their surviving children that are suijuris

f. Grandparents of the deceased

g. Uncles and aunties of whole blood or the surviving children

h. Creditors of the intestate estate. See Section 49 AEL Lagos.

In this case, the court held that the failure to stamp property documents is an offence liable on conviction to payment of the unpaid stamp duty and a fine. It also makes the document inadmissible in evidence.